Mexican-American War and the Media

The Royal mail steam-ship Caledonia arrived at this port shortly before 10 o’clock last night from Boston. The Caledonia left that city on the 16 inst., but brings Halifax accounts of the 19^th, one day later than our usual dates. The Cambria had arrived out at Halifax.

Our accounts from New York by this arrival extended to the close of the 15^th inst. In the interim since the despatch of our last advices nothing had transpired of any great importance with regard to the war. Letters of the 12^th from Washington published in the New York Journal of Commerce, state that Mr. Senator Bagby as Minister to the French Court. Mr. King was expected tot succeed Mr. Bagby in the senate. They also state that “the Mexican citizen who had been in correspondence with Mr. Buchanan in relation to the northern province of Mexico,” Mr. Buchanan declining to enter into any negotiation, would leave Washington on the 14^th . “M. Zeva,” says the corespondent of the Journal, “did not propose that the Northern Provinces should be annexed to the United States, but hat they should declare their independence, and that the United States should guarantee their independence. The provinces for which he assumed to speak were Tamaulipas, New Leon, Cohahuila, Chihuahua, and Durango. He says that the people of these states are not fit to come into this Union.” The proceedings of Congress on the 14 were uninteresting.

From the south accounts had been received announcing the quiet investment of Saltillo by General Worth, and the return of General Taylor to Monterey; and it is stated by the American journals that it was the intention of the General to concentrate at Tampico the whole of the forces not employed in garrisoning the several ports on the line of communication, with at view to future land operations against Vera Cruz. General Wool, with the army of the centre from Monclova, was expected to effect a junction with the army of the left at Monterey.

From the mouth of the Rio Grande we have accounts stating that large forces were being shipped for Tampico including a company Sappers and Miners arrived at the Brazos from New York, and the 4^th Regiment of Indiana volunteers. Some bold measures were fully anticipated.

From the Gulf squadron and other scenes of operations there are no later accounts. Many rumours were current in the southern American ports with regard to privateers; and in New Orleans the apprehensions entertained in consequence had acted favourably for British freights.

From the interior of Mexico we have yet no definite accounts.

In the domestic affairs of the Union there is nothing new. A discussion of the slavery question in Congress was expected.

The Payment of the Pennsylvania interest due in February next was beyond question.

Commercial affairs had been active. Cotton, since the last dates from Europe, b the Caledonia, to the 19^th ult., had steadily advanced both in prices and in demand; while for bread-stuffs the prices had declined, but the demand was still great, and very considerable shipments had been made, and were making, to Europe.

Money was in demand, but not scarce. There was timidity among the banks, mainly because of he operations of the law which exacts coin in payment of all dues to the United States, and it locks it up while in the treasury. The exchange on England ranged from 6 to 6 ¼; though there had been transactions at 5 ¾. The expectation still was, that a considerable amount in coin must necessarily, in such a state of the exchanges, find its way hither from England.

From Canada we have no accounts of importance. From Havannah dates to the 2d inst. had been received. The English mail-steamer from England due at Havannah on the 29^thult. Had not arrived up to 123 o’clock on the 2d. Fears for there safety were beginning to be felt. The new crop of molasses was beginning to come in.
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LT 1847 January 8, page 5f THE AFFAIRS OF MEXICO.

(From our own correspondent)

MEXICO, Nov. 29.

Beaten in every encounter by their hostile neighbours, and wholly unable to support he expense of a protracted war, the Mexicans are still averse to peace. “Let us gain a battle,” they say, “and then we will negotiate.” They forget both the extreme improbability of their with being accomplished, and that its fulfilment would only lead to more vigorous reprisals by the Americans. The loss of Monterey is admitted to be a misfortune and disgrace, but h blame is laid, as usual, on the commander. Santa Anna has collected about 20,000 men at San Luis Potosi, where it seems to be his intention to await the approach of the invaders. His ingenuity will be taxed to maintain this body of men together for any length of time, the ordinary resources of the Government being cut off by the blockade, and their credit wholly exhausted. To meet the most pressing necessities it has bee fond necessary by General Salas to decree a forced loan of 2,00,000 dollars, the repayment of which, at the expiration of two years, is to be gauranteed by the clergy’ the heads of the church, according to the decree, accepting bills at that date, with interest at 5 per cent. Per annum. One third of the loan will be received by Government in their own recognized paper, bearing interest; and an immense discount is offered for the instantaneous payment of the remainder. This measure (which of course does not apply to foreigners) has excited the utmost indignation on the part of the Mexican capitalists, who seem determined on opposing it, and it may be questioned if the Government of Salas is strong enough to overcome their resistance, particularly as the clergy show no great alacrity to fulfil their portion of the arrangement . The difficulty in procuring the sinews of war affords the best ground for anticipating the return of peaces to which Santa Anna, privately, is perhaps not averse, though in a late communication to General Taylor he asserted that no peace could be made while an American soldier remained in arms on Mexican ground. Of his dark and tortuous policy it is difficult to form an opinion. Collusion with the Americans is suspected, and the fact of his having been allowed to enter the harbour of Vera Cruz unchallenged by the blockading squadron is cited in support of he charge. He may have entered into some stipulations with the Government of the United States, but it does not by any means follow that he will now fulfil them. On the whole, the Americans would have acted more wisely in opposing his return. The Government of Bravo, with Garay as Minister, were anxious to treat for peace, and might have lasted long enough to accomplish it, if Santa Anna had been kept at a distance. Should the public voice or his own interest dictate a continuance of the war, Santa Anna is most formidable foe that the Americans could have found; in fact, the only one possessed of an ascendancy sufficient to organize and unite such means of resistance as Mexico contains. However, this may be the crisis of his fate. To fight a battle on the plains of San Luis, and lose it, would be utter ruin. On the other hand, to negotiate with out a struggle would confirm the suspicions already attached to his name. On the 15^th inst. General Taylor’s advanced guard was within six leagues of Saltillo, the capital of the state of Coahuila, and the only town between Monterey and San Luis. General Wool was in Monclova with 3,000 men, and about 3,000 more had crossed the river at the Presidio de Rio Grande, to unite with him. Whether this division is destined to reinforce General Taylor or to co-operate with General Kearney in the invasion of Chihuahua is unknown. It seems probable that if the Congress to assemble here on the 6^th of next month show no disposition to negotiate for peace with the United States, General Taylor will advance on San Luis, or Zacatecas, and ultimately, perhaps, to this city. To accomplish an undertaking of such magnitude (as respects the distance to be traversed), he will probably consider it necessary to assemble 20,000 men at Saltillo, a work of sometime; for by the latest accounts he had only 5,000 men at Monterey, and an equal number at Camargo. He will be supported, it is said, by a considerable force for Tampico, now in the hands of he Americans. The great object of the Cabinet of Washington in this war seems to be the acquisition of Upper California, to obtain which it is thought by well-informed persons, they might be induced to relinquish to territory between the Nueces and the Bravo, to which they now lay claim as a portion of Texas. How such an arrangement might be regarded in Europe I can form no opinion, but, if offered, the Mexicans would do well to accept it. Upper California is far too distant to be governed from Mexico, and will under any circumstances soon be populated from the United States, while the interposition of a barrier between Texas and Mexico, such as the district between the two rivers, is of vital importance to the latter.

The conversion of the deferred Mexican bonds I London is again a subject of discussion here. Last month it was supposed to be settled irrevocably by the order of the Minister, Senor Haro, to pay a dividend in London, and the natural conclusion was, that Santa Anna had sanctioned the operation. Without any great injustice to that personage, the same opinion may be still entertained, notwithstanding the extraordinary letter (of which I send you a translation) addressed by him to a confidential friend here, and published by his desire. He there disavows and disapproves the whole affair, and throws great blame on the ex-minister. It does not, however, necessarily follow that the arrangement can be unsettled, or that Santa Anna has any real objection to it.

Ministers of Finance succeed each other here with astonishing rapidity. The portfolio is now held by Don Lazaro Villamil, a devoted follower of Santa Anna.

Commercial affairs are stagnant. The consumption of all but articles of the first necessity has diminished, and the city wears a dull and gloommy aspet. No communication is allowed with the places occupied by the Americans, and, if Vera Cruz should fall into their hands, the last outlet for specie on the Atlantic will be closed. The result will be an extraordinary accumulation of the precious metals in the interior, and an injurious disturbance of the balance of exchange.

The town of San Juan Bautista, capital of he state of Tobasco, has been cannonaded by Commodore Perry. This severity seems to have been caused by the treachery of the Mexicans in firing on a flag of truce, and their absurd pertinacity in directing musketry against vessels armed with 42-pounders. The loss of life on this occasion is stated to be small, but the town is said to be greatly injured.
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LT 1847 January 8, page 6d MEXICAN LETTERS OF MARQUE

On Wednesday an office for granting letters of marque and reprisal, according to the decrees of the Mexican Government, was first opened in the vicinity of the Tower, being the first time that an occurrence of the kind has happened during the last 40 years in England.

The following are extracts from the official ordinances of the Mexican Government relating to this subject :-

“TO WHOM AND WITH WHAT CONDITIONS LETTERS OF MARQUE HAVE TO BE GIVEN.

“Art. 1. To obtain letters of marque against the United States during the present war, a patent from the Supreme Government will be required, which will be granted in the form and under the conditions prescribed in this regulation.

“Art. 2. The patent referred to in the foregoing article will only be granted to vessels of which the captain, officer, and other individuals appointed thereto, are Mexican citizens according to the laws of the Republic.

“Art. 3. Every individual who may wish to arm one or more privateers, shall deposit for each one a capital of net less than $4,000 should the vessel not exceed 100 tons, or $8,000 if of larger burden; or shall give security for like amount, to the satisfaction of the person who may furnish the patent.

“TO WHOM TO APPLY FOR OBTAINING SAID PATENTS.

“Art. 4. The requisition shall be addressed to the Supreme Government in the territory of the Republic, through the respective governors; and in foreign countries through the consuls, or authorized agents for this purpose.

“Art. 5. In the requisition shall be minutely expressed everything that may be necessary to give a circumstantial account of the vessel destined to cruise, its tonnage, force, equipment, and crew, on the understanding that it shall not be less than 60 tons.

“Art. 6. With letters of marque will also be given to the parties interested letters of commission for those in charge of the prizes, if they should solicity them, to the number which the functionary delivering the said patent may consider necessary, having in view the appointment of the vessel.

“ON THE PROTECTION WHICH HAS TO BE GIVEN TO THE OWNERS.

“Art. 9. The naval commanders, harbour masters, and other local authorities shall afford to the owners and captains of the privateers all the protection which they may need, and which may be in their power, in everything conducive to the quick armament of the vessels, permitting them to receive all he persons they may require, excepting those who may be in actual service on board the national vessels of war, coercing those who may resist to obey their orders, and prosecuting deserters, who shall be condemned to six years’ service in the army or navy, if they should be apprehended after the privateer shall bave made sail.

“Art. 10. Likewise they shall be furnished with arms of every description, powder, and shot, when they may be asked for and the service may not want them, giving out to them these last articles at the cost or costs, with a credit at the most of six months; if they should bot be able to make immediate payment, to take sufficient security for it. That which they may not consume during the period they shall return, the value thereof being credited to them.

“Art. 11. In case of shipwreck, or the vessel being taken, they shall be freed from all responsibility, both themselves and their securities, the loss or seizure being fully proved.

“ON THE RIGHTS OF THOSE EMPLOYED IN CRUISING, AND THE PRIVILIGES GRANTED TO THEM.

“Art. 12. All those who may be employed on board of privateering vessels shall be subject, in their internal police and regulations, to the ordinances of the navy, and shall enjoy the rights of the navy in all that may not relate the prizes.

“Art. 15. The individuals out of their crews who may be disabled from wounds received in action, and without the necessary supplies for their subsistence, shall have the same privileges as invalids of the navy, each one according to his class, and in conformity with the reports made by captains and commanders of the privateers, also consulting theron the respective commanders of the naval department.

“Art. 16. The widows of those who may die from like causes, and who should also be left without resources, shall enjoy pensions, which the Supreme Government may be pleased to grant them.

“ON THE ADJUDICATION AND DISTRIBUTION OF PRIZES.

“Art. 17. The owners and other individuals who may be employed privateering shall have entirely adjudicated to them, and without any reserve whatsoever, the prizes which they make, under the following regulation :-

“Art. 18. Moreover, should the vessels taken be of war, a gratuity of $60 shall be given for every cannon that may exceed 12 inclusively, $40 if they should exceed four, also inclusively; and $20 for every prisoner of he enemy’s forces; the amount of this gratuity exclusively belongs to the captain, subalterns, marines, and sailors of the privateering vessels, amongst whom it will be divided according to the wages which they may receive.

“WHAT VESSELS AND EFFECTS ARE TO BE CONSIDERED OF LAWFUL SEIZURE.

“Art. 24. Of lawful seizure are-

“1. Vessels of the enemy with all that they may carry on board belonging to them, whether or war, privateers, or merchant vessels.

“2. The cargo and effects of neutrals and Mexicans which may be found on board these said vessels, after sufficient time has elapsed for the declaration of war, proclaimed by the Government of the United States to the Mexican nation, being known.

“3. Vessels constructed by the enemy, or which may have belonged to the enemy, if the property be not sufficiently accredited or neutral.

“4. Those which may be navigated without patents or register that may prove their neutrality, their entire cargo, or part thereof, being, if they should be found in the same predicament, for want of the indispensable papers, the act alone of throwing papers into the sea, shall be sufficient motive for declaring them lawful seizure.

“5. Those which may be found without legal patent of sovereignty, state, or republic, having the authority for granting it.

“6. Those which may have it from one or more Powers.

“7. Those who may fight under other colours than the sovereign or state to whom their patent belongs. If these vessels, and those comprised in the foregoing paragraphs, should be armed for war, their captains and officers shall be reputed as pirates.

“8. Those which, after the national flag is hoisted, should refuse to lie to, and should provoke combat.

“9. Those which may navigate with the patent of the enemy in the terms expressed in the second paragraph.

“10. Those belonging to Mexicans and neutrals which may be armed for privateering under the Mexican flag, without having obtained permission from the Supreme Government, and accredited with the patent, their captains shall be treated as pirates.

“11. Those of pirates and mtineers returning to their owners should they appear within one year nd a day, and those also who can prove not to have taken part, directly or indirectly, in piracy, separating a third part of their total value for the benefit of those making the seizure.

“12. Vessels abandoned by the enemy, or which may be adrift form tempest, or any other acident, before being brought to safety, if it should not be known to whom they belong, for want of documents, or if they should not have their proper crew, and if the owners of them should not appear within a year and a day; adjudicating, under any circumstances, the third part to those taking them, the two remaining parts shall belong to the public treasury.

“13. Merchandize known in war to the contraband, on board of whatsoever vessel it may be found, if it be going to the country of he enemy, or point occupied by it. By contraband effects of war are understood to be the following :-Cannons, mortars, howitzers, swivel guns, blunderbusses, muskets, guns, carbines, rifles, pistols, pikes, swords, sabres, lances, harping-irons, battle-axes, grenades, shells, powder, matches, balls, and whatever other articles which may apply to arms; shields, helmets, breastplates, coats of mail, infantry and cavalry belts, uniforms of apparel for soldiers, horses with their trappings, and, lastly, every description of arms, or instruments of iron, steel, bronze, and copper, or other manufactured materials prepared and made for the purpose of waging war by sea or land.

“14. Provisions which maybe carried to the enemy’s camp, blockaded or besieged by the forces of the nation.

“15. The effects and merchandise which may be found on board neutral vessels, whenever the power to which they belong should not recognize the principle of exemption.

“ON THE CONDUCT TO BE OBSERVED BY PRIVATEERS AND VESSELS OF WAR.

“Art. 28. If a vessel should refuse to lie to after the Mexican flag has been hoisted, it shall be compelled to do so by force.

“Art. 29. If a vessel flying enters the waters of another Power, it should no longer be pursued; the seizure made on these waters shall be unlawful.

“Article 30. Should the enemy not respect this principle, claims will be made of he Power whose jurisdiction has been violated; and if a reparation should not be obtained it will be acted against, according to the orders which the Government may find it convenient to dictate.

“Art. 49. It is prohibited, under the penalty of from two to 10 years’ hard labour, to drove on shore, sink, or burn the vessel captured, unless without absolute necessity; and if, in consequence thereof, one or more of those on board should perish, then, and for such offence, shall the punishment of death be inflicted upon him who gave the order for the act, and, in default of such order, upon the actual perpetrators.

“Art. 50. It shall only be allowed to sink or burn the vessel when it shall be impossible in any other way to prevent its falling into the hands of the enemy, releasing before all things every one there may be on board, and taking all the papers; any omission with respect to the first shall be punished as directed in the second part of the Article 49; and with respect to the second, with from two to 10 years’ hard labour.

“Art. 51. The same penalty of death shall the captain incur who leaves the crew of he vessel to perish, if it should go to pieces in consequence of the action, and when he, being able to save the lives, does not do so.

“Art. 52. The same penalty shall be incurred if they are abandoned on the desert coasts or islands.

“Art. 53 Prisoners of war shall be treated with all humanity and moderation, paying to every one the consideration due to his rank, until they are delivered over to the military of political authority of the first part of the Republic where they shall arrive, taking the necessary certificate.

“ON THE PORTS WHERE THE PRIZES ARE TO BE TKEN.

“Art. 59. The prizes shall be conducted to the commercial ports of the Republic; but, if there should be any danger of falling into the enemy’s hands, they may then take them to those of the coasting trade.

“Art. 60. When the prizes are made at places very distant form the coast of he Republic, and near ports of neutral Powers, they may be taken to the nearest where they may be permitted, having a consul or Mexican agent, and there be sold, should it undoubtedly belong to the enemy, in the judgment of the said consul. Excepting these cases, this measure shall only be taken when, without real danger, it cannot arrive at the ports of the Republic.”
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LT 1847 January 13, page 5c LETTER OF MARQUE.

TO THE EDITOR OF THE TIMES.

Sir,-I am a faithful, though sometimes a laggard reader of your influential paper, and it is only now, in getting through arroars, that I have perceived the intelligence in your Friday’s paper, headed, “Mexican Letters of Marque,” with an announcement that “on Wednesday and office for granting Letters of Marque and Reprisals, according to the decree of he Mexican Government, was first opened in the vicinity of the Tower, being the first time that an occurrence of the kind has happened during the last 40 years in England.”

You add extracts from the official ordinances of he Mexican Government, relating to the subject.

So announced in you columns, I trust the attention of the Government, and of the public, will be awakened to the inquiry, “are these things so?”

In this city, the centre of the civilization of the whole world, in the middle of the 19^th century, “can these things be so?” and that a foreign consul sent here, and entertained here for purposes only of commerce and of peace, has dared publicly to open an office, where, on English ground, and in the bosom of this empire, for the base and filthy hope of gain, for the unmitigated lust of lucre, shall be publicly bartered for, the remaining virtue, honour, honesty, and good feeling of our merchants and ship-owners!

On the one hand, shall we be content to enforce at our police-courts our Foreign Enlistment Bill, and on the other hand, if he letter of the law, of that or any other statute , does not reach such a case as the traffic in letters of marque, shall an order of council be withheld to put down, and in a moment, this much more intolerable offence?

I am no friend to the Flores expedition to Ecuador, nor advocate for the North Americans in their unjust aggressions upon Mexico. I wish the Mexicans every success, and that they may become the instruments of Providence to teach to the North Americans humility. But I am an enthusiast in the desire to preserve my countrymen, and their principles, from pollution, and the temptation towards it.

“For 40 years (you say) has not an occurrence of he kind happened in England!”

For 32 years England has enjoyed, in Europe, the blessings of peace.

In this season of peace, when men’s passions may be considered cool, and temptation at a distance, I have thought that reason might be appealed to against the sin and the evils of privateering.

So thinking, for nearly 25 years, as opportunities have been given to me, I have, sometimes in print, and sometimes by word of mouth, and by correspondence, invited men’s minds to the consideration of the fitness of an international law for the extinction of privateering.

Why should war upon the sea be conducted on principles less humane than war upon the land?

Is such a thing heard of, in the most justifiable war, as the raising of a troop for independent action, and the licensed pillage of private property in an enemy’s land?-a regiment of freebooters and robbers! Yet, why should private property be respected in general cases on land, and free license be given for its plunder upon the sea? Is the merchant less worthy of protection than the husbandman or the artisan?

Why should the delusive hope of “a profitable little war on private account” be allowed to corrupt our merchants, and form a school of piracy and disgrace?

Benjamin Franklin was the first, within my reading, who felt and wrote rightmindedly on this subject; and that, at a time when his countrymen were the people most likely to be tempted to avail themselves of a “buccaneering spirit” against our merchant vessels.

Prussia, as yet, has the honour to be the only European power that has consecrated the principle of repudiating privateering on the face of a public treaty.

How small is the demarcation between privateering and piracy! In the present case, a few inches of parchment-not from our own Sovereign, but from a foreign and factious republic-by the hands of a consul “accredited for trade and protection,” but now abusing his office to corrupt and to seduce. I have said how small is the demarcation between privateering and piracy. I say, also, that the effect upon those employed in either way is identical-equally demoralizing and brutalizing’ nor has it ever been that, as a whole, the profit of privateering has reimbursed one-fifth of the expenses of these ungodly and ungracious enterprizes, whatever single instances may have been put forward of individual gain.

Even without the inter diction, by international law, of formal treaties to that end, one might reasonably have hoped that the progress of civilization, and the improved morality of nations, would have been sufficient to have put down the most odious enormity of barbarous times.

You constant subscriber of 40 years,

665.
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LT 1847 January 15, page 6b

TO THE EDITOR OF THE TIMES.

Sir,-As I believe my house is alluded to in your papers of this day as “an office for the sale of letters of marque and reprisal against the vessels of the United States,” I will endeavour to convince you that you have written upon wrong information.

On Monday, the 4^th inst., I procured one of he first copies of the decree of he Mexican Government, and sent an advertisement to The Times, as follows:-“The decrees of the Mexican Government granting letters of marque against the United States may be seen at the factory of Frederic Barnes, gun-maker, Union-row, Tower-hill,” which your paper refused to insert.

The decrees have been read by many, for whose information I made the notice public, viz., owners and captains of ships. I have no power to grant letters of marque, and I am not aware they can be procured from anyone resident in this country.

I am, Sir, you obedient servant,

FREDERIC BARNES.

3, Union-row, Tower-hill, Jan-13.
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LT 1847 January 18, page 4d

To those persons who are capable of appreciating the self-complacent modesty by which a grave Republic excuses a great aggression, and the specious names by which she describes it, the instructions issued by the Navy and War Departments of the United States to the officers of both services engaged in the Mexican expedition will suggest matter for reflection, not unmixed with diversion. To those who seek for an explanation of national conduct and character in national institutions, we do not think that they will supply any additional reasons for admiring the Government of the United States.

It is curious to notice the foregone conclusion of the American Government long before the war was begun. So far back as June, 1845, it had its eye on the opening chapter of accidents. The difficulty was how to force the initiative on Mexico. But this once begun, the course of consequences was clearly chalked out. Tit is highly amusing to read the instructions sent from Washington, and to compare their avowed and ostensible desire of peace with their earnest preparation for and anticipation of war. In June, 1845, the Secretary for he Navy Department thus addresses the Commodore in the Pacific:-“It is the earnest desire of the President

“to pursue the policy of peace……Should Mexico, however, be resolutely bent on hostilities(!), you will be mindful to protect the persons and interests of citizens of the United States near your station…. The Mexican ports on the Pacific are said to be open and defenceless. If you ascertain with certainty that Mexico has declared war against the United States, you will at once possess yourself of the port of San Francisco, and blockade or occupy such other ports as your force may permit.’ It is true that the Commodore is here ordered to ascertain that Mexico has declared war against his country; but when was the commander of a hostile fleet at a loss to interpret a constructive declaration of war? He was to protect the persons and interest of American citizens. Of course; this was natural. But the presence of an American fleet might expose them to danger of to insult. They might be attacked, mobbed, or merely frightened. In any case they might claim the protection of their own ships; and who doubts but that a sharp officer would quickly light this up into a strong casus belli ? There never will be wanting a good opportunity to a dexterous officer, who is ordered to prepare against the determined hostilities of a foe whom he wishes to attack, particularly when he is lying off “open and defenceless ports.”

But though San Francisco was to be taken and California annexed, these things were to be done as cheaply as possible. The model Republic is in her novicate of aggression. She has a strong appetite for conquest, but her sinews are not yet fully braced, and her powers of action do not equal her powers of conception. Men and money are the vulgar instruments of warfare; but men and money are not to be obtained for noting. As little shot and powder as possible-as much soft sawder as you please; this is the plan of American warfare, and a very economical one it is, particularly where you have to deal with an enemy of no very decided energies. “Even,” so proceed the instructions, “should you be compelled to occupy San Francisco and other Mexican ports, you will be careful to preserve, if possible, the most friendly relations with the inhabitants.” Again, You can readily conduct yourself in such a manner as will render you occupation of San Francisco, and other ports, a benefit to the inhabitants (!).” But the next passage contains a still cooler plan of annexation;-“In taking possession of the harbours, you will, if possible, endeavour to establish the supremacy of he American flag without any strife with the people of California.” Now, this is certainly the most economical mode of acquiring territory we ever heard of. Only the question naturally occurs, if all this can be done so cheaply-if harbours can be blockaded-if provinces can be subjugated, without striking a blow-why go through the form of equipping fleets and armaments? Why not send a drab deputation from Pennsylvania, or some bold adventurers form Michigan, or some members of the Universal Peace Association, bearing the “stars and stripes” in their hands, and soliciting all Mexico and California to fraternize? If all the Western Hemisphere is only panting for an opportunity to become part and parcel of he model Republic, what need of the New York volunteers and the 1,000 horsemen? If California has already adopted a sympathetic attachment to the States, why should the latter go to war with Mexico? “If California”-thus it is written in the despatch of June 8, 1846-“separates herself from our enemies, the central Mexican Government, and establishes a Government of its own, under the auspices of he American flag, you will take such measures as will best promote the attachment of the people of California to the United States, will advance their prosperity, and will make their vast region a desirable residence for emigrants from our soil.” Attachment! Convey, the wise it call.” It is curious to observe the facility which American Statesman have in detecting the latent affections of their neighbours. Texas, we presume, was similarly “attached;” and opened a “residence equally desirable for emigrants from their soil.” We should have imagined that after all these directions the following hint would be wholly superfluous, at least to so intelligent an officer as the American Commodore:- “You will bear in mind that this country desires to find in California a friend, not a foe; to e connected with it by near ties(!); to hold possession of it -at least during the war (!): and to hold that possession, if possible, with the consent of its inhabitants.” This may, to some, appear the very consummation of triumphant impudence. It bears a sort of rude approximation to the style of Henry V.-just as much as the Blueskin would to that of Achilles:-“It is not possible (illegible word) me you should love the enemy of France; but in loving me you will love the friend of France; for I love France so well that I will not part with a village of it. I will have it al mine.” But-tough they agree in their with to have it al theirs-the two invaders differ as to the means of achieving their conquest. Henry V. had not the oily demureness of President Polk; but then it is true he did not wage war with Californians. The President has had the advantage of a more profound education. He can utter cutting jokes with the gravest face. What a sarcastic commentary upon an expedition sent 3,000 miles off by land, and some multiples of that distance by sea, to tell the commanding officer that he hopes to get possession of the invaded country with the consent of its inhabitants! It is “keen, devilish keen.” They can relish a dry joke in the States.

But this is not the climax of impudence. W should have liked much to see the expression of Mr. Mason’s face while he dictated these words-after all the preparations of brigadiers, commodores, cannons and frigates:-

“The existing war with Mexico has been commenced by her. Every disposition was felt and manifested by the Unite States Government to procure redress for the injuries of which we complained, and to settle all complaints on her part in the spirit of peace and of justice which has ever characterized our intercourse with foreign nations.”

Why are such comic powers wasted on red-tapery?”

The state papers of he New World” flog” those of the Old to tatters. There is no parallel between their plans and ours-their conquests and our conquests. We proceed on an old, trite, and costly path. They have a new, brazen Brummagem, cheap way of doing business. They get into collision with a weak State, blockade its ports, blarney its people, and, without the glory of contention or expense of corruption, quietly “attach” a new province, “impressed with their justice, grateful for their clemency, and prepared to love their institutions and honour their flag!”
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LT 1847 January 25, page 5b. AMERICA

LIVERPOOL, SATURDAY.

Accounts from Boston to the 5^th inst. inclusive have been received by the arrival of he packet-ship Anglo-Saxon, after a short run of 18 days.

The accounts thus received add little to our previous information. From Washington we learn that on the 2d inst. the House of Representatives, by a vote of 115 to 48, resolved “that it is inexpedient to levy any duty on tea and coffee.” The decision of the house was given without the slightest debate.

The Sub-Treasury Bill had come into operation.

General Scott left New Orleans for Tampico on the 13^th ult. Accounts from Tampico rumour that a large body of Mexican cavalry had been observed in the vicinity. The British ship-of-war Alarm, Lieutenant Mayo, had rrived in the port: the captain had been left indisposed at Vera Cruz. From the Rio Grande the accounts merely note the continuance of he movements consequent upon the changed plan of operations. The 3d and 4^th Illinois Regiments, the Tennessee Regiment of Cavalry, and other troops, were either about the start of had started from Matamoras en route for Tampico via Moquete. The three regiments together amounted to 1,800 men. Great sickness existed at Matamoras. Several Americans had been murdered on the route to Camargo and Monterey. From the latter place we learn, that on the 12^th of December General Taylor would start for Tampico, via Victoria, with one division of the army and a portion of a brigade. It was reported that General Urrea, with a troop of 6,000 Mexican cavalry, was at Victoria. It was reported, also, that Santa Anna had assembled a force of 28,000 men at San Luis. The Chief, it is said, had imprisoned Ampudia and other officers on a charge of cowardice. General Wool remained at Parras, and General Worth at Saltillo.

Mexico had been again the scene of intestine disturbances. The state of Tobasco, resenting the neglect with which the central Government treated the applications of the department for assistance at the time of Commodore Perry’s recent attack upon Tobasco, had issued a pronunciamento declaring independence.

Yucatan, also, was involved in disturbance. Campeachy had pronounced against the reunion of the department with the central Government.

Canadian journals to the 30^th of December add nothing to our last accounts.

Havannah advices to the 20^th of December had been received. They merely state, that a Yucatecos steamer had managed to enter the harbour, in the face of the United States vessel of war cruizing on that ground, by hoisting the British flag.
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LT 1847 January 30, page 5c MEXICAN GENERALS

MEXICAN GENERALS.-Not the least important items in the recent news from Mexico are those which relate to the distribution and organization of the Mexican army. That army numbers 41,000 men, of whom 25,000 are with Santa Anna, in the city of San Luis de Potosi, 8,000 in the fertile vale of San Francisco, and a like number at Tula, a town distant from San Luis 80 miles, and from Tampico 120. Of the 8,000 men at Tula, 2,500 have ben formed into a corps of observation, and the command thereof given to General Jose Manuel Urrea. Very few military adventurers have experienced greater vicissitudes of fortune than this Urrea. He is a native of the department of Sonora y Sinaloa-and during the war of independence fought in the ranks of the patriots, at the age of 20. It is said he defeated, at that early age, a body of Spanish troops under circumstances highly creditable to himself. When Santa Anna invaded Texas I 1836, he gave to Urrea the command of a brigade; and throughout the campaign Urrea conducted himself to the perfect satisfaction of his chief, but scarcely to that of the friends of humanity-for it was he who presided at the execution of the prisoners taken at Goliad. Execution did we call it? It was a murder; and as foul a one as ever man perpetrated, or God avenged. Yet we will do Urrea the justice to say, that in conversation he often regrets the share he had in the massacre of the Texans, though he endeavours to exculpate himself in this manner; “What under the circumstances could I do? My orders to shoot the prisoners were explicitly and peremptory; and you know that it is a soldier’s duty to obey the orders of his superior, not to question their propriety.” This Urrea spent the 18 months that suceeded the battle of San Jacinta, in comparative obscurity. Soon after that battle hi received from the President (Bustamente) the Governorship of Sonora y Sinaloa. But the Government of a remote district of Mexico-a district almost beyond the confines of civilization-and the population of which is not one-half of that of the city of New York, could not satisfy the ambitious and active-minded Urrea. SO, in 1838 he “pronounced” for federalism, and commenced a war with the central government, which lasted four years. During that period Urrea must have fought 20 or 30 battles and skirmishes, of some of which the western coast of Mexico was the scene; of others the eastern. In some he was signally successful; in others he had the greatest difficulty in escaping with his life. Urrea is barely 50 years of age, though the hard life he has led has given him a somewhat older appearance. His manners are very polished, resembling those of a French general of the old regime. His administrative talents are good. It cannot be denied that he is an accomplished general; but at the same time it must be admitted that he is sometimes wanting in decision, when decision is most wanted. It is worthy of not, that the corps which Urrea now commands is composed of the very best infantry regiments in the Mexican service-these are the Cortagnardia, of Tampico, the Puebla regiment, and the corps of veterans. May we not infer from this circumstance that Santa Anna has assigned to Urrea an enterprise of “great pith and moment!”- New York Herald.
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LT 1847 February 6 page 8e. MEXICAN PRIVATEERS

MEXICAN PRIVATEERS.-It is understood that three Mexican privateers have been fitted out and despatched. They sailed under Spanish names. The object is said to be to stop outward-bound American shipping which may have specie on board. The report, or the fact, is already creating a difficulty in insurances.-Sun.
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LT 1847 February 9, page 6e. THE AFFAIRS OF MEXICO.

(FROM OUR OWN CORRESPONDENT.)

Mexico, Dec. 30.

The proceedings of Mexican legislators are proverbially tardy; yet it was thought that the novel and alarming situation of the country, invaded by a powerful enemy, and suffering the severe effects of a blockade since May last, would induce the Congress, which was installed here on the 6^th inst., to give its earnest and immediate attention to the American proposals to negotiate for peace, particularly as the reverses sustained by the Mexican arms have too clearly demonstrated their incapacity to bring the war to a successful termination. The result has not justified that expectation. True to the vain and frivolous character which has distinguished the Mexican people since the hour of their emancipation from the sway of Spain, the present Congress has devoted all its energies to the miserable intrigues of party, regardless of the danger which menaces their existence as a nation, or referring to it only as a political clap-trap for electioneering purposes. The subject which has latterly excluded all others here has been the election of a President ad interim , until the new constitution (which, like the numerous codes that have preceded it, is intended to secure the permanent happiness of Mexico) shall have been framed by the wisdom of Congress. Santa Anna would have liked matters to continue as they were. General Salas was sufficiently under his influence to prevent any measure positively disagreeable to the Commander-in-chief from receiving the sanction of a Government of which he was the head. But the Liberal party had other views. They saw the necessity of yielding the provisional presidency to Santa Anna (whose position at the head of he army forbids his assuming the control of the Executive), but by electing a vice-president also, according to the constitution of 1824, which they cite as their text, they secured the effective exercise of power, at least for a time, to the latter. The elections have terminated in conformity with this scheme, General Santa Anna being named President, and Don Valentin Gomez Farias Vice-President of the Republic-a result most unpalatable to the former, who finds himself in possession, indeed, of the highest title, but really subject to the orders of an ancient foe, now by the force of circumstances converted into a doubtful ally. Since Santa Anna’s return he has shown on more than one occasion a disposition to resume his old despotic habits, and there can be no doubt that he would now gladly seize any opportunity to overturn Gomez Farias, to Congress, and the federal system, which he found it expedient to embrace as a means of returning from exile. If guided by his own inspirations Don Valentin is not unlikely to afford some pretext for another revolution. Years have not tamed his enthusiastic devotion to democratic principles, in their widest sense; and, without any imputation on his private integrity, he shows a passionate eagerness to confiscate the property of the church not surpassed in intensity by the avarice of Santa Anna himself. The rev. fathers are sorely beset. Santa Anna, when dictator, permitted them to retain possession of their property, but prevented any tendency to repletion by frequent and severe exactions, not always, it may be presumed, applied to the public service. Goez Farias, from an excess of patriotism, wold strip them altogether. In their extremity they are not unlikely to coalesce with their old tyrant, through aware that from him protection must be purchased at a heavy rate.

The Vice-President has addressed a brief speech to Congress, in which he urged the necessity of continuing the war with the United States until they evacuate the Mexican territory. Senor Gomez Farias is probably not without a personal motive in this. While the war lasts, Santa Anna will be excluded from Civil power, and the oftener the Mexicans are beaten, the easier will it be hereafter to get rid of the army, which all true Federalists hold in abhorrence. In the present Government of Mexico the sword is superseded by the gown. Ortiz, a priest from Guadalaxara, has been named Minister of Justice; Senor Ramirez, for Foreign Affairs; and Senor Zubieta, for the Department of Finance. The two latter are lawyers of the same liberal school in politics as Gomez Farias, whose original profession was medicine. The War Department has been given to General Canalizo, a mere soldier, devoteed to Santa Anna. He has just returned from Europe, having shared his leader’s exile and recall.

Beyond strengthening their positions, the American army has made little progress during this month, one of the finest in the year for active operations. General Worth remains in Saltillo, and the small town of Parras, about 30 leagues west of that city, is occupied by General Wool. General Taylor is said to be moving part of his forces towards Tampico, which the Americans are fortifying strongly. At sea they have met with nothing but disasters, and a very low estimate of the American navy is growing up in the minds of the Mexicans, who remember the dashing style in which the French took the castle of San Juan de Ulloa, and were not prepared to see the Americans pass fully eight months in looking at it. Even the blockade of the coast is not effectively maintained, various vessels having succeeded in entering the port of Alvarado. At Tabasco Colonel Traconis has made a pronunciamiemento, declaring that paltry state independent. It was surmised that his object was to open communications with the Americans, but nothing is yet known here to confirm that suspicion, though it is difficult to account for the proceeding on any other grounds. The annual fair of San Juan de los Lagos has taken place as usual. Salesare stated to have bad, except of goods introduced under peculiar circumstances by the west coast. The fair trader(in another sense) in Mexico has enormous difficulties to contend with, from the heavy import and internal duties to which he is subject, and from the exceptional cases which are continually occurring to his prejudice. After the goods are sold, the exportation of specie, in which the return in made, is burdened with a duty of no less than 10 per cent., exclusive of he expense of conveyance to the coast, freight, insurance, &c. To these local legislature of Zacatecas has just added a tax of two per cent. On the extraction of specie from that state. This is one of he fruits of the Federal system, under which each state assumes the right of levying contributions, and the example will doubt be followed by others. It is not surprising that the sufferers from this remorseless taxation ardently desire the success of the United States in their present enterprise, and would gladly see the barrier of he stars and stripes permanently planted in this capital.

From the mines, those seemingly exhaustless deposits of treasure, the returns this year have been large. Guanazuato and Zacatecas are flourishing, and the produce of he Real del Monte has increased. The El Oro Company have also ver flattering prospects. A considerable quantity of iron (the use of which was unknown to the aborigines) is now produced in the neighbourhood of Zimapan, and, favoured by the blockade, meets with a ready sale.

The conversion of the Mexican bonds in London is still a subject of acrimonious controversy in the journals here, and will probably be discussed in Congress. In the meantime, Santa Anna applies the tobacco revenue (on which the bondholders have alien) without scruple to military purposes, and will, no doubt, continue to do so until the conclusion of the war.
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LT 1847 February 12, page 6c AMERICA.

Accounts from New York to the 23d ult. inclusive have been received at Liverpool, by the arrival of the packet-ship Queen of the West, Captain Woodhouse. The Queen of the West left New York on the 23d ult., passed Holyhead at an early hour on Wednesday evening, and entered the Mersey yesterday morning, having accomplished the entire run in the space of little more than 18 days.

The accounts received by this arrival from the scene of war confirm our anticipations that the movement against Saltillo had been merely a feint, if even so much. The force observed in the vicinity of that post would now appear to have been simply a foraging or reconnoitiring party. General Taylor had consequently continued his advance from Monterey for Victoria, where, it was understood, a Mexican force of 5,000 cavalry, under General Urrea, was stationed. The New Orleans journals now reduce their estimates of Santa Anna’s force at San Luis to 10,000 men, and, more than this, now state that they are poorly provisioned, badly clothed, and scantily supplied with arms and ammunition. The official journal contains the following official account of General Taylor’s movements during the apprehended crisis:-

“Despatches have been received from General Taylor, dated the 22d of December, near Monterey, representing that he had left that place on the 15^th, for Victoria, having previously put in motion the troops destined for that point. At Montemorelos a junction was effected on the 17^th with the 2d Infantry and 2d Tennessee Regiment of Foot from Camargo; and it was intended, with the whole force (3,500men) to march, on the 19^th, for Victoria. But on the evening of his arrival at Montemorelos, a despatch arrived from General Worth, commanding at Saltillo, with the intelligence that Santa Anna designed to take advantage of the division of force towards Victoria, and, by a rapid movement, to strike a heavy blow at Saltillo; and, if successful, then at General Wool’s force at Parras. Under these circumstances, and with no means of judging how far this information might be well-founded, the General returned to Monterey with the regular force, in order to be in a position to reinforce Satillo, if necessary. The volunteers under General Wuitman, reinforced by a field battery, were ordered to continue their march, and effect a junction with General Patterson at Victoria, while General Taylor returned to Monterey with General Twigg’s division, now increased by the 2d Infantry.

“IN the meantime General Butler and General Wool, being advised by GeneralWorth of a probable attack upon his position, moved rapidly to join him with all the available force at Parras and Monterey, while orders were despatched by General Butler to hasten up troops from the rear. The latter General proceeded in person to Saltillo, and assumed command agreeably to instructions which had been given by General Taylor before his departure to meet a case like this.

“General Taylor had proceeded beyond Monterey on his way to Saltillo, when he was met on the 20^th, by a despatch from the post, announcing the early arrival of General Wool’s column, and also that the expected concentration and movement of the Mexican troops upon that position had not taken place-indeed, that their advanced posts had rather been withdrawn. Deeming the force there and soon to be at Saltillo quite sufficient to repel any demonstration at this season from San Luis Potosi, General Taylor did not think it worth while to throw forward General Twigg’s division to that place, and after resting it a day, designed putting it again in march for Victoria, to which point he was to proceed himself.

“General Patterson was supposed to be then well on his march from Matamoras to Victoria, when his division, except the Alabama rangers (in garrison at Tampico), will be brought together. With a force holding in observation the passes from Tula, the garrison at Tampico may be reduced with advantage to the service.”

From the squadron in the Gulf at Anton Lizardo we have accounts up to the close of December. That portion of the crew of the unfortunate brig-of-war Somers which, on the occasion of her wreck, reached the shore had been released on parole by the Mexicans. A reconnaissance of the fortifications of San Juan de Ulloa had been made.

From Laguna we learn, that 900lb. of powder were captured, 50 soldiers disarmed, and 15 cannon destroyed at the capture of that town by Commander Perry. The following is the official account:-

“United States ship Mississippi, Anton

Lizardo, Dec. 27, 1846.

“Sir,-In conformity with your instructions of the 16^th inst., I left this anchorage with the Mississippi on the 17^th (having in tow the Vixen, Commander J. R. Sands; Bonita, Lieutenant-Commandant Bennham; and Petrel, Lieutenant-Commandant Shaw), and proceeded direct to Laguna de las Termines.

“Arriving off that port on the 20^th, I placed myself on board the Vixen, and, with the Bonita, Petrel, and four barges, all in tow of the Vixen, I crossed the bar, and anchored after nightfall opposite the town without resistance from the enemy.

“In the morning I sent Commander J. R. Sands and Lieutenant James L. Parker to the Military Commandant and other authorities of the town, demanding its unconditional surrender, which demand, after some little demur, was submitted to.

“During the day I caused the arms of the few soldiers left the garrison to be delivered up’ the powder found in the magazines to be embarked in a lighter ready to go on board the Mississippi’ the two forts taken possession of, the American colours hoisted upon them, and the guns and carriages destroyed.

“After completing all these and other necessary arrangements, and leaving Commander Sands, with the Vixen and Petrel, in command of the place, I sailed on the morning of the 23d, in this ship, with the Bonita in tow, for the Tobasco.

“Arriving off that river, I directed Lieutenant-Commandant Benham, in the Bonita, to anchor inside the bar, and to assume command of the small blockading force stationed there.

“Having sent Commodore Adams ashore to collect information, the period of his absence was occupied in adding about 10,000 gallons to our stock of water.

“Leaving the bar of Tobasco on the evening of the 25^th, I shaped my course to the westward, and traced the coast along, sufficiently near to discover the smallest boat, looking into the mouths of the principal rivers, and particularly those of Santa Anna, Goaasacoalcos, and Alvarado.

“Off the latter named, I this morning captured and towed to this anchorage the Spanish schooner Isabel, a few hours from Alvarado, bound to Havannah, and the Mexican schooner Amerlia, from the same place, bound also to Havannah.

“The printed papers herewith sent will inform you that another of the political changes so frequent in Yucatan has recently taken place.

“With great respect, dear sir,

“Your obedient servant,

“M.C. PERRY.

“Commodore D. Conner, Commander naval forces,
Gulf of Mexico.”

The fortifications of Alvarado and Tobasco had been refortified.

From the Pacific we have no later advices.

Mexican accounts of a more minute character are published in the American journals, and communicate the speech of Mariano Salas on opening the Constituent Congress, the details regarding the capture of Los Angelos in California, &c. A long report, we learn, had been made by a select committee of the Congress, in which the monthly expenditures of the army under Santa Anna were estimated at $308,789, and those of the garrison at Vera Cruz at $80,00 peer month. The whole extraordinary expenses of the war for six months are estimated at $3,600,000. The deficit in the ordinary revenues for the six months was estimated at $884,496, which the committee proposed to supply by requiring payment in advance for a year of the direct contributions imposed by previous laws in 1841, 1842, and 1843. The first article of the bill submitted by them declared that the expenses of the war with the United States should be paid in preference to any other demands upon the Treasury. This report and bill were submitted on the 23d of December.

From Yucatan we have further indistinct accounts. They add nothing to our hopes that the department will extricate itself from the intestine struggles which now disturb and injure its commerce. Campeachy would appear to be fully alive to the damage inflicted upon the prospects of the department by the blockade instituted by the United States. The manifesto issued by the revolutionary chief, Barret, had reduced the tax on each Yucatecos to 1 ½ reals monthly. It is said, that a Commission was to be sent to the city of Washington to procure a recognition of the independence of the country; and Commodore Connor had been requested not to attack their towns in the meantime. The manifesto is couched in language to the effect that the union with Mexico exposes Yucatan to “all the evils of war with a powerful nation, which heretofore has manifested the greatest consideration to the country, and which possesses the means of reducing it to the greatest misery by the simple prohibition of exporting its own productions, the sole resource of subsistence for the inhabitants;” and it calls upon all the inhabitants of Yucatan “to join this movement, professing that it is adopted in the spirit of self-preservation, and not with any unkind or hostile feelings towards the Mexican people, for whose happiness, prosperity, and growing strength, they put up the most fervent aspirations.”

The proceedings of Congress since our accounts of the 15^th ult. had been of an interesting but miscellaneous cast; the principal point of note being the refusal of the House of Representatives-ayes 50, nays 60-to receive a bill to appropriate the sum of $2,000,000 for the use of the Executive in regard to Mexico. A similar bill, but for an increased amount of $3,000,000, was introduced into the Senate on the 19^th ult. by Mr. Sevier, of the Committee on Foreign Relations; but no “action” had been had on the bill up to our last accounts. Mr. Sevier premised the introduction of the bill, with the remark that “a speedy close of the war would result from the appropriation.” On the same day a bitter dispute occurred between Colonel Benton and Mr. Calhoun upon a point of form; and, as a indication of the acrimonious feeling which prevails between the Cabinet and the hon. Senator, it is observed that the official journal had absolutely “dared” Mr. Calhoun to introduce the motion which, according to rumour, he contemplated-that the operations of he army and navy should be hence-forth simply confined to the retention and defence of the present acquisitions of he republic. From a document published in the New York journals we learn that this policy is also advocated by General Taylor; and from the same source we learn, also, that Saltillo, according to that commander’s views, is the extreme point to which, on that line, the American troops should advance. The General complains of the want of means of transport-views Vera Cruz as the point whence to reach the capital-and declares a levy of 15,000 volunteers necessary. The date of the letter is not given. The proceedings of Congress had also included a variety of measures for the increase of the pay and grant of lands to the volunteers in the Mexican war, and several resolutions had been adopted calculated to draw from the Executive information relative to the finances, the war, &c. In the House, also, on the Oregon Bill, the slavery question had been again touched upon, more especially in regard to the questioned power of he Central Government of he Union the prohibit slavery in newly acquired territories. In the House, on the 21^st ult., on the Treasury Note Bill, amendments were offered to repeal the tariff of 1846, to impose an additional duty on articles not taxed, and to levy a duty on tea and coffee. The amendments were, however, either lost or declared to be out of order. In the Senate, on the 22d, a resolution was offered by Mr. Cilley, setting forth-

“That speedy and honourable peace with Mexico is exceedingly desirable; that the constitution does not provide for holding foreign territory, nor for incorporating foreign nations with the Union; and that the President be requested to withdraw our troops to some point in the United States on or near the boundary line.”

On the same day, in debate on the Ten Regiments Bill from the Lower House, the Senate rejected-ayes 14, nays 48-a resolution offered by Mr. Houston to change the troops named in the bill from regulars to volunteers, and to make the officers elective.

Washington letters renew rumours previously current with regard to the retirement of Mr. Walker from the Treasury. The Washington Un ion remarks, with regard to a rumour to the effect-

“That General Taylor has been recalled from the army of Mexico, and that the Castle of San Juan de Ulloa is not to be attacked, and also that Commander Perry will not return to the Gulf of Mexico, that ‘Government is in possession of the ultimate conditions on which Mexico will consent to make a peace with the United States, and that it has determined to accede to them, if Congress will enable the Executive to meet the views of Mexico.’ We know not upon what authority these things have been reported, but certain it is we do not believe there is any adequate authority or foundation for either of these statements.”

Mr. Mason, the Secretary of the Navy, had been elected senator for Virginia.

A bill had been introduced into Congress to restrict the importation of foreign paupers and criminals into the United States.

Commercial reports are important. The Hibernia accounts had not arrived at New York up to our latest accounts; but the Quebec (late London) advices had been received, and had advanced the rates for cotton and given firmness to the market for breadstuffs. Exchange was quoted at 106 to 106 ½ per cent. Premium. Money had become more abundant. A large quantity of specie was expected by the steamer from Liverpool. Exports continue to be large’ imports were moderate. Shipping continued in great demand, and to London and different parts of Ireland there had been an increased request. The American Government had taken up a large number of vessels as transport ships for the Gulf of Mexico. The weather was rather more severe. The thermometer at New York, on the 23d, at noon, stood at 21 deg. The St. Lawrence, we learn, was frozen over at Ogdensburg, and teams could cross the stream. Philadelphia letters stated that the river was much obstructed by ice. New Orleans dates are to the 13^th ult. W subjoin a detailed report.

The Pennsylvanian debt interest would be paid on the 1^st inst., in due course. The sum necessary, however, was to be obtained on loan. The Georgian interest would be paid in advance, according to the New York Courier.

From the Indian territory we hear of a conflict between a band of Omahas and Sioux. 60 of he former were slain.

The Queen of the West spoke the steam-ship Cambria, hence to Boston, on the 7^th inst.

The Hibernia may be expected in the Mersey, on her return, about the evening of Sunday next. Lest her non-arrival outward should create anxiety, in view of the large amount of specie taken out, we may mention that the Hibernia, at the date of our New York accounts, was then only 17 ½ days out. The voyage of he same vessel at the corresponding period of 1846 occupied 18 ½ days; and that of he Cambria, at the same period of 1845, occupied 19 ½ days.

Canadian accounts extend to the 16^th ultimo. The contents are, generally, unimportant to our readers. Our journals contain the annual report of the Toronto Board of Trade for the year ended on the 30^th of December last. It is extremely lengthy. An address was being prepared by the citizens of Montreal to greet the arrival of Lord Eldon in the province assigned to his care. The electric telegraph was about to be extended from Quebec to Halifax.
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LT 1847. February 18, page 5a

HER MAJESTY’S Ambassadors abroad no sooner receive a slight than they display their spirit in the same distinguished manner. But General Taylor, who commands the American forces in Mexico, has certainly given the most signal example of this prevailing indiscretion by writing a full account of all the difficulties and weaknesses of that army under his orders to a friend, who of course follows the universal practice, and prints the letter the next morning. To contemporary journalists, and to future historians, these authentic materials spare an infinite deal of speculation and research. We ourselves are under an obligation to every man who commits one of these acts of folly and impropriety. But whilst these eminent persons contend with ourselves for the honour of instructing the public and diverting our readers, it were to be wished that they sometimes remembered that their peculiar duties are not identical with those which we endeavour to discharge.

General Taylor’s letter, which has called forth these remarks, and which we publish elsewhere, is beyond all comparison the most imprudent and absurd display of this kind of vanity which we have ever met with. It amounts to little short of treachery towards the Government which that officer serves; it demonstrates the extravagance of their policy, the inadequacy of their resources, the imposibility of bringing the Mexicans to sue for peace by any demonstration the American army can make in the field, and the hopeless aspect of the contest in which the Government of the United States has engaged itself. Mr. Polk’s bitterest enemy could have said nothing so fatal to his character as a statesman, or to the policy of his Administration, as these unparalleled disclosures of the General-in Chief who is engaged in carrying that policy into effect. And the conduct of General Taylor is the more reprehensible, inasmuch as he appears to have been led to make this strange communication immediately after the receipt of a despatch from the Cabinet of Washington, blaming the terms he had granted to the enemy at the capitulation of Monterey.

Nothing can be more preposterous than the pretensions of he American Government, when we are made acquainted with the real amount of the forces they had placed at General Taylor’s disposal. A detachment of 6,250 men, of whom only 2,700 were regulars, and the rest volunteers, was all that could be brought to act against Monterey in October last. Their train of artillery was small and ineffective; their only mode of transport consisted of 1,700 pack mules, collected with the greatest difficulty in the enemy’s country. General Taylor, relying on the personal intrepidity of his little army, declares that he could have taken Monterey by storm; but he says that the evacuation of such a position “nearly as strong as Quebec”(?)-with a great superiority of numbers and of artillery on the part of the enemy, “is among the unaccountable occurrences “of the times.” It is evident that for he second time since the commencement of this war the American forces narrowly escaped a destructive repulse, or at least a most perilous and desperate operation. All this time, from the first declaration of war until the 2d of November, the army had received no supplies or waggons. Its movements had been completely crippled. The mounted regiments from Tennessee and Kentucky were nearly five months on their way to the headquarters of he army, and as they were only raised for a limited period of service, they were hardly arrived in the field when they might claim to be sent back to their homes. The volunteers had, as might be expected, been greatly thinned by sickness and casualties; and the General sums up this lamentable narrative of he campaign by a declaration that he will advance no further than Saltillo-that the distance of 360 miles from Saltillo to San Luis Potosi cannot be crossed by the army for want of roads and water-and that if operations are undertaken against the city of Mexico, they must be based on the line of Vera Cruz. There is not one of these difficulties which we had not anticipated from the commencement of the war, and we are by no means surprised that they should have paralyzed the American army. These reverses and failures, in which the enemy has had little or no part, are the natural consequences of proclaiming a war policy without having the foresight or the power to adopt all the measures of preparation which a state of war demands. The burdens already imposed by the war on the people of the United States, although they are onerous enough to have excited universal dissatisfaction are wholly inadequate to enable a nation uprovided with any effective naval or military establishment to carry on vast aggressive operations. Mr. Polk’s war is ridiculous and contemptible. It is originated in injustice, it was justified by hypocrisy, it has been carried on with impotence. The only chance of a speedy termination or a successful issue is the treachery of he most influential leader of the Mexican people; but although various significant attempts have been made by the Cabinet of Washington to obtain from Congress the means of buying a peace, we trust Santa Anna will not incur the infamy of such a transaction.

These matters are of small importance in themselves, and can have no decisive influence on the history of our time; but they throw a clear and instructive light on the working of those democratic institutions which are the pride, or the peculiarity, of the United States of America. We see a war begun principally for party purposes by a President who evades the express provisions of he constitution for the declaration of war by Congress, and orders the troops of the United States to march into a neighbouring territory. We find the General who commands this army publicly complaining of the want of reinforcements and supplies, disclosing and denouncing the schemes of he Government, and discussing the policy of the war. We learn that the Congress, although pledged to carry on the war, refuses the most natural financial expedients proposed by the Executive Government, and that in this respect it fairly represents the determination of the people to submit to no fresh taxes. We know that the army and the fleet are in reality so ineffective that they can attempt no decisive operations even against a country which employs no active means of defence. Every one must foresee that the war will end in some compromise more humiliating to the United States than to Mexico, and fatal to the reputation of the Government which engaged in this shameful enterprise. Yet, notwithstanding all these facts, which are better known in America than in Europe, Mr. Polk continues to misdirect the policy of his country, and some years more must elapse before the United States will be relived from the active influence of a policy whose evil consequences will outlive this generation.
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LT 1847-2-18-5d
Gen. Taylor letter to Gen. Gaines on Mexican affairs

*The letter is as follows, some unimportant portions being omitted. It is dated Monterey, Nov. 9, 1846 :-

"After considerable apparent delay on the part of the quarter-master's department in getting steam-boats into the Rio Grande adapted to its navigation, I succeeded, towards the latter part of August, in throwing forward to Camargo (a town situated on the San Juan river, three miles from its junction with Rio Grande, on the west side, nearly 500 miles from Brazos Island by water, and 200 by land, and 140 from this place) a considerable depot of provisions, ordnance, ammunition, and forage; and then, having brought together an important portion of my command, I determined on moving on this place. Accordingly, after collecting 1,700 pack mules, with their attendants and conductors, in the enemy's country (the principal means of transportation for our provisions, baggage, &c.), I left, on the 5th of September, to join my advance, which had preceded me a few days to Serralvo, a small village 75 miles on the route, which I did on the 9th; and, after waiting there a few days for some of the corps to get up, moved on, and reached here on the 19th, with 6,250 men, 2,700 regulars, the balance volunteers. For what took place afterwards I must refer you to my several reports, particularly to my detailed one of the 9th ult. I do not believe the authorities at Washington are at all satisfied with my conduct in regard to the terms of the capitulation entered into with the Mexican commander, which you no doubt have seen, as they have been made public through the official organ and copied into various other newspaper. I have this moment received an answer to my despatch, announcing the surrender of Monterey and the circumstances attending the same, from the Secretary of War, stating that 'It was regretted by the President that it was not deemed advisable to insist on the terms I had proposed in my first communication to the Mexican commander, in regard to giving up the city, adding that 'the circumstances which dictated, no doubt justified the change.'

"Although the terms of 'capitulation' may be considered too liberal on our part by the President and his advisers, as well as by many others at a distance, particularly by those who do not understand the position that we occupied (otherwise they might come to a different conclusion in regard to the matter), yet, on due reflection, I see nothing to induce me to regret the course I pursued. The proposition on the part of General Ampudia, which had much to do in determining my course in the matter, was based on the ground that our Government had proposed to him to settle the existing difficulties by negotiation, (which I knew was the case without knowing the result), which was then under consideration by the proper authorities, and which he (General Ampudia) had no doubt would result favourably, as the whole of his people were in favour of peace. If so, I considered the further effusion of blood not only unnecessary, but improper. Their force was also considerably larger than ours, and from the size and position of the place we could not completely invest it; so that the greater portion of their troops, if not the whole, had they been disposed to do so, could any night have abandoned the city, at once entered the mountain passes, and effected their retreat, do what we could. Had we been put to the alternative of taking the place by storm (which there is no doubt we should have succeeded in doing), we should, in all probability, have lost 50 or 100 men in killed, besides the wounded, which I wished to avoid, as there appeared to be a prospect of peace, even if a distant one. I also wished to avoid the destruction of women and children, which must have been very great had the storming process been resorted to. Besides, they had a very large and strong fortification a short distance from the city, which, if carried with the bayonet, must have been taken at great sacrifice of life, and, with our limited train of heavy or battering artillery, it would have required 20 or 25 days to take it by regular approaches.

"That they should have surrendered a place nearly as strong as Quebec, will fortified under the direction of skilful engineers, their works garnished with 42 pieces of artillery, abundantly supplied with ammunition, garrisoned by 7,000 regular and 2,000 irregular troops, in addition to some thousand citizens capable of (and no doubt actually) bearing arms, and aiding in its defence, to an opposing force of half their number, scantily supplied with provisions, and with a light train of artillery, is among the unaccountable occurrences of the times.

"I am decidedly opposed to carrying the war beyond Saltillo in this direction, which place has been entirely abandoned by the Mexican forces, all of whom have been concentrated at San Luis Potosi, and I shall lose no time in taking possession of the former, as soon as the cessation of hostilities referred to expires, which I have notified to the Mexican authorities will be the case on the 11th inst., by direction of the President of the United States.

"If we are (in the language of Mr. Polk and General Scott) under the necessity of 'conquering a peace,' and that by taking the capital of the country, we must go to Vera Cruz, take that place, and then march on to the city of Mexico. To do so in any other direction I consider out of the question. But admitting that we conquer a peace by doing so - say at the end of the next 12 months - will the amount of blood and treasure which must be expended in doing so be compensated by the same? I think not, especially if the country we subdue is to be given up; and I imagine there are but few individuals in our country who think of annexing Mexico to the United States.

"I do not intend to carry on my operations (as previously stated) beyond Saltillo - deeming it next to impracticable to do so. It then becomes a question as to what is best to be done. It seems to me the most judicious course to be pursued on our part would be, to take possession at once of the line we would accept by negotiation, extending from the Gulf of Mexico to the Pacific, and occupy the same, or keep what we already have possession of; and that, with Tampico (which I hope to take in the course of the next month, or as soon as I can get the means of transportation), will give us all on this side of the Sierra Madre, and, as soon as I occupy Saltillo, will include six or seven states or provinces, thus holding Tampico, Victoria, Monterey, Saltillo, Monclova, Chihuahua (which I presume General Wool has possession of by this time), Santa Fe`, and the Californias, and say to Mexico, 'Drive us from the country;' - throwing on her the responsibility and expense of carrying on an offensive war; at the same time closely blockading all her ports on the Pacific and the Gulf. A course of this kind, if persevered in for a short time, would soon bring her to her proper senses, and compel her to sue for peace, provided there is a Government in the country sufficiently stable for us to treat with, which, I fear, will hardly be the case for many years to come. Without large reinforcements of volunteers from the United States - say 10,000 or 15,000 (those previously sent out having already been greatly reduced by sickness and other casualties) - I do not believe it would be advisable to march beyond Saltillo, which is more than 200 miles beyond our depots on the Rio Grande - a very long line on which to keep up supplies (over a land route, in a country like this) for a large force, and certain to be attended with an expense which will be frightful to contemplate when closely looked into.

"From Saltillo to San Luis Potosi, the next place of importance on the road to Mexico, is 30 miles - 140 badly watered, where no supplies of any kind could be procured for men or horses. I have informed the War Department that 20,000 efficient men would be necessary to ensure success if we move on that place (a city containing a population of 60,000, where the enemy could bring together and sustain, besides the citizens, an army of 50,000), a force which I apprehend will hardly be collected by us with the train necessary to feed it, as well as to transport various other supplies, particularly ordnance and munitions of war.

"In regard to the armistice, which would have expired by limitation in a few days, we lost nothing by it, as we could not move even now had the enemy continued to occupy Saltillo; for, strange to say, the first waggon which has reached me since the declaration of war, was on the 2d inst., the same day on which I received only 125, so that I have been since May last completely crippled, and am still so, for want of transportation. I could bring here only 80,000 rations (15 days' supply), with a moderate supply of ordnance, ammunition, &c., to do which all the corps had to leave behind a portion of their camp equipage necessary for their comfort, and, in some instances, among the volunteers, their personal baggage. I moved in such a way, and with such limited means, that had I not succeeded, I should no doubt have been severely reprimanded, if nothing worse. I did so to sustain the administration.

* * * * * * * * * * * *

"Of the two regiments of mounted men form Tennesse and Kentucky, who left their respective states to join me in June, the latter has just reached Camargo; the former had not got to Matamoras at the latest dates from thence. Admitting that they will be as long in returning as in getting there, to say nothing of the time necessary to recruit their horses, and were to be discharged in time to reach their homes, they could serve in Mexico but a very short time. The foregoing remarks are not made with the view of finding fault with any one, but to point out the difficulties with which I have had to contend.

" Monterey, the capital of New Leon, is situated on the San Juan river, where it comes out of the mountains, - the city (which contains a population of about 12,000) being in part surrounded by them, at the head of a large and beautiful valley. The houses are of stone, in the Moorish style, with flat roofs, which, with their strongly enclosed yards and gardens of high stone walls, all looped for musketry, make them each a fortress within itself. It is the most important place in Northern Mexico (or on the east side of the Sierra Madre), commanding the only pass or road for carriages form this side, between it and the Gulf of Mexico, to the table lands of the Sierra, by or through which the city of Mexico can be reached."
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LT 1847-2-22-6d
Blockade of Mexico

THE BLOCKADE OF MEXICO.-The following is the report of the British bark Columbine, Rose master, from Laguna, sailed on the 28th of December, 1846:-" The American fleet took possession of Laguna on the 21st of December without any resistance; the steamer Vixen and two war schooners came inside the harbour, leaving the Mississippi steam-frigate outside, with some sloops of war; Commodore Perry then declared the port under blockade, and gave my vessel, and also the Camoena notice and permission to leave, and endorsed my register, warning me not to attempt to enter any Mexican port, as the whole coast was under blockade from Rio del Norte to Cape Catouche. The port of Laguna is now strictly blockade by steamers and sailing-vessels. Left no other vessels at Laguna but the Camoena, and she was to sail the day after me.

"(Copy of Endorsation on the register of the vessel.)

"Laguna de Ternains, Dec. 20, 1846.

" I certify that I have boarded the British bark Columbine, and have warned her leave this port within 15 days.

" The whole coast of Mexico coast of Mexico and Yucatan, extending from the RD del Norte to Cape Catouche, has been declared by the Commander-in-Chief of the United States Naval Forces in the Gulf of Mexico under strict blockade, and all vessels are accordingly warned not to attempt entering any port of the said coast.

"M.C. PERRY, Commander, United States Navy, and commanding & Detachment of United States vessels.

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LT 1847-2-25-4e Mexican War

The accounts periodically received in this country of the Mexican war are so strange and perplexing as utterly to confuse the judgements of those who have only studied such matters in the prosaic history of the older world. We are informed in reiterated despatches that Mexican numbers have offered no mentionable obstacle to American valour, and we certainly hear of authenticated exploits which are astounding enough to warrant the most sweeping inferences of Saxon ascendancy. A 16-gun sloop impounds a province ; a regiment of volunteers annexes a quarter of a continent ; and towns are taken by fifty men and garrisoned by five-and-twenty, in the midst of a numerous and exasperated population. The armies of the west and of the centre, of conquest and of occupation, are all represented by detachments which would hardly if concentrated make up one effective division. Congress has decreed a gold medal to the enterprising general who has covered his country's arms with such imperishable glory and the first magistrate of the republic appeals triumphantly to the war of his own creation, as the noblest action of the State, and the grand distinction of his reign.

Side by side with this striking intelligence we find it announced that the most energetic efforts of the victors are directed, hitherto unsuccessfully, to procure a peace. Their general writes a letter home, which, with the pleasing promiscuousness of American confidence, is of course published in a newspaper, stating the utter hopelessness of the position which the victorious troops have won, and the entire worthlessness of the conquests for which he is about to be rewarded. The parties best satisfied are the defeated and invaded people. As their country happily affords plenty of sea-room for the political storm, they can retire from one post to another, and extemporize a metropolis at a few hours' notice. Omne solum forti patria. Towns are politely evacuated for the use of the stranger, who is only embarrassed by the ease with which he might march in any direction, if he were not so tired of his journey. The ingenuity of generals and commodores is taxed to the utmost to discover some means, in addition to repeated defeats, which may induce this perverse enemy to give up his decided "preference for war." One scheme suggests the continuation of a line of forts from Tampico to Mazatlan, which should cut off the northern moiety of the Mexican territory, so that a tract of some fifteen or twenty degrees in depth may be held in pawn till its proprietors choose to "attend to negotiation." Commodore PERRY advises the capture of all the ports both on the Gulf and on the Pacific, and the relinquishment of all the interior provinces, except such as they may "think "fit to keep," so that a thriving border of free and enlightened Americans may be planted all round Mexico, like a belt of young firs round a turnip-field, though for purposes less beneficial than those of shelter or ornament. This project of hermetically sealing up an entire people till they "ask to be let "out" has attracted great admiration, and the highest "qualities of true statesmanship." Mr. BENTON has a third plan, which has a t least the magnificence of obscurity, and we have to lament that we cannot give our readers its details, as they are, unfortunately, not yet disclosed. Mr. BENTON declines to release his country from the horrors of war except for a consideration. He sets his secret at no less a price than the Lieutenant-Generalship of the States - a price which the States, with a cautious economy of confidence have declined to pay. We can only conjecture at the character of this mysterious scheme from the enticing hints which its author threw out on the 25th of last month as he dangled a closed roll of paper containing the important plans before the eyes of the tantalized Senate. He alleged - of course as its peculiar and distinctive features - that it " was not "framed in total ignorance of Mexican resources," but promised "an issue and a result." Another striking novelty in its conception was "a diplomatic mission "nationally constituted both in a political and a geographical sense, to attend the head-quarters, and while the Minister stood ready to negotiate at every step, the army was to take an organization and an attitude to give emphasis to negotiation." It must be admitted that this provision strikes at the very root of the evil ; for the proposed ambulance of plenipotentiaries being wheeled rapidly up to the critical part of the field, might perhaps surprise the defeated parties into that "honourable peace" which they would be sure to decline the next morning. When we add, that the scheme provided the "subsistence of the invaders by duties regularly paid, and contributions regularly collected," and concluded by promising "a death worthy of the soldier - the battle-storm his embrace - the field of honour his bed - and the lofty summits of the Cordilleras his monument and his grave," we are sure our readers must be astonished that their Transatlantic brethren did not at once take Mr. BENTON at his own appraisement, and make him a CROMWELL on the spot.

The point most perplexing to ordinary European minds is the object for which this much-desired peace is sought. If the provinces and ports, the people and property, the taxes and customs of a nation can be seized and distributed ad libitum already, it is hard to conceive what further advantages are to be gained by the most amicable negotiations. What does President POLK want to buy with 2,000,000 of dollars, when he can get so much for nothing? PHILIP of Macedon's receipt for taking a fort was sensible enough, but who ever drove an ass laden with silver into an unprotected town? The Mexicans have clearly the vantage-ground of their foes. Defeat and invasion may easily be put up with when they leave the conquerors beggars and the vanquished choosers. SANTA ANNA is flattered with compliments and beset with solicitations, and has the daily refusal of half-a-dozen overtures of the eternal amity of his enemies. He can hardly do better than strengthen himself by additional defeats and fresh repulses, and leave his adversaries to complete their humiliation and embarrassments by a protracted career of glory.
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LT 1847-3-11-6b Mexico, appropriation of Church property and protests

The following is the Decree for the appropriation of Mexican church property to national purposes.

The Vice-President of the United Mexican States, exercising the Supremo Executive Power, to the inhabitants of the Republic. Be it known that the General Congress has decreed as follows: --

1. Government is authorized to raise $15,000,000, in order to continue the w

The Mexican-American War and the Media, 1845-1848