Mexican-American War and the Media

We have already spoken in terms of merited approbation of the courteous tone which pervades the communications of Mr. Buchanan with Mr. Pakenham on the Oregon question. Such praise is due not only to the style of his correspondence, but also to the ability by which it is characterized. But whilst we are ready to allow this generally, we see no reason for retracting the charges which we have before advanced of special pleading and verbal sophistries, against his final note to Mr. Pakenham.

It seems to us that Mr. Pakenhan's argument is a fair one. The claim of the Americans to he Oregon territory must be founded either on prior occupancy, or on the transfer by Spain. It cannot rest on both. If the occupancy were undoubted both in time and kind - if it had been accompanied by all the external symbols of property as well as all the evidences of undivided possession - then an alienation by Spain after an interval of 30 years would be worth nothing at all, for Spain would have in that case transferred what she hd no right to; and the American title would thus be good as one of prior occupancy only. But if on the other hand America founds her pretensions to the Oregon on a cession by Spain made in the year l8l9, any previous occupation can only be considered as an usurpation; and a state has no more right than an individual to fortify its title by its own wrong. The prior occupation and the after cession may be cited as distinct facts, but they cannot confer one title. Two bad titles can no more make one good one than two affirmatives can make a negative. By putting forward the cession by Spain the American Minister destroys the claim arising from an earlier right; and likewise by appealing to this antecedent right, he destroys all the validity of the Spanish cession. Instead of the two titles coalescing, they are repugnant and mutually destructive. Nor is this a question of words, but of consequences. For if America's right be founded on the early possession, it can only be of the same kind as the possession itself was. If that was divided and distributed, this right can only be divided and distributive one.

Even if that ownership were distributive - if it were, on a grand scale, a permicetpertout tenancy - the argument is not affected by it. Supposing this to have been the case, Spain could only have alienated a moiety of her proprietorship and not the exclusive possession of the whole territory; and most certainly the United States could not acquire a claim to an exclusive sovereignty by such an alienation.

In either case, then, it appears to us that the republic has no right to more than a moiety of the disputed territory upon any ground of right, whether lst prior occupancy; or 2dly a transfer from Spain be alleged in support of that right. For the first is too doubtful, as a matter of fact, to be relied on singly; and as far as it goes it tends to subvert the second; and the second, if admitted irrespectively of the first is impaired by a previous treaty between England and Spain.

But we question whether either two nations be disposed to settle the matter as one of right merely. The fact of first occupation is obscure; of first ownership nearly as obscure. Two things alone are neither obscure nor doubtful. First, that since the year l790, at any rate British subjects have been settled in the Oregon, and have had the privilege of using the river Columbia; secondly, that it is an object of equal interest both to British and American subjects to have this privilege continued to them. Let any man sense and impartiality take a broad and liberal view of the points at issue between the two countries, and what facts present themselves to his notice> Why these - That from a period antecedent to the year l790 some British settlers, and from a period posterior to the year l8l8 both British and American settlers, have cultivated the valley, and navigated the river and enjoyed the harbour of the Columbia. And now, at last, when both British and American colonists have certainly for 30 and probably for 60 years together, been tilling, buying, selling, sailing, anchoring, importing and exporting from and to the banks of the Columbia, an American Minister discovers that the Oregon territory once belonged to Spain, and was with all its rights and privileges transferred by Spain to the republic. What would any man of sense say to such a statement as this? Why, that the title of Spanish alienation, even supposing it to have been valid for 45 years ago, could not stand against the prescriptive use of 60 years; and that British subjects who had for upwards of half a century possessed with American citizens the usufruct of that great district, the easement of its capacious river, and the license of traffic with the Indians, might indeed be driven out by force, but could not be evicted by justice. But if, in addition to this, it were made to appear that long before the treat of Florida - in the year l790 - Spain had claimed that at that time a British Minister, Mr. Pitt, had described this claim as the "most absurd and exorbitant that could well be imagined - a claim which they had never heard of before, which was indefinite in its extent, had originated in no treaty nor formal establishment of a colony, nor rested on any one of those grounds on which claims of sovereignty, navigation and commerce usually rested: - that similar language was used by the peace-loving leader of the opposition, Mr. Fox - that in return to the remonstrances of the English Court the Spanish Monarch replied, that "His Most Catholic Majesty had at no time pretended to any rights in any ports, seas or places other than what properly belonged to his crown, and that the rights and immemorial possession of Spain in those parts were still not quite certain;" - that after this repudiation and a second extravagant reassertion of Spanish authority, the Spanish Minister finally consented to make reparation for the insult offered to the English crown, and restitution of property to English subjects of both states should be at liberty to carry on their trade and make settlements, as well in the places which were to be restored to the British subjects as in all other parts of the north-western coast of North America, wherever the subjects of either of the two Powers might have made settlements since April, l789; whereas in South America it was provided by the same treaty that "no settlement should be formed on the eastern or western coasts of it, either by English or Spaniards, in such parts of those coasts as were situated to the south of the territory already occupied by Spain;" - if we say that these facts were acknowledged - and acknowledged they must be, for they are matters of history - what we ask is the inference that any impartial and intelligent man would draw from such premises? Simply this, that Spain had no exclusive sovereignty in North America; that she had formed settlements on the coast on the same terms and in the same way as England had; that by the express phraseology of the Florida treaty, a contrast is stated between the "not quite"certain" rights of Spain in North America and her recognized authority in South; and that, therefore the United States could only come in as joint tenants with Great Britain, and have no earthly right to eject Great Britain from possession. Spain and Great Britain agreed to share the whole coast district between them, share and share alike. The United States are now in the place of Spain.
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LT 1846/1/3/4b Oregon Question

LONDON, Saturday, January 3, l846

We think it must be tolerably clear to the generality of unprejudiced minds, that, on the grounds of positive right, the American Republic cannot claim the Oregon territory; and we think it is equally clear that the matter cannot be determined at all on grounds of abstract right. In this respect the United States are nearly in the same predicament as Spain was in the year l789. Spain asserted a proud and unlimited claim to the whole northwest coast of America. In the belief, or assumed belie, of a just title to this vast empire, she seized on the ships, the cargoes, and the persons of British sailors, and destroyed the huts and factories of British settlers. The Spanish Minister, Florida Blanca, supported the violence of Don Esteman in a memorial which justified the pretensions urged by the former in favour of his country to a district extending as far as the 64d parallel of north latitude. But when the matter was sifted, it came out that these gigantic pretensions rested on a vague expression in the 8^th article of the Treaty of Utrecht; that no insignia of Spanish sovereignty had been exclusively displayed, no Spanish settlements exclusively founded, on that coast. That there had been Spanish settlers was true. That Spanish vessels had been in the habit of touching there was also true. True, too that those seas had in that and the preceding century were still not quite certain. What, then did England propose, under the counsels of Mr. Pitt; and what did Spain assent to, under the administration of Count Florida Blanca? The one proposed and the other accepted, conditions which every man who loves peace and justice must approve now, as they were approved then by the friends of peace and equity - condition of joint occupancy, extending over the whole of the northwest of North American hitherto claimed by Spain.
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LT 1846/1/8/5b Mexico, affairs of

AMERICA, January 8, l846

The New York Courier and Enquirer of the l0th contains the following:

A letter which we publish this morning from our Washington correspondent contains a statement which may be deemed as having an important bearing upon our relations with Great Britain, and will be found confirmatory of the opinions expressed by ourselves on that subject. An interview of some length had taken place between Mr. Buchanan and the British Minister, undoubtedly on the Oregon question, and if, as the rumour is at Washington, Lord Aberdeen has expressed the feeling imputed to him in relation to Mr. Pakenham's correspondence with our Government, it is certainly of some importance."

RUMOURS OF CABINET CHANGES:

The return of Mr. Calhoun and the elevation of Mr. Walker to the Bench continued afloat. The Oregon question was brought up in the Senate on the l7 ult as follows:

FROM THE NEW YORK HERALD

General Cass moved the adoption of the resolutions which he submitted last week to with instructions to the committee on naval affairs to inquire into the condition of the navy, and to the military committee to institute a similar inquiry into the condition of the land defences, and to the militia committee rejected its reorganization all of which inquiries were to be considered with the view of an efficient preparation by land and sea, against the dangers apprehended of a foreign invation. General Cass said it was impossible to read the annual message of the President, and the commentaries of the public press, without the apprehension that a crisis is arriving which will demand the cordial cooperation of the whole country. The President tells us in his message that negotiations are closed - that the claims of the two nations have failed to be settled by arbitration. The influence of England with the European Powers, from which an arbitrator would have had to b e chosen, had doubtless decided our authorities against the process - that we had better hold on than submit to a Royal arbitrator. Conceding his entire and cordial adhesion to the views of the President, in the present attitude of the two nations, arising from their conflicting claims, what are we to do. Shall we recede or st and still or go on? To recede was not to be thought of at this stage of the question There was nothing to be gained from national pusillanimity - we cannot purchase present peace at the expense of the national honour. It would be sowing the wind and reaping the whirlwind. No. General Cass would not repeat what he had expressed heretofore that it was better to fight for the first inch of Oregon than the last to better meet the enemy at the threshold, than await his approach to the hearthstone. And however separated now by party difference, or by space, al parties throughout the Union to its extremities, he knew would be united in defense of the national rights. Our destiny is onward - its westward movement cannot be resisted; you might as well attempt to stay the waves of the Pacific as the tide or our emigration setting in that direction. We cannot recede, we cannot stand still, our claim must be maintained or abandoned. Our hardy population of Oregon demanded the support of the Government, or they would establish a government of their own. We had an explicit and able memorial upon this very subject last week, setting forth that the memoralists were tired of waiting for you and would cast off all diplomatic chicanery and national pusillanimity, and set up for themselves. It was impossible that a people under two distinct Governments at the same, as are the people of Oregon, could under the existing state of things, long remain so. This point Government was not designed for a civilized and growing community, nor adapted to them, and if continued, could not fail to lead to bloodshed. It is hoped that England would yield, rightfully and honourably, in order to the peaceful settlement of this question. But will she? It was safest to act upon the conclusion that she will not. When did she, in any case where she had fastened upon a claim to territory or power, relinquish it of her own accord: Never had she exhibited no symptoms of relaxation of her hold upon Oregon. (Here General Cass referred to the London Morning Chronicle of the 5^th of April last, and read extracts from the debate in Parliament of the previous day, particularly from the speeches of Lord John Russell and Sir Robert Peel, bullying Brother Jonathan upon the Oregon title, the President of the United States having assumed that our title to the whole or Oregon is clear and unquestionable." Sir Robert Peel, on the contrary, roundly asserting that the British claim was clearly irresistible." General Cass, in his commentaries and congratulated our country that we secured Texas in spite of her collusions to wrest it from us. Recurring to what he esteemed as almost an inevitable alternative of the future, General Cass briefly reviewed, in the aggregate the power and dominion of Great Britain. This little narrow island, on the western frontiers of Europe, held dominion over l53,000,000 of people or nearly one-fifth of the population of the glove. She held, subject to her laws, an aggregate territory of 3,8l2,000 square miles, or nearly one-eighth of the surface of the habitable earth, all of which, from the subjugation of Ireland (saving the acquisition of Scotland, and certain discoveries in the South Seas), she had torn from the original possessors by the sword. It afforded no pleasure to review her ambitious policy; but we could not shut our eyes to the fact, that she had been prosecuting, and is now pursuing, a systematic attack upon our institutions. And yet we had been charged as an ambitious and grasping nation. To this, we can reply that we have made but three acquisitions of territory (Florida, Louisiana and Texas) all of contiguous territory, and all peacefully, and with the assent of the possessors and the inhabitants and our latest acquisition and best (Texas) was a proud example of the moral power of our Republican system. It was our latest acquisition but he hoped not our last. There was nothing to fear from the extension of our borders. If this administration could secure the peaceable acquisition of California, it would receive the lasting gratitude of the people. California, of course California, we must have that and then Cuba. We have started and must go on. We must give the twelve months' notice and if England persists in her claims, war must inevitably follow; and it will be a war in which all the strength and the prejudices of both nations will be brought into force. Let us then make adequate preparation. Le us show to the world that we are a united people, anxious for peace, yet prepared for war. The President had discharged his duty ably and fearlessly. Let us cooperate with him not by words but by deeds. The only means of preventing war is an immediate preparation for prosecuting it will all the means and energies we command. Vast portions of our country are but sparsely settled, and they are without defenses; our navy is not in a condition for active and efficient protection of our coasts. Means and materials are wanted - men are always ready. We have to do with a people who have arsenals, depots, dockyards filled to repletion, and with a Government better fitted than ours for prompt action. But let us show to our constituents that we are ready for duty; and that we meet the assumptions of England, not in a spirit of deprecation, but in a tone of firmness and self reliance. Let us show the world that republics are jealous of their rights and prepared to defend them and well as monarchies. Mr. Mangum, in a very energetic and eloquent manner, followed against the adoption of the resolutions. We regret that our time will not permit even a thread of his remarks. He argued that the resolutions and the remarks upon them by the senator from Michigan were injudicious. This matter could be more properly confided to the Executive - he could advise the Senate, with closed doors, of the means of defense required; and this would be wiser than inviting the enemy by an exposure of our weakness/ Besides the committee would inquire, of course into the subjects introduced in the resolutions, with out instruction. He opposed to plunging the country into a war; he prayed to God that this worst of all evils might be averted; but if it did come, then there would not, he believed, be an anti-war man on the continent. He believed, however, there would be no war; but that this dispute would be yet satisfactorily and amicably adjusted. If a war were to break out, it would be, not a war for Oregon, but a war between the antagonistic systems of the European monarchies and republican institutions. It would enlist every man on this continent our side, and half of Europe would revolt against it. He hoped the resolutions would be permitted to lie over. But the Senate refused.
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LT 1846/1/9/3f Real del Monte mines

January 9, l846, The Real Del Monte Mines

To the Editor of the Times:

Sir - In the letter from your correspondent in Mexico, which appears in this morning's Times, there is a paragraph relating to the Real del Monte Mines, and in that paragraph a statement which is calculated to create considerable alarm amongst the shareholders of the company. It is to the effect that that the earthquake of the 7^th of April last caused such a flood of water to be poured into the two principal veins that all the power of steam cannot keep It under." Now although the water has been troublesome and is still very abundant, it is the fact that the drainage of the mines is at this moment fully maintained by three steam engines, viz., one of 75 inch cylinder, and two of 30 inch cylinder each; while the company has unemployed an engine of 53-inch cylinder, and others of smaller size for use, in case of need, so that I think it may fairly assume that your correspondent has been misinformed on the above point. My object in writing this is to allay any fears which may be caused amongst a large body of shareholders by your correspondent's letter, and if therefore, you can find space for my communication, you will oblige, Sir.

Your very obedient servant, John Phillips, Secretary to the Real del Monte Company, 2 Duke Street, Adelphi, Jan. 8.
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LT 1846/1/14/5d France on the US annexation of Texas

Wednesday, January l4, l846: France and the Annexation of Texas.

Paris Jan 20, l844

Monsieur le Comte - Lord Cowley has read to me a dispatch, written to him by Lord Aberdeen on the project formed at Washington of preparing the annexation of Texas to the United States Confederacy. The principal Secretary for Foreign Affairs expresses in that dispatch the wish to know if the King's Government be disposed to furnish its Envoy to the United States with instructions similar to those which the Britannic envoy will receive to manifest the opposition of his Government to such a project. You may announce to Lord Aberdeen that I shall write to the same effect to Mr. Pagoot. Texas having been acknowledged as independent, by several of the great Powers, and particularly by that which now seems inclined to absorb it, it is evident that we have a right to appreciate the act which now seems inclined to absorb it, it is evident that we have a right to appreciate the act which would annihilate that independence, and to urge the objects to which it may give rise, as respects either right or interests. Those objects are numerous. It is known that even in the United States the wish for annexation in question is far from being unanimous. If the slave states are very anxious for it, in order to subject t a system of Customs' duties, by which they are bound, country whose commercial competition they dread, and above all to secure to themselves, by the acquisition of an ally a preponderance in the confederacy, the other states would, by a natural consequence, view it with extreme repugnance; and though it behooves us not to meddle with that internal contention, the consideration on which it rests is certainly not of a nature to make us lean to the side of the partisans of the annexation. Our direct information from Texas seems, besides, to prove that the majority of the Texan people are contrary to it, and that the thought of it is energetically rejected by the existing Government. It is therefore only by the aid of violence more or less avowed, or more or less disguised, that it could be accomplished; and, I repeat it, it would in no respect suit us to accept such a change.

February l0, l844

Sir - I have received without opposition the despatched you have addressed me unto No. 36, and the date of the 28^th of December last. "What President Tyler's message has disclosed, respecting the projects of the Federal Government, regarding the annexation of Texas to the United States, and what you have written to me about it, could not fail to attract my serious attention. That of the London Cabinet is not less excited as to this question, as you will find by the accompanying copy of a dispatch I addressed on the 29^th of January to Count de st. Aulaire, in consequence of a communication made to me by Lord Aberdeen through the medium of Lord Cowley. This communication referred to the opposition which the English Government proposed offering to any project of incorporating Texas with the Confederacy's territory, as well as to the instructions to be forwarded to Mr. Pakenham, Lord Aberdeen having wished to know whether we had the same intentions I have desired Count de St. Aulaire to inform him that you would receive similar instruction."The last reports from the French Legation in Texas, whilst informing me of the efforts of the Washington Government and its representatives at Amstin to forward annexation, represented President Houston as energetically opposed to any arrangement of that description, and protesting that nothing of the kind should take place so long as he should direct affairs. The language held here by M. Ashbel Smith is not less explicit. Nevertheless, it behoves us to know whether both faithfully express the opinion and wishes of Texas and whether the question of the annexation to the States of the confederacy, if agitated in the Texan Congress, would not be affirmatively resolved on there. That annexation would be lawfully justifiable, but only in the event of its being voluntary, and not the result of violence on the part of the United States - and with us, as well as with England, it is above all on the resistance of the majority of the Texan people to the accomplishment of such a project, that the opposition we should manifest would be founded. But I shall add that even should the annexation be voluntary and freely assented to on the part of Texas,consideration, both political and commercial, would not permit us to view it with indifference; and that under all circumstance, we must wish that the country remain independent.

From all these considerations we must be naturally opposed to any project tending to the absorbtion of Texas by the United States. I know not what the tenor may be of the instructions sent from London to Mr. Pakenham, and consequently how far the English Cabinet intends carrying the manifestation and consequences of its opposition; but I say enough as concerns us not to let you be mistaken as to the attitude you are to assume and the language you are to hold. We manifest our opposition to any violent and forced annexation of Texas to the United States and even should that Republic spontaneously pronounce itself , you would still have to express yourself in such way as to make it known and well recorded by the Federal Government that we cannot behold with indifference such an occurrence and that in the event of its taking place, we could not dispense with very expressly making every lawful reserve as to the alterations that would result in the position and advantages our treaty with the Texan Republic has yielded us in that country. I however confide in your judgment and experience, and you will besides be enabled to come to an understanding with Mr. Pakenham as to this object, which is common to the two legations.
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LT 1846/1/15/4c France and the annexation of Texas issue

THURSDAY, January l5, l846

The despatches which have been laid before the French Chambers with reference to the annexation of Texas, and the part taken by France and England in opposition to that transaction, are documents of great interest, and they completely demonstrate the cordial cooperation of the two Powers in this negotiation. One whole year before the correspondence of Mr. King and Mr. Calhoun, to which we called the attention of the public on the 2d of January, l845, was known in Europe, the French Government had given the most formal and precise instructions to its diplomatic agents in direct contradiction to the system of encouragement and connivance which Mr. Calhoun ascribed to it. In a dispatch from M. Guizot to the French Ambassador in London, dated the 20^th of January, l844, on the Texas question, Mr. Guizot announces, in reply to the question of the Earl of Aberdeen - "Is the French Government disposed to furnish its envoy in the United States with the same instructions as those which will be received by the British Envoy against the annexation? That he will write to Mr. Pageot in the same sense; and adds "Texas having been recognized as independent by several of the great Powers, and particularly by that which now seems desirous of absorbing it, it is evident that we have a right to take into consideration an act by which that independence would be destroyed, and to bring forward the objects to which it is liable, either as regards questions of right or interest." In the despatch to M. Pageot, dated the l0th of February, M Guizot fulfills the promise made to the Early of Aberdeen, and enters with more detail into the subject. Amongst other arguments, he says, "In a political point of view there is connected with the preservation of this independence a a real interest of equilibrium. The union of Texas, by extending the limits of the territory of the United States as far as Rio Grande would as immediate consequence, place the United States in direct contact with Mexico - that is to say in a condition to invade that country whenever it might please the Government of the United States to do so". In concluding this despatch, M.Guizot says "As France was the first of the European Powers to recognize the independence of Texas and to enter into a treaty of commerce and friendship with that republic, it is due to our dignity that what we have solemnly recognized should be preserved and respected.

In spite of the non-success of this negotiation, we see no reason to regret the part assumed by the two great European Powers. They gave the United States and the world a signal proof of their union in support of those principles of political justice and moderation which can nowhere be violated with impunity. They protested against the assumptions of the Cabinet of Washington, when it first affected to deal with the interests of its feebler neighbours on the American continent in the headstrong and arbitrary spirit of unlimited sovereignty; And although the presence of an overwhelming majority of American citizens in the province of Texas had, in fact, extirpated or crushed those parties in the new state which might have maintained its independent existence and therefore rendered our interference in their favour nugatory, the Governments of France and England would have abandoned Mexico and all America to the arrogant domination of the Anglo-American democracy if they had not consistently opposed the annexation of Texas.

The time, however, is now come when the attention of the Governments of Europe must be directed to still more important events, which are already distinctly indicated by the pretensions of Mr. Polk's message, and the whole policy of the United States towards their Spanish neighbours. General Cass's warlike speech in Congress was answered by the cry "We must have California," "We must have Cuba". To the fulfilment of these designs nothing is wanting but opportunity; and unhappily the increasing decrepitude of the native Government of Mexico seems to promise opportunities of spoliation as ample and immediate as the most insatiable aggressor could desire. The letters of our correspondent in Mexico have furnished us with an accurate and lamentable picture of the state of the country. The attempt to send a small detachment of troops into the province of California has proved a miserable failure, and they have not been able, for want of money, to leave the port of Acapulco. The Governor of the province of Sonora has pronounced against the feeble Government of the republic; and every province which is thus successively detached from the confederation may be regarded as a morsel prepared for the next meal of the United States' Government. Finally, it is not improbable that the next mails may bring us tidings of another revolution in the capital, and Herrera will probably sink before Paredes, at the head of the only body of troops which still follow the standard of a leader. In several parts of the country, the Indians and mixed population have availed themselves of this state of complete anarchy to commit acts of violence and pillage; and the European capital invested in various undertakings in Mexico is, more than ever in a situation of great peril. It is clear to demonstration that such a state of things as we now witness is rapidly preparing the whole country for subjugation, and after having asserted their independence of the Court of Madrid, the provinces of New Spain lie prostate at the feet of the Congress of Washington. There is but one solution of the difficulty. Mexico cannot remain as it is. It must either sink without a struggle under the yoke of a neighbouring republic, hostile and opposed to the whole character of its native population by race, by religion, and by institutions, or it must seek by strengthening its connexion with Europe a protection against the spirit of territorial aggrandizement and dominion which is eager to establish an universal sovereignty over the continent of America. Such a connexion with Europe can clearly have but one form and one origin - the form, monarchical; the origin, Spanish. The results of Mexican independence are before the world. The people of Mexico cannot be insensible to their own ruin, however powerless they may be to avert it. Under such circumstances, what would be the effect of the reappearance on the shores of America of that flag of Spain which was originally planted there by the great discoverers and captains of former ages, and which left indestructible traces of its pristine authority in the colonial descendants of the Spanish people? It would be as easy to accomplish the conquest of Mexico at the present moment with a handful of the troops which form the garrison of Cuba, as in the days of the aboriginal Mexican princes. Would it be impracticable to accompany such an expedition with political institution, fitted to the wants of the Mexican people and calculated to rescue them from the perils which threaten their national existence: When we threw out this suggestion some months ago, we confess that it wore an air of romance, and might be received with incredulity. But the more the world has learned of the utter weakness of Mexico and the unquestionable designs of the United States, the more urgent has the case become, and the more practicable the application of the only remedy which has been thought of. As far as Spain herself is concerned, such an enterprise would not be unworthy of the man whose military success and whose resolute character have already restored so much of the lustre of the Spanish monarchy. In Mexico, a Prince of the House of Spain, bringing with him a moderate force to restore order to the country, and the guarantees of a constitutional government for the protection of its liberties, would be hailed with enthusiasm by a considerable party, and would confer inestimable benefits on the people, whilst he would re-establish a natural and salutary conexion with the maritime and constitutional Powers of Europe. Amongst the cognate suitors of Queen Isabella it would not be difficult to point out the very individual best fitted for such an enterprise by his personal qualities and his liberal sentiments. And if the pretensions of the United States were thwarted by a measure with which they have not the most distant right to interfere, they are certainly not in a condition to oppose the united policy of the European Powers, when its sole object would be to preserve a national government in New Spain and to repair the disastrous effects of abortive revolutions upon the provinces which were once annexed to the Spanish crown.
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LT 1846/1/16/5a Oregon question

JANUARY 16, 1846 , OREGON QUESTION

ARRIVAL OF THE ACADIA, LIVERPOOL, TUESDAY

The British and North American Royal mail steamship Acadia arrived in the Mersey this morning, with the usual mails, of the lst instant, from Canada and the United States. These accounts are of great importance. The position of the Oregon question in the House of Congress is most interesting. We annex the usual excellent summary of the New York Courier and Inquirer, and also an outline of the proceedings of Congress. "The year which began so prosperously, and which in its career has, generally speaking, been one of satisfactory results to commercial enterprise, closes in gloom and uncertainty.

The political sky, overcast during the summer, by reason of the annexation of Texas, and the menaced resentment of Mexico, had scarcely become clear again, when graver and more serious concern is inspired by the aspect of our difficulties with Great Britain.

On this head, we design neither unnecessarily to alarm, nor unduly to impart confidence, which we do not ourselves feel in the ultimate preservation of peace between the two countries. Hitherto, we have expressed the belief that all might b e well, notwithstanding present adverse appearances. We are bound now to say that our confidence of such a result is somewhat diminished, not because of any change in the facts of the case, but because of the temper in which, on both sides of the Atlantic, it seems likely to be treated.

The recommendations of the Presidential message respecting Oregon were all subordinate to what might be done without any violation in letter or in spirit, of the treaty of joint occupation; but in both houses of Congress bills have been introduced which go beyond these recommendations and do infringe upon the treaty stipulations. These indeed as yet are only bills, and of course lack the sanction of laws; but that reported by Mr. Douglas, in the House of Representatives is from the Committee on Territories, and comes, therefore, with weight before the House. It proposes the immediate extension of a territorial government over the whole territory of Oregon - thus asserting, or appearing to assert, the sovereignty of the United States over the region in question, and not simply - as it might rightfully do, over citizens of the United States there resident. It also contemplates prospective grants of land to settlers, another assertion of sovereignty. These provisions may possibly be modified, so as to make them conform to the President's recommendations - but the mere proposal of them is an unfavourable indication.

The discussion on this project and others connected with this dispute will not come on in Congress till about the middle of next month; and while this is at its height will come back upon us by the steamer by the 4^th of January, the comments of the English press on the President's message. If the tone and temper of them shall be such as we apprehend, they will reach here at the very moment when exasperation will most certainly be produced thereby, and therefore mischief.

It is not, moreover, calculated to smooth the difficulties; that one hon. Senator of the United States has thrown down the gauntlet publicly for California as next in order for an annexation to the United States; nor that another proposed - though he has since withdrawn the proposal - that this Government should institute negotiations with Spain for the purchase of Cuba. Combining these manifestations with the absolute claim for all Oregon, there may be some hesitation on the part of England - even if otherwise well disposed - to renew in any shape an overture to this Government for the cession of any part of Oregon.

On the other hand, and notwithstanding, these unfavourable manifestations, there is a strong impression that if England should renew the offer made by this Government, and rejected by Mr. Pakenham, of the 49^th parallel, with the freedom of the ports in the straits of Fuca - it must be accepted by us.

In the course of a speech on the resolutions submitted by General Cass, instructing the Committees on Military and Naval Affairs to inquire and report upon the actual condition and necessities of those arms, Mr. Niles, a senator from Connecticut, and a supporter of the Administration, used this emphatic language:--

It was true the negotiation had been broken of, yet it can it probably will be resumed. Whether it was wise in our Government to have renewed the offer made on former occasions, by way of compromise to divide the territory upon the 49^th degree of north latitude, he would not pronounce an opinion, but having made that offer and withdrawn it after it had been declined, he could not see how it well could be refused, should Great Britain hereafter propose that as the basis for compromising the dispute."

This is in coincidence with the sound opinion of sound men of all parties, and it would thence seem that the decision of the question of war or peace is in the hands of the British Government. Can they, for the mere barren triangle of land which constitutes the difference between what they ask and we have offered, be willing to put at hazard the peace of the world? For a war between the United States and England would not long be confined to those two powers.

Certainly both countries have much to lose by such a war, but England most of the two; and surely it is wise on both sides to fortify the claims of peace by the consideration of enlightened self-interest. The first blows of a war between the two countries would - because England is always armed, and the United States are habitually destitute of armour - fall heavily upon us; and national hatred, if the passion exist, might be gratified by the injuries it could inflict on our commerce and on our sea-board. But these would not touch the power of the country, while they would kindle all its spirit and nerve it to efforts, which in the end would be triumphant. Meanwhile, English manufactures would be cut off from our cotton. English trade would be cut off from our consumption - while our own manufactures, increasing and multiplying in every quarter, would weaken permanently and irreparably the sources of the power of England. There is another consideration to which we advert reluctantly, but which, as we are dealing frankly with the whole subject, we think well worthy of being pondered on the other side - the amount of stock of the different states held there.

There are, it has been computed, about $260,000,000 (in round numbers) of stock of the different states now afloat. Of this amount, two thirds are, it is quite safe to assume, held in England. On many of these, the interest has been, and is regularly paid, and as the period comes round for their redemption, they are punctually redeemed." A case in point in the redemption at this moment of some $l,300,000 by the state of New York - of which almost all was held abroad. But if war should supervene between the two countries, and it should be any possibility be conducted on the part of the British, as there has been some threatening that such a war would be - by burnings and devastations, might there not be danger in a country, where the popular vote gives power and makes the law, that a stop would be put to the payment either of the interest or of principal to those, to whom it would only furnish fresh means of annoyance and injury to ourselves. We desire not to press this point, contenting ourselves with suggesting it for the deliberation of those whose influence, for peace or war is certainly not inconsiderable

Leaving their ungrateful speculations, which can only find their apology in the deep anxiety we feel for the preservation of peace, we proceed to give an account of the condition of our markets and money concerns.

There has been great fluctuations in the stock since the lst instant - partly owing to political apprehensions, partly to the large sums locked up in bread stuffs held on speculation and partly to the contraction which the position of the banks requires them to make.

In this state of expansion come rumours of war, which whether well or ill founded, affect public confidence.
[PGC]

LT 1846/1/17/4d United States affairs

JANUARY 17, 1846, LONDON, SATURDAY

The accounts brought by the Acadia from the United States are interesting; but it would, as yet, be premature to draw any positive inference either from the rumours and opinions circulated in that country, or from the legislative transactions which have produced them. Most of the latter are of a formal or preliminary nature, and hardly to be relied on as indications of definite purpose on the part of those who have brought them forward; certainly not as signs of the popular will and determination. It is perfectly natural that, pending the crisis of an indecision, words of swelling import should be uttered, and resolutions of a martial tone proposed; but it would be erroneous to infer from these easy resources of unsettled minds that war is seriously contemplated as the ultimate expedient of our difficulties and aggression desired as the necessary precedent to war.

We attach, therefore, less consequence to sundry vehement speeches and strong propositions in the two Legislative Chambers than the American press seems to claim for them. On the other hand, we feel great satisfaction at the comparative strength and energy of a party which is proverbially weak in all republics, and most obnoxious in young republics - the moderate party; the party which prefers peace to war; compromise to aggrandizement; tranquility to invasion, triumphs, and victories.

An unfavourable impression, however, has been made by the report brought up from the Committee on Territories by Mr. Douglass. It proposes an extension of the American laws and government over the whole territory of Oregon; an extension which supposes the right, and would involve the fact, of American sovereignty over a vast amount of territory which previous negotiations have uniformly and invariably allowed to belong to Great Britain. It suggests that it be considered as part of Wisconsin territory up to 54 deg. 40 min., and that military posts be established therein. Viewed by itself, this is one of the most flagrant projects of injustice which the history of nations records. Nor is it wholly to be condemned. It is not merely the scheme of one man, but the recommendation of a committee. So far it suggests grounds for alarm. But the considerations and modifications which ought to be applied to all strong proposals may safely be applied to this, especially when it is borne in mind that these resolutions must be debated in the House of Representatives before they can assume the form and have the virtue of legislative acts. And we should with very great difficulty, bring ourselves to believe that the representatives of the United States would enact, or the people of the United States ratify, a policy at once heinously unjust and unprovokedly warlike.

Meanwhile, we readily incline to the belief that the opinion of Mr. Niles is one viewed with approbation by the majority of intelligent and influential citizens in the States. He sees no reason why negotiations should not be resumed by an offer on the part of Great Britain to take the parallel of the 49^th degree as the line of boundary; and no reason why, in the event of this offer being made by Great Britain, it should be refused by the republic. We have already stated our opinion most fully on this subject and it is hardly necessary now to repeat it. We still retain our conviction that the offer made by Mr. Gallatin, in the Presidency of Mr. Ad ams, concedes no more than this country is fairly entitled to. That offer was to take the 49^th degree of north latitude as far as the sea as the boundary line, reserving to Great Britain Vancouver's Island, the harbour of St. Juan de Fuca, and the free navigation of the Columbia. We are not covetous of territory. It grieves us not to lose a few hundred miles of barren domain. We would sacrifice the costly ostentation of imperious pretensions at the altar of justice. We would surrender an undoubted right for the preservation of peace. Even something of what men call national honour we would concede, rather than plunge two kindred nations in the horrors of war. But we have duties to discharge to our countrymen on the remote shores of the Pacific. They look to us for help, protection, and support. The dwellers of the forest and the traversers of the lakes are our countrymen. We have sent them on a mission of commerce to distant and inhospital climes. It behooves us to see that their mission be fulfilled with safety; that all its purposes be carried out efficiently; and that neither the paucity of their numbers nor the insufficient of their equipments deprives them of the fruits or materials of their occupation. But of what avail will it be to possess a large superficial area of uncultivated district, from the Rocky Mountains to the sea, if we lose that which has hitherto constituted its almost sole advantage, viz., a transit to those engaged in traffic from Hudson's Bay down the southern branch of the Columbia? What is Oregon worth to us without the easement of that river? What would be the inevitable consequence of its loss? Would it not be that immediately the great carrying trade between the northern lakes or the northeast country and the sea would pass into the hands of Americans? - that what our countrymen have hitherto shared with the citizens of the United States, and would be content to share with them in future, would be monopolized entirely by the latter? Does the American Government, does the American Republic, seriously think that an English Minister would tamely yield, would be allowed to yield, benefits which have constituted the chief value of that dependency to English subjects? It is the very essence of our rights in Oregon that we should preserve the free - we do not claim the sole - navigation of the Columbia; take that away, and we lost at once our trade between our possessions in the North East of America and our growing colonies in the Pacific. Such a loss would involve the ruin of perhaps very few individuals, but it would inflict a wound on the honour, it would damage the solid interests of this country; and it would raise immeasurable disgust and unbounded distrust in the breast of every colonist in our most remote dependencies. Give up, if you will, a large strip of territory, cede as much as you like between the Rocky Mountains and the lowest bend of the Columbia; but preserve whatever solid and substantial benefit has been enjoyed by the hardy adventurers of the forest and the lake, who have gone forth in reliance on your faith, in confidence of your readiness, and without a doubt of your power to protect them. To desert them were ignominious enough. But an ignominy of such a kind is among the worst disasters that a nation can suffer. Preserve for your colonists the great and precious privileges of anchorage, navigation and coast settlement. Preserve for them the right of sharing with Americans the trade to the other settlements of their own mother country. Deprive them of this, and you make them poor, helpless and contemptible; but you dishonour yourselves when you damnify them.

We have not reverted to the question of title, because in the reports which have come to hand we have not observed an argument which affects it. But we have noticed several conjectures as to the probabilities and no few suggestions as to the means of carrying on war. We will not dwell on a subject so painful, and we hope so remote. We do not for a moment doubt that it would be in the power of either country to inflict upon the other the most serious injuries, the most dire calamities, that human nature can sustain. We do not doubt that an American war would carry devastation into a thousand districts, ruin and sorrow into families innumerable; that it would give a terrible shock to the mechanism of commercial intercourse, the stability of commercial faith; and do in a few years more evil than a century of peace could repair. We will not dispute this. We will not stay to argue which nation could inflict the greatest amount of evil. It is superfluous. We feel too keenly their mutual powers of mutual injury not to be grateful that the fairest, and most peaceful, and most statesmanlike proposal - that of an adjustment by arbitration - was advanced by an English, and declined by an American, Minister.The hope that a more speedy settlement of the question might be attained by negotiation was the motive assigned by Mr. Calhoun for rejecting this proposal; the negotiation which ensued unfortunately resulted only in an offer of compromise upon grounds which Mr. Pakensham found himself compelled to refuse and as this mode of arranging our conflicting claims to the territory has been, for the present, at least unsuccessful, we rejoice to hear that Mr. Pakenham had, shortly before the departure of the Acadia, once more urged upon the American Minister his proposal of an arbitration.
[PGC]

LT 1846/1/26/4b Oregon question

JANUARY 26, l846, LONDON, SATURDAY

The conversation which took place in the House of Commons on Friday night, respecting the Oregon question, was eminently satisfactory, as evincing the unanimous desire of all parties to maintain peace with the United States, but their no less determination that the peace so maintained should be consistent with the dignity of a great country, and rest upon the solid foundations of equity and self-respect. The regret expressed by the Premier at a seeming precipitancy on the part of Mr. Pakenham proves how sincere is the wish of the Government that no undue occasion of offense, no casual cause for war, be offered by this country to the American Republic; while the unusual heartiness of Mr. Hume, the accordant cheers of the House, and the concurrent approbation of the Opposition members, in affirming the propriety of increasing our military resources, are no less demonstrative of the tone and temper with which an unjust aggression will be confronted, and an involuntary war will be prosecuted. With regard to the alleged indiscretion of Mr. Pakenham, it seems to us that he has sinned rather against the forms of diplomatic etiquette than the spirit and interest of a diplomatic commission. It appears that the last proposal submitted to him by Mr. Buchanan - viz., a division of the territory - he rejected at once. Now it is urged that he should have communicated with the Home Government before he took so summary a course. It would require a fuller acquaintance with the circumstances of the case than is afforded by Sir. R. Peel's explanation to pronounce positively upon the propriety of his conduct. If by the term "division" be understood a division formed by a line continued from the 49^th parallel, we can understand the motives which forced him to reject the offer. This partition of territory would have deprived us of the Columbia river; in fact, of the most essential property - the only beneficial interest in the disputed country. Excluding this, it excluded not only the most important part of our claims, but that which previous conventions and previous proposals had conceded to us. It would have been impossible for an English Cabinet to accept offers so humiliating, or rights so truncated. But would it not have been more prudent to wait for the answer of the Home Government, in order that upon it future negotiations might be based? This is not self evident. If the Home Government could return but one answer to such a reference - the very answer, in fact, which was given by our Minister at Washington - we do not see, what good could have resulted from the delay. But if, in addition to this, it should be made clear that pending these negotiations, or previous to them, the President's Message to the Senate had developed the policy of the Washington Cabinet, then Mr. Pakenham's decision must, we think, be pronounced not only not precipitate, but natural, reasonable, and worthy of his position; for be it remembered, that Mr. Buchanan's proffers were on the most attenuated scale. He receded considerably from the terms of his predecessors. He offered to the British Minister far less than was rejected by a British Minister when Mr. Adams was President of the republic. And if after such an offer the latter had deliberated - if he had delayed - if he had even professed a willingness to consult his Government at home as to the expediency of accepting conditions which he must at the time have known to be derogatory to the just rights of his country, it requires little more than a knowledge of the transactions of the last few years to aver that such an hesitation would have been followed by counter-claims more ambitious and aggressive than before. If Mr. Pakenham had betrayed an undecided or doubtful mind when called upon to cede the navigation of the Columbia and the rich soil upon its banks, what would have been said by the politicians of the United States, by the mob constituencies, by the mob flatterers, by the panderers to bad passions and the suitors for popular favour? What but this? See how these English vapour and bluster how easily they can be bullied. They once scouted the notion of accepting half the territory with the notion of accepting half the territory with the Columbia and Vancouver's Island, and now their representative is half ready to yield the latter why should he have what we have offered? Why half or any of it. Strike for the whole country. The whole of Oregon or none. His Government fears to go to war. For peace she would surrender all that she has claimed. It will be our own fault if we do not get more than we once hoped for.

Such would have been the cry; it would spread like wildfire - "The whole of Oregon, or none and whilst relying on the probity of the American Government and the faith of international intercourse, diplomatic modes were exchanged , an American army might have been encamped on the Columbia, and the Oregon proclaimed a part of the Wisconsin.

We believe Mr. Pakenham as acted as he ought to have acted on such an emergency. Even if he has erred, much allowance should be made for the errors of one whose every word and deed is scrutinized with the most critical minuteness of jealousy - who has no other support than his own self reliance - and the exigencies of whose position demand from him a directness and prompt of action inconsistent with appeals to distant authority and remote counsel. Such allowance should be made for the errors of every diplomatist. It should therefore be made for any which Mr. Pakenham may have committed. But it is not clear to us that he has committed any.

It is not by the tactics of diplomacy or the wisdom of statesmanship alone that a great question like this can be settled. It is a hard thing to raise a cry for war. It is an easy thing to pique the vanity, to woud the pride and disgust the prejudices even of an enlightened people into national hatred. The time may come when an unseasonable joke, a sarcastic allusion, or any other trifle, may spur great kingdoms or republics into mad and sanguinary hostilities.
[PGC]

LT 1846/1/28/6e Oregon question

JANUARY 28, 1846 - The Oregon Question - AMERICA

We have received important advices from New York to the 8^th inst. Inclusive by the arrival of the ship, Henry Clay, Captain Nye.

The Oregon question has been taken up in the House, and warmly debated, with a warlike aspect. On the 2d inst. Mr. Adams gave his views at great length in favour of promptly giving the notice to terminate the existing joint occupancy of the Oregon territory. On the 5^th the Committee of Foreign Affairs recommended the adoption of that measure. The report was debated and adjourned on the 6^th until the first Monday in February, by a majority of l02 to 82.

Some conversation then took place as to the time fixed for the special consideration of the Oregon Bill, reported from the Committee on Territories, and on the motion of Mr. Douglas, the second Tuesday of February was substituted for the first for that purpose.

A bill was introduced on the 2d instant, by Mr. Haralson from the Committee on Military Affairs, for the organization of two regiments of riflemen, and also for increasing the infantry, artillery, and dragoons, to be at the disposal of the President for the protection of emigrants to Oregon or the defense of the frontier. After considerable discussion upon the question of making the resolution of a special order for the first Tuesday in January.

Mr. JQ Adams rose and addressed the house. He referred to the variety of bills providing for the defense of the country before Congress, and asked what reason there was for increasing their military establishment when they were at profound peace with the whole world? Three or four years ago, when the prospect of war was as great as then, they had reduced the military establishment by one third; but he said, I don not believe at all in any danger of war at this time. If there was danger, the first measure should be to give notice to Great Britain of their desire to terminate the existing joint-occupancy of the Oregon. Last session he had declared himself ready, as he did then, to give this notice. He hoped it would be given; and that then they would proceed to a real occupation of the whole territory. He was surprised the Committee on Foreign Affairs had not reported the notice in question, and he should deeply regret if a majority of that Committee should not be prepared to do so. If he hoped that a majority of the house would support him, he would press such a resolution that day. While the existing convention remained, he would vote for no resolution such as that then before them. It did not follow that if they gave notice there must of necessity be war; nor did it follow that they should then take possession. It would only be saying to Great Britain, "After negotiating 20 years about this matter, we do not choose to negotiate any longer; we shall take possession of what is our own; and then, if so settle, the question what is our own you wish to negotiate, we will negotiate as lone as you please. They might negotiate after they had taken possession. I say therefore, he continued - "That I hope the first measure adopted by Congress will be to give, in the most solemn manner, the notice to Great Britain which the treaty requires; then the coast will be clear for us to do what we please. It does not, I repeat, follow as a necessary consequence, that, because we give this notice, we must take possession, though it is my hope that we shall. It does not necessarily draw after it a war; and if Great Britain chooses to take such notice as an act of hostility on our part, and forthwith commence hostilities on hers, we have been told that we shall all be one party, and God Almighty grant that it may be so. If it shall be so, the war will have less of those very extraordinary terrors which my friend from South Carolina (Mr. Holmes) has now just discovered, notwithstanding the extreme military propensities which he manifested on this floor last year with regard to Texas. And of this I am very sure, that in that case Great Britain will not long occupy Oregon, or anything else north of the Canada line. (Great sensation, and incipient indications of applause). But if you will agree to give notice, strong as in my horror of war, and of all military establishments, if there should then be the breath of life in me, I hope I shall be willing to go so far as any in making any sacrifice to render that war successful and glorious. I can say no more. However, we may without giving notice, extend our laws and our protection to our brethren who have settled at least in that part of Oregon which is not claimed by Great Britain; but there can be no need of increasing our army and our navy to do that. I hope that such an act will not be offensive to Great Britain, and that she will not think of going to war about it. But if we are going to take actual occupation of the country, then some additional force will be needed to our army, and in that case, however unwilling I have ever been to increase our military establishment, I think I should get over my difficulties especially if a disposition should be manifested by Great Britain to take offense at the measure I have just mentioned. I believe it will not be necessary for me to refer to any other part of this subject. There have been, as I understand, two applications made to this house by fellow citizens or ours settled beyond the Rocky Mountains for the protection of this Government. The Chairman of the Committee on Foreign Affairs presented, as I think, one memorial while another from a different quarter is also before the territorial committee - possibly is a copy of the same." [PGC]

1846/1/29/6f US, preparations for war

AMERICAN PREPARATIONS FOR WAR, January 28, l846

We noticed that orders had been sent to Norfolk for estimates of the expense of fitting out all the United States ships at that port. It seems that Norfolk is not the only place where inquiries have been made, but that New York has come for a share. It is stated that a party of naval gentlemen have been in this city on a tour of examination; and, besides examining the vessels at the navy yard, have inspected the mammoth river steamers. The report of the committee in relation to these steamers, if we may judge from what we hear in conversation, will be not a little amusing as well as curious. So far as steamers are concerned, the river boats are entirely unfit for any Government service, except the transportation of troops or munitions of war on the North River. The extreme lightness of their construction, and the mass of top hamper about them all, make them totally worthless as armed vessels. They would be quite as unsafe for their own crews, from the effect of their own guns, as they would be dangerous to an enemy. If Government requires steamers they must build them at once. One of the steamers of John Bull that rejoice in the names of the heathen gods would sink as many steamers like the Colonel Harney, and such as the river boats would make, as would be built in years. We are glad the Government is looking round, and that it has found out that blows are to be received as well as given in a war with England. War or no war, it is indispensable that we have a large addition to our steam marine; and if the present state of affairs stimulate a minute inquiry into our means of defense, it will end in a little good. So far as war steamers go, we are not fit to be named as having a navy at all and the sooner the want is supplied the better - New York Evening Express.

LT 1846/1/30 5e Oregon question

JANUARY 30, 1846

The American journals brought over by the last packet are fraught with matter of the most interesting and important kind. The Oregon question is daily advancing towards a definite and positive shape, and as far as it is possible to augur the result of legislative deliberations or popular sympathies, no great length of time can be expected to elapse before some strong decision is expressed as to the occupation of the disputed territory. The first thing that strikes us in the proceedings of the American Congress is the confirmation which that Assembly stamps upon a previous assertion made by ourselves. On a former occasion we declared that, in reference to a mere question of equitable right, the data of history or of treaties were insufficient to establish the claims of either of the two nations to the contested territory and that it would be impossible to adjust the present dispute without considering the peculiar wants and interests of the two litigant parties. It is to use the words of Mr. Rhett in the House of Representatives now a question of interest and policy that we are to settle.

With some of the representatives, as Messrs. Baker and Hilliard, the claim of property as deduced from prior occupancy or from the Spanish title is still in vogue. But it is exceedingly difficult to see the force of the evidence which has convinced them that their title is good on the former ground, and we think that we have already shown that it fails on the latter. The sole evidence of prior occupancy rests on the supposed discovery by Captain Robert Gray, who as Mr. Wintrhop said, had no more idea than the man in the moon that he was discovering this or any other country; and who does not appear to have left any permanent or recognized symbol of his country's power on that coast. But if positive discovery were to be laid down as the foundation a territorial claim, the partial discovery by Captain Gray cannot weigh against that more complete one effected by Broughton, who sailed 90 miles up the Columbia. But we suspect that the statesmen of both countries feel the impossibility of adjusting the question on the authority of what an intelligent American representative acknowledges to be vague traditions

And musty histories of old voyages."

Disposing then of the question of prior occupancy and original right until the time when it shall be clearly shown that one country or the other exercised unquestioned, undivided, and universally acknowledged

Jurisdiction over the coast and northwest continent of the Oregon - which means for ever let us again recur to the validity of the title as deduced from Spain. Now, it cannot be doubted that if Spain was rightfully possessed of the territory in question, she might rightfully alienate it. But if she had it not, any professed alienation by her would not be worth the parchment which professed to convey it. Now no one American legislator professes to believe that Spain had alienated her right over the Oregon to the United States till after l790. Whatever treaty be adduced as the Spanish title - whether that of l796 or l8l8 - there is no treaty whatever of or before the year l790 which confers a claim to the United States, derived from the Spanish title. But there is a treaty on record - no ignoble or obscure treaty - but one signalized by many coincidental and consequential events of importance - a treaty dictated by an English Minister who inherited a proud sense of English honour and a firm determination to maintain it - the treaty of Nootka Sound, ratified at the fall of the year l790 - which ceded to England rights and titles, not indeed paramount nor undivided, but totally incompatible with any after alienation or disposition or demise of plenary jurisdiction to or by any other Power in the world. Whatever interpretation may be affixed to the 3d, 4^th and 5^th articles of that convention, no interpretation, however strained, however distorted, can construe them so as to make them consistent with a reserved license for Spain to transfer her right of full sovereignty in these regions to any foreign Crown or State whatever. Spain may indeed at a later period, either by a careless phraseology or al pompous assertion of non-existent rights, have spoken of her possessions even to the 52^nd of north latitude, and proposed to transfer her rights therein. But if she did this, she acted as a mortgager who sought to transfer over again an interest in property already encumbered without notice of that previous encumbrance, or as a simulated proprietor professing to sell land to which he had no title. The right of the mortgagee in the one instance, and of the vendee in the other, is just that sort of right which the United States have in this case derived from Spain, and none other.

But we are bound to admit that the terms in which the Nootka Sound convention is couched are curious, and we believe, unprecedented. As far as relates to North America, they are negative on the subject of sovereignty. They express an agreement between the two high contracting Powers that it should be lawful for their respective subjects to fish, erect huts on the coast, trade with the natives, etc. but they reserve no right of paramount sovereignty to either of the two. The only approximation to a reserved right - as far as North America is concerned - is in favour of Great Britain; for it is stipulated that compensation should be made to British settlers for injuries sustained at the hands of Spain previous to April l790, and all the land and buildings of which they were then possessed should be restored to them. Now as far as this goes, and we are not disposed to push it to any undue length, we must say it is a strong a priori testimony in favour of British rights. And when it is viewed in connection with the very high pretensions of the Spanish Minister, and his subsequent abatement of them, we must say that it approaches as nearly as negative phraseology allows to a full admission of British sovereignty in these parts. Why should British settlements be "restored" if there had been no right jure patrice auctoritatis to establish them? Why should compensation have been made to British subjects if the British Crown were not recognized in its sovereign capacity? But we will not urge these conclusions, because they are modified (rather than resisted) by some of the stipulations in the treaty. The subjects of both Powers are to fish, settle, trade with the natives, apparently on a footing of perfect equality. If a paramount jurisdiction had been contemplated in behalf of either of the Powers, such would not have been the language of the convention. Mr. Pitt was no untaught or inartificial composer of slovenly documents - no weak master of English tongue - no thoughtless, reckless assenter to the ill-digested propositions of others. Nor was it characteristic of Spanish diplomacy to leave ought to casual conjecture or indifferent construction. Mr. Pitt was a lover of accuracy; the Spanish Cabinet of formality. We may infer, then, that it was neither in heedless haste nor indifferent ignorance that the treaty was framed. It meant something, depend upon it. What, then, did it mean? We believe that it meant to leave the question of sovereignty in abeyance. The nature of the country was unexplored and unknown; its advantages and capabilities undreamed of: it was supposed to be valuable for its fisheries and harbours; useful to traders navigating the Pacific; useless for the purposes of colonization, and top contemptible for projects of ambition. Spain did not care to fight for its retention, nor England for its acquisition. All had been done that was worth doing immediately when indemnity for past violence and security for future "quiet enjoyment had been obtained. Thenceforth the English and Spanish subjects were to occupy the territory as they chose; it was open to every commercial virgin country courting the affections of each new adventurer. It was to be occupied under the joint-protection of the two Governments. It was to be a joint-tenancy on a grand scale. The conditions and incidents of a joint-tenancy were - as far as the analogy of the case would allow - to follow this occupation by subject Spaniards and Englishmen. And it was to be terminated as a joint-tenancy is terminated - by partition, at the will of either Sovereign. Wrong sustained by the subject of either crown was to referred to his own Court, and finally decided by a mixed commission under the authority of the two Courts. These we believe to have been the terms on which Spain and Great Britain occupied Northwest America, Strange, unprecedented, and informal they may be pronounced; still, if they were not of this kind, or nearly of this kind, it would be impossible to define of what kind they really were. Nor is such a definition unsupported by affairs dehors. We may suppose that it was not the intention of Mr. Pitt or Count Florida Blanca to leave matters for all time to come in this state. A partition might have been looked forward to, as likely to be enforced. But circumstances intervened to prevent it; the French Revolution broke out --Spanish power languished and died; English enterprise was diverted into other channels.

But the relative position of Spain and England at that time appears to have been just such as we have described it; and such the interest of Spain in those regions - an undivided moiety of the whole possession, not the whole of an undivided moiety - in fact a distributive and diffused possession. And such was the interest, and only such, that Spain could transfer to any other power. If therefore Spain in l796 or l8l8 pretended to alienate a plenary authority over these regions to any other state than Great Britain (which she could have done by a sort of release on a grand scale), such alienation would be as inoperative as that of Texas by Mexico after annexation to the United States. Nor is this view materially affected by any war which might have broken out after the first compact of co-equal possession. The two contracting countries might go to war; but no war could affect the rights of their subjects already established and settled by a previous treaty. Spain might have quartered her troops on the northwest coast of America, and have carried on an internecine contest with individual British settlers, and thus have reconquered the whole settlement by degrees; but the law of l8l8 pretended to alienate a plenary authority over these regions to any other state than Great Britain (which she could have done by a sort of release on a grand scale), such alienation would be as inoperative as that of Texas by Mexico after annexation to the United States.

There is reason to believe that the Senate will declare against the measures which may be voted. In the interval which will ensue, in consequence of this inevitable conflict, the British Government would do well to commence a decisive negotiation, if it wishes to escape serious complications abroad. This is the course expected on the Stock-Exchange in London and in the city; for although the public mind was excited by the tone which pervades the message, the public funds were not paralyzed by it."

Columbia River and the coast to the south of Vancouver's Island, on the authority of discoveries by Cooke, Vancouver and Mackenzie; on the authority of the Nootka Sound Convention in l790 with Spain, and of settlements, effected and maintained at different times by British subjects. The United States claim the territory on the ground of discoveries made by her citizens, Gray, Kenbrick, etc; of the cession made by Spain in l8l9, and of occupation and settlements previously, as well as afterwards, effected by American traders. It will be obvious that the right of sovereignty which attends discovery, unless backed by some decisive measures on the part of the Government by whom or by whose subjects the discovery is made, is worth very little. Did the rule prevail that every nation was entitled in perpetuity to the sovereignty of any territory discovered and claimed by any of its subjects, without any immediate act on the part of its Executive to enforce such claim, the tenure of most colonial dependencies at the present day would be one of very equivocal legality; and, indeed, there is so much doubt hanging over the history of all territorial discoveries, that it would be difficult to suggest a worse title than that which is conferred by the assertion of such a claim, unsupported by any evidence of continuation by the Government in whose behalf it is represented to have been made. In the present instance, the honours of discovery appear to be due to a Spanish navigator of the l7th century, Jean de Fuca, who has been given his name to the strait that separates Vancouver's Island from the mainland. Nor is a much better title afforded by mere occupancy unprotected by the home Government of a state ,recognized by foreign nations. The question of right is thus narrowed to the consideration of the original proprietorship, and subsequent alienation. The American Ministers assert, that not only the valley of the Columbia, but the whole of the Oregon territory, and territory as far as the 42^nd degree of north latitude - belonged to Spain, and was by Spain transferred to the United Sates at the Treaty of Florida in l8l9. They say that they have a title not only to the valley drained by the Columbia, but also to the whole of the Oregon, and they take credit to themselves for evincing no small moderation in proposing the parallel of the 40^th degree as a boundary line. The question therefore arises, which is the better claim; that which is founded on the treaty by Spain with England in l790 or that which rests on the Florida treaty with the United States in l8l9 ? By the former Spain agreed to give indemnity to British subjects dispersed of their settlements about Nootka Sound, and to guarantee the same liberty of access to the citizens of both nations as well as those parts which were to be restored to British subjects are in the other parts of North America, which then belonged to Spain. By the latter, she ceded all her authority and jurisdiction over her provinces in North America to the United States. Now, when it is recollected that in l789 Spain abandoned her settlements in Nootka Sound and that from this time she appears to have neglected this portion of her colonial empire altogether.

THE UNITED STATES

We subjoin abridged reports from the several Secretaries of State, which are extremely valuable as evidence of the efficiency of the several departments:

REPORT OF THE SECRETARY OF WAR

This document occupies five columns of the Union, but the following synopsis from that paper tells the whole of a long story:

It exhibits, in the first instance, the organization, strength and constitution of the regular army. The rank and file - embracing every arm of the service does not exceed 6500 men. At this time there is stationed but a single regiment on the whole northern frontier, from Maine to Lake Superior - an extent of 2,000 miles; and on the whole line from the Falls of St. Anthony to New Orleans (l500 miles) only one regiment of dragoons and two of infantry. The artillery regiments - reduced by detachments of four companies from each - now garrison the fortification of the seaboard from Newport to New Orleans. The remaining and larger proportion of the army is now stationed in Texas. The report gives an interesting account of the political reasons which have induced the Government to give them this destination. The secretary does not think it prudent to remove the troops from this position until our relations with Mexico have assumed a more decidedly amicable character. In the event of there being any necessity to increase the army he proposes to build upon the basis of the regiments by adding to the rank and file of each company instead of creating new regiments. This necessity may be found in the course of Mexico, or in the conduct of the Cumanches, or of the Indians that are found in Oregon, or that may interrupt the increased current of the emigrations to the Rocky Mountains. By the proposed arrangement of filling up the infantry companies to 68 men and the dragoons to 60, the privates are increased without a corresponding augmentation of the officers.

The report suggests that, besides this increase of the number of privates in the two existing regiments of dragoons, another regiment of dragoons or of mounted riflemen may be necessary in the event of extending our posts to the Rocky Mountains.

It states that, though the concentration of so large a proportion of the army on the frontier of Texas may have, in some measure, enlarged the expenditures (certainly in the article of transportation), yet it has in some degree been compensated by the improvement which has taken place in the discipline of the troops. It renews the recommendation for establishing a corps of sappers, miners, and pontoniers, to assist, among other things, in constructing bridges, in consequence of the military occupation of Texas. L00 men will be sufficient for the purpose

The report gives a rapid but interesting account of Colonel Kearney's expedition, during the last summer, to the south pass of the Rocky Mountains, the impressions it produced among the Indians, the number of emigrants which it met on their way to Oregon, to the number of 2,325 men, women and children, with 7000 head of cattle, 400 horses and mules and 460 wagons. This report of Colonel Kearney accompanies the communication of the commanding general, and will furnish, no doubt, an interesting store of extracts at a season of grater leisure. It also refers to the adventures of another detachment of the dragoons, under the command of Captain Sumner, nearly to the northern line of the United States, between Lake Superior and the Lake of the Woods. Among the Indians whom they met with on their route, and upon whom they made a due impression with their military array, was a numerous band of the half-breeds of the Red River of the North, who had come from the region of the Hudson Bay Company into our lines to hunt buffalo. They had even solicited permission to reside in the Unites States.

The Secretary refers to the considerations which had prompted General Gaines to dispatch the volunteers of Louisiana to the camp of General Taylor. Ample justice is done to their gallantry and Congress is invited to make appropriations for their compensation. General Taylor had also accepted the services of our Texan companies of mounted men for three months.

The estimates for the ensuing year do not greatly vary from those of former years. The item for aming the fortifications is increased l00,000 dollars. The attention of Congress is directed to the st ate of the forticiations - to the armories of Springfield and Harpers Ferry to the establishment of a national foundry for cannon to the preservation of the gunpowder belonging to the Government - to the condition of the mineral lands in the northwest, which the Secretary proposed to transfer from the management of the Ordnance Department to some other.

(The Presidents message suggested to the Land Office)

It calls the attention of Congress to the 48 forts in process of construction, and to the propriety of erecting new forts at other points. Among these, as suggested by the reports of the Engineers, are fortifications of the narrows at Staten Island and Sandy Hook, and the condition of the long suspended fortress at the Pea Patch; an additional work at Solles' Point, for the protection of Baltimore; and projected fortifications on the Florida reef.

The Secretary speaks with great consideration of the school at West Point, and proposes some improvements. He calls special attention to the report of the chief of the corps of Topographical Engineers, to the improvement of the harbours on the lake, which are so well calculated to furnish accommodations to steamers, that in a state of war, may be turned to the most effective purposes, and to furnish facilities to a commerce that is now estimated at $l00,000,000 annually.

The Secretary speaks with enthusiasm of expeditions under Captain Fremont, and his valuable services. He refers to other reports of the pension office, which has now returned on its books 28,92l pensioners - 237l added during the last year, and l,428 known to have died. He devotes a considerable space to the Indian agency and the Indians - the Pottawatomies, the Choctaws, and particularly the Cherokees. He lays before the President some highly interesting communications from our Indian sub-agent in the territory of Oregon.

He dedicates the conclusion of his comprehensive and very interesting report to a subject which is of so profound an importance in a free government, viz, the organization of the militia. He suggests various alterations, and amongst the rest, submits the question, whether it might not be advisable to reduce the period of service from l8 years of age to 2l, upon the ground that although citizens of l8 years of age are not too young to bear arms, they were not generally in a situation to equip themselves with arms, as the law requires.

REPORT OF THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY

The communication of the Secretary of the Navy opens, without any preface, with the following sentence:"During the past year the usual squadrons of navy of the United States have been maintained." In the Mediterranean, Commodore Smith had command of the Cumberland the Plymouth. The Plymouth was ordered to the Brazil squadron, and the Cumberland returned home, and their places will be taken at the opening of the present season by a part of the present African squadron. The African squadron was organized under the command of Commodore Perry, who was relieved by Commodore Skinner; the Preble and the Truxtan contracted disease on board, and were sent home; the Southampton, with stores, was sent out to remain, and was followed by the Marion and Dolphin. The Boxer is destined for the same station; and in January the Cumberland, bearing the broad pennant of Commodore Read, will relieve the Jamestown and Yorktown, which will proceed to the Mediterranean.

The disposition of the remainder of the naval force is thus states:

On the Brazil station, Rosseau, the first officer of the Alleghanies ever selected to command a squadron, relieves Commodore Turner. The Raritan will return to the home squadron; the Boston is ordered to return to the United States. The Columbia, the Saratoga, Plymouth, and the Bainbridge, as for the present substitute the Brazil squadron.

Commodore Parker, after a very successful cruise, returned from the Asiatic station in September, bringing home the Brandywine, St. Louis and the Perry. At the Bay of Islands, Captain McKeever, in the St. Louis, had the happiness to render valuable service to the inhabitants of an infant British settlement

In May Commodore Bidelle sailed for the East Indies in command of the Columbus ship of the line, bearing the Minister to China and the ratified treaty between the United States and the Chinese Emperor. The health of Mr. A.H. Everett, the Minister having induced his return, the exchange of the ratification of the treaty was committed to the charge of Commodore Biddle, who will doubtless show that an able and gallant naval officer conducts satisfactorily all affairs entrusted to him. The constitution is on her return from China, after having visited different ports and islands in the Indian Seas.

The Pacific squadron, under Commodore Sloat, has consisted of the Savannah, the Levant, the Warren, and the Shark. The first three will return in l846 and will be relieved by the Congress, the Portsmouth, and the Cyane.

The home squadron has been under the command of Commodore Conner, who has distinguished himself by sound judgment in the performance of his duty. His force, which consisted of the Potomac, the Falmouth, the Vandalia, the Lawrence, and the Somers, was weakened by the return of the Vandalia, which visited Hayti, and was driven home by the yellow fever, contracted at Port-au-Prince, where she had been ordered on duty. The squadron was increased by the Princeton and Porpoise, the St. Mary's, and the Saratoga, under Commodore Stockton, and soon after by the John Adams, and the steamship Mississippi

The Secretary visited all the naval establishments but those at Pensacola and Memphis, and they are generally in excellent order.

He recommends that the Naval Asylum at Philadelphia, at which are now more than l00 sailors, be never enlarged, but that new pensioners should be placed "in some salubrious spot near the ocean, where the aged seaman can watch ships as they come and go, and have old familiar objects in sight." There is a dash of romance in this suggestion which is rather unexpected.

He condemns as a fruitless expenditure the employment of professors and instructors on board ship, and suggests that midshipmen, in the intervals of sea duty, may be collected together on shore and be suitably instructed. The instructors being provided, the idea was carried out by organizing a school at For Severn, at Annapolis, under the direction of Commander Buchanan.

He recommends that the plates of all the charts engraved by order of Congress be deposited in the National Observatory building.

The grant of a large sum for the establishment of a well-furnished and efficient navy yard at Pensacola is recommended and he disapproves of the grant for the Memphis Depot, as to large for a mere work of preparation. He thinks Congress should confine the use of the money first to the construction of a rope walk; and, next, to simple arrangements for building and equipping steamships. He justly adds that "the United States should produce all the hemp used in the navy, and that to introduce at the west the manufacture of American hemp for the navy will prove a national benefit.

The Mexican-American War and the Media, 1845-1848