| January-June 1845 | July-December 1845 | January-June 1846 | July-December 1846 |
| January-June 1847 | July-December 1847 | January-June 1848 | July-December 1848 |
January
REv71i44p1c3 4 January 1848, The Cause of the War
REv71i44p4c56 4 January 1848, The March to the Rio Grande
REv72ii44p1c6 7 January 1848, Eight Days Later from Vera Cruz
REv72ii44p1c7 7 January 1848, Later from General Wool's Line
REv72i44p2c6 7 January 1848, The Late Lieutenant Easly
REv72i44p4c12 7 January 1848, The Tampico Letters
REv73i44p2c3 11 January 1848, The Army Troubles
REv75i44p1c34 18 January 1848, Late from Mexico
REv75i44p2c13 18 January 1848, Extracts from Mr. Reverdend Johnson's speech to Senate
Is the war honorable and just?
REv75i44p2c3 18 January 1848, The Army Difficulties
REv75i44p4c14 18 January 1848, Return of Santa Anna to Mexico
REv75i44p4c7 18 January 1848, Later from Mexico
REv76i44p2c6 21 January 1848, Later from the Rio Grande
REv76i44p4c67 21 January 1848, Senate
Petition to end the war
REv77i44p1c2 25 January 1848, Senate
Discussion over the Mexican territory
REv77i44p1c5 25 January 1848, Army Troubles
REv77i44p4c2 25 January 1848, Later from Mexico
(Very hard to read rough copy)
REv77i44p4c4 25 January 1848, From Santa Fe
REv77i44p4c5 25 January 1848, Mexican Affairs
REv77i44p4c5 25 January 1848, The Rio Grande Boundary
REv78i44p1c2 28 January 1848, Rumors of Peace
REv78i44p1c57 28 January 1848, Later from Mexico
REv78i44p4c1 28 January 1848, Later from Vera Cruz
February
RE1848i45v79p2c7,
February 4, 1848, COURT OF INQUIRY
List of administrative actions being taken
RE48v44i80p1c23,
February 8, 1848, LATE AND IMPORTANT FROM MEXICO
Rumors of peace
RE48v44i80p2c1,
February 8, 1848, LATEST FROM MEXICO
Movement of officers to Matamoras
RE48v44n80p2c1, February 8, 1848, WHIG DIVISION ON THE WAR QUESTION
RE48v44i81p4c3,
February 11, 1848, HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF OCCUPATION
Report from Gen. Taylor to the Secretary of War
RE48v44i84p2c5, February 18, 1848, FROM
THE RIO GRANDE
News about the dispersing of officers and the money collected from the
Mexicans
RE48v44i85p1c56,
February 22, 1848, SANTA ANNA
Rebuttal to the Whig about its report on Santa Anna's return
RE48v44i85p1c7,
February 22, 1848, FROM THE RIO GRANDE
Governing information about Mexico
RE48v44i85p2c12,
February 22, 1848, NEWS FROM MEXICO
News of peace
RE48v44n85p2c2, February 22, 1848, IMPORTANT FROM MEXICO
RE48v44i86p1c37, February 25, 1848, NO TITLE
Long article about the debate between Whigs and democrats
RE48v44i87p2c67,
February 29, 1848, LATER FROM MEXICO
News that Santa Anna has requested a passport so he can leave Mexico
RE48v44n87p2c7, February 29, 1848, THE TREATY
WITH MEXICO
Synopsis of the treaty
RE48v44n87p2c7, February 29, 1848, THE UNION AND THE TREATY
Comments on the Washington Union's assertions or rumors about what
the treaty does not include
March
RE48v44i90p1c5 March 7, 1848 Another Universal
letter writer.
On Gen Taylor's correspondence.
RE48v44i90p2c2 March 7,
1848 The Justice of the War.
Polk's justifications for the war.
RE48v44i90p4c1 March 7, 1848 Recruits
for 1st Va. Reg't.
Recruiting add.
RE48v44i90p1c4 March 7, 1848 p4c2:
Generals Scott and Worth
Correspondence between the two.
RE48v44i91 March 10, 1848 What Does John
Bull Say.
Britain and American relations.
RE48v44i91p1c5 March 10, 1848 A
Systematic attack.
Issues concerning General Pillow,
RE48v44i91p1c6 March 10, 1848 To the
Editors of the Picayune.
More concerning General Pillow.
RE48v44i91p2c2 March 10, 1848 The Kaleidoscope
of Taylorism.
Taylor and the political arena.
RE48v44i91p4c2 March 10, 1848 Mexican
Affairs.
Issues going on in Mexico.
RE48v44i91p4c3 March 10, 1848 New Light
No Principle Taylor Whigs.
Political battles.
RE48v44i92p1c2 March 17, 1848 The Treaty.
The terms of the treaty.
RE48v44i92p1c3 March 17, 1848 Returned
From the War.
About an officers return. (difficult to read.)
RE48v44n95p1c4 March 28, 1848 Senate.
Issues concerning peace.
RE48v44n95p1c1 March 28, 1848 The
No Territory Party.
Mr. Webster's speech concerning a push for peace not land.
RE48v44n95p2c4 March 28, 1848 Latest
From Mexico.
News on the Army and progress for the war.
RE48v44n95p4c1 March 28, 1848 Treaty
Message, Correspondence & c..
Various subjects concerning the treaty, including statements from President
Polk.
RE48v44n95p4c1 March 28, 1848 Mr.
Buchanan to Mr. Trist.
A collection of correspondence.
RE48v44n96p1c7 March 31, 1848 Ten
Regiments Bill.
The need for more men is debatable.
RE48v44n96p2c7 March 31, 1848
Arrival of the Great Western.
More news from Mexico.
RE48v44n96p4c1 March 31, 1848 Mexico.
Dealing with guerrillas.
RE48v44n96p4c1 March 31, 1848, More
Testimony Against the Whigs.
Letter from Samuel Black to a Senator of the United States.
RE48v44i105p1c2, May 2, 1848, Gen. Taylor’s Politics
RE48v44i105p1c4, May 2, 1848, General Scott and the War Department
RE48v44i105p1c4, May 2, 1848, No title
RE48v44i105p2c1, May 2, 1848, More Letters From Gen. Taylor
RE48v44i105p2c2, May 2, 1848, No title
RE48v44i105p2c1, May 2, 1848, Where are the Taylor Men?
RE48v44i105p2c1, May 2, 1848, No title
RE48v44i105p2c2, May 2, 1848, The Virginia Regiment
RE48v44i105p2c2, May 2, 1848, No title
RE48v44i105p2c5, May 2, 1848, Yucatan
RE48v44i105p2c5, May 2, 1848, To the Senate and the House of Representatives of the United States
RE48v44i105p3c1, May 2, 1848, Regimental Orders
RE48v44i105p4c1, May 2, 1848, Later From
Mexico
From the N. Orleans Delta, April 22nd
RE48v44i105p4c2, May 2, 1848, Correspondence of the Picayune. City of Mexico, April 13, 1848
RE48v44i105p4c2, May 2, 1848, No title
RE48v44i105p4c3, May 2, 1848, For the Enquirer. General John A. Quitman
RE48v44i105p4c5, May 2, 1848, Reply of Captain Edwards. Norfolk, April 7, 1848
RE48v44i105p4c5, May 2, 1848, No title
RE48v44i1p1c1, May 5, 1848, General Scott’s Letter
RE48v45i1p1c4, May 5, 1848, Sort of Dilemma
RE48v45i1p1c6, May 5, 1848, No title
RE48v45i1p1c6, May 5, 1848, No title
RE48v45i1p1c5, May 5, 1848, Gen. Scott and Mr. Marcy
RE48v45i1p1c7, May 5, 1848, For the Enquirer
RE48v45i1p2c1, May 5, 1848, Reply of Mr. Marcy
RE48v45i1p2c4, May 5, 1848, Gen. Scott and the Administration
RE48v45i1p2c4, May 5, 1848, No title
RE48v45i1p2c6, May 5, 1848, Thunder Without Light!
RE48v45i1p2c6, May 5, 1848, Taylorism in Virginia
RE48v45i1p3c1, May 5, 1848, Letter from Mexico
RE48v45i1p4c4, May 5, 1848, Thirtieth Congress—First Session
RE48v45i1p4c4, May 5, 1848, Later from Santa Fe
RE48v45i1p4c4, May 5, 1848, Pass it Round
RE48v45i1p4c4, May 5, 1848, No title
RE48v45i1p4c5, May 5, 1848, More Taylor Letters
RE48v45i2p1c1, May 9, 1848, Mr. Marcy’s Reply to Gen. Scott. [Concluded]
RE48v45i2p1c5, May 9, 1848, Quartermaster General’s Office, Washington City, February 18, 1848
RE48v45i2p1c5, May 9, 1848, Quartermaster General’s Office, Washington City, April 17, 1848
RE48v45i2p1c6, May 9, 1848, Quartermaster General’s Office, Washington City, April 18, 1848
RE48v45i2p2c1, May 9, 1848, Thunder Without Light
RE48v45i2p2c2, May 9, 1848, Which Will “Surrender?”
RE48v45i2p2c4, May 9, 1848, To the Editors of the Enquirer
RE48v45i2p2c5, May 9, 1848, To the Editors of the Enquirer
RE48v45i2p2c7, May 9, 1848, Six Days Later from Vera Cruz
RE48v45i2p3c1, May 9, 1848, No title
RE48v45i2p4c1, May 9, 1848, Thirtieth Congress—First Session. Washington, Thursday May 4
RE48v45i2p4c4, May 9, 1848, General Taylor and the Whig
RE48v45i2p4c6, May 9, 1848, To the Editors of the Enquirer
RE48v45i2p4c5, May 9, 1848, The Question Settled
RE48v45i3p1c1, May 12, 1848, Thirtieth Congress—First Session. Washington, Monday May 8.
RE48v45i3p1c1, May 12, 1848, Tuesday May 9, 1848. Senate.
RE48v45i3p1c4, May 12, 1848, The WhigThe Tariff and Mr. Jefferson.
RE48v45i3p1c3, May 12, 1848, Anecdotes in Yucatan.
RE48v45i3p1c6, May 12, 1848, Clay in Alabama.
RE48v45i3p1c6, May 12, 1848, Original Correspondence.
RE48v45i3p1c7, May 12, 1848, MexicoThe Treaty, &c.
RE48v45i3p2c2, May 12, 1848, Later from the City of Mexico.
RE48v45i3p2c3, May 12, 1848, Interesting from Chihuahua.
RE48v45i3p2c5, May 12, 1848, Political “Bluff.”
RE48v45i3p2c6, May 12, 1848, No title.
“We expressed our surprise on Tuesday that the Republican and its “independent”
candidate…..”
RE48v45i3p2c6, May 12, 1848, The Treaty, &c.
RE48v45i3p2c6,
May 12, 1848, No title
“Mr. Trist left New Orleans……”
RE48v45i3p2c6, May 12, 1848, How Old Zac received the Missive from Ashland.
RE48v45i3p3c1, May 12, 1848, Thirtieth Congress—First Session. Washington, Wednesday, May 10, 1848.
RE48v45i3p3c3, May 12, 1848, Correspondence
of the Enquirer.
Washington, Thursday, May 11, 1848. U.S. Senate.
RE48v45i3p4c1, May 12, 1848, Congressional.
U.S. SenateApril 12, 1848.
California Claims.
RE48v45i3p4c6, May 12, 1848, Thunder Without Light.
RE48v45i3p4c7, May 12, 1848, Senator Mason’s Speech.
RE48v45i4p1c2, May 16, 1848, “My Friends.”
RE48v45i4p1c2, May 16, 1848, No title.
“Clay Whigs of Virginia…….”
RE48v45i4p1c3, May 16, 1848, Another Letter From General Taylor.
RE48v45i4p1c3, May 16, 1848, Mr. Clay’s LastIllustrated.
RE48v45i4p1c4, May 16, 1848, The Origin of the Mexican War.
RE48v45i4p1c5, May 16, 1848, Correspondence of the Baltimore Sun. Washington, May 8,1848.
RE48v45i4p1c7, May 16, 1848, Later from Yucatan.
RE48v45i4p2c4, May 16, 1848, From the
New Orleans Picayune, Extra, May 8
Arrival of the Steamship New Orleans. Later From the City of Mexico.
RE48v45i4p2c4, May 16, 1848, Special
Correspondence of the Picayune
City of Mexico, April 26, 1848.
RE48v45i4p2c6, May 16, 1848, From the Vera Cruz American of April 30.
RE48v45i4p3c1, May 16, 1848, The Court of Inquiry.
RE48v45i4p3c1, May 16, 1848, Court of Inquiry.
RE48v45i4p3c1, May 16, 1848, Gen. Cushingthe Peace Treaty.
RE48v45i4p3c2, May 16, 1848, Correspondence of the Enquirer. Washington, May 15P.M. U.S. Senate.
RE48v45i4p4c3, May 16, 1848, Whig Sentiment in Other States.
RE48v45i4p4c5, May 16, 1848, Truly Said.
RE48v45i4p4c6, May 16, 1848, Thirtieth Congress—First Session. Washington, Thursday May 11, 1848. U.S. Senate.
RE48v45i5p1c1, May 19, 1848, General Taylor and Mr. Clay.
RE48v45i5p1c2, May 19, 1848, General Taylor and the Veto.
RE48v45i5p1c1, May 19, 1848, No title
Bold statements of the Whig PressGeneral Taylor’s nomination.
RE48v45i5p1c7, May 19, 1848, Yucatan.
RE48v45i5p1c7, May 19, 1848, Election in Oregon.
RE48v45i5p2c1, May 19, 1848, Remarks of the Hon. Thomas H. Bayly, of Virginia.
RE48v45i5p2c4, May 19, 1848, From Vera Cruz.
RE48v45i5p2c5, May 19, 1848, No
title
The Republican briefly replies to our exposure…
RE48v45i5p2c7, May 19, 1848, Thirtieth Congress—First Session. Wednesday, May 17, 1848, Senate.
RE48v45i5p4c1, May 19, 1848, Thirtieth Congress—First Session. Saturday, May 13, 1848, Senate.
RE48v45i5p4c4, May 19, 1848, Mexican News.
RE48v45i5p4c5, May 19, 1848, An Anomaly!
RE48v45i5p4c4, May 19, 1848, The Treaty.
RE48v45i5p4c5, May 19, 1848, Interesting
Correspondence
The Views of General Worth on Political Questions.
RE48v45i5p4c6, May 19, 1848, To the Editors of the Enquirer: Washington, May 13, 1848.
RE48v45i5p4c7, May 19, 1848, City of Mexico, January 10, 1848.
RE48v45i7p1c1, May 26, 1848, Indian War in Oregon.
RE48v45i7p1c6, May 26, 1848, The Case of General Pillow.
RE48v45i7p2c4, May 26, 1848, Gen. Lewis Cass.
RE48v45i7p2c4, May 26, 1848, Important from Mexico. Rejection of Treaty.
RE48v45i7p2c5, May 26, 1848, There is an End to Peace.
RE48v45i7p2c4, May 26, 1848, By Telegraph. New Orleans, May 18, 8 ½ P.M.
RE48v45i7p2c4, May 26, 1848, (From the N. O. Picayune, Extra, May 18, 1 P.M.) Late and Important From Mexico.
RE48v45i7p2c5, May 26, 1848, Editors Picayune. City of Mexico, May 2, 1848.
RE48v45i7p2c5, May 26, 1848, From Vera Cruz.
RE48v45i7p2c5, May 26, 1848, Late and Important
from Yucatan. Conclusion of a Treaty of Peace.
From the New Orleans Picayune May 18
RE48v45i8p4c5, May 26, 1848, Arrival of Gen. Scott at New York.
RE48v45i8p4c5, May 26, 1848, Important from Mexico.
RE48v45i8p1c6, May 30, 1848, Alexandria Volunteers.
RE48v45i8p1c7,
May 30, 1848, The Voice of a Whig Soldier
From the Clinton Democrat
RE48v45i8p1c7, May 30, 1848, Arrival of Gen. Santa Anna
RE48v45i8p1c7, May 30, 1848, Thirtieth Congress—First Session. Thursday, May 25, 1848
RE48v45i8p2c2, May 30, 1848, Mexico – Treaty of Peace
RE48v45i8p2c2, May 30, 1848, Three Days
Later From Mexico
From the New Orleans Crescent, Extra, May 21
RE48v45i8p2c3, May 30, 1848, Arrival
of the British Steamer Tay. Late and Important From Mexico
From the N. Orleans Picayune, Extra, May 21
RE48v45i8p2c3, May 30, 1848, Mexican Congress – Message
RE48v45i8p2c3, May 30, 1848, Message of the President of the Republic
RE48v45i8p2c2, May 30, 1848, Tamaulipas
RE48v45i8p2c2, May 30, 1848, Jalisco
RE48v45i8p2c2, May 30, 1848, San Luis
RE48v45i8p2c2, May 30, 1848, The Special Commission
RE48v45i8p2c2, May 30, 1848, From Pachuca
RE48v45i8p2c2, May 30, 1848, Appointment
RE48v45i8p2c2, May 30, 1848, The Mexican Senate
RE48v45i8p3c2, May 30, 1848, By the Magnetic Telegraph. Correspondence of the Enquirer. Washington, May 20 – P. M. U. S. Senate
RE48v45i8p4c1, May 30, 1848, Adjournment of the Convention
RE48v45i8p4c2, May 30, 1848, The President’s letter
RE48v45i8p4c5, May 30, 1848, British Bondholders in Mexico
RE48v45i8p4c6, May 30, 1848, Yucatan
RE48v45i8p4c6, May 30, 1848, For the Enquirer. Mr. Jefferson and the Tariff
RE48v45i8p4c7, May 30, 1848, British
Intervention
RE48v45n9p23, June 2, 1848, Lieut. WM. B. Giles
Report from Mexico; Giles is injured and therefore not in charge of the
command; following the enmy to Mexico City; explaining the orders given to
the army
RE48v45n9p2c6, June 2, 1848, Important from Mexico
Report on the prospects of Peace declining; Herrera not elected President;
Com. Pickney and Harris drowned
RE48v45n9p2c6, June 2, 1848, Congress
Comments made in the Senate about how the war with Mexico cost the safety
of those in Oregon; government should go with the military to Oregon;
RE48v45n9p3c2, June 2, 1848, By the Magnetic Telegraph
Bill to refund state governments the money advanced for the transportation
and subsistence of volunteers in the Mexican War passed
RE48v45n9p4c4, June 2, 1848, Major Lawrence P. Graham
Praises given to Graham's performance at the battle of Resaca de la Palma
RE48v45n9p4c6, June 2, 1848, Congress
Comments about Oregon made in the Senatedebate about sending a government
with the troops
RE48v45n10p1c7, June 6, 1848, Ratification of the Mexican Treaty
Ratification of the Peace Treaty has been done by the Mexican Congress
RE48v45n10p2c7, June 6, 1848, The WhigConvention
Taylorites in NY had a large rally; friends of Clay mean to rally to the
defeat of Taylor
RE48v45n10p2c7, June 6, 1848, Peace Made
Treaty ratified by the Mexican Congress; orders have been given to call
in the outpost of the army; Gen. Smith has been appointed superintendent
of the embarkation of the forces at Vera Cruz
RE48v45n10p2c7, June 6, 1848, To the Editors of the Enquirer
Movements have been taken to overlook Clay and make Taylor the nominee
for President; Gens. Scott, Quitman and Cushing are here but preparing to
leave for MD
RE48v45n10p4c1, June 6, 1848, The Peace Prospects
Letter received expressing that the ratification of the peace treaty is
certain; opponents of the treaty in Mexico are looking to the Whig party success
in the up coming election
RE48v45n10p4c2, June 6, 1848, Late and Important from Mexico
The committee of Congress to whom the treaty has been referred made a
favorable report; Senor Pena y Pena has been elected by Congress Provisional
President; Herrera cannot take his seat as elected president because the
votes from one state are not yet in; seems to be no doubt about the ratification
of the treaty
RE48v45n10p4c2, June 6, 1848, Arrival of the New Orleans
Lieut. Contee left the city of Mexico on the 15th of May; while
he was there all agreed to peace; news from Queretaro became more favorable
after Contee left; Lieuts. Hare, Tilden, and Dutton and the man Laverty convicted
of murder and burglary have been sentenced to be hung; loss by drowning
of Com. Harris and Pinkey; more comments about the prospects of peacevery
detailedreports about the Mexican Congress' every move, dealing with the
treaty
RE48v45n10p4c6, June 6, 1848, Thirtieth Congress
Comments about what to do about Oregon and its current state of no government;
RE48v45n11p1c5, June 9, 1848, Important from Mexico
Vote on the treaty in the Chamber of Deputies; preparations for the embarkation
of the troops; Gen. Smith is to command the embarkation of the troops
RE48v45n11p2c3, June 9, 1848, Another New Antic
Whigs have discussed letting Louisiana represent Texas
RE48v45n11p2c2, June 9, 1848, Ratification Meeting
Resolution about how the Mexican war was needed and caused by Mexico
RE48v45n11p2c2, June 9, 1848, Another Taylor Letter!
Letters upon letters of Taylor's have been publishedmaking fun of Taylor
RE48v45n11p2c6, June 9, 1848, Ratification of the Treaty
Private letter from an officer at Vera Cruz states that the treaty has
been signed
RE48v45n11p2c7, June 9, 1848, Correspondence of the Washington Union
Taylor's support is much depressed here today and Scott's popularity is
improving; Taylor needs to enter convention with a pledge to submit to their
policies or otherwise he won't win
RE48v45n11p4c2, June 9, 1848, Important from Mexico
Ratification of the treaty in the Chamber of Deputies; outposts of the
army to be called in; embarkation of the troops; Gen. P.F. Smith starts for
Vera Cruz to oversee the embarkation
RE48v45n1p4c5, June 9, 1848, The Whig Convention
Impossible to speculate as to the probable nominee of Taylor but his chances
seem to be improving; have quotes saying that Taylor will not get the nomination
if he does not promise to abide by the policies of the party
RE48v45n11p4c5, June 9, 1848
Whigs of South Carolina voted against instructing their delegate to vote
for Taylor
RE48v45n11p4c6, June 9, 1848, Thirtieth Congress
Report on the discussion about the Oregon Territorial Bill in the Senate
RE48v45n12p1c1, June, 12, 1848, The Response of the Whig Press
Whigs hail the nomination of Taylor; comments about how the Whig Press
covered the nomination of Taylorgives quotes from Whig papers
RE48v45n12p1c2, June, 12, 1848,
Surgeon General of the US army has purchased a site for a military hospital
on the Gulf
RE48v45n12p1c4, June 12, 1848, National Whig Convention
Report on what happened at the Whig convention; report on the recommendation
that Louisiana be able to vote for Texas
RE48v45n12p1c4, June 12, 1848, Whig Convention
Report on the nomination of the Whig presidential candidate; gives the
numbers of votes given to each candidate for each round of the nomination
RE48v45n12p2c3, June 12, 1848, Gen. Taylor's Prospects
Oppose that Taylor has been called a Whig candidate and not an independent
candidate
RE48v45n12p2c3, June 12, 1848, Florida
A state that the Whigs have claimed for Taylor
RE48v45n12p2c2, June 12, 1848, Old Zac in a Dilemma
Placing Taylor as a nominee puts him in direct contradiction to all of
his letters
RE48v45n12p2c3, June 12, 1848
Comments about how Taylor is a good soldier but not a politician
RE48v45n12p4c1, June 12, 1848, Congressional
Remarks of Hon. G. W. Brown of VA in the House of Representatives about
the Bill to amend an act entitled "An act to raise for a limited time an additional
military Force and for other purposes" do not want to decrease the size
of the army
RE48v45n12p4c5, June 12, 1848, The Denouement
Taylor has been given the nomination of the Whigs for President; allowed
the delegates of Louisiana to vote for Texas; little enthusiasm was produced
at the announcement of his nomination
RE48v45n12p4c6, June 12, 1848,
The new of peace with Mexico strikes a blow for the Whigs who have placed
on their platform a return to peace
RE48v45n12p4c7, June 12,1848: Gratifying News
Ratification of the Treaty with Mexico has been completed and peace now
exists between Mexico and the US
RE48v45n12p4c7, June 12, 1848, Important from Mexico
Report of the ratification of the treaty; Gen. Kearny ordered to command
the City of Mexico and replace Gen. Smith; great tensions in the City of Mexico
because of the Indians; final vote on the treaty occurred on 25th
of May; comments about troops leaving
RE48v45n12p4c7, June 12, 1848
Delegation from Richmond to invite Scott to the city arrived today
RE48v45n13p1c1, June 16, 1848, Our Flag is There
Comments about how the Whigs have Taylor's promise not to veto any bill
from Congress
RE48v45n13p1c2, June 16, 1848, Trouble in the Whig Camp!
Comments about how the Whig party is split between Taylor and Clay
RE48v45n13p1c 4, June 16, 1848, Whig Ratification Meeting in Washington
City
Comments made by Whigs about Taylor and whether they support him for president
or not
RE48v45n13p1c5, June 16, 1848, Correspondence of the Baltimore Sun
Major Graham is said to have a copy of the ratified treaty; Gen. Persifer
F. Smitharrived at Vera Cruz and began his job as municipal govern; many American
soldiers are volunteering for the Yucatan; Mexican Government has decided
to send to Switzerland 12,000 men to be incorporated into their army;
RE48v45n13p1c6, June 16, 1848, Thirtieth Congress
Now that peace had been established with Mexico troops used for the war
can be used to protect Oregon
RE48v45n13p2c1, June 16, 1848, Platform of Whig Principles
Many letters written by Taylor explaining his political stance on issues;
comments about how he does not want to accept the nomination for President
RE48v45n13p4c1, June 16, 1848, The Whig Convention
Full details of the convention that nominated Taylor for President
RE48v45n13p4c3, June 16, 1848,
NY Tribune expresses unhappiness with the nomination of Taylorbut
will deal with it
RE48v45n13p4c6, June 16, 1848, Return of the Troops
Quartermaster's Department in Richmond is fitting and sending transportation
to bring troops home
RE48v45n13p4c5, June 16, 1848, The Managerie at Philadelphia
More comments about the battle between the Clay Whigs and the Taylor Whigs
for the Presidential Nomination
RE48v45n13p4c5, June 16, 1848, Peace Established
Mr. McKee passed through this morning with official government information
of the treaty between the US and Mexico; peace is finally established
RE48v45n13p4c5, June 16, 1848, Rough Notes of a Virginia Volunteer Officer
During a Short Campaign in Mexico
Comments about Taylor, the make up of the army, places where he went etc.
RE48v45n14p1c1, June 20, 1848, Gen. Taylor and "Free Soil"
Comments about Taylor's stance on the slavery issue
RE48v45n14p1c2, June 20, 1848, "General Taylor's Position"
Taylor's supporters will withdraw his name if he does not follow their
lead; Taylor said he would not refuse the Whig nomination and will not withdraw
his name if Clay is nominated
RE48v45n14p1c4, June 20, 1848, Whig Ratification Meting
Comments about Taylor being equal to Washington
RE48v45n14p1c5, June 20, 1848, "Old Whitey"
Reported that Mr. Collier of Ohio reported to nominate Taylor for President
and "Old Whitey" for VP
RE48v45n14p2c1, June 20, 1848
Gen. Taylor supported in the North as long as he promises not to veto
the Wilmot Proviso
RE48v45n14p2c3, June 20, 1848, Gen. Taylor's Qualifications for the Presidency
Comments about whether Taylor himself stated that he had not qualifications
for PresidentWhigs say that he did not
RE48v45n14p2c5, June 20, 1848 Whig Rallies
Continue to receive reports of how the Whigs are trying to rally support
for Taylor
RE48v45n14p2c5, June 20, 1848
Some papers in Louisiana and South Carolina fly the name of Taylor alone
RE48v45n14p2c5, June 20, 1848, Intercepted Correspondence. General Taylor's
Acceptance
Letter to Taylor asking him to accept the nomination for president; and
letter from Taylor accepting the nomination
RE48v45n14p4c3, Jun3 20, 1848, Sober Second Thoughts
Report on how Whig delegates have acted upon their return from the nomination
of Taylor
RE48v45n14p4c3, June 20, 1848, To the Editors of the Enquirer
Comments about how Taylor cannot carry the state of NY
RE48v45n14p4v6, June 20, 1848 Thirtieth Congress
Report on the Oregon Territorial Billdid not pass in the Senate; conversation
in the House about a joint resolution dealing with the return of military
forces from the war with Mexico
RWvXLVi14p4c5, June 20,1848: To the Editors of the Enquirer
Report on a Whig rally held in City Hall in Washington; division between
the WhigsClay vs. Taylor
RE48v45n15p1c1, June 23, 1848,
More comments and reports on the division between the Whigs Clay vs.
Taylor
RE48v45n15p1c2, June 23, 1848, Long Tail and BobTail Coons
Report that Taylor believes the slavery question should be left up to
the people
RE48v45n15p1c4, June 23, 1848, To the Editors of the Enquirer
Comments about Taylor is a military man not a politician
RE48v45n15p2c1, June 23, 1848, To the People of Virginia
Defends the US occupation of Mexico
RE48v45n15p2c5, June 23, 1848, Later from Mexico
Indians continue to murder in the Yucatanquote from a report about it
RE48v45n15p2c5,June 23, 1848, Further from Mexico
Prisoners known as the St. Patrick prisoners have been pardoned by Gen.
Butler; Gen. Herrera has been elected President; comments about US troops
leaving Mexico; reprint of an address to the US commissioners after the Mexican
Congress had ratified the treaty
RE48v45n15p4c4, June 23, 1848, An Easy Conscience
Quote from the Wheeling Times that it is in agreement with Taylor's
political stance
RE48v45n15p4c4, June 23,1848: General Taylora Tariff Man
Quote from a letter from John Buchler, said Taylor would make a fine president
because he is a Whig and a tariff man
RE48v45n15p4c3, June 23, 1848, Santa Anna
Belief in Mexico that Santa Anna will return
RE48v45n15p4c3, June 23, 1848, Almonte
The distinguished Mexican will be visiting the US
RE48v45n15p4c3, June 23, 1848, Governor of New Mexico
Brevet Lieut. Col. Washington will command the troops detached from Gen.
Wool's command and on his arrival in Santa Fe he will act as governor
RE48v45n15p4c5, June 23, 1848, Later from Vera Cruz
Explosion in the city; recruits arriving are now turned back without landing
because of the fever; details of the explosion in the city; Gen. Smith paid
a visit to Com. Perry
RE48v45n15p4c4, June 23, 1848, The Whig Address of the Central Committee
of June 17th
Comments about how Taylor has shown no ability to lead in civil matters
RE48v45n16p1c1, June 27, 1848:Thirtieth Congress
Comments about how Taylor was opposed to the annexation of Texas; Whigs
believe Taylor to be an honest Whig and trust his decisions
RE48v45n16p1c6, June 27, 1848, The Great Embodiment
Comments about how Clay received the news of Taylor's nomination
RE48v45n16p1c7, June 27, 1848, Rough Notes [No.II]
Description of Mexicoland, people, towns etc.
RE48v45n16p1c6, June 27, 1848,
Letter from Martin Van Buren saying he will not vote for Cass or Taylor
RE48v45n16p2c1, June 27, 1848
Reasons why Virginia should sustain the nomination of Cass and Butler
against that of Taylor and Fillmore
RE48v45n16p2c2, June 27, 1848
Gen. Butler expected to arrive in New Orleans last week
RE48v45n16p2c3, June 27, 1848, White or Black!
Comments made by Taylor about supporting Clay for President but not withdrawing
his name if Clay won the nomination
RE48v45n16p4c6, June 27, 1848, From Mexico
Major General Butler published a General Order announcing the peace between
the US and Mexico and ordering the evacuation of the countryreprint the
order
RE48v45n16p4c7, June 27, 1848,
Remarks about the Allison Letter written by Gen. Taylor
RE48v45n16p4c6, June 27, 1848, Correspondence of the Pennsylvanian
Quotes made by Taylor about how he has no political opinions, but then
stating that he is a Whig
RE48v45n17p1c5, June 30, 1848, What will be the effect of Van Burens Barnburning
nomination!
Report that Van Buren will take more Whig votes than Taylor
RE48v45n17p1c7, June 30, 1848, From New Orleans
Steamer arrived from Vera Cruz; Herrera has finally accepted the Presidency;
ten thousand US troops were evacuated and waiting transportation; inhabitants
from the Isle of Canea have petitioned Com. Perry to not withdraw the Naval
Forces until the Mexican government has provided for their safety; Indians
have become troublesomeCapts. Hunt and Wise with their companies had to
repel attacks of the Whites and Indians from Campeachy
RE48v45n17p1c6, Jun 30, 1848, Rough Notes (No.IV)
Description of Matamoras
RE48v45n17p1c5, June 30, 1848, Rough Notes (No. III)
Description of the Texas coast line; Indians, Santa Anna's mandate; the
Rio Grande
RE48v45n17p2c1, June 30, 1848, A Screw Loose
Editor certain that the Whigs of NY will not support Taylor; comments
about Taylor and Whig support
RE48v45n17p2c6, June 30, 1848, Later From Mexico
Mr. Sevier, out commissioner to Mexico, left the capital on the12th; conspiracy
has been formed in the city of Mexico, headed by Paredes and Jarauta to overthrow
the existing government; all troops expected to be at Jalapa on the 21st;
Palmetto brought four companies of Michigan Volunteers
RE48v45n17p2c7, June 30, 1848, Thirtieth Congress
Report on the bill to make additions to the Texas navy; report on the
bill for fortifications; report on the bill to establish the Territorial
Government of Oregon
RE48v45n17p4c3, June 30, 1848, The Virtue of Consistency
Comments about how no one knows where Taylor stands on issues
RE48v45n17p4c3, June 30, 1848, The Spirit of Faction
Report that Southern Whigs held against the nomination of Taylor at the
Whig Convention; comments about the Mexican war and how the Whig stance on
it, is wrong
RE48v45n17p4c4, June 30, 1848, The Barnburners' Nomination
More comments about Taylor's supposed stance on slavery; and because he
owns slaves, prediction on his vote on the slavery question
RE48v45n17p4c6, June 30, 1848, Thirtieth Congress
Report on the Oregon Bill and the debate surrounding it in the Senate
RE48v44n79p2c7, February 4, 1848, COURT OF INQUIRY
We have been politely favored (says the New Orleans Delta) with a manuscript copy of the following General Order of the Secretary of War issued by direction of the President. It explains itself.
The command of the army in Mexico will necessarily devolve on Gen. Butler, of Kentucky, he being the officer next in rank to Gen. Scott whose presence will be required at the Court of Inquiry.
WAR DEPARTMENT, Adj’t General’s Office
Washington, Jan. 13, 1848.
General Order No. 2 – The following Order received from the Secretary of War, is published for the information and guidance of the officers concerned:
WAR DEPARTMENT, Jan. 13, 1848
By direction of the President of the U. States a Court of Inquiry, to consist of Brevet Brig. Gen. N. Towson, Paymaster General; Brig. Gen. Caleb Cushing, and Col. E.G.W. Butler 3d Dragoons, members, will assemble in Mexico to inquire and examine into the charges and allegation preferred by Major General Winfield Scott, against Maj Gen. Gideon J. Pillow, and Brevet Lieut. Col. James Duncan, Captain of the 2d Regiment of Artillery, and the charges of matters of complaint presented by way of appeal by Brevet Maj. Gen. W.J. Worth, Colonel of the 8th Regiment of Infantry, against Maj Gen. Winfield Scott; and also, into any matters connected with the same, as well as such other transactions as may be submitted to the considerations of the Court; and after investigating the same the Court will report the facts in each case, together with the opinion thereon, for the information of the President.
The Court will convene on the 18th day of February next, or as soon thereafter as practical in the Castle of Perote, in Mexico, where it will continue to hold its sittings, unless the exigence of the public service may require the place to be changed, in which case the Court is authorized to adjourn from place to place, as circumstances may render necessary, in order that no embarrassment to the service may be occasioned by the sessions.
Should any of the members named in the order be prevented form attending, the Court will proceed to and continue the business before it, provided the number of members present be without the limitations prescribed by law.
1st Lieut. Richard P. Hammond, 3d Artillery is appointed to act as Judge Advocate and Recorder of the Court.
In case the Judge Advocate and Recorder should be prevented from attending, or unable to discharge the duties, the Court is authorized to appoint some other proper person, or devolve the duties of Recorder upon the junior member.
W.L. MARCY, Secretary of War
By order: (Signed) R. Jones, Adj Gen
[SDW]
RE48v44n80p1c24, February 8, 1848, LATE AND IMPORTANT FROM MEXICO
[From the New Orleans Picayune, Jan. 29.]
LATE AND IMPORTANT NEWS FROM MEXICO.
Two weeks later from the City of Mexico and ten days later from Queretaro.
Safety of Col. Wither’s command – Rumors of Peace – Capture of Gens. Valencia and Torrejon and other Mexican Officers – Attempt at Insurrection in the Cirty of Mexico – Skirmish between the Rangers and Gurrillas – Supposed Death of Padre Jarauta – Pena y Pena again President &c,&c.
The U.S. steamship Edith, Capt. Cuillard, arrived last evening from Vera Cruz, which place she left on the 20th January. By her we have received our letters and files from the city of Mexico to the 13th of January, and from Vera Cruz to the date of the sailing. The most important feature of the intelligence by this arrival relates to the rumors of peace and an attempted insurrection in the city of Mexico.
Col. Wither’s command, about which our last advices left some anxiety on the public mind, arrived in safety at Real de Monte.
A detachment under Col. Wynkoop captured Gen. Valencia and his aid, and Col. Arrista, at the hacienda of the former, Tepijaco, on the 1st inst. Col. Wynkoop was in pursuit of Jaruata and Rea at the time. These escaped him a few hours only. Gen Valencia and Col. Arrista were released on parole.
Cols. Torrejon, Minon and Gaund were shortly afterwards captured at Amaxnca, near Puebla, by Dominguez, Capt. Of the Mexican spy company in the service of the United States.
Gen. Cadwalader’s command, consisting of the 4th Artillery, 6th, 8th and 11th Infantry, left the city of Mexico on the 3d inst. For Toluca. The troops were in fine spirits at the prospect of active service once more. They had reached Lerma at the last accounts, without molestation.
On the 4th inst. Major Talliafero arrived in Mexico from Real del Monte with a detachment of the 9th Infantry and twenty dragoons, in charge of one hundred and fifty thousand dollars in silver bars – a part of the assessment levied upon the State and Federal District of Mexico.
The rumor prevailed in the city of Mexico that the Mexican Commissioners had offered a plan of peace – based upon Mr. Trist’s propositions at Tacubaya – which had been sent on to Washington city. The departure from the ultimatum offered by Mr. Trist, was supoosed to be a demand for $30,000,000 for the territory proposed to be surrendered to the United States.
We regret to learn that the four regiments which accompanied Gen. Butler to Mexico, are suffering much from sickness.
From a hasty glance at our Mexican papers, of which we have a full file, we can find nothing more than is contained in the letters of our correspondents.
We extract the following paragraph from the World, of Guadalaxara, under date of the 17th of December:
In a letter from Teple, dated the 11th December, 1847, it is said that news had reached Manialen that 500 rancheros of California had attacked the Americans who were in possession of La Pax and San Jos, had defeated them and set fire to those places. On the 24 three American vessels had left Maxatian to render assistance, and this occurrence would prolong the blockade of San Blias.”
The following is a list of passengers in the United States steamship Edith, from Vera Cruz:
Lieut. A.S. Way, Georgia Bat,; Lieut. Averson; Joseph Johns, discharged soldier; Robert Smith and Capt J. Loyall.
The Edith brought over forty sick and discharged soldiers – two of whom died on the passage – and the bodies of the following deceased officers:
Brevet Lieut. Col J.S. McIntosh, 5th U.S. Infantry; Capt. S. McKenzie, 2d Art.; Capts. M.E. Merrill and Whipple, 5th In.; Capt E.K. Smith, 1st Inf.; Capts. M.j. Burke and E.K. Capron, 1st Art.; Capt. S.B. Thornton, 2d Dragoons; Capt. J.W. Anderson, 2d In.; Capft. Charles Hanson 7th In.; Brevet Capt. Geo W. Ayres, 3d Art.; 1st Lieuts. C.B. Daniels and Wm. Armstrong, 2d Art.; 1st Lieuts. J.P. Johnstrone and Joseph F. Irons 1st Art.; 1st Lieut. J. D. Bacon, 6th In.; 1st Lieut J.G. Burbank. 8th In.; 1st Lieut. Sidney Smith, 4th In.; 2d Lieut. Wm. T. Burwell, 5th In.; 2d Lieut J.F. Farry, 3d Art; 2d Lieut S. Hoffman, 1st Art.; 2d Lieuts. Joseph P. Smith and Erastus B. Strong, 5th In; T. Crosby, U.S.A.
These bodies will be conveyed this morning to J.D.G. Quirks, Camp street, where they will be properly bestowed, and prepared for their transportation.
[Special Correspondence of the Picayune]
CITY OF MEXICO, Dec. 12, 1847.
You will find in one of the letters of the gentleman who continued his correspondence with you during my indisposition, an account of the capture of Gen. Valencia, the renowned hero of Contreras, and Col. Arresta, at the hacienda of the former, in this valley, by a party of Texan Rangers under command of Col. Wynkoop, of the Pennsylvania Volunteers. From all I can learn, the expedition was managed in the most successful manner, and the party came very near laying hands on Padre Jaruaura himself, who has been busy in this vicinity some weeks.
Yesterday, Dominguez, the captain of the Mexican Spy Company, arrived with a small man, and brought intelligence of his having had a brush with a party of the enemy’s cavalry between Obijo de Agua and Napoluca. The cavalry he dispersed, and took prisoners Gens. Torrejon, Minon and Gaund, who were with the party, and delivered them over to Col. Childs, at Puebla, together with two American deserters whom he found with the party. I regret that in addition to these captures I cannot add that of Gen. Salazar, who rendered himself infamous by his cruelty to the Santa Fe prisoners. The scoundrel was in the city a few days since, upwards of twenty four hours, with his family, and the authorities, on learning his whereabouts, sent a body of soldiers to arrest him, but unfortunately he had left the city about two hours before it was known he was here. All these prisoners have been liberated on parole.
The policy of liberating these men I think extremely doubtful. On parole they can go where they please, and among their own people can say what they please, which enables them to do us much more injury in exciting the people to acts of hostility than if they were never taken prisoners, and their influence not confined to such parts of the country only as they could muster courage to visit. As an instance in proof of what I say, I am told by a gentleman who came up with Col. Johnson’s train from Vera Cruz, that on entering one of the small towns at this side of Puebla, which was an advantageous position to resist the advance of Col. Johnson, Gen. La Vega (who, together with his brother, Col. La Vega, taken at Huamantila, and Gen. Heren, taken at Cerro Gordo, came up with the train on temporary parole) addressed the first know of his countrymen he met in the town, and asked them why they were not up. It would be much safer to keep these men confined here, or send them to the U. States.
It is impossible to say when there will be a movement towards any of the cities still in the possession of the enemy. The commanderinchief, confident, perhaps, of a peace resulting from the proposition of which it is said the Mexican Government has made, is not disposed to disturb the deliberations of the Government at Queretaro by sending an expedition in that direction, or to create new causes of animosity, by making additional conquests, until the result of the proposition is known.
A bearer of dispatches from Washington arrived yesterday with Col. Dominguez, and it is possible that an onward movement may be ordered. If it is ordered soon, there is little, if any, probability of resistance being offered to our progress. There is not at any one point that I can learn sufficient men and military supplies to resist one thousand of our soldiers.
I regret to say, there is a great deal of sickness among the four volunteer regiments from Kentucky, Tennessee and Indiana, which Gen. Butler commanded to this city. The measles, the mumps and the diarrhea are the prevailing diseases, and on an average one half the men in the four regiments are unfit for duty.
We have news today from Queretaro: Anaya, who was elected President after Santa Anna’s resignation, has gone out of office, the term having expired, and Pena y Pena, by right of his office as Chief Justice, at present file the vacant chair, or has been elected President – I cannot positively learn which, but I am inclined to believe the former. He has declared that he will pursue the policy of Abaya, who is supposed to be favorable to peace. The letter which brings this news is dated the 8th just, and says the Cabinet has been reorganized by the appointment of Sr. Rosas as Minister of Foreign Relations and temporary Secretary of the Treasury, Riva Salacio as Minister of Justice and Pedro Maria Anaya as Secretary of War. Yours, D.S.
CITY OF MEXICO, Jan. 13, 1848.
On Monday last the Commanderinchief was informed of a movement designed here to attack the quarters of the officers of the army, and if possible, to take them prisoners, or kill them. – The plan was, that the population, or so much of it as could be induced to take part in the conspiracy, should rise, and assisted by a body of guerillas which were to enter the city at a certain hour, make the attack. During the day, the Commanderinchief informed all the chief officers of the intended attack, designated rallying points for the different regiments, and made every disposition necessary to defeat the insurrection. At night scarcely a Mexican was to be seen in the streets – showing that the whole population had a knowledge of what was to be attempted. The precaution adopted, it is supposed, prevented an attempt to execute the plan. The projectors of the insurrection were either blind to the effects of their plan, or foreseeing them, must have been utterly reckless as to the consequences which would result to their own countrymen; for if the attempt had been made, there is not an officer in the army, not excepting the Commanderinchief himself, who could have restrained the troops from sacking the city. During the night Lieut. Baker of the 5th Indiana regiment, commanding a patrol, came in sight of two carts near the Plazza del Torro, in the South Eastern part of the city, one of which containing one hundred stand of arms he captured; the other he was unable to come up with before it was placed in concealment. Whether General Scott has the names of the parties who originated the plot, or not, I do not know; but it is pretty well understood that the chief conspirators are among the soldiers of the Mexican army, who assumed citizen’s dress when our army entered the city, and have remained there since. A few days may reveal more a relation to the matter.
You will, perhaps, learn before this reaches you of a similar attempt at Puebla, which the promptitude and determination of Colonel Childs nipped in the bud. Enclosed you will find Colonel Childs’ proclamation in the Spanish. D.S.
MEXICO, Jan. 13, 1848.
Yesterday Colonel Hays, and some of his men, had a brush with Padre Jaruota, at a place called San Juan, some twenty or thirty miles from here. Although the guerillas far exceeded the Texans, they did not wait for more than the first charge, but fled in great confusion. Jarauta was seen to fall from his horse, which, together with his lance and cloak, fell into the hands of Colonel Hays. His saddle was bloody; from which it is inferred that the reverend scoundrel was killed. C.C.
THE MEXICAN JOURNALS
The noticioso, of January 12, (says the New Orleans Delta,) contains the proclamation of President Anaya, dated at Quertaro, December 16, relative to the organization of the Mexican army. The several levies amount to 16,000 men, exclusive of the troops already raised, whose ranks are to be filled up. The new levies are to serve for three years, unless sooner discharged. They are not to consist of malefactors or invalids, they must be at least five feet in height and their age not to exceed forty years.
The disaffected population of Juasterca had made a pronunciamento against the Mexican army laws and government, and valorously threatened to march against the city of Mexico in order to wrest it from the Americans.
Col. Gates, commanding at Tampico, has given notice that all gold and silver metals, or specie, must be left at the Customhouse, when designed for exportation, where an exact account will be taken of it. The duty will be deducted there from and the balance returned to the owners for exportation.
A pronunciamento was put down at Queretaro, by President Anaya, on the 19th ult, by a display of military force which overawed the disaffected. They, however, threatened to rise, after Anaya’s term expires, which occurred on the 8th inst.
The small sum allowed the Mexican officers and soldiers had disgusted many of them, according to the Noticioso, and a great many of the officers had petitioned for permission to resign.
The Ameojo, of Durango, hopes that peace will soon be concluded, or the war renewed with vigor.
The Legislature of Durango had joined its vote to that of Jalisco, in favor of authorizing the Mexican Congress to take measures to form a coalition between all the HispanoAmerican governments on the continent.
The Patriots, of Aguascalientes, says it has received various communications on the existing state of the country. Some of the writers propose to call Santa Anna to the dictatorship, while others suggest a national Convention, to deliberate whether peace shall be made or the war continued.
CITY OF MEXICO, Jan. 13, 1848.
Eds. Delta – The city of Mexico is rife with rumors in reference to peace; some have it that peace is made; others have it that commissioners have gone on to Washinton, &c, &c.; and thus we have it up and down every day – peace and war alternately. Believe nothing you hear from this city at the present time on this ubject, for I assure you no one, unless it is Gen. Scott or Mr. Trist, knows anything more about it that “the man in the moon.” And these gentlemen are exceedingly cautious in everything relating to the movements of the army, and everything connected with it. The nearest that I can come to the present state of affairs, is from my correspondent at Quertaro, who informs me that there has been no treaty concluded, but he adds: “The whole subject rests witht eh United States – the Government of Mexico is willing to make a treaty, and are prepared and are strong enough to sustain it.” Many of the most influential men in the Republic, who have heretofore been violently opposed to making a treaty, are now advocating it strongly. – Those persons, who formerly belonged to the army and have been discarded by the Government, are perfectly prostrate; their influence is nothing on either side of the scale. The Congress had not yet met at Queretaro at the latest dates, but it was expected there would be a full meeting by the 19th or 20th inst.
The brigade of Col. Riley is still at Tacubays, and the brigade of Gen. Cushing at San Angel. No movement of troops for San Luis can take place before the 1st of February, even if General Scott most earnestly desired it. The command, before it starts from here, must be fully appointed for five or six months, as it will take that time at least before they would be able to make a road from San Luis to Tampico, by which they would be enabled to bring supplies from the latter place. At present they are without one of the most necessary articles, clothing, for such an expedition. Gen. Scott has sent twice to Vera Cruz for it, and both times has received a very meager supply; therefore he has had to resort to one of the poorest means of procuring it – having it made here. Capt. McKinery, ot the Quartermaster’s Department, has now about 10000 men and women engaged in making clothing for the soldiers, and I understand they will be at least until the 1st of February before a sufficient quantity will be ready. It is a very easy matter to move armies on paper, but more difficult in the field.
P.S. – 11 o’clock. – Col. Jack Hays has returned; he routed Padre Jarauta from one of his dens – killing some 10 or 12 of his men, and wounding about 15 others. One of the men shot the Padre; whether they killed him, I am not informed; they brought in his horse, saddle and bridle, and cloak and other trinkets belonging to the Rev. Father.
We have received the intelligence of the attack on Col. Miles’ train, and are sorry to learn that the fine company of Mounted Rifles has been cut up. We suppose it to be Capt. Ruff, as we do not know of any company of mounted rifles down there except his. The gallantry of Capt. Ruff and his company in several of the most important battles in this country has been severely tested, and always highly distinguished themselves. If the Mexicans did, as we are informed “cut him up,” you may rest assured they had a dear bargain of it. No men in the service use all their arms better than this company.
Yesterday the Police Guard discovered about a wagon load of muskets concealed in a Convent in this city.
Mr. Trist does not go home with the train going down tomorrow.
The gallant Capt. Walker, of 6th Infantry, so severely wounded at El Molino del Rey, will be sent down; he goes in a litter – still being too weak to travel otherwise.
MUSTANG
HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OT PUEBLA
Puebla, January 5, 1848
PROCLAMATION – Whereas, a diabolical and bloody correspondence has been detected between Don Manuel Perez, and other (as yet unknown) citizens of Puebla, with a person called General Rea, a guerilla chief, in which the said Perez and his confederates recommend the assassination of the person who styles himself the Governor of the State of Puebla, as well as many of the peaceably disposed citizens, in order to “strike terror into the whole community,” and then for the said Rea to pronounce against the State and General Gobvernment, and declare himself Dictator: this is to give notice to the inhabitants of the city of Puebla that so long as the troops of the United States of North America shall hold military possession of the city, any Mexican, or other person, not owing allegiance to the United States, corresponding with known guerillas or with any organized military body, in arms against the forces of the United States, will be considered in the light of spies, and any attempt to furnish such armed bodies with supplies of any kind, will be deemed as a violation of good faith, and persons thus detected, will be regarded as in open hostility against the forces of the United States, and treated accordingly. Citizens remaining in the city of Puebla during its military occupation by the United States troops, enjoying protection of person and property, tacitly acknowledge such military authority, and any aid of theirs compromising their neutrality, is, by the laws of war, severely punished.
THOMAS CHILDS, Col., U.S.A,
Civil and Military Governor
[SDW]
RE48v44n80p2c1, February 8, 1848, LATEST FROM MEXICO
The New Orleans Picayune of the 30th ultimo contains various matters of interest, form which we select the following:
Among the passengers on the Maria Burr, from the Rio Grande, came Lieut. Franklin, of the Topgraphical Engineers – a gallant young officer who rendered himself conspicuous at Buena Vista as a member of General Wool’s staff by his gallantry. Lieutenand F. is direct from General Wool’s headquarters at Monterey, which place he left on the 13th instant.
Just before he left an express was received from Saltillo from Col. Hamptramck, in a command of the forces there, stating that a report had reached him from a source entitled to credit, that a force of Mexicans, 10,000 strong, under command of Gen. Bustamente, were marching down upon Saltillo. The report even particularizes the points from whence the troops had been raised, but so frequent are the stampedes upon that line, very little credit was attached to the report. Our forces, there were in good condition, and perfectly willing to be attacked whenever the enemy though best to make the experiment.
Upon the receipt of this news Gen. Wool had appraised the merchants at Monterey, Camergo, Matamoras, and other ports, that he could afford them no protection in the way of escorts. From another source we learn that Colonel Carasco, a Mexican officer who has rendered himself rather conspicuous, is at Monterey, proposing to enter into negotiations with Gen. Wool for a pronunciamento against the existing Government of Mexico and in favor of the Un. States, on the part of the States of Mamaulipas, Nueva Leon, and Coahuila. He also proposes to bring in Gen. Canales, that cowardly chief of guerillas, who has given us so much trouble upon the Rio Grande. Col. Carasco has been for a long time residing in Matamoras with his family, and appears friendly to the Americans. We know not what degree of credit to attach to this report.
Capt. Deas, of the artillery, who was a short time since wounded by a Mexican lancer between Saltillo and Monterey, has recovered from the effects of his wound, which was not so severe as was reported.
The Matamoras Flag, of the 22d, contradicts the report as to the probable death of Capt. G.K. Lewis, from wounds received in a recent fight with the Indians, near Paira. He was able to move about the streets of Saltillo with slight aid from a crutch. The wound is in the foot, a toe or two having been cut off by an Indian arrow. – Mr. Lewis is a printer.
The steampropeller Massachusetts, Captain Wood, fourteen days from New York, arrived at the Brazos on the 17th ult. She suffered some damage to her machinery, but being a superior sail vessel, there was not much detention in consequence. Several ladies, wives of officers of the army on the Rio Grande line, and others, were passengers.
FOR
THE BRAZOS. – The U.S. steamship Fann, will sail for the brazos this
morning. She takes over the following named passengers: James Campbell, bearer
of dispatches; Major Early, Virginia Regiment, Dr. H. Stenneke, Capt. Wm.
R. Archer, Virginia Regiment, in command of a detachment of recruits for the
3rd Dragoons; Sergt Maj Brown; Mrs. Dr. Treavit and two childred,
Mrs. Powers, Messrs Field James Delby, C. Taylor, A.U. McConlin, Gen. Randolph,
Charles C. Churchill, James Knowles, Julian Magill, and Paine.
[SDW]
RE48v44n80p2c1, February 8, 1848, WHIG DIVISION ON THE WAR QUESTION
What
is termed a rupture, and said to have been long fermenting between Governor
Young of New York, and the Clay whigs in the State Legislature, at length
is made clearly manifest in the extraordinary report just made by a majority
of the committee to whom was referred that portion of the governor’s message
relating to the Mexican war. They have brought forward a long protest,
with a series of resolutions, dissenting form the stand the Governor had assumed
and in favor of the waste between the Nueces and the Rio Grande as the boundary.
A minority report, on the same subject, has been submitted also.
[SDW]
RE48v44n81p4c3, February 11, 1848, HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF OCCUPATION
Agua Nueva, March 3, 1847
Sir – I have had the honor to receive your communication of January 27th enclosing a newspaper slip, and expressing the regret of the Department that the letter copied to that slip, and which was addressed by myself to Major General Gaines, should have been published.
Although your letter does not convert the direct censure of the Department or of the President, yet, when it is taken in connection with the revival of a paragraph in the regulations of 1825, touching the publication of private letters concerning operations in the field, I am not permitted to doubt that I have become the subject of Executive disapprotation. To any expression of it, coming with the authority of the President, I am bound by my duty and by my respect for his high office, patiently to submit; but, lest my silence should be construed into a tacit admission of the grounds and conclusions set forth in your communication, I deem it a duty which I owe to myself to submit a few remarks in reply. I shall be pardoned for speaking plainly.
In the first place, the published letter bears upon its face the most conclusive evidence that it was intended only for private perusal, and not at all for publication. It was published without my knowledge, and contrary to my wishes. Surely, I need not say that I am not in the habit of writing for the newspapers? The letter was a familiar one, written to an old military friend, with whom I have for many years interchange opinions on professional subjects. That he should think proper, under any circumstances, to publish it, could not have been foreseen by me.
In the absence of proof that the publication was made with my authority or knowledge, I may be permitted to say, that the quotation in your letter of the six hundred and fiftieth paragraph of the superceded regulations of 1825, in which the terms “mischievous” and “disgraceful” are employed to characterize certain letters or reports, conveys, though not openly, a measure of rebuke, which, to say the least, is rather harsh, and which many may think not warranted by the premises. – Again: I have carefully examined the letter in question, and I do not admit that it is obnoxious to the objections urged in your communication. I see nothing in it which, under the same circumstances I would not write again. To suppose that it will give the enemy valuable information, is to know very little of the Mexican sources of information, or of their extraordinary sagacity and facilities in keeping constantly apprized of our movements.
As to my particular views in regard to the general policy to be pursued towards Mexico, I perceive by the public journals that they are shared by many distinguished statesmen, and also in part by a conspicuous officer of the navy, the publication of whose opinions is not perhaps obstructed by any regulations of his Department. – It is difficult, then, to imagine that the diffusion of mine can render any peculiar aid to the enemy, or specially disincline him “to enter into negotiations for peace.”
In conclusion, I would say, that it has given me great pain to be brought into the position in which I now find myself with regard to the Department of War and the Government. It has not been of my own seeking. To the extent of my ability, and the means placed at my disposal, I have sought faithfully to serve the country, by carrying out the wishes and instructions of the Executive. But it cannot be concealed, that, since the capitulation of Monterey, the confidence of the Department, and I too much fear of the President, has been gradually withdrawn, and my consideration and usefulness correspondingly diminished. The apparent determination of the Department to place me in an attitude antagonistical to the Government, has an apt illustration in the well known fable of EScp. But I ask no favor, and I shrink from no responsibility. – While entrusted with the command in this quarter, I shall continue to devote all my energies to the public good, looking for my reward to the consciousness of pure motives, and the final verdict of impartial history.
I am, Sir, very respectfully,
Your obedient servant,
Z. TAYLOR
Maj Gen. U.S.A., commanding.
Hon. W.L. MARCY,
Secretary of War, Washington
[SDW]
RE48v44n84p2c5, February 18, 1848, FROM THE RIO GRANDE
By the arrival of the U.S. schooner Belle, Captain Morgan, which left Brazos Santiago on the 30th ult, we have dates from Matamoras to the 26th ult., says the New Orleans Picayune.
From the Flag of this date we learn, that Gen. Wool has issued an order, dated the 17th ult., at Monterey, requiring all disbursing officers of Government on that line, receiving monies form merchants and others for checks on the United States, to charge six percent on the amount of coin so received, the percentage to be credited to the United States. It also requires the Collector for the Districts of upper and lower Rio Grande, to state on the invoices of goods going to the interior, that the duties have been paid, mentioning the amount on each article. We also give below another order of General Wool, regulating, trade with the interior.
We regret to learn from the Flag the particulars of a recent fatal duel. We copy the Flag’s paragraph:
“We understand that a duel was fought at Camargo, a few days past, between Capt. Joshua Collet and Capt. Alexander Wilkins, both of the 10th infantry, now stationed at that place, in which the former was killed. We have not learned the particular causes of difficulty, but have been told the meeting arose out of a dispute between Capt. Wilkins and Capt. Postley of the same regiment, in which Capt. Collet acted as the friend of the latter.”
Dates to the 17th ultimo have been received from Monterey by the Flag. All was tranquil. The Union Gazette of the 15th, speaking of Colonel Hamtramck, commanding at Buena Vista, says that by his energy and prompt action, the guerrilla bands in the neighborhood of Saltillo have been completely broken up and dispersed. Refugio Gonzales, a celebrated guerrilla chief, and his brother, have fled the State. The VBice Governor of Saltillo has likewise fled, fearing lest he might be roughly dealt by, as papers had been captured from the robbers which implicated him in their schemes.
From the Flag we also copy an article touhing the “spreading” of our army over Mexico.
Colonel Davenport has ordered Captain Dunlap, with his company of Illinois mounted me, to take permanent post at Santa Teresa, a considerable town, sixty miles distant from here on the route to Victoria. The object in sending troops to Santa Teresa, is to break up the Mexican custom house established there, and to prevent the collection of duties from traders coming to the place, or going to the interior, and to give them protection, as far as circumstances will admit. This is a good beginning, and an augeury of what is to follow. Next San Fernando, and then Victoria must be occupied, and so on until our troops are spread over all the country between us and the mountains, giving protection to the people, and security to trade in every quarter. Our troops scattered over the country, the trade of Matamoras will be quadrupled, and the increased duties collected will be more than adequate to defray all expenses incident to the maintenance of troops at posts thus widely separated. Besides, the inhabitants of the country will be brought immediately in connection with our people, and being freed from the conniving spirits who are ever inciting them against us, a spirit of friendship will grow out of our intercourse with them, the same as witnessed in this city, and in nearly every city now occupied by our troops. The good to result from this widespread friendship is incalculable.
The following is the order of General Wool, referred to above:
HEADQUARTERS, ARMY OF OCCUPATION,
Monterey, Mexico, Jan. 12, 1848.
[Orders No. 4]
1.To prevent as far as possible, the evasion of the orders of the Government in relation to the collection of duties on importations to Mexico, the following regulations will be observed by all concerned, viz:
All persons leaving the Lower Rio Grande with goods, wares, or merchandize for any of the posts in advance of Matamoras, or any one leaving, in like manner, the districts of the Lower or Upper Rio Grande for the interior, will before their departure, present to the collector of the district correct invoices, in duplicate, of the articles to be transported specifying to what place they are to be taken. The collector shall satisfy himself that the required duties have in each case, been paid; and if such be the fact, he will endorse to that effect on the invoices – one of which he will send direct to the collector of the district in which the goods are to be sent, and will return the other to the carriers of the property, who will exhibit it to the commanding officer of each military post through which they may pass, who will countersign it, and afford to the persons presenting it every protection and facility in his power.
The absence of the invoices herein directed, or any frauds detected in any of them, will subject the goods to be confiscated.
2. * * * All persons coming into the interior from the posts or ports below, or passing from one post to another, will, before leaving be required to obtain a passport from the commanding officer of the post, and to have it countersigned by the commander of every post through which he may pass to reach his destination.
All persons arriving at a military post will invariably present themselves to the commanding officer, who is required to see that this order is in each case duly complied with.
* * * *
Commanding officers will be careful to give passports only to those who may deserve to receive them.
By command of Brig. Gen. Wool:
(Signed) IRWIN McDOWELL
Eug. E. McLean, A.A.G.
[SDW]
RE48v44n85p1c56, February 22, 1848, SANTA ANNA
Rebuttal to the Whig about their report on Santa Anna’s return
From the terrific blustering of the Whig about the return of Santa Anna, one would suppose that that journal had never heard of his return to Mexico until after the call was made by the House of Representatives upon the President to furnish information touching his “free pass.” – We indulged in some speculations a short time ago on this subject, which were characterized, in the graceful language of the Whig, as “fustian and rant.”
We now present some of the speculations of that journal on the same subject, bearing date 1st September, 1846. Comparing the views it presented at that time, with its present uproarious course on the same subjects, we leave it to our readers to determine where the right application of “fustian and rant” belongs. From the Whig of 1st September, 1846, we take the following:
“The last Southern mail brings us intelligence, which may be found in another column, of the arrival of Santa Anna at Vera Cruz, and of the successful pronunciamento in his favor at Metropolis; and what was entirely unexpected, of the downfall and imprisonment of the late dictator, Paredes.
“This news, however, is chiefly interesting to the people of the United States from the influence which it may probably exert upon the relations subsisting between our government and that of Mexico. Will it lead to a more determined, united and vigorous prosecution of the war, or will it tend to a speedy restoration of peace? Santa Anna and Almonte, who have both traveled extensively in the United States, and are more familiar with our resources than most of the public men in Mexico, must be satisfied of the hopelessness of the struggle on the part of Mexico, even under the most favorable circumstances, and equally so, that, the longer it is protracted, the more injurious it will be to that country. Hence, however, keenly they may feel, as Mexicans, the injuries which, in their opinion, Mexico has sustained at the hands of the United States government – and the diplomatic intercourse between the two governments, during his own previous administration, as well as subsequently, will show that they do believe, however erroneously, that they have suffered many and grievous wrongs – they cannot be less painfully convinced that they can never obtain redress by an appeal to arms – and that they have much more to hope, even now, from an appeal to the magnanimity of our people and Government, than by obstinately persisting in their present hostile attitude. And we take it for granted, that Santa Anna would not have been permitted by Com. Conner to enter Vera Cruz, had not that officer received instructions from Washington to interpose no obstacle to his attempt, or had he not been satisfied that his influence would be exerted to put an end to the existing hostilities. The fact, too, that Capt. A Slidell Mackenzie was three months ago sent by President Polk on a secret mission to Havana, where he had several interviews with Santa Anna, gives strong color of plausibility to the rumor that there has existed for some time such an “understanging” between the Mexican President and the authorities at Washington as will reder the pacific adjustment of the controversy mere matter of form – unless, indeed, Santa Anna shall find on his return to Mexico, that thos who have recalled him from exile are nevertheless in facor of a vigorous prosecution of the war. In that event, it will be a matter of very little consequ3ences what may be the personal wishes of Santa Anna, since the whole history of events in Mexico, shows that the President for the time being must conform to public opinion or cease to rule. The facility with which, by the mere edict of a few influential military commanders, at different points, dynasties are overthrown and restored, is sufficient to satisfy us that the Executive is generally a mere instrument in the hands of these chieftains even though invested with the title of Dictator, and not the supreme power in the State.
“What
then is the probably opinion of these Warwicks of Mexico – these puttersup
and pullersdown of rulers? Had not the restoration of Santa Anna been accompanied
by an exhibition of popular resentment towards his predecessor, our impression
would have been that the change of rulers would not lead to a change of policy
towards the U. States. If, as our previous accounts had prepared us to expect,
the authors of the successful revolution, by which Santa Anna has been restored,
had permitted Paredes to remain at the head of the army intended to operate
against General Taylor, or had even allowed him to withdraw quietly to his
private residence, as did President Herrera, when Paredes deposed him
and usurped the executive functions, we should have been inclined to believe
that public opinion in Mexico was still averse, under existing circumstances
, to a renewal of negotiations with the U. States. But the imprisonment of
the ExPresident, who has evinced so determined a spirit of hostility towards
us, would seem to justify a belief that the leading feature of the policy
of his administration is not in harmony with public sentiment, and that his
overthrow has been decreed in consequence of his inflexibility upon this point.
If this inference be correct, we may regard the restoration of Santa Anna
as the harbinger of a speedy restoration of peace. In that event, it will
be a subject for general congratulation – for although the United States is
in no danger in such a contest, from the worst consequences of a war – the
invasion of our own territory – yet there are strong reasons why even our
own people should desire the termination of a conflict in which but little
honor is to be gained even by repeated victories, the cost of which, in life
and treasure, will scarcely be repaid by their fruits.”
[SDW]
RE48v44n85p1c7, February 22, 1848, FROM THE RIO GRANDE
News from ChihuahuaProspects of another engagementCapture of a party of AmericansMilitary Executions at Buena Vista and Saltillo
By the last arrival from the Brazos we have received several private letters, from which we glean a number of items of interest that have reached us from no other source, and which we have not seen elsewhere. Information had been received across the country at Saltillo, which would indicate some little work ahead for the American troops sent from Sante Fe to take possession of Chihuahua. On the 15h of December they were encamped at El Passo, from whence it was understood they would march about the latter part of January. The Mexicans in that part of the country, are making every effort to oppose their march with a strong force. At first they did not intend making any resistance whatever; but, emboldened by the long delay of our troops at El Paso, they set to work in good earnest, and have now a considerable numerical force and twelve pieces of cannon. Should our troops continue on their march, they will probably have a second edition of the battle of Sacramento.
Our
readers will doubtless recollect that some months since, our correspondent,
J.E.D., with General Wool’s column, mentioned that Mr. James Collins, commonly
known as “Squire Collins,” who was interpreter to Colonel Doniphan’s command,
and behaved with the greatest gallantry at Sacramento and Brazita, had started
across the country in company with Colonel Ward, and a small party of less
than a dozen, for Santa Fe. The expedition was regarded as extremely hazardous,
both or account of the Indians and Mexicans; but the old Squire and his veteran
companion, who is eighty four years of age, were undaunted and determined.
The party were heard from a short time since; and we regret to say, they were
taken prisoners at Presidio del Norte by the treacherous conduct of a Mexican
padre. When near a place called San Carlos, on the Rio del Norte, they encountered
four Mexicans, out on an expedition after Camancho horses, and inquired of
them the distance to San Carlos, where they wished to purchase provisions.
The Mexicans represented the distance as short, and offered to guide them
thither. On arriving at San Carlos, they were unable to satisfy their wants,
and were advised to proceed to the Presidio del Norte the Mexicans
telling them that there was no garrison there, and that they had nothing
to fear. The squire and party determined to follow their advice, and set
out; but in the meantime, as afterwards appeared, the Mexicans had sent off
a courier to Presidio, with information that a party of Americans were on
their way to that place. Ignorant of the circumstance they in due time arrived
at the Presidio – were kindly received by the old padre, and considered
themselves perfectly safe. Dinner was prepared for them, and a table spread
at one end of a large “safa,” their arms being deposited at the other.
While quietly appeasing their hunger, a party of Mexicans rushed in, seized
their priest appeared to be quite delighted at the success of his ruse, but
received anything but blessings form the party, who regarded him as a second
Judas Incariot. The square and companions were all conveyed to Chihuahua,
and incarcerated in prison, where they still remained at last accounts. Old
Col. Ward was very ill, and some of the Foreigners in the place offered to
become his security; but the Mexican authorities inhumanly refused to release
him.
[SDW]
RE48v44n85p2c1, February 22, 1848, NEWS FROM MEXICO
News of peace
Peace is the word. Our citizens have been very much interested during the past two days in relation to the news which was received by the Southern cars on Sunday morning. According to these accounts, a peace has been agreed upon, only awaiting ratification by the proper authorities. We publish extracts from the New Orleans papers, from which our readers may see what is known to have occurred, and what rumors are afloat. A correspondent of the Baltimore Sun, writing from Washington, says that the treaty of peace arrived in that city on Saturday. The boundary is to be “the Rio Grande on the Atlantic side, and the Gila on the Pacific ocean; New Mexico and Upper California, including San Diego, to be ours, of course. A corps of our army, perhaps 12,000 men, to remain one year in Mexico.” The correspondent adds, that this is as yet mere rumor, but believed by him to be well founded. We learn from several members of Congress, who arrived in Richmond yesterday, that little doubt exists in Washington with regard to the receipt of a treaty.
P.S. –Since the above was written, we have received
the following Telegraphic Dispatch
WASHINGTON, Feb. 217 P.M.
Nothing
known as to the terms of the treaty, or what will be done.
[SDW]
RE48v44n85p2c2, February 22, 1848, IMPORTANT FROM MEXICO
The steamship New Orleans, Capt. Edward Auld, to whom we are indebted for the prompt delivery of our correspondence, arrived yesterday afternoon from Vera Cruz, having sailed the afternoon of Tuesday last, the 8th inst. She brought over sixtry officers of the army. Most of them are ordered on the recruiting service. The New Orleans had some thirty other cabin passengers and about 190 discharged soldiers and quartermaster’s men. The ship has made an extraordinary run.
Mr. Freaner arrived at Vera Cruz on Sunday last, the 6th inst., bearing dispatches from Gen. Scott for Government at Washington. He was only four days from the city of Mexico. – He sailed on Monday, the 7th inst., on board the U.S. steamer Iris for Mobile. The New Orleans was detained for two days to give the Iris time to get in ahead – why is scarcely known. – The New Orleans, however, overtook the Iris and passed her before she reached the Balize. – The dispatches brought by Mr. Freaner are of the utmost importance. The nature of them was not generally known at Vera Cruz, but from a source in which we have abiding confidence we learn that the Mexican Congress has sent interms of peace, which Gen. Scott has taken the responsibility of accepting. One of the articles of this arrangement is that twelve thousand Unites States troops shall remain in Mexico until certain obligations are fulfilledthe remainder of the troops to be withdrawn.
We learn further that the preliminaries of the treaty of peace were signed on the first day of February by the Mexican Government, and that no doubt was entertained that the Mexican Congress, which was to meet in a few days, would ratify the same by a large majority. By the terms of this treaty we understand that the United States obtain the boundary of the Rio Grande, New Mexico and Upper California. The pecuniary consideration for these concessions is a mere trifle compared with that proposed in the conferences at Tacubaya.
Our dates by this arrival are to the evening of the 2d inst. From the city of Mexico, and the information given above comes to us through so many channels and in such authentic form that we see no reason to question the fact.
We are almost overwhelmed by letters and papers by this arrival, but give below as many of our letters as we can possibly find room for.
Orizaba was captured on the 26th ult. A full account of the expedition is furnished us by one of our special correspondents, who accompanied it. His narrative is intensely interesting, but is so long that we cannot possibly find room for it this morning. One of the purposes of the expedition was to capture Gen. Santa Anna at Tehuacan. The wily Mexican, however, effected his escape through the treachery of one of his countrymen. Our readers will be extremely intered in the narrative, which we will lay before them in our next.
Com. Perry returned on the 8th inst. To Vera Cruz, from an expedition to Tlacatalpam and other towns south. We have a report of it, but are unable to insert it today. Our paper on Tuesday will contain a mass of Mexican news unavoidably laid over today.
Two large trains left Vera Cruz on the 7th instant, one for Orizaba, under Colonel Bankhead, consisting of over 1500 men, and the other for the city of Mexico, under the command of Major Caldwell of the Voltiguers.
The expedition which left Vera Cruz on the 24th ult. against the guerrillas does not appear to have effected much. They had two or three brushes with the enemy, but no great harm was done on either side. In the Free American of the 4th inst., we find an explanatory statement in regard to it, but we have not room for it.
Special Correspondence of the Picayune
CITY OF MEXICO, Jan. 15, 1848.
From what I have heard I am satisfied of the correctness of the information impated to me in Jalapa, by an intelligent merchant who has resided there several years, that an attempt would be made to raise a national insurrection, but, as it struck me at the time, and, as has since been verified, the conspirators had not sufficient courage or energy to attempt the execution of their plans. The design appears to have been to rise simultaneously in this city, in Puebla and Jalap, and attack the garrisons, but especially the officers. Circumstances have come to light which serve to convince, that no portion of the respectable inhabitants here were implicated in the affair; on the contrary, they were desirous of the plot being discovered, and it was from them information of the design was obtained. – The Padre Jaruara, it is confidently said, was in the city a day or two before the attack was have been made, and was active in his efforts to excite the people and to perfect the plan. It is probable that he will give no more trouble to us for sometime, if ever, as there is but little doubt he was severely wounded in the brush he had a few nights since with the party of Rangers under Col. Hays. His horse and his saddle, stained with blood, and a cloak with his name on it, also stained, were captured, and a Mexican officer, whose skull has fractured by being thrown by his horse against a stone wall in the fight, before dying, said Jaruata was wounded. I would look upon the capture of Jaranta as the most valuable that can be made, and an expedition will be started from here in a few days, which there is strong hopes will result in his capture and perhaps that of Santa Anna himself. The capture of Jarauta would be valuable, because he is active, energetic, and talented, and is possessed of more courage than any of his brother robbers. There is but little doubt, too, that Salazar was in the city upon an errand similar to that of Jaruta, but he, like his colaborer, found it prudent to shorten his visit.
The expedition to which I refer will consist of about four hundred mounted men, half Texan rangers, and half dragoons, under the command of Gen. Lane, whose activity in the neighborhood of Puebla, in routing the different bodies of the enemy, with severe losses, from their rendezvous, gives promise that he will not return without achieving something important, if there is a possibility of doing so. The expedition will be absent some ten or twelve days, and after thoroughly scouring this valley, in which it is known there are several guerilla bands, will strike for high game in the direction of Orizaba.
D.S.
MEXICO, Jan. 21, 1848.
The expedition under the command of General Lane, which left the city on Tuesday last, consisted of a portion of Col. Hays’ Texas Regiment, with the gallant Colonel himself, and two companies of the 3d Dragoons under the command of Major Polk. Mr. Scully, your special correspondent, accompanies the party, and will doubtless keep you fully advised of all its movements.
The Star of Wednesday published an extract from a letter of the Secretary of War, which contains an eloquent and well merited tribute to the high military skill and bravery of Gen. Scott and the army under his command. This is as it should be. Such testimonials coming from so distinguished a source, are gratifying to the gallant army whose achievements have so richly deserved them, and are not without their effect on the day of battle.
I inclose you a letter from Gen. Bravo to the editor of Los Debates, a new journal published in Queretaro, some copies of which I sent you by the courier who left on the 13th. It was drawn forth by a late publication of Santa Anna’s in which the “Napoleon of the West” charges Bravo with cowardice in his defence of Chapultepec. The gallant veteran, whose humanity to our prisoners here will not soon be forgotten, writes in an indignant tone, and all who were present at the storming of Chapultepec know the falsity of the charge brought against him by the “hero of a hundred defeats.”
The Monitor says that Padre Jarauta is neither dead nor severely wounded – that he escaped with a slight wound in the hand. It adds that he had only twenty men in his late skirmish with the Texans, and that since his success in that affair his force has rapidly increased. This is about as near the truth as the Monitor generally gets. His saddle, which was reeking with blood tells a different tale to his wound and the precipate flight of his band, does not look very much like success. He has two powerful enemies to contend with the Texans and the native spy command of Col. Dominguez; should he fall into the hands of either his race is run.
Upon the discovery of the intended insurrection, some days ago, many persons supposed to be implicated were arrested, and among them the celebrated Dr. Marlano Otero. Yesterday he was liberated, the Governor being fully satisfied of his innocence. The doctor was formerly the leader of the Moderadoparty here, and for a umber of years edited the “Siglo XIX.”
The advance of General Marshall’s train came in this morning, and Colonel Miles, with the rear will be in tomorrow. The mail is in the rear, of course. C.C.
MEXICO, Jan. 22, 1848.
The boys in the streets are selling an address to the Mexican people, signed by the notorious Jarauta. He calls upon the people to awake from their lethargy and rally around his standard in defence of his just rights. He concludes that the God of Battles has, for some unaccountable purpose of his own, favored the Yankees heretofore, but that “luck must turn some time,” and as the tide of success is now at the flood, he conjures the greasers not to neglect the favorable opportunity.
The Star of this morning publishes the following communication in regard to the San Luis pronunciamento furnished to them by a foreign resident, who says he has correspondents at Guadalajara and San Luis Potosi. He is a strong friend of peace, and his wishes may in this instance give color to his views:
“The basis of the plan proves to have been nothing more than a part of a proposition made by the Vice Governor to the Congress of the State, and as it was not admitted, both the Governor and Vice Governor endeavored to coerce the Congress by threatening to bring up the National Guard and turn out the members, but which threat was not carried into execution, as the Commandete General, Amador, was opposed to the proposition, and also the regular troops under his command. This conduct of the Gevernor is the more atrocious in endeavoring to employ the customary military tyranny, as only a very short time before, in his opening sessional address to the Congress of the Stae, he had argued that the system of Commandetes General and Gevernment troops should be abolished, as having had the practice of controlling the legislative and civil power. These propositions were printed in an unofficial paper and sent to this city, where the preface to them, announcing the four States being agreed, is reported to have been added by the partisans here.”
We find in the papers from Mexico the following orders of Gen. Scott, one of which is strikingly illustrative of his humanity and soldierly feelings:
HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY,
Mexico, Jan. 20, 1848.
GENERAL ORDERSNo.26.
For the information and convenience of merchants in the interior, who are importers of foreign goods through the custom house at Vera Cruz, it is ordered that, in future, payments may be made in advance, on account of duties on such goods, to the Chief Paymasters, Major Kirby, at this place, and to the Paymasters at Puebla and Jalapa, respectively, for the benefit of the military chest in this army.
Receipts in triplicate, will be given in the case of each payment, and be attested and registered by the commanding officers at Puebla and Jalapa, respectively, and at this place by the Superintendent (Major Gardner) of Assessments. Two of those receipts will be delivered to the payer, or his agent, to entitle him to a credit at the custom house for the amount expressed therein, and the other receipt, be transmitted, by the attester, to the proper accounting officer at Washington, to be charged against the receiver.
When it happens that the money may be more needed, on account of the public service, by one of the other disbursing officers, (the Chief Quartermaster or Commissary) at the place of such payments, the commanding officer will direct the transfer of the money from the receiving paymaster accordingly.
By command of Major General Scott.
H.L. Scott, A.A.A.G.
HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY,
Mexico, Jan. 20, 1848
GENERAL ORDERSNo. 27.
It is represented that some of our gallant men who have recently died in general hospital, have not been buried with due solemnity. The GeneralinChief is certain that no blame can be attached either to the Chaplains of the Army or to the Catholic Priests of the city. ON due notice, they, no doubt, would promptly have performed the duties of their holy offices at the graves of the deceased.
It is ordered that the body of no soldier, no matter what his rank, if not executed as a felon, shall be buried in future, without the customary military honors, unless the presence of the enemy may render the ceremony impracticable, and also without giving notice to some clergyman, at hand, according to the religion of the deceased.
Patients who die in general hospital will be promptly reported by the senior surgeon of the hospital, to Brig. Gen. Smith, if the deceased belongs to the regular army, or to the senior officer of the volunteers present if the deceased by a volunteer, who, respectively will take care to make all proper arrangements for the funerals.
By order of Major General Scott:
H.L. SCOTT, A.A.A.G.
[From the American Star of Jan. 20.]
“FROM
QUERETAROWe have nothing of importance from the seat of Government. The pronunciamento
of the State of San Luis had created some excitement, and the Ministers were
about making a reply to what is termed so “rebellious” a document. It is
in contemplation to send the response to all the States. There was no quorum
of members present although several meetings of those in attendance had been
held. When shall we have something of interest from Queretaro? Pena y Pena
is in the Presidential chair; but not withstanding the appeal in his recent
address, the members do not come together. The bold stand taken by the important
State of San Luis appears to have taken the Supreme Government by surprise.
As its policy and course in relation to the war are the main grounds of the
rebellion, we have some curiosity to see the document which is promised in
reply to the San Luis manifesto.”
[SDW]
RE48v44n86p1c37, February 25, 1848, NO TITLE
It is a favorite game of the Whigs to contend that the war in which we are engaged is pernicious, aggressive, inglorious and unjust. The following article, which we have had on hand for several days, refutes this position in a masterly manner. Let not its lenth det the reader from a careful perusal. Its powerful arguments, conclusive historical sketch, and eloquent and patriotic sentiments must have an effect on the public mind, is vindicating the honor, the good name and the rights of the country. We would add, that it is from the pen of one of the ablest and most distinguished Whigs in Nelson county, who rising superior to party, manfully and triumphantly sustains the honor of his own country:
For the Enquirer.
Messrs. Editors: I wish to present you a concise statement of the causes and events which led to the Mexican war. In doing so I shall consider the relations between the United States and Spain prior to, and at the time of, and subsequent to the purchase of Louisiana. France had claimed and held Louisiana in virtue of the discoveries of Lasalle, for many years before she ceded it to Spain. His discoveries extended to the Rio Bravo del Norte, and France had as good a right to the territory in that direction and to that limit as she had to any other part of Louisiana.Spain held it under the cession from France, until the year 1802, and holding the adjoining territory, it was not necessary between France and herself, to designate with precision the boundaries of the cession just made. In the year 1802, Spain ceded Louisiana and the Floridas back to France, of the terms of which cession Spain afterwards complained and alleged that France had not complied with the stipulations between them, and especially she complained that France had violated an agreement not to cede it to any other nation.
SPAIN AND THE UNITED STATES
In 1803 and after the conduct of Spain and her Intendant at N. Orleans had produced great excitement and even consternation in the U. States, his suspending the right of deposit at N. Orleans and before France had taken possession of the country ceded, Mr. Jefferson, then President of the United States, opened a negotiation with Bonaparte, then first Consul, for the purchase of Louisiana. Pending this negotiation, Spain took the alarm and entered her protest against it. The reasons assigned in the protest are those before referred to, but the true reason, perhaps, was that Spain had yielded to the overshadowing power of the first Consul, then existing in all its splendor, and the cession on her part was the result of his dictation. It was an interior power submitting to the mandate of a superior one. If France could have reconquered St. Domingo, she would perhaps have held Louisiana, but failing in that enterprise, her interest to retain it passed away, and besides being at war with England, she was exposed to the hazard of losing it by conquest, an event which would unquestionably have happened, had she not sold it to the United States.
Let us see what happened pending this negotiation. Let us look into the arguments then used by Mr. Jefferson, and let us compare these positions and arguments, taken and insisted on by him, with the modern doctrine that the United States cannot and ought not to make conquests.
In 1802 Mr. Jefferson writes to Mr. Livingston, then our minister to France, that “the cession of Louisiana and the Floridas by Spain to France, works most sorely on the Unites States. It completely reverses all the political relations of the United States and will form a new epoch in our political course. It is New Orleans through which three eighths of the produce of the United States must pass; and France, placing herself at that door assumes to us the attitude of defiance. Spain might have retained it quietly for years.” Such a result, he says, might follow from her feeble state and pacific disposition. “Not so, however, with France. The day that France takes possession of New Orleans fixes the sentence which is to restrain her forever within her low water mark. It seals the Union of two nations who in conjunction, can maintain exclusive possession of the ocean. From that moment we must marry ourselves to the British fleet and nations. We must turn all our attentions to a maritime force, for which our resources lace us on very high ground, and having formed and connected together a force which may render reinforcement of the settlements here impossible to France, make the first cannon which shall be fired in Europe the signal for tearing up any settlement she may have made, and for holding the two continents of America in sequestration for the common purposes of the United British and American nations. This is not a state of things we desire – it is one which this measure forces upon us as necessarily as any other cause by the taxes of nature brings on its necessary effect.”
Now I would enquire, what is the meaning of all this? Is it not simply that, from our geographical position, New Orleans was essentially necessary to our existence as a nation, and that we were obliged to have it, and would have it. Was such a position contrary to the law of nations? Not so. By that law we were entitled to every thing necessary to our existence – not indeed unjustly. But what would be justice in that case? The answer is, to take it, and pay for it a just equivalent. But suppose the soldier would not agree to sell it? Then it would follow, as a natural necessary consequence, that the nation, whose existence depended upon it, would take it by conquest. Refine as you will upon justice – selfpreservation is the first law of nature, and it will be vindicated, even at the expense of an injury to another – such an injury being one of the unavoidable incidents of human existence. It was exactly the deduction of wisdom, “That the day France takes possession of it, fixes the sentence, which is to restrain her within the lowwater mark”” – a metaphorical expression, indicating that, from theat moment, she was to be held as an enemy.
But how happens it that the United States, according to the modern doctrine, cannot make conquests? Are we the only people on earth who may lose and cannot gain? Can other nations conquer of us, and not we of them? If we can acquire at all, is not conquest of the modes of acquisition? But Mr. Jefferson, who was not very bellicose in his disposition, and always a stickler for the Constitution, asserts in express terms, “that we must conquer New Orleans;” and, indeed, he goes far beyond, that “we must marry ourselves to England, and by the union, conquer the whole of North and South America, to be held in sequestration for the common purposes of the united British and American nations.”
What nonsense it was for the United States to invade Canada during the last war with England, if we could not and ought not to make conquests!
In the Spring of 1803, Mr. Monroe was sent to France to unite with Mr. Livingston in the negotiation for the purchase of Louisiana; and Mr. Jefferson, in writing to Mr. Dupont Nemours, uses the following language: “The use of the Mississippi is so indispensable to us, that we cannot hesitate a moment to hazard our existence for its maintenance,” and also, “whatever power than ourselves holds the country East of the Mississippi, becomes our natural enemy.” He enquires, how long would it be held by such a power, with such an enemy as the United States situated at its door, added to Great Britain?
In the Summer of 1803, and because Napoleon, then first Consul, had been precipitated into a war with England sooner than he expected, the negotiation ended in his making the sale Mr. Jefferson desired.
On this acquisition there was no little croaking and complaint at that time. It was said, “That extended empire, like expanded gold, exchanged solid strength for feeble splendor.” The murmur, so often since repeated, was then strongly urgedthat it would lead to the extension of slaverythat it would lead to the dissolution of the Unionand, as is too often the case with partisans, when other reasons fall, that it was a violation of our Constitution; but all these croakings, as evanescent as a morning dream, have passed away, and millions of human beings have been rendered happy by the acquisition, whilst our wisdom which controlled our Government in this great and national transaction, the next in importance to the establishment of our Independence.
Upon the subject of the territory acquired, Mr. Jefferson says: “Our information as to the country is very incomplete. The boundaries, which I deem not admitting question, are the high lands on the Western side of the Mississippi, enclosing all its waters of course. And we have some claims to extend on the sea coast, westwardly to the Rio Norte or Bravo.”
On the 1st November, 1803, in writing to M. Dupont, after congratulating him and thanking him for the aid he had rendered in the purchase of Louisiana, he tells him:
“It is true, at this moment a little cloud hovers in the horizon. (It was indeed a cloud which continued to hover in after times.) The Government of Spain has protested against the right of France to transfer, and it is possible she may refuse possession, and this may bring on force.But against such neighbors as France there and the United States here, what can she expect from so gross a compound of folly and false faithshe is afraid of her enemies in Mexicobut not more than we.”
Some difficulties existed with Pichon, the French Minister, about the ratification of the treaty, and Mr. Jefferson tells our Minister, Mr. Livingston, “that he had assured Mr. Pichon that he had more confidence in the word of the first consul, than in all the parchment we would sign.” (There was something of soft corn in that.) And he tells him “that the treaty was ratified, Mr. Pichon knowing that Spain had entered with us a protestation against its ratification; grounded first on the assertion that the first consul had not executed the conditions of the treaties of cession, and secondly, that he had broken a solemn promise not to alienate the country to any nation.” We answered that these were private questions between France and Spainand so they were, and Spain had no right to wreak her vengeance on us in after times, on that account.
In writing to Dr. Priestly and speaking of Louisiana, Mr. Jefferson says: “Whether we remain in one confederacy or form into Atlantic and Mississippi confederacies, I believe not very important to the happiness of either part. Those of the Western confederacy will be as much our children and descendants as those of the Eastern; and I feel myself as much identified with that country in future time as with thisand did I now foresee a separation at some future day, yet I should feel the duty and the desire to promote the Western interests as zealously as the Easterndoing all the good for both portions of our future family which should fall in my power.”
In virtue of the treaty with France the United States took possession of Louisiana, in opposition to the remonstrance of Spain. But Spain still continued restiveshe was the author of many acts of injustice toward usshe continually refused every reparation, notwithstanding all our efforts at accommodation, backed even by Napoleon’s influence, and we submitted tamely through a long series of years. Is it forgotten that she contemptuously refused to permit Mr. Nelson, our Envoy, to set his foot on her soil? To a charge made at the time against Mr. Jefferson, that he was yielding the boundary of the Rio Bravo, which belonged to us, in a letter to Wm. A.Burwell, he uses this language:
“It is not true that our Ministers in agreeing to establish the Colorades as our Western boundary had been obliged to exceed the authority of their instructions. Although we considered our title good as far as the Rio Bravo, yet, in proportion to what they could obtain East of the Mississippi, they wre to relinquish West.” But no treaty was made.
The French inhabitants of Louisiana complained of the prohibition of importing slaves, a complaint which Mr. Jefferson says may be removed by the introduction of slaves form the other States, which by dividing that evil would lessen its danger.
And, in 1807, in his letter to Mr. Bowdoin, this strong language is used:
“Never did a nation act towards another with more perfidy and injustice than Spain has constantly practiced against us, and if we have kept our hands off her till now, it has been purely out of respect to France, and from the value we set on the friendship of France: We expect, therefore, from the friendship of the Emperor, that he will either compel Spain to do us justice, or abandon her to us. We ask but one month to be in possession of the City of Mexico.”
Ayeayewe ask but one month to be in the city of Mexico. For what? Upon a fool’s errand? If incompetent to conquer or to hold, why go there? And why did we not do it?Any relation with Spain to prevent it? Never had a nation acted with more perfidy toward us. The only reason was, that Napoleon prevented it!and shortly afterwards the power of Spain was completely crippled by France, and so continued until the overthrow of Napoleon, and the meeting of the allied powers in 1815, when Spain was reinstated in power.
SPAIN AND THE UNITED STATES
We have seen how matters stood between France, Spain and the United Statesthat Mr. Jefferson asked only that the Emperor would stand with hands off, and we would be in Mexico in a month. Why? Because no nation had ever acted toward the United States. Let us see, now, how matters progressed between Spain and the United States after Napoleon’s overthrow. Just at that time the United States had come out of the war with England, crippled and weak, and she was, compared with Spain, who had been reinstated by the allies, just what Spain was, compared with France, in the zenith of Napoleon’s power. In plain language, she was the superior, and we the inferior powerand, just so soon as she was warmed into life, she returned to the old bone of contentionthe acquisition of Louisiana in opposition to her protest;and it must be fresh in the recollection of every onethe arrogance, and indeed insolence, practiced by the Spanish Minister at Washington during Mr. Monroe’s administration. Mr. Monroe was alarmed to death. Spain was using every means in her power to kick us into a war with her. She had rejected our Minister, and the avowed object was to reclaim Louisiana. She was stimulating the Indians and the inhabitants of Florida to annoy us in every possible shapeand nothing but a series of events, one of which was the apprehension of a revolution in Mexico, prevented Spain from persevering in the course she had marked out until that object was effected. When General Jackson had, Jackson like, and to his immortal honor, crossed the Florida line, and had hung Arbuthnot and Ambrister, the Spanish government demanded his disgrace, and, to the shame of our government, the President and his cabinet sat in judgment upon the proposition. Like Sir Walter Raleigh, General Jackson was to be offered a sacrifice to Spanish pride and ambition. Can Mr. John C. Calhoun tell us any thing about that matter?
But the condition of Spain in Europe, owing to her intestine divisions and civil wars, and the movements in Mexico portending and hastening to a revolution, led Spain to adjust the Louisiana matter and the Florida sale by a treaty. But how? It was in every aspect a superior dictating to an inferior powerand Mr. Monroe yielded to it, being most certainly panicstricken at the menacing attitude of Spain.
The terms dictated were, that we were to pay five millions of dollars for Florida, being ten times as much as it was worth, and to cede to Spain the country between the Sabine and the Rio Grande. But this was not all: The line was to leave the Sabine, and cut in two the Red river, thereby giving to Spain the key to New Orleans because, with an invading army, she could be upon New Orleans in twentyfour hours.
Mr. Rivers, in his speech on the Tyler treaty, says “it is impossible to look upon the map and not see that the possession of Texas was essentially and vitally necessary to the safety of the United States.” If so, that settled the questionIf holding any portion of the country east of the Mississippi rendered the holder our natural enemy, surely, holding the key to New Orleans did the same thing. He says; “How it happened that we could have agreed to such a boundary, was an enigma which had never been solved.” But see’st thou not an awful form arise from tout the earth? Is it any longer an enigma? Mr. John Quincy Adams can tell us all about it if he would, and Mr. John C. Calhoun could do the same thing. It was simply this: that Spain, looking forward to her retention of her Mexican provinces, determined to hold this keyand Mexico understood that thing in after times as well as Spain did.
Mr. Rives says, “it was sufficient for him that Mr. Jefferson and all the distinguished men of the day considered our title to the Rio Grande as complete as our title to New Orleans.” If it was sufficient for him, it is sufficient for me, and it should be sufficient with all men. He adds, moreover, “That when the question came to be understood, it would be met with more unanimity than any question which had ever been presented to the United States.”
But we ceded it away, and ceded American citizens along with it. It is said these citizens protested against it and why do not the Texan Senators, who it is presumed are acquainted with Texian and Mexican history, give us some account of this matter? It is said that these American citizens refused to submit to the jurisdiction of Spain, and that Spain was actually preparing to reduce them to submission when the Mexican revolution broke out. But be this as it maywe ceded to Spain all the country between the Sabine and the Rio Grande, and that territory had never been a part of the Vice Royalty of Mexico before that cession was made. The Revolution in MexicoMexico consisting of various departments, amongst which Texas had become one, governed by distinct municipal arrangements and political limitsbeing successful, the sovereignty of Spain was thrown overboard, and the short lived reign of Iturbide, as Emperor, followed that event. This Government soon perished, and the attempt was made by the several States to unite and form a Federal Constitution upon the plan of the U. States. This Constitution soon yielded, too, to another revolution, and the Central Government was adopted, with Santa Anna as a Dictator. In the struggle between Spain and Mexico, the United States treated each party alike. They were both placed upon the same terms in outposts; and when Mexico had succeeded in the struggle, the United States were the first to acknowledge their independence. The independence of whom? Of the United States of Mexico, of which Texas was one.
Texas, one of these confederate States, refused to submit to the Central Government, and a civil war ensued.
What, then, was the state of things between
MEXICO AND TEXAS?
It is laid down by Vattel, “that civil war produces two independent parties; that they are to obseve the common laws of war, and that the maxims of humanity, moderation and probity are to be observed on both sides.”
How was it in this civil war? A handful of men, of American origin, had been invited by Mexico to settle in Texas. They had acted well their part under the Constitution of 1824. They refused to submit to the Central Government and to Santa Anna, clothed with his new dignity of Dictator, and for this they were invaded by that Dictator, with the declaration of “no quarter,” and no man in the United States can doubt, if he had been successful, he would have put to the sword, or expelled from the country, every man, woman and child of American origin.
Whence, is it that there is so much of Mexican sympathy at the present day? Whence is it that to enlist that sympathy she is spoken of as a “sister Republic?” What sort of Republic with Santa Anna a Dictator? Why no sympathy for Texas, who presents a spectacle of heroic virtue, in resisting this attempt to enslave her, which has no parallel in modern times? We had Greek committees, Greek contributions, Greek bails to aid revolutionary Greece. England and France combined to destroy the Turkish fleet at Navarino, to prevent Turkish butcheries, and yet we stood by and saw the Texans threatened with a like butchery, without saying a word in their behalf. I speak of the governmentand when our citizens, yielding to instinct, flew to their rescue, coldblooded apathy has been inclined to reproach our government for not preventing it.
Mexico and Texas were equal and how many of our citizens engaged on the side of Santa Anna, we are yet to learn.
Notwithstanding the odds in this desperate struggle, the God of battles was in favor of the few and the oppressed, and Texas succeeded in acquiring and maintaining her independence, and took her stand in the rank of nationsthe United States, England, France and Belgium recognized that independence, and with them she stood clothed with all the attributes of perfect sovereignty. What was the extent of her territory? I answer to the Rio Grande, because anterior to the treaty with the United States in 1819 the country between that and the Sabine formed no part of the Vice Royalty of Mexico. It went with the Texans upon it from us as a whole, and stood that same whole when it was conquered by Texas. Texas asserted her right to the Rio Grandesuppose she had made good that assertion in the greatest part, and suppose there had been a strip of country between Corpus Christi and Matamoras which Texas had not, but would reduce to subjection, the moment Texas became annexed to us it was our duty to carry out and do what Texas would have done, had annexation not taken place.
As between Spain and Mexico in their struggle we had treated each party alike, and as between Mexico and Texas we did the same thing. But this would not suffice for Mexicoshe arrogantly demanded that we should expel Texan vessels from our ports, and demanded that they should be arrested as pirates; and when Texas had expelled her armies from her limits and there was not a soldier to defend our frontier from the Indians, a thing which Mexico had bound herself to do, and when Gen. Gaines had gone to Nacogdoches to accomplish that object, with the assurance from Gen. Jackson that nothing else was contemplatedthe Mexican minister declared it was an invasion of Mexican soila capus belli broke up this mission, and the Mexican Government, following his example, dismissed our minister, Mr. Ellis, and closed all diplomatic relations with us. Was this a course to enlist all sympathies in behalf of Mexico?
IN the struggle between Mexico and Texas, it is said the United States ought to have been neutral. I deny it. The law of nature is the same thing with individuals and with nations. Is it right for one man to stand by and see a giant cut a pigmy’s throat? We had, as a nation, the perfect right, fairly to estimate the merits of the dispute and to take the part of the one on whose side justice was found to lie. Accordingly, Vattel writes, “That in vivil war another nation may interpose their good offices for the restoration of peace, and this the law of nature prescribes to them; but if their mediation proves fruitless, they who are not tied by any treaty may, for their own conduct, take the merit of the cause into consideration and assist the party which they shall judge to have right on its side.” We had no treaty with Mexico which forbade our interference, nor with Mexico, that was not as much a treaty with Texas, a component part of Mexico when the treaty was formed.
It is true, if I interpose to prevent a strong man from murdering a weak one, he may strike me, and I hazard that when I interpose; but this does not deprive me of the right to interposeand so the United States ought to have interposed and have left it to Mexico or Santa Anna, its Dictator, to strike if they dare.
When Texas had established her independence, and she had established it so far as those were concerned who had acknowledged that independence, she acceded to the proposition to be annexed to the United States. She had a perfect right to part with her territory and to sink her sovereignty into that of any other nation. She did that by her compact with the United States; and from the happening of the event let us see how Mexico and the United States stand.
Mr. Gallatin says, the annexation of Texas was a declaration of war against Mexico. It was so if Mexico chose so to consider it; but it does not follow that it was right or just for Mexico so to consider it. The true question of right or wrong is to be decided by a reference to the merits of the controversy between Texas and Mexico. If Texas was right, we were right in giving to her all “the aid and comfort” we could; and Mexico could not be right, when she had been foiled in the attempt to cut the Texian throats, to make the attempt to cut ours also.
Upon this question the “Doctors disagree.”Mr. Calhoun, who aspires to the honor of annexing Texas, ascribes the war to the march of Gen. Taylor from Corpus Christi to Matamoras, upon the ground that this was disputed territory. Well, it was disputed territory, and how was the dispute to be settled? Were there any other than two modes of adjusting it? One by negotiation and the other by war? Had not Mexico contemptuously spurned the proposition to settle it by negotiation, and what other mode remained but to settle it by arms, that being the last resort and the only one left my Mexico herself?
It is in vain for those who denounce the war to attempt to conceal the fact, that Mexico had determined upon war, and would have stricken our army as well at Corpus Christi as at Matamoras or any where else, the moment she had the opportunity to do soand had Gen. Taylor listened to the mandate “if you don’t break up your camp and be off in twenty four hours, I will chastise you with a vengeance,” he would have been but little entitled to the liberal honors which his generous country is so willing to lavish upon him.
But suppose I have failed to show that the United States were right in annexing Texas, and let it be admitted that that step was injurious and offensive to Mexicoyet for most injuries there are many things that lie in compensationand immediately on the annexation of Texas a messenger was dispatched with an offer to Mexico of ten millions of dollarsand the superadded offer to negotiate and settle the difference upon terms both just and honorableWhat more could the United States do? There had been an armistice between Mexico and Texas, which had been broken up by Mexico, and that too on account of the interference of the United States. Mexico had renewed the war with Texas she refused our offer of conciliation, and in striking at Texas she was striking at us.
I leave out of view Mexican insults, Mexican debts and spoliations, and I demand, if the foregoing synopsis be right, what reason there is for the pronouncing the war unjust on our part?
The vote in the Senate and in the House of Representatives for the annexation of Texas, and that for the acquisition of Louisiana, may be not unfavorably compared. In the last case the vote in the Senate was 24 to 7, and in the House of Representatives 59 to 23. Upon the question of annexation the vote in the Senate was 27 to 25, and in the House of Representatives, 132 to 76.
If ever there was a question solemnly decided by a nation, it was the question of annexing Texasannexing it, too, although it might involve us in the war then existing between Texas and Mexico. It is a most serious thing to charge a nation with engaging in an unjust war, and disguise it as they will those who make the charge must desire our defeat. I would fear that this was the inclination of Mr. Gallatin’s mind.
It is painful to see how by mingling propositions which have no foundation whatever, he has been the author of a publication calculated to injure the country of his adoption, and that country which has delighted, during his protracted life, to listen to him with respect, and at all times to do him honor. I shall endeavor briefly to expose the fallacies which he has ingeniously intermingled in his production.
He has divided his argument into eight parts, and I wish to give it a passing notice. In his first clause, headed “the law of nations,” he describes the Mexicans as a “heterogeneous population of seven millions, with very limited resources, and no creditas distracted by internal dissensions, and by the ambition of its chiefsa prey, by turns, to anarchy and military usurpers, and as occupying among the nations of the civilized world, either physically or mentally, whether in political education, social state, or any other respect, a most inferior position”and yet it is this very people in whose behalf all his sympathies are enlisted whilst in his whole production he has not had one moment’s leisure to look at the condition of the people of Texas, against whom these Mexicans were waging a war of indiscriminate extermination, for the only reason that they would not submit to be the slaves of this demisavage people, distracted by anarchy and military usurpation, and occupying only a halfway position in the civilized world, the degraded position he has so eloquently described. He compliments our valor at the expense of our principleconcludes that we must be successfulenquires what are the terms which we have a right to impose on Mexicotakes it for granted that all will agree that it must be an honorable peace, and then enquires, “Will any one dare to assert that a peace can be honorable which does not conform to justice?”
Why does Mr. Gallatin ask this question?Such a question may be asked by one who takes it for granted that our government has been in the wrong from first to lastthat, half savage as the Mexicans are, we are still more savage than theybut it ought hardly to be asked by one who has just before described us as an energetic, intelligent, enlightened and united nation, possessing unlimited resources and credit, and enjoying all the benefits of a regular, strong and free government;and it would not have been asked, but for the inference which the writer would have to be drawn, that our object was neither just nor honorable.
Why not have addressed his homily of “thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself, love your enemies, and as you would that men should do to you, do you also to them likewise,” to this demisavage population of Mexico, and have endeavored to bring them into the civilized ranks?Why not have told them that they must cease to trespass upon the rights of others, before they were entitled to any sympathy either from God or man? And why present them as a people who are privileged to rob because they are unable to pay? Whose land must not be taken from them because they have agreed among themselves not to part with it, and who are privileged to show no mercy to their brethren in Texas, engaged in civil war; but when the lash is applied to them, the eloquence even of Mr. Gallatin is to be evoked for their apology?
Why not have told them that the marauder does not always go unwhipt of justice; that the day of retribution will come?and that such may be the destitution of principle, “from him who hath not, even that which he hath shall be taken away?” Why not have told them that their conduct was a reproach to civilized man, and if they were treated as they ought to be treated, they would be left in a condition no longer to be cutting their own throats, and no longer to be annoying a neighboring nation, who had practiced forbearance toward them until forbearance ceased to be a virtue?
Why tell those who were averse to the annexation of Texas, that it would be a shameful dereliction of principle, on their part, to countenance shy attempt to claim an acquisition of territory or other advantage, on account of the success of our arms? Is this the part for a minority to set, in a Republic like ours? A thing being determined on by the voice of the majority, becomes the will of the nation; and shame to those who would paralyze that will, so legitimately manifested. The argument is, that having been robbed by Mexico; having prevented Mexico from burchering the population of Texas; having offered to Mexico all just and honorable terms of adjustment, after being spurned and insulted by Mexico, and driven to war, whether we would or not; after the loss of so many valuable lives, so justly to be deplored; after incurring an enormous expenditure, which we did all we could to avoid, we must claim no advantage on account of the success of our arms; and we are told this under the head of the “law of nations.”
Is it satirical irony, or sober earnest, which the writer is addressing to the American people? Does he offer it as a deliberate insult to their understanding?
There are two modes of expressing our feelings in favor of those we side with. One is to weep over their failures, the other is to glory in their success. During the war with England, there were many who much more bemoaned the fate of Tecumseh than they regretted the capture and destruction of the city of Washington; and in the present war it is quite obvious that these are many who look so completely to one side of the question, and with such a jaundiced eye upon the position of their own country, that happen what will, they will have it that we must, and will, and ought to be disgraced and dishonoredif not in a military, at least in a national, moral or political point of view.
Mexico has fallen, and they are found deploring her fate. And yet, but yesterday, Mexico was impregnable; she stood protected by the mighty panoply of mothers, reefs sand banks, cariles, Castillian pride and Sastillian honor. Mr. Pofnsett was ready to portray the terrific and tremendous fortifications of the Castle of San Juan de Ulloa, of Vera Cruz, of Perote, of the National Bridge and of the immoral citythe terrific defiles and passes in which our armies were to be cut to pieces.
Mr. Thompson, et id omne genus, joined in this war song over the remains of our fallen army: Mexico believed all this. She believes now that she will repel the barbarians, as she styles us, and that she is in the unqualified enjoyment of the best wishes of this and every other land who beheld her enriched, and encircled by honor and renown, by valor and by patriotism.
What say you, brave soldiersyou who, where the banner of Washington floated to the wind, presented your dauntless bosoms in defense of your country’s cause? Are you a mercenary crew, creeping forth at the despot’s bid, to murder your fellow man, reckless of the causes which led to the catastrophe? To wage an unjust war against helpless, defenseless, injured and insulted Mexico? Or have you stept forth voluntarily, to reap the laurels of the field of battle, and to vindicate, at the expense of your lives, the interest and the honor of the beloved country whose flag waves in triumph over your heads? Do you want any crocodile tears shed over your graves? Have you not long since learned that the soldier’s meed is the bays of honor and renown on glory’s grave? How do you like to be told that all you have achieved is nothing compared with the disasters which have followed your army?Are not the survivors, whom Providence has restored to their beloved country, to the scenes of their earlier days and happier hours, when heart with heart delights to blend, received with an enthusiastic delight sufficient to make the heart dance with joy?
Over the dead who have fallen in distant landsfrom kindred friends, how far!may the eagle forever hover with wide spread pinions
And the red brezet, oft at evening’s hour,
Still kindly lend its little aid,
With gathered moss and fragrant flower,
To deck the grave where they are laid.
No howling ghosts shall then be seen,
No goblins lead their midnight crew;
But Fairy Fays shall dance the green,
And deck their graves with pearly dew.
Adorned with honors on a distance shore,
Silent they sleep and dream of wars no more.
Time fails me. Seven out of eight of Mr. Gallatin’s positions remain unanswered. They are like setts of exchange. The first not being paid, pay to the remainder. I have endeavored to pay the first. And if necessary, I may at some aftertime go to the trouble of showing that the remainder of the sett should be treated as blanks, blanks and nothing more.
My object, Messers. Editors, is to vindicate my country from the charge of having been guilty of the greatest crime imputable to man, the crime of having rushed into an unjust war.
When Congress voted that “the war was the act of Mexico,” they announced to the world the exact truth; and when Mr. Clay, with an audacity which merits the indignation of ever just man, rashly asserts that the Whigs who voted upon that question voted a liz, the charge should be hurled back contemptuously in his teeth.
Mexico had, very promptly over and over again, pronounced that the “casus belli,” existed. She took great care to place herself in an attitude, in which she might strike whenever she please. She had dismissed her President Herrera, because he advocate peace. She had taken Paredes, because he advocated war. She had collected her armies on the borders of Texas, as to whom she had ended the armistice. She was at open war with Texas, with whom we had become identified. She knew that Gen. Taylor had been instructed that it was “not our design” in our present relations with Mexico, that “you should treat her as an enemy,” but should she assume that character by a declaration of war, or any other act of hostility towards us, “you will not act merely on the defensive, if your relative means enable you to otherwise.” And, knowing all this, she availed herself of the first opportunity to carry out an open act of hostility by attacking the forces of Gen. Taylor, in the unquestionable expectation that success awaited her, and inglorious defeat was to be the fate of the brave Taylor and the comparatively small army he had the honor to command. Thanks to this army, the result was otherwise; and he who can see any thing in this transaction to justify Mexico, and traduce us, can hardly examine the matter with a patriot’s or with an imperial eye.
When Mexico has assumed the lofty attitude she had, when she had ruptured the friendly relations therefore existing between herself and the United Stateswhen she had gone off with the debt she owed our citizens in her pocket (for it is to be remembered that war cancels all debts)when she has assembled her armies on the frontiers of Texas witht eh avowed purpose of war, it is in vain to assign the war to Gen. Taylor’s occupation of disputed territory. It is possible, by playing a shiftyshally game, the game of hide and seek, the game of manouvre and prevaricationwe might have been able to skulk out of the way of Mexico and thereby have postponed the period when the first blow would actually have been stricken. But, for one, I am not for playing that game and for one, I think with Mr. Polk and Gen. Taylor thatif Mexico intended to strike, it was right to give her the opportunity of doing so just as soon as she pleased.
The celebrated Mr. Sterne has characterized plemic divinity by the following satire. A battle was to be fought by Gymnast and Tripest.
“Which words being heard by all the soldiers which were there, diverse for them being inwardly terrified did shrink back and make room for the assailant. All this did Gymnast very well remark and consider; and, therefore, making as if he would have alighted from off his horse, as he was poising himself on the mounting side, he most nimbly (with his short word by his thigh) shifting his feet in the stirrup and performing the stirrup leather feat, whereby, after the inclining of his body downwards, he forthwith launched himself aloft into the air and placed both his feet together upon the saddle, standing upright with his back turned towards his horse’s head. Now, said he, my case goes forward. Then, suddenly, in the same posture wherein he was, he fetched a gambol upon one foot, and turning to the left hand, failed not to carry his body perfectly round, just into his former position, without missing one jot. Ha! Aid Tribet, I will not do that at this time, and not without cause. Wee, said Gymnast, I have fail: I will undo this leap; then, with marvelous strength and agility, turning towards the right hand, he fetched another frisking gambol as before; which done, he set his right hand thumb upon the bow of the saddle, raised himself up and sprung into the air, poising and upholding his whole weight upon the muscle and nerve of the said thumb, and so turned and whisted himself about three times, at the fourth, reversing his body, and overaiming it upside down and foreside back, without touching anything, he brought himself betwixt the horse’s two ears, and then giving himself a jerking swing, he seated himself upon the crupier.
[“This can’t be fighting.” Said my uncle Tony. The corporal shook his head at it. “have patience,” said Yorick!]
“Then Tripet passed his right leg over his saddle, and placed himself en croup. But, said he, it were better for me to get into the saddle; then putting the thumbs of both hands upon the cruppet before him, and, thereupon, leaving himself as upon the only supporters of his body, he incontinently turned heels over head in the air, and straight found himself betwixt the bow and the saddle, in a tolerable seat; then springing into the air with a summerset, he turned him about like a windmill, and made about an hundred frisks, turns and demipommaders.”
“Good God!” cried Trim, losing all patience! “One home thrust of a bayonet is worth it all.” “I think s, too,” replied Torick. “I am of a contrary opinion,” quoth my father.
I would not have had Mr. Polk to play either Gymnast or Tripet.
Those who maintain that the war is unjust, attribute it to the march of our army upon disputed territorylet us test that question by the laws of nations.
Suppose our right to the disputed territory to be doubtful one? And suppose it to have been occupied by Mexico? Vattel says:
“In things doubtful, if one of the parties will not listen either to conference or accommodation, a negotiation or a compromise, the other has only the last resource for the defence of himself and his rightsthe means of fore; and his arms are just against so unfractable an adversary. For in a doubtful cause we can only demand all the reasonable methods of eluciatinng the question, and of deciding or accommodating the dispute.”
Now all this was done by the United Sates, and every overture on our part was rejectedMr. Gallatin’s wiredrawn distinction between a Commissioner and a Minister is a flimsy hypercriticism, and a ground now taken back by Mexico. ON the contrary every approach on our part was repelled with scorn and contempt.
Vattel proceeds: “It is not permitted to take arms to obtain the possession of a thing to which the person has but an uncertain or doubtful right; but he may oblige the possessor, if it be necessary by force of arms to discuss the question, to accept some reasonable method of decision or accommodation, or, in short, to negotiate upon as equitable footing.”
And so having been involved in war with Mexico, the motives of the war have been appropriately styled “to conquer a peace”in doing which, (see page 393,) the United States have the right, according to the same authority, to superadd to all other charges against Mexico, “the expenses incurred the charges of the war, and the reparation of damages.”
In whatever form it may please the U. States to accommodate this controversy, to what extent they may claim indemnity, and whether they shall receive that indemnity in territory or not, remains to be decided by the wisdom and justice of the counsels which control their destiny; and these should remember that they have the right to compromise or concede the honor, the interests and the rights of their own country, actuated by Quixotic philanthrophy for Mexico, or partisan feelings in reference to ourselvesthe question of who shall or shall not be President being one which shall have passed away and been forgotten when the effects of the decision now to be made will influence the destiny of a large portion of the human race in all after time.
The Constitution declares “that Congress shall have power to declare war,” and to make “all necessary regulations concerning captures on land or sea.”
The consequences of war are governed by the laws of nationsand by these laws the instant our armies conquer territory from the enemy, it becomes the territory of the United States, and that by the highest law known to the political bodythe Constitution which governs them.No laws of annexation are necessary. Es vi iermins such territory stands annexed as completely as if it had belonged to the body politic at the moment of the adoption of the Constitution, and at the moment that Constitution conferred the war making power upon Congress.
Thinking as Mr. Rives did when he uttered the sentiment, “that this question, when understood, would be met with more unanimity than any other ever presented to the American people,” I have ventured, Messers Editors, to forward these sheets to you. Give them what disposition you may think fit.
C.
[SDW]
RE48v44n87p2c67, February 29, 1848, LATER FROM MEXICO
ARRIVAL OF THE ROYAL MAIL STEAMER DEE
The royal mail steamer Dee arrived at Ship Island on Sunday, the 20th February, from Vera Cruz. She left Tampico on the 13th, and Vera Cruz on the 16th February. She had on board five passengers for Havana, five for England, and ten for New Orleans. Among the latter were Major Dimick, United States Army, Dr. Wiley, Fleet Surgeon, United States Navy, M’lle Dimier. The Dee had on board 100,000 dollars in specie, and 350 ceroons of cochineal.
The news from Mexico by this arrival is important. The courier of the English degation has arrived at Vera Cruz having left the capital on the 13th February, four days later than our previous advices.
The American Star of the 11th contains the official announcement of the conclusion of a treaty of peace under the signature of Senor Rosa, the Minister of Foreign Relations.
There was yet no quorum of the Congress at Queretaro, from which city our dates are to the 10th February; but a majority of the Deputies in the city are represented as approving the treaty. The Star of the 11th says, that a meeting of the Deputies on the 7th there were twentyfour present. It requires nearly thrice this number to form a quorum.
Gen. Lane reached Mexico, from Orizaba, on the 10th inst., without further adventure.
Lieut. G.A. Schott, of the 4th Kentucky Volunteers, is dead.
Gen. Smith’s brigade was reviewed on the 10th inst. By Maj. Gen. Butler.
Col. Clarke, with his command, was at Cuernavaca on the 9th inst. Gen. Alvarez was making great efforts to cut off his supplies, and the Col., in turn, was taking every means to thwart the designs of the redoubtable commander of the Piatos.
In the Star of the 13th we find the following article in regard to Santa Anna. It is of much importance:
SANTA ANNAThe Monitor of yesterday gives an extract from a letter written by a person of distinction, which says: “General Santa Anna has asked for a passport, to enable him to leave the Republic, and has recommended his friends to sustain a peace, and the Government of Pena y Pena.” The same paper cites an article in the Constitution prohibiting the President of the Republic from leaving the territory while in the exercise of the supreme command, and one year afterwards. Another Queretaro correspondent of the Monitor intimates that Santa Anna’s official communications in regard to his passport, &c., will be published. We hardly know what to make of this movement of the exPresident and at first were inclined to discredit the statement altogether. If it be true, however, that he recommends his friends to support the Government of Pena y Pena, it evinces a very sudden change of opinion in Santa Anna. We suspect that, if any such recommendation has been made, it is for the purpose of securing a safe egress from the Republic, rather than of giving any sincere support to the pacific policy of Pena y Pena.
We may add, while on this subject, that la Bandera del Puebloat Guanajuato, brings as a letter from a writer in this city, in regard to the late flight of Santa Anna from his hacienda at Tehuacan. It proceeds from the gentleman escorted by lancers who was met here by General Lane on his way from Santa Anna’s residence. The writer say he gave a man fifty dollars for hurrying across the fields to apprise the exPresident of Gen. Lanes’ approach, assuring the messenger that that distinguished functionary would pay him still more handsomely. The letter continues, I should add, that the Government at Queretaro, in agreement with Scott, has resolved upon the imprisonment of Gen. Santa Anna, in order to remove the only obstacle in the way of concluding a peace. The Government has been guilty of the blackest of treasons. Men who have drawn their blood from the heroes of the Independence, seek to shed that of the illustrious Gen. Santa Anna, to remove him form the scene as the only obstacle to the conclusion of a treaty of peace, and they are right, for Gen. Santa Anna will never consent to the dishonor and infamy of his country. The editor of La Banderaadds that a treaty of peace has been signed, and that nothing is wanting but the imprisonment of Santa Anna. We give these passages for what they are worth, but the reader will observe that they are singularly at variance with the statements of the Monitor’s Queretaro correspondents.
In the same paper we find the following notice of movements at Queretaro:
QUERETAROWe have nothing of interest from Queretaro, though our dates are to Wednesday. Another meeting of the Deputies is toe be held tomorrow. There were various agents present from the principle houses in the city offering resources to the Government. The minister of the Treasury, however, had made no arrangement with any of them, though much in need of funds. There is much life and animation in the city, commerce was reviving, and those who abandoned the Government in its misfortunes, were coming from every part to offer their respects and obtain their salaries. It would seem from this, that the general belief that peace would soon come, was creating confidence among the people and bringing about a better state of feeling.
The following paragraph from the same paper gives an indication of the state of the country:
ROBBERYA gentleman who came down from Toluca yesterday says that about midway between that place and this city, a small party of muleteers were attacked by banditti, and one of them killed. The robbers then took some dry goods and put off. Our informant is an American, who left Toluca in the diligence in the morning. About fifty guerrillos, heading by a priest, stopped the diligence to look for Americans, but finding none as they supposed, allowed it to proceed on.
The following article was prepared by the Star evidently for transmission to this country by the British courier. It appeared in the number of the 13th inst:
FOR THE UNITED STATESMany of our papers will go to the United States, and perhaps a few words in regard to the present position of the relations between the two Governments may be acceptable to our home readers.
We are of opinion that the prospect for an adjustment of the difficulties between the two Republics was never more favorable than at this moment. It has been officially announced by the Minister of Relations at Queretaro that a treaty of peace was signed on the 2d inst, at Guadalupe, between Nicholas P. Trist, commissioner on the part of the U.S., and Sts. Canto, Cueva and Atristian, commissioners on [illegible] art of the Mexican Government. The document making this announcement is conceived in a most excellent spirit, and evinces a disposition on the part of Perna y Pena to use the influence of his high position, both with the people and the Governors of the States, to unite all opinions in support of the treaty. The response of the Governors to the circular of the Minister, asking their cooperation, will probably be shortly known. It does not appear that they have any more knowledge in regard to the treaty than the mass of the people. The Cabinet at Queretaro very properly preserve a strict silence on the subject, declaring that the conditions will be made known immediately upon the assembling of Congress. The President of the Republic is using all his influence fot the union of the members for the performance of their legislative duties. Thus far his means have not been commensurate with his efforts. But twentyfive members have yet appeared at the preliminary meetings, though it is believed that the severe meetings, though it is believed that the severe penalties ordered to be inflicted upon the recusant Deputies will have the effect of securing a quorum at no very distant day.
Probably there is as much known in the United States, in regard to the treaty, as in this city. By the masses, it is generally believed that it was dispatched to Washington, by express, immediately after its ratification by the commissioners here. Several of the Mexican journals affirm, theat it yields California, New Mexico and Texas, pays five millions to our citizens in settlement of claims, and guarantees the payment of fifteen millions to Mexico for the territory surrendered by her. It is not worth while to speculate upon the alleged character of the treaty until we have something official before us upon which to form an opinion. The Mexican provinces named are all in possession of our troops at this time, and we hold them by right of occupation.
California and New Mexico are a mine of wealth in themselves, and if the indemnity to the United States provide in the treaty be ample, the general policy in the army of occupation will be in favor of peace. No one desires war for the mere purpose of conquest, and all, we feel confident, will sanction an honorable settlement of existing differences. We have taken some pains recently to ascertain the sentiments of the army on this question, and we believe that twothirds of it are in favor of an honorable peace; in other words, they are ready to sustain the Administration in its welldirected efforts to secure the attainment of this great object.
We congratulate our readers in the United States upon this favorable aspect of the question, and we trust that nothing may occur to present its consummation to a successful issue. Pena y Pena is the man for the crisis, and it is the ardent hope of all Americans in Mexico that he may be sustained by Congress and by the people. Letters from Queretaro, and intelligent gentlemen who are conversant with the state of affairs in that city, affirm that he will be. But we must await the event.
The disposition of the troops continues nearly the same as the date of our last article for the States. Colonel Clarke’s brigade, however, has since left the city for Cuernavaca. Alvarez, who has a considerable force in the vicinity, is endeavoring to embarrass him by cutting off his supplies. The stringent measures of Colonel Clarke, however, will counteract the efforts of the Mexican general.
The health of our troops is not so good as we wish it werethe typhoid fever prevailing to a considerable extent in some regiments, principally, however, among the new recruits. As they leave the vity for the interior, the health of the soldiers will no doubt much improve.
We may add that we learn that the 4th Kentucky Regiment has applied for permission to occupy Pachuca and that Tulancingo, a delightful city, about the size of Jalapa, some forty miles easy of Pachuca, will also shortly be occupied.
We publish the following order of Gen. Smith, less for its importance here than to show how thoroughly Gen. Scott is carrying into effect the orders of our Government to quarter on the enemy:
OFFICER OF CIVIL AND MILITARY GOVERNOR
National Palace, Mexico, Feb. 4, 1848.
To insure tranquility and good order in the neighborhood of the city of Mexico, all that part of the territory commonly known as the valley, the basin of Mexico, including the places hereafter named, as annexed to the “Federal District,” and placed under the jurisdiction of the Ayunamiento of the city, for all purposes of police revenue.
The quota of the contribution to be paid by the City and Federal District, including the Valley, is $400,000 per annum, and net $268,332 by the remaining part of the State of Mexico – all to be paid in equal monthly portionsthose of December and January being now due.
The following is a list of the subdivisions, towns and villages, included under this decree in the Federal district:
EAST OF MEXICO
DivisionsMunicipalities
TEXCOCOTexcoco, Papalotia, Atango, aeman, Chiautla, Chicoloapam, Tepetiastoc, Calpulalpan.
TEOTIHUACANTeotihuacan, Orumba, Axapusco, Temascalapa, Tecamac, San Cristoba, Ecatepec.
CHALCOChalco, Tlalmanalco, Amecameca, Tepopula, Xochitepec, Ozumba, Torolanga, Ylayacapa, Tlahuac, Ixiapaluca, Ayotzingo.
WEST OF MEXICO
DivisionsMunicipalities
TLALNEPANTLATlalnepantla, Tutitlas, Huixquiluca, Monte Bajo, MonteAltoNauscapam.
XUMPANGOZumpango, Tequisquac, Neclaipan, Tlucipostla.
CUATITLANCuautitlan, Tepotzotlan, Texloyucan, Huehuetoca, Tutlepec.
TLALPAMTlalpam, Xochimilco, Coyoacan, MilpaAtla, Toyahualco, San Angel, Sante Fe.
TULANCGINGOTulancingo, Atononilco, El Grande, Huascazaloya, Acorochitilan, Tuoropee, Tenango, Huchuetla, Zinguiluca.
PACHUCAPachuca, Mineral Del Monte, Mineral Del Ohico, Gempoala, Tizzyucan.
APAMApam, Tepeapulco.
By the Governor:
R.P. HAMMOND, Secretary.
The following is the latest order we see from Gen. Scott:
General OrdersNo. 54.
HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY
Mexico, Feb. 12, 1848.
The 58th article of war directs that “all public stores taken in the enemy’s camp, towns, forts, or magazineswhether of artillery, ammunitions, &c, “shall be secured for the service of the U. States,” or the orders of Government by treaty or otherwise. Until the receipt of such superior orders, not a piece of captured artillery or ordinance, and no captured ammunition, or other materiel, will be taken from any of the forts or cities held by the American army in the Republic, except for immediate service in the existing war.
By command of Maj. Gen. Scott
H.L. SCOTT, A.A.A.G.
[SDW]
RE48v44n87p2c7, February 29, 1848, THE TREATY WITH MEXICO
The following is said to be a synopsis of the treaty article by article, given in the New York Herald.
Senors Cuevas, Conto and Atristan, are appointed Commissioners on the part of the Mexican Government, to adjust with the Commissioner of the United States, Mr. Trist, a lasting treaty of peace.
Article second provides for the present suspension of hostilities between the forces of the two nations.
Article third defines the future boundary between the two Republics. The line is to commence in the Gulf of Mexico, three leagues from land; to run up the middle of the Rio Grande, its intersection with the Southern boundary of New Mexico; thence North, until it intersects at first branch of the Gila; thence down the middle of that branch of the Colorado; thence it follows the division between Upper and Lower California to the Pacific, which it strikes on league South of San Diego.
The next article guarantees to citizens of Mexico, now residing in the territory ceded to the United States, all the rights and immunities of citizens of the latter country, provided they take the oath of allegiance; or in case they desire to continue citizens of Mexico, there is guaranteed to them the right to leave the territory, and to dispose of their property to the best advantage.
The next article of importance provides the grants of lands in the territory ceded, made in Mexico prior to the treaty, shall be respected by the United States.
The next article provides that Catholic residents in the ceded territory are to be protected in the exercise of their religion.
The next article provides that grants of land by Texas, made by Mexico prior to the year 1836 shall be respected by the United States.
The next article provides that this government shall take prompt and effectual measured for the defense of the borders from Indian incursions.
In consideration
of the cession of territory or the part of Mexico, the government of the
United States binds itself to pay Mexico fifteen millions of dollars. In
this sum are to be included by three millions of dollars already appropriated
by Congress, for the furtherance of peace, and are subject to the order of
Mr. Trist. This sum to be paid immediately on the ratification of the treaty
by the Mexican Government.
[SDW]
RE48v44n87p2c7, February 29, 1848, THE UNION AND THE TREATY
The
Washington Union, of Saturday, has an article in reference to the
rumors in circulation with regard to the treaty which is now before the Senate.
It asserts that the treaty, was not, as is alleged made by Mr. Trist by private
instructions by Mr. Polk, and that the Cabinet knew nothing of it; that there
is no provision in the treaty about the Wilmot Proviso, as has been stated;
and that there is a large cession of country made by us, “of a greater extent
than any country in Europe except Russia”that the territory does include
the bay of San Francisco in the 373 degree of north latitude. “In fact,”
add the Union, “we acquire, according to the reported stipulations of the
treaty, all the best ports on the Pacific line in California, even counting
down to the extreme cape in the peninsula. We shall gain some of the finest
harbors in the world harbors which are essential to the comfort as convenience
of the six or seven hundred warships that flock to this region. On this account
alone, Massachusetts may well boast of the acquisition, if it should be accomplished.”
[SDW]
REVXLIVi105p1c2, May 2, 1848, GEN. TAYLOR’S POLITICS
Now that the Virginia Elections are over, this question has lost much of its interest—as signs indicate that, whatever the “nolusvolus,” spontaneous noparty friends of Taylor may design doing, the old chief, as the Whig candidate, is carefully to be laid on the shelf. But, as the problem of Gen. T.’s true political attitude has excited as much curiousity and speculation as the question gravely raised in New York some time since, “Will saltpetre explode?” we deem it due to his friends to give them all the benefit of the very latest revelation on the subject—and that is to be found in the Nashville Whig, a zealous advocate of territorial indemnity, and once a “sink or swim” supporter of Old Zac, though it has lately been whipped into the “trap of the veteran political gamblers” of a National Convention.—That paper predicts that, should
General Taylor deem it proper to make a exposition of his views as it thinks he will do to rebut the conversations falsely ascribed to him, he will take his stand upon “the great Republican platform upon which our liberties rest, viz: the careful preservation and scrupulous maintenance of the distribution of the powers of the General Government between the Executive, Legislative and Judicial departments, as provided for in the Constitution.” The Nashville Whig continues, in a very authoritative tone: “We venture to PREDICT, that he will delcare it to be his FIXED DETERMINATION to leave to the LEGISLATIVE
>Department of the Government the business of LEGISLATIION, without interposing his INDIVIDUAL WISHES, much less his OFFICIAL INFLUENCE, to thwart, shape or control it; and further, that he will never interpose his veto, except in cases of manifest haste and want of due consideration by Congress, or where there has been a CLEAR and PALPABLE violation of the Constitution. This, WE UNDERTAKE TO SAY from UNQUESTIONABLE evidence now in our possession, is the broad CONSERVATIVE, WHIG ground, which Gen. Taylor will occupy, and which he is ready to avow his intention to occupy, it elevated to the Executive chair. And this settles all questions, doubt or difficulty, as to the course he will pursue, if elected in reference to the Tariff, the Bank and other national measures. He will leave such questions to the decision of Congress. If THE PEOPLE OF THE U. SUATES, speaking through the legitimate and constitutional channel, the LEGISTRATIVE DEPARTMENT OF THE GOVERNMENT shall demand a Bank, he will not interpose his influence in any way to thwart their wishes, should they not desire a Bank, he will not seek to press one upon them; should they, through their representatives in Congress, signify that they are content with the Tariff of 1846, he will not recommend its repeal; should they, on the other hand, through their representatives, require its repeal or modification, he stands ready to sanction any act which Congress may pass for that purpose; and so with the SubTreasury, and other measures of national policy, with the exception of such cases only as involve clear and palpable violations of the constitution,, or as are manifestly the result of hasty and inconsiderate legislation—in which category is included neither of the Tariff, Bank or SubTreasury measures. This, we have reason to know, is the course which General Taylor has marked out for himself to pursue, in the event of his election. And it is the true course, the patriotic, Republican, Conservative, Whig course. Let it but be pursued by our Executive Magistrates, and our free institutions will be coextensive with all time.”
The Times, while itself professing its firm belief, that Gen. Taylor is a Whig, upon the “amply sufficient” evidence now before the public, yet thinks it “right that the opinions of every individual who is prominently recommended for the high office of President, should be perfectly known.” It, therefore, is “perfectly confident” that he “will consider it his duty to make a frank, unequivocal and perfectly satisfactory exposition of his views on the different political questions of the day,” and it does not doubt that said exposition “will be in the main what is indicated by the Nashville Whig.”
Now we ask any candid man to look at the chart laid down by the Nashville Whig, and answer whether it discloses any political opinion of the old soldier. Does it enlighten us on the question whether General T. is for or against a Bank, Protective Tariff or Sub Treasury? Does it not, on the contrary, positively affirm that he has, and will have, no opinions of his own on these questions; but if Congress enacts either of those measures, he will acquiesce, and if Congress should, on the other hand, let matters stand as they are now, he will be equally passive? These Whigs would make the old soldier a mere automation, an inanimate machine in the hands of Congress. The Constitution requires the President to recommend to the consideration of Congress such measures as he may think necessary and expedient. Still the Whigs would have him a perfect mute, a stock, a stone, having no mind of his own, but implicitly following the dictates of Congress. Is it such a President that the Constitution designed? Is it such a President whom this great and free Republic will content itself with?
But, again; if Gen. Taylor has no opinions of his own, how can the people know for what political principles or measures they are voting and what index will the members of Congress have to guide their own votes? To carry any measure, they must have some “exponent,” some “embodiment.” But according to the political chart laid down for Gen. Taylor, the whole affair is to be pellmell, regulated by chance and accident. We had thought that the Whigs were surfeited with “Accidencies.” If Gen. Taylor be elected
President, with no more “satisfactory” exposition than the above, we shall have the strangest administration that the world ever saw—Congress omnipotent—and the President, headless and bodiless, the “exponent” of nothing but the edicts of Congress.
We have said enough to show that this last revelation places Old Zac in no very creditable position, and is but a poor argument why the American people should vote for him. The Republican, however, quotes “the noble and independent” sentiments of Gen. Harrison against giving any pledges in regard to his course when elected President, as identical with Gen. Taylor’s position. Now, the very language of Gen. Harrison quoted by the Republican exhibits a glaring contrast between the two. “Old Tip” is represented as saying—“A better guarantee for the correct conduct of a Chief Magistrate may be found in his character and the course of his former life, than in pledges and opinions given during the pendency of a doubtful contest; and, although recognizing the right of the people to be informed of the leading political opinions of the candidates for offices of trust, yet as it regards the subjects upon which the Legislature may be called to act, the pledges and opinions should be required, if required at all, of the candidates for Congress.”
Here Gen. H. expressly recognizes the right of the people to be informed
of the leading opinions of candidates for office, such as Bank, Tariff,
&c.; and in 1840, the Virginia Whigs paraded his letters to prove that
he was antiBank, for the Compromise Tariff, &c. Has this plan been
pursued in the case of Gen. Taylor? Is not the very question in issue
his failure to enlighten the people as to his “leading political opinions?”—and
does not the parallel, if it exist at all, break off here? We shall not
here allude to the scenes in 1840, save only the remark, that it is strange
that Mr. Tyler should have been denounced as a “traitor,” if he had made
no “pledges or promises.” After these hasty remarks, we trust that there
will be no one so blind as not thoroughly to understand Gen. Taylor’s
political sentiments, in all their length and breadth!
[BWP]
REVXLIVi105p1c4, May 2, 1848, GENERAL SCOTT AND THE WAR DEPARTMENT.
We regret that we have not room for the Union’s long and scathing article upon the trickery of the Whigs in Congress, and their bold and impudent attempt to suppress the printing of Mr. Marcy’s reply to Gen. Scott’s most elaborate and violent attack upon the whole course of the Administration in the conduct of the war, from the commencement of the Vera Cruz expedition up to the time of the session of the Court of Enquiry in Mexico.
This extraordinary letter of General Scott, the Union characterizes as
“on its face a bill of indictment against the War Department, drawn
up and sent forward by General Scott at his leisure, and apparently in order
to be used at their discretion by his friends in Congress.” The Whigs of
Congress, for partizan purposes, designed to let this violent attack on
the War Department go forth alone to the world, unaccompanied by Governor
Marcy’s conclusive reply, which on Democratic motion, was in terms embraced
in the call for the correspondence. It was evidently with this unjust view,
that they attempted to suppress Gov. Marcy’s reply, and thus forestall and
prevent, by misrepresentation, the public judgment upon a document, which
the Union predicts will, when it is published (as it will be shortly) “be
regarded as a most triumphant and irrefutable vindication against Gen. Scott’s
charges of the whole course of the administration and the War Department
in the conduct of the war.”
[BWP]
REVXLIVi105p1c4, May 2, 1848, No title.
The Harrisburgh Telegraph, a leading Scott paper of Pennsylvania, takes
ground against the nomination of Gen. Scott for Vice President, and says
that he cannot be nominated for that office with the consent of his friends.
[BWP]
REVXLIVi105p2c1, May 2, 1848, MORE LETTERS FROM GEN. TAYLOR
In yesterday’s Republican we find the following information: “We are authorized to say that Gen. Taylor has never made the statements imputed to him, viz: that he was in favor of the Tariff of ‘46—of the SubTreasury—that he originated the war with Mexico—nor that, if elected, he would choose his Cabinet from men of both parties.—Not one of these thiongs has he said. The contradiction of these reports cannot undo the mistaken impressions that have had their influence in the Virginia elections, but they will not be too late for the consideration of the Nation.
Our authority is a letter from Gen. Taylor in reply to one from us. We shall present the contradiction in his own words tomorrow.”
Our own opinion is, that the “reports” had but little effect upon the Virginia election—for, if they induced any Whigs to abandon the old General, would they not for the same reason influence some Democrats not to oppose him? On that score then, the principle of compensation would let matters stand unchanged. All the excuses the Whigs may bring up cannot explain away their defeat. Virginia is thoroughly Democratic, and she was resolved to show this Spring to her Democratic sister States, that she is ready for the great Presidential struggle in the Autumn, and eager to cast her vote for any sound Democrat, true to the constitutional rights of all parts of the Union, whom the assembled Democracy in their patriotic wisdon may select. It is unnecessary to look elsewhere for the Whig disasters in Virginia. She eschews modern Federalism in all its shifting and manyhued form.
So much for the assumed “influence” of the “reports” of the old soldier’s political opinions.—Of course, we shall await the General’s own letter in today’s Republican—but, to judge from that paper’s synopsis, whose accuracy we cannot doubt, this last missive from Baton Rouge is of an entirely negative character.
He denies that he ever made the statements ascribed to him—but he stops there, and does not, as we were led by the Whig and other Taylor organs to expect, come out with a full, and perfect, and “satisfactory” exposition of his political creed—whether he is for or against a Bank, for or against a protective Tariff, SubTreasury, the justice of the war, &c. If, then, the Republican has sketched correctly the substance of the letter, “the nation” will be as much in the dark as ever as to the political opinions of Gen. Taylor. The N. York Express intimates that, even should Gen. Taylor be induced now “to change front, in order to better to meet the enemy,” and make all the necessary “pledges,” “we (the Express) may ask—as some one cried out in the French Chamber of Deputies—Is it not too late?”
But it was currently reported by Whigs on the street yesterday, that there were other letters in town from General Taylor—one in which he says, in substance, that he is in the field as “the people’s candidate,” and that he will not withdraw in favor of any candidate, or at the bidding of any Convention. But, still farther, we hear there is another letter in town from the old soldier, which intimates, that he feels “intense interest in Mr. Clay’s success,” (General Twiggs’evidence quoted by the Republican,) and that he will not allow his own claims to interfere with the Presidential aspirations of Mr. Clay. These statements are from Whigs, and we do not vouch for them. But does not the Republican think that these letters should also be presented to “the consideration of the na * “light” that is within the reach of General Taylor’s organs, in order to guide them in their choice of candidates? If these letters be really in the city, we trust that the Taylor organs will see the propriety of laying the information before the great public. Is it sufficient to repeat over and over again that General Taylor is a “Whig,” and to prove their proposition by the following syllogism of the Marion (Ohio) Eagle, a Whig paper? “That General Taylor is at heart a genuine Whig, we have the most entire confidence. His very determination to make no public exposition of his political sentiments, is to us the strongest evidence of this fact. For, were he a Locofoco, there would be no motive for him to be silent, no impropriety in his proclaiming the fact to the world.”
Upon this pithily remarks the N. Y. True Sun, a Whig has “motives to be silent” on the subject of principles, and it appears that it is a gross impropriety to say any thing in r elation to the subject.
But “the letters—the letters!” Whigs and Democrats are eager for an inspection of them. If they are in town, let not their too fortunate possessors continue to tantalize the public by longer withholding such precious and tenderlytobenourished documents, as the Republican seems to regard them.[BWP]REVXLIVi105p2c2, May 2, 1848, No title.
“Mustang” writing to the Delta on the 13th of April from the city of Mexico, has every reason to believe, that the next week would find the Mexican Congress acting on the Treaty. He says that but six Deputies and two Senators are opposed to its ratification—but that its fate will materially depend upon the course Commissioner Clifford pursues. The European news, he thinks, will somewhat affect the action of the Congress—as it will destroy all hopes of the Paredes or Monarchical party.
Brig. General Cadwallader has resigned his commission in the army and
left the city of Mexico for Vera Cruz on the 8th April.
Mr. Trist left with an escort on the same day. The Judge Advocate in the
case of Maj. Gen. Pillow, had expresed the opinion that the Court of Enquiry
would conclude the investigation of evidence in Mexico, about the 20th,
and then adjourn to the U. States.
[BWP]
REVXLIVi105p2c1, May 2, 1848, Where are the Taylor Men?
Gen. Watkins declines to go to Philadelphia as a Taylor delegate from Missouri—yet, as a Whig, he will sustain the nominees of the party.
On the last trip of the Lucy Bertrand to St. Louis, a vote was taken for President, and resulted as follows: For Henry Clay, 33; Zachary Taylor, 2; Democratic Nominee, 31.
At the Taylor meeting in New York, which was addressed by Mr. Toombs, of Ga., and Col. Todd, of
Kentucky, the friends of Henry Clay were the most numerous, and had the cheering all their own way. So
says the Evening Post.[BWP]REVXLIVi105p2c1, May 2, 1848, No title.
We learn from the New Orleans Delta that Gen. Leslie Coombs, so famous
as the signer of the celebrated secret circular issued from Lexington, and
for his unfulfilled pledge to climb the ashpole at Lexington feetformost,
in case Mr. Clay was defeated in 1844, is now in New Orleans, and it is
said he is giving the Taylor men “Jesse.” On dit, says the
Delta, that the General’s visit has some connection with Gen. Scott’s expected
arrival, and the movement of Northern politicians, to bring out Mr. Clay
and Gen.. Scott on the same ticket for President and Vice President.
But the New Orleans Mercury thinks Gen. S. will sail for New York and not
visit New Orleans—and, moreover, a Scott organ in Pennsylvania says that
Gen. Scott will not consent to play second fiddle for any body—and will
take nothing less than the first office—the Presidency! But, perhaps, the
Claymen, who now imagine that they have “the world in a sling,” will use
“the persuaders” upon the General, and, by threatening him with their
displeasure and certain defeat, now and hereafter, if he should dare to
aspire to the Presidency in defiance of the Great Harry—by such arguments,
alternately addressed to his fears and to his interest, they may induce the
General to lower his crest a little, and for the present,
put up with the chances for the Vice Presidency. The Clayites are
still positively certain that Gen. Taylor is politically dead, and that Mr.
Clay will be the nominee for President by a large majority of the Whig Convention.
We shall see!
[BWP]
REVXLIVi105p2c2, May 2, 1848, THE VIRGINIA REGIMENT. –
The following is an extract from a letter received by the editors of the
Enquirer: “I think the State of Virginia should make a donation of
books to our Regiment. For be assured, they deserve it. A
more highminded and chivalrous legion never left their native shore to
maintain their country’s honor on a hostile soil. When I left them
(on the 10th March, on account of sickness and family misfortunes
at home) they were like so many long caged lions—impatient to rush upon the
foe,”
[BWP]
REVXLIVi105p2c2, May 2, 1848, No title.
Detachments from the various volunteer companies escorted yesterday to
the Petersburg Depot the remains of the gallant Lieut. Easley, who fell
nobly in Mexico. They are to be transported to their lastresting place
in his native county Halifax. The procession was very solemn.
[BWP]
REVXLIVi105p2c5, May 2, 1848, YUCATAN.
We lay before our readers a very interesting message, which was yesterday transmitted to both houses of Congress by the President. It called out some remarks in both houses, but in neither was it fully discussed.
We have no space left us this morning for the documents which accompanied
the message, or the measures they recommend. But we have no doubt that,
the country will stand by the wise and humane, and moderate policy
which the President recommends. (Union.
[BWP]
REVXLIVi105p2c5, May 2, 1848, To the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States:
I submit, for the consideration of Congress, several communications received at the Department of State from Mr. Justo Sierra, commissioner of Yucatan, and also a communication from the governor of that State, representing the condition of extreme suffering to which their country has been reduced by an insurrection of the Inidans within its limits, and asking the aid of the United States. The communications present a case of human suffering and misery which cannot fail to excite the sympathies of all civilized nations. From these and other sources of information, it appears that the Inidans of Yucatan are waging a war of extermination against the white race. In this cruel war, they spare neither age nor sex, but put to death, indiscriminately, all who fall within their power. The inhabitants, panicstricken and destitute of arms, are flying before their savage pursuers towards the coast; and their expulsion from their country, or their extermination, would seem to be inevitable, unless they can obtain assistance from abroad.
In this condition they have, through their constituted authorities, implored the aid of this government to save them from destruction, offering, in case this should be granted, to transfer the “dominion and sovereignty of the Peninsula” to the United States. Similar appeals for aid and protection have been made to “the Spanish and the English Governments.”
Whilst it is not my purpose to recommend the adoption of any measure, with a view to the acquisition of the “dominion and sovereignty” over Yucatan, yet, according to our established policy, we could not consent to a tranfer of this “dominion and sovereignty,” either to Spain, Great Britain, or any other European power. In the language of President Monroe, in his message of December, 1823, “we should consider any attempt on their part to extend their system to any portion of this hemisphere as dangerous to our peace and safety.” In my annual messasge of December, 1845, I declared that "near a quarter of a century ago, the principle was distinctly announced to the world, in the annual message of one of my predecessors, that the ‘American continents, by the free and independent condition which they have assumed and maintained are henceforth not to be considered as subjects for future colonization by any European power.” “This principle will apply with greatly increased force, should any European power attempt to establish any new colony in North America. In the existing circumstances of the world, the present is deemed a proper occasion to reiterate and reaffirm the principle avowed by Mr. Monroe, and to state my cordial concurrence in its wisdom and sound policy. The reassertion of this principle, especially in reference to North America, is at this day but the promulgation of a policy which no European power should cherish the dispositon to resist.—Existing rights of every European nation should be respected; but it is due alike to our safety and our interests, that the efficient protection of our laws should be extended over our whole terriitorial limits, and that it should be distinctly announced to the world, as our settled policy, that no future European colony or dominion shall, with our consent, be planted or established on any part of the American continent.”
Our own security requires that the established policy thus announced should guide our conduct, and this applies with great force to the Peninsula of Yucatan. It is situated in the Gulf of Mexico, on the North American continent; and from its vicinity to Cuba, to the Capes of Florida, to New Orleans, and indeed to our whole south western coast, it would be dangerous to our peace and security if it should become a colony of any European nation.
We have now, authentic information that, if the aid asked from the United States be not granted, such aid will probably be obtained from some European power, which may herafter assert a claim to “dominion and sovereignty” over Yucatan.
Our existing relations with Yucatan are of a peculiar character, as will be perceived from the note of the Secretary of State to her commissioner, dated on the 24th of December last; a copy of which is herewith transmitted. Yucatan has never declared her independence, and we treat her as a State of the Mexican republic. For this reason, we have never officially received her commissioner; but whilst this is the case, we have, to a considerable extent, recognized her asa a neutral in our war with Mexico. Whilst still considering Yucatan as a portion of Mexico, if we had troops to spare for this purpose, I would deem it proper, during the continuance of the war with Mexico, to occupy and hold military possession of her territory, and to defend the white inhabitants against the incursions of the Indians, in the same way that we have employed our troops in other States of the Mexican republic in our possession. In repelling the attacks of savages upon the inhabitants who have maintained their neutrality in the war. But, unfortunately, we cannot at the present, without serious danger, withdraw our forces from other portions of the Mexican territory now in our occupation, and send them to Yucatan. All that can be done, under existing circumstances, is to employ our naval forces in the Gulf, not required at other points, to afford them relief. But it is not to be expected that any adequate protection can thus be afforded as the operations of such naval forces, must, of necessity, be confined to the coast.
I have considered it proper to communicate the information contained in
the accompanying correspondence, and I submit to the wisdom of Congress
to adopt such measures as, in their judgment, may be expedient to prevent
Yucatan from becoming a colony of any European power which in no event could
be permitted by the United States; and at the same time to rescue the white
race from extermination or expulsion from their country. JAS. K. POLK.
WASHINGTON, April 29, 1848.
[BWP]
REVXLIVi105p3c1, May 2, 1848, REGIMENTAL ORDERS
The training of the officers of the 19th Regiment of Virginia
Militia, and those attached thereto, will commence at the City Hall this
Tuesday evening, at half past 3 o’clock, P. M., and continue the 3d and 4th,
at the same time and place. Officers will appear in Summer uniform.
Noncommissioned officers of the volunteer corps are requested to attend
the training. The Regimental muster will take place the 5th of
May at the City Hall, at half past 10 o’clock. By order of the Colonel.
JNO. Q. JAMES, Adjutant 19th Regiment Virginia Militia.
May 2
[BWP]
REVXLIVi105p4c1, May 2, 1848, (From the N. Orleans Delta, April 22d.) LATER FROM MEXICO.
The British West Indian mail steamer Avon arrived off the North Chandeleur Island, on Thursday evening, the 20th inst., from Vera Cruz, having left that place on the 17th inst.—By this arrival we have dates from the city of Mexico to the 14th, with later proceedings of the Court of Inquiry, a portion of which we can only make room for in our columns this morning.—Below we give a summary of the Mexican news, from the ample files of Mexican papers and correspondence now before us. As to the ratification of the Treaty, the news by the arrival is not very promising. At last accounts from Queretaro, a quorum had not been formed in Congress. The Monitor, of the 11th, contains a long article condemning the conduct of the members of Congress in delaying the session. Sixteen members were still wanted in the Chamber, and two in the Senate, to constitute a quorum A correspondent at Queretaro, of the Monitor, thinks the necessary number will soon be in attendance, and that when Congress once gets together, Herrera will be chosen President, since a majority of the Legisatures have expressed themselves in his favor. The news of the ratification of the Treaty, had been received in Queretaro, and some persons entertained the belief that its modifications would be accepted.—On the other hand, we have before us an extract of a letter dated “Mexico, 13th April,” addressed by an English merchant, long resident in the city of
Mexico, to his friend, an officer of the Avon, which says: “There is a dearth of news of any kind. Commissioner Clifford arrived here two days ago.—Amongst the Americans the impression is that a treaty will not be made; some of the Deputies, most inclined for peace, swear they will have nothing to do with it, unless the Americans leave force sufficient to support a Government, and I think the chances are that they will not come together in the stipulated time.”
On the same subject, we make the following extract from an article in the Free American, of the 15th inst: “We had occasion yesterday to converse with a respectable gentleman who had just arrived from the city of Mexico. He is a Mexican and is in favor of peace, but says that the members of Congress will not vote for the treaty as it now stands;that he has heard many of them express their opinions on the subject, and that they all seem to agree that they have not the power to cede any portion of the territory belonging to the republic. Doing this, they think, would be violating the Federal Constitution of Mexico. They would be willing to pay the expenses of the war.
They are also willing to abandon their pretensions to the ownership of Texas provided the demarcation of the boundary line be left to commissioners to be appointed by each government. “In our opinion, if this statement, be true, and we believe it is,it shows plainly that the Mexicans have again made an abuse of the good faith of the American government.”
We learn from the Monitor that a battle was fought at Santa Cruz de Rosales, twentytwo leagues from Chihuahua, on the 16th March, in which, as usual, our troops were victorious.—The Monitor says “the firing commenced at 9 o’clock in the morning, and continued until dark at night, when the Americans stormed the place, took eight pieces of heavy artillery, six small pieces of ordnnnance, and more than one thousand muskets. The number of killed on either side is not yet known; but the loss of life on both sides was very great. Don Angel Trias, Governor and Commander, and the officers under his command, were taken prisoners at the moment the action ceased.” Commissioner Trist and Gen. Cadwalader left the city of Mexico on the 8th inst. We do not hear of their arrival at Vera Cruz.
Commmissioner Clifford had arrived in the city of Mexico.
It was supposed that the Court of Inquiry would adjourn about the 20th. A conducta from Guanajuato had arrived at Mexico, escorted by forty Mexican Dragoons.—The amount brought by the conducta is stated to be $400,000. Another conducta, arrived from Puebla, Mineral del Monte and El Chico brought 68 bars of silver.
The funeral obsequies of the late Gen. Valencia were celebrated on the 4th inst. at the Convent of San Francisco. The Monitor of the 7th , contains a letter from San Luis stating that the Indians to the number of 2500, are now in a state of revolution, and that their number is still increasing. Several Haciendas, or plantations, have been robbed of all the cattle and horses. Some of the planters have been murdered. The letter also states that the capital, San Luis, is the only part of the State where one can remain with secruity. The session of the Legislature of the State adjourned on the 31st ult., and deprive, by a decree, Don Adame, Governor, and Don Avila, Lieut. Governor, of their respective offices. Don Juliano Reyes, their present Governor, received extraordinary powers, to last until the meeting of the next Legisture. The election for a new Governor of the State will take place on the 30th of the present month. A detachment of 800 men, sent to San Luis de la Paez by the Government of Guanajuato, to assist in protecting the State against the Indians, has retired to Dolores Hidalgo without firing a gun. Gen. Bustamente, to whom the people looked for assistance, has written that he would come, but they have lost all hopes of getting succor from him.
The Moniotr of the 11th says, that the State of Guanajuato followed the example of San Luis, and the Indians are in a state of revolution. The Monitor says that the revolution which was commenced by about forty individuals has now mustered upwards of two thousand partisans.
Robberies were still frequent on the roads and in the city of Mexico. Numbers of families who have been obliged to abandon their homes on account of the insurrection in Yucatan, had arrived in Vera Cruz—some of them entirely destitute. It was proposed to hold a meeting to adopt measures for their relief.
The court martial for the trial of Lieut. John Smith, 3d battalion Louisiana Volunteers, commenced sitting on the 13th inst., at Vera Cruz.—We find no report of the proceedings. The court consists of Lieut. Col. Fiesca, (President,) Capts. White, Featherstop, Besancon, Forry and Wheat, and Lieuts. Curtis and Young (Judge Advocate.) The charges preferred against Lieut. Smith are, desertion; enticing of soldiers to desert; embezzlement of public property; conduct unbecoming an officer and a gentleman.
It is stated that the General Hospital is to be removed from Vera Cruz to Jalpa—probably on account of the approaching sickly season.
The French citizens of Vera Cruz were to give a grand banquet on the evening of the 16th, in honor of the French Revolution. We learn from the Free American that a supper was given by some of the French citizens on the 8th in honor of the Revolution. Several Americans were invited. The French consul was present, and, like his countrymen, manifested his sympathy for the liberal principles by which the French people will be governed.
Our Vera Cruz correspondent, “Ulua,” says: “It is rumored that Gen. Cushing’s brigade is ordered to Jalapa.” The regular mail coaches commenced running between Verz Cruz and the city of Mexico on the 15th, and will leave hereafter three times a week.
The career of the notorious Father Jarauta has at last been checked. A letter from Queretaro, dated April 2, states that the Father was arrested at Huejutla, by the Perfect, Don Cristobal Andrade. The arrest is officially announced in the Tampico Noticioso.
Capt. Connolly, of the La., Mounted Battalion, arrived at Vera Cruz escorting
the mail from Puebla, on the 12th inst. Capt. C. met with
a great many guerrilleros, but they made no opposition to his march. He
also met a Mexican train of eight wagons, the conductors of which reported
that the guerrilleros had levied a contribution of $300 on their merchandise.
[BWP]
REVXLIVi105p4c2, May 2, 1848, Correspondence of the Picayune. CITY OF MEXCO, April 13, 1848.
It is reported, on the authority of the Progresso, the “Puro” paper, published at Queretaro, that Pena y Pena has asked that four months be now allowed him to obtain a ratification of the treaty. I can learn of no other authority for the report, and am disposed to doubt its truth; for if Pena y Pena is desirous of the ratification of the treaty, his only prospect of succeeding is by pressing the subject on Congress immediately. It is added, too, that the Mexicans have great hopes of obtaining concessions and modifications of the treaty as approved by the Senate of the United States, from our own Commissioner or Commissioners, and if they were to be guided by the past, as I had occasion to observe in a former letter, they would procrastinate negotiation, or continue the war, in the conviction, that the more the one was procrastinated, or the longer the other was continued, the greater would be their ultimate advantage.
I have, however, strong hopes that neither Mr. Sevier nor Mr. Clifford will permit any trifling on the part of the Mexicans, but will tell them at once, without parley, “Gentlemen, here are our terms—accept them or reject them, as you think proper. We are conquerors, and have and will exercise the right of conquerors in dictating our terms.” This is all the negotiation that is necessary, and all that should ever have been used. Mr. Clifford arrived here day before yesterday, with the Secretary of the commission, Mr. Wlash, and was very handsomely received, all the troops in the city having, by order of General Cutler, turned out to give him a reception.
The following was the order issued on the occasion:
HEAD QUARTERS, ARMY OF MEXICO,
Mexico, April 10, 1848.
(ORDERS NO. 58)
The Hon. N. Clifford, United States Commissioner, is approaching this capital, and may be expected to arrive this evening or tomorrow.—The troops on duty in the city, will be held in readiness to receive him with appropriate honors. Major Gen. Patterson is assigned to the command of the troops on the occasion and will make proper dispositions accordingly.
By order of Major Gen. BUTLER: L. THOMAS, Ass’t Adj’t Gen.
We learn that Mr. Sevier left Vera Cruz for this city on the 7th inst., and the commanderinchief has ordered similar honors to be paid to him. Capts. Fairchild and Kerr, in command of two companies of the Louisiana mounted men, escorted Mr.
Clifford up. They will remain here about a week, and together with Col. Biscoe and Lieuts. Kelly and Hunter, also of the Louisiana Battalion, will then return to Vera Cruz. The prospect is still favorable for a speedy meeting of Congress at Queretaro; and for my own part, notwithstanding the contradictory rumors and reports on the subject, I shall be disappointed if the treaty is not ratified within a month or six weeks. In anticipation of favorable action upon the treaty, all the sick who can bear removal, numbering about one thousand, were yesterday sent to Jalapa, with an escort commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Preston, of the 4th Kentucky Regiment. On Sunday night last, between the hours of 8 and 10, a parole of ten riflemen, commanded by a corporal, was fired upon from the building known as the “bullpen,” in the Lepero quarter of the city. After sustaining the fire for about ten minutes the parole was compelled to retire.—Reinforcements, consisting of one company of the Rifles, under Lieut. Russell, three companies of the 4th
Kentucky Regiment, the name of the commander of which I have been unable to learn, and a company of Marines, under Capt. Henderson, were ordered out. These forces having arrived on the ground, forty or fifty armed horsemen were meet, who secreting themselves in and about the “bullpen,” kept up a fire upon our troops for nearly an hour. Several shots were also fired from the tips of the houses in the vicinity, and two riflemen were severely wounded. Owing to the darkness of the night and the fear that our troops might accidently shoot one another, their fire was not effective, and but two of the Mexicans were killed. A few were taken prisoners, and houses in the neighborhood were searched and the arms found in them captured.—During the latter part of the fight a firing was heard towards the Allemede, in the opposite quarter of the city, and Lieut. Russell started in the direction, from which it was heard, but on reaching the spot no one was to be found. The horsemen that were seen at the “bullpen” were regularly armed as guerrillas or cavalry, with lances, escopettes and pistolls, and it is supposed the object was to break the armistice. The firing at the Allemede was, it is thought, for the purpose of drawing attentiion that way, and by weakening our forces at the “bull pen,” to enable the Mexicans there to act with more boldness and effect.
The twentyeight deserters I spoke of in my last letter as being about Chapultepec, are still at large. The party sent in search of them was unsuccessful, and they are probably here this in Queretaro. Two privates of the 3d Dragoons were caught in the act of deserting night before last, with their horses, arms and equipments,2d Lieut. Thos. H. Bassey, of the 4th Infantry, has been found guilty by a court martial of absenting himself without leave from his command, of disobedience of orders, and of conduct unbecoming an officer and gentleman, in charging in a pay account, which he sold, $10 for commanding a company in his regiment, whereas he never commanded a company. The court has sentenced him to dismissal from the service, and the sentence has been approved by the commanderinchief. We first heard of the late great revolution in France on Sunday last, 9th inst., and the day had not passed before measures were taken to afford the Americans here an opportunity of manifesting their joy at the glorious event, and of expressing their sympathies with republican France. Accordingly, a preliminary meeting was held night before last, the proceedings of which I send you. A more enthusiastic meeting I have never witnessed, and the determination is universal that whatever demonstration the committee of arrangements may agree upon to celebrate the event, it shall be one worthy of the occasion.
RE48v44i105p4c2, May 2, 1848, No title
Mr. Robert Greenhow, the author of the “History of Oregon,” which Col.
Benton did not like at all, it is said, will be appointed Secretary of Legation
to France, vice Dr. Martin, promoted to a chargeship. His history, Col
Benton’s objections to the contrary notwithstanding, “is a conquest of
the normal mind,” and he will undoubtedly be particularly acceptable to
Mops. Lamartine.—(Baltimore American.
[BWP]
REVXLIVi105p4c3, May 2, 1848, For the Enquirer. GENERAL JOHN A QUITMAN
Messrs. Editors: The Whigs are making the most powerful efforts to concentrate their forces, and are about to select their most distinguished champion to lead them in the great political battle to be fought in November next, and it is of vast importance, I conceive, that every true Democrat should be sensibly alive to the tremendous interest involved in the contest, be filled with the holiest zeal for the good cause in which he is about to join battle with our political enemies and fly to the banner of that chief under whose command he can be best assured of a glorious victory! The great Democratic Convention by whom this leader is to be selected will soon assemble in Baltimore and I beg leave through the columns of your journal to call the attention of this Convention, and that of the whole Democratic party, to the name that heads this article. I earnestly invite them to enquire into the history of General Quitman’s life—as a citizen, as a lawyer, as a judge, as a husband, as a father, as a neighbor, as a friend, and last, though not least, as a patriot warrior, at the call of his country, tearing himself away from the embraces of a most interesting, devotedly loved family, the comforts of affluence and the many warm friends among the virtuous and the good by whom he was surrounded; girding on his sword and going forth to battle in defence of that country’s rights and honor; baring his bosom to her toes, and heroically perilling his life so often in her service—not forgetting the while his soulinspiring exhortation to his men before the storming of Chapultepec, either by their bravery on that day to cause our flag to wave in victory over the vanquished hosts of the enemy, or nobly to die beneath its folds; the humanity, the generosity and true magnanimity of feeling, displayed by him towards that enemy, when defeated, as evinced by his address to Gen. Bravo, commencing, “I am sorry to meet General Bravo in misfortune,” and lastly, the undaunted and heroic personal courage which he exhibited at the bloody battle in the environs of Mexico, in which he gained, as it were, the final triumph over the Mexicans and proudly planted the American eagle in their capital amidst the shouts and acclamations of a republican soldiery, whom he commanded, and the mingled envy and applause of every officer in our army. Think not, Messrs. Editors, that I design to compliment Gen. Quitman at the expense of the many brave and meritorious officers who have so greatly distinguished themselves in the war with Mexico,or that I wish to institute any invidious comparison between them. Nothing, I assure, you is farther from my intention I only allude to his career in Mexico ad furnishing the most conclusive proof that he is with the Democratic party in head, in hand, in heart and in soul, upon the great war question, which so entirely divides the two political parties at this time; and I again invite our friends in all sections, and particularly the leaders of the Democratic party, who will attend the Baltimore Convention, to examine his just pretensions to the highest honor in the power of a free people to conterpretensions founded not on military deeds alone, but upon the most distinguished civil qualifications.
General Quitman is a Democrat in the true Jeffersonian sense of the world, believing in the construction placed by the great Apostle of the people’s rights upon the constitution, and is profoundly acquainted with the whole science of political economy and Government. The best portion of his life has been devoted to the acquisition of knowledge, and it would be difficult to mention the statesman better acquainted with the diversified interests of the whole country than he is. He is opposed to a United States Bank, and in favor of the SubTreasury,is opposed to a high Protective Tariff, and prefers the Tariff of 1846, to that of 1842—in a word, he is with the Democratic party upon every great principle for which they contend. His private character is perfectly unexceptionable, and may proudly defy the assaults of his political foes.—He is entirely free from all arrogance and foolish pride, in his intercourse with his Fellow Citizens, of much simplicity and cordiality of manners, and treats every honest man, who has the impress of his Maker’s image upon him, with respect—in fact he has every great quality, both of head and heart, to render him one of the most popular men in our country, and I verily believe, if he could receive the nomination of the Democratic Convention and the whole press of our party were to come out in his favor, a flame of enthusiasm would be kindled in the public mind for his election, which would bring him into the Presidential chair by a larger majority over Henry Clay (who will most probably be the nominee of the Whig National Convention) than that obtained by President Polk in 1844.
The editors of Democratic papers in every section of the Union, who are in favor of a fair and impartial examination of the claims of the most distinguished leaders of our party in the coming Convention in Baltimore, are respectfully solicited to give the within nomination the earliest insertion in their columns. Nothing is farther from the wish of Gen. Quitman’s friends than to produce the least split in the Republican ranks. All they ask is that his pretensions may be examined, and if another than himself be the choice of the Convention, they pledge themselves to use every honorable means to ensure his success—provided he be entirely free from the leperous taint of Abolitionism, which is now with fiendlike malice gnawing at the very vitals of the Republic, and if not put down by the good sense and patriotism of the people, must end ere long in a dissolution of the Union and perhaps at last in the entire overthrow and destruction of one of the fairest fabrics ever constructed by the wisdom of man for the happiness of the human race.
Gen. Quitman, as President of the U. S., would be guided in his course by the Constitution of his country and would lend his aid to no encroachments on the rights of the South solemnly guaranteed to her in the sacred instrument because he believes that upon the maintenance of these rights unimpaired, depend both the prosperity and perpetuity of our Union. He warmly sustains the President in his claim of Mexican Territory, not as has been falsely argued because “it will extend the slavery of the African race,” but because he believes his own country to have been in the right from the commencement; that the war was forced upon her by the act of Mexico, and such being the case, we have a perfect right, under the laws of nations, to demand some indemnity for the enormous expenses we have been compelled to incur in its prosecution; that while we allow to Mexico what to her will be ample compensation for the loss of New Mexico, Upper California and the harbor of San Francisco, they will prove in the end of incalculable value to the United States; that by the junction of the two oceans we will have it in our power to make the rest of the world tributary to us, and by the treasures thus obtained our whole country will be made to smile with joy and gladness. The contemplated acquisition of territory would, in many respects, it is true, be highly beneficial to the South, but then it is clear to demonstration that the North, as a commercial and manufacturing people, would be infinitely more benefited by it.—General Quitman, though long a resident of the South, is a native of the North, and no one feels a warmer interest in all that conerns her prosperity than he does. Within the wide limits of our glorious confederacy there breathes not a purer patriot, or one more entitled to the respect, esteem, and affecxxtion of his fellowcitizens; and should it be his fortune to obtain the highest honor in their power to confer, the Democracy of every State in the Union migh say with pride¨ “This is the President of our choices, and we introduce him to the world as a true Representative of
American character,of its patriotism, its chivalry, and its honor!”
VIRGINIUS.
[BWP]
REVXLIVi105p4c5, May 2, 1848, (Reply of Captain Edwards.) NORFOLK, April 7, 1848.
Gentlemen: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your kind invitation to a public dinner to be given me by the citizens of my native county, which I accept with no ordinary pleasure. You have been pleased to approve my conduct in the valley of Mexico, and, next to the consciousness of duty well discharged, nothing can be more gratifying to me than the generous approbation of my fellowcitizens, especially of my native county.
Permit me to express my obligations to yourselves for the very kind manner in which you have thought proper to address me, and to return to my fellow citizens of Surry my heartfelt thanks.
With sentiments of respect and esteem, I am, gentlemen, your obedient servant, O. E. EDWARDS, Capt.
U. S. Voltigeurs.
[BWP]
REVXLIVi105p4c5, May 2, 1848, No title.
8th. Our Navy: The debarkation of our troops at Vera Cruz gave earnest of the science that directs and of the skill which performs its operations. To prove its gallantry equal to both, it wants only an “opportunity.”
9th. Our Volunteer Soldiery: By achievements without a parallel,
they have immortalized themselves, illustrated the annals of their country,
conferred imperishable renown upon its prowess, and in the salutary caveat
they thus offer to the world, insured it future security.
[BWP]
REv45i1p1c1, May 5, 1848, GENERAL SCOTT’S LETTER. Mexico, February 24, 1848.
SIR: On the 18th I received your two letters of the 13th ulltimo, and immediately issued the general order No. 59, (a copy enclosed,) devolving the command of the army, in Mexico, upon Major General Butler. As the officers detailed for the court of inquiry, before which I am ordered to appear as a criminal, are not known to have arrived in the country, I avail myself of a moment’s leisure to recall some of the neglects, disappointments, injuries, and rebukes which have been inflicted upon me by the War Department, since my departure from Washington, November 23, 1846.
To me, the business of recrimination, however provoked, has ever been painful. In this summary I shall therefore indulge in no wantonness of language, but confine myself to naked historical facts—leaving conclusions to men of sense and candor.
In the hurry of preparation for Mexico, (only four days were allowed me at Washington, when twenty might have been most advantageously employed in the great bureaux—those of the chief enginers, chief of ordnance, chief quarter master and chief commissary of subsistence) I handed to you a written request, that 1 of 3 of our accomplished captains, therein named might be appointed assistant adjutant general, with the rank of major, for duty with me in the field; and there was a vacancy at the time for one. My request has never been attended to and thus I have had no officer of the Adjutant General’s Department with me in the campaign. Can another instance be cited of denying to a generalinchief, in the field, at the head of a large army—or even a small one—the selection of his chief of his staff—that is, the chief in the department of orders and correspondence?
Early in the following January, I asked that a general courtmartial might be appointed on the part of the President, for the trial of two officers (named by me) for conduct each had committed, that endangered, in a high degree, the success of the impending campaign; and I specially referred to the anomalous and fatal act of Congress, (May 29, 1830) which prohibited me as the “accuser or prosecutor,” from ordering the court for the trial of the cases. My application has never been noticed. This neglect alone ought early to have admonished me that I had no hope of support at Washington in any attempt I might make (against certain officers) to maintain necessary discipline in the army I was about to lead into the field. I left Washington highly flattered with the confidence and kindness the President had just shown me, in many long personal interviews on military matters. For more than 2 months my expressions of gratitude were daily and fervent, nor were they less emphatic towards the head of the War Department. Proceeding with zeal and confidence in my most hazardous duties, I learned, January 27, at the Braxos San Jago, that an attempt was on foot to create a lieutenant general to take command in the field over me. Shocked and distressed, I allowed of no relaxation in my efforts to serve my country, resolved that for the short time I was likely to remain in commission to be “True as the dial to the sun, Although it be not shined upon.”
A yet greater outrage soon followed: failing to obtain an act for the citizen lieutenant general, a bill was pressed upon Congress to authorize the placing a junior major general just appointed (the same individual) in command over all the old major generals then in front of the enemy!
I will not here trust myself to add a soldier’s comment upon those attempts; but I may thank God that He did not allow them, nor subsequent injuries, to break down entirely the spirit and abilities (such as they are) with which He had endowed me.
Foreseeing, at Washington, that from the great demands of commerce at the moment, it would be difficult, if not impossible, to take up, perhaps at any price, a sufficient number of vessels at New Orleans and Mobile to transport the regiments of my expedition from the Rio Grande frontier to Vera Cruz, I endeavored to impress upon the War Department the necessity of sending out, from the Northern and Eastern ports a certain number of large ships in ballast, in order that the expedition might not be delayed, and in view of “the fixed fact”—the return of the vomito at Vera Cruz in the Spring of the year—a delay of a few weeks was likely to prove a total defeat. In a paper transmitted to me, headed “Memorandum for the Quartermaster General,” marked “War Department, December 15, 1846,” and signed by the Secretary, which I received January 8, it is said: “Independently of this number of transports for troops and ordinance stores, (from the north,) there will be required, say, five ships for the transportation of the (surf) boats now being prepared, besides which ten vessels must be taken up and sent out in ballast, (for troops,) unless stores can be put on board, to make up the number (40) required by the commanding general.”
The date of this memorandum is December 15, more than three weeks after my requisition and departure from Washington. Of not one of the “ten vessels” in ballast, or with stores, (leaving room for troops) have I heard, up this day. Relying upon them, confidently, the embarcation was delayed, in whole or in part, at the Brazos and Tampico, from the 15th of January to the 9th of March; leaving, it was feared not half the time needed for the reduction of Vera Cruz and its castle before the return of the yellow fever.—But half the surf boats came at all; and of the siege train and ordnance stores, only about one half had arrived when the Mexican flags were replaced by those of the United States on those formidable places. We succeeded, at last, in reading the point of attack, in the midst of frighful northers, by means, in great part, of trading craft, small and hazardous, picked up accidentally at the Brazos and Tampico; and when the army got ashore, its science and valor had to supply all deficiencies in heavy guns, mortars, and ordnance stores.
The first letter that I received from the department, after entering the captured city, contained an elaborate rebuke, (dated February 22,) for having ordered Col. Harney, 2d dragoons, to remain in the command of the cavalry with Major General Taylor, so as to leave Major Sumner, of the same regiment, the senior of that arm in my expedition. There was no great difference in the number of cavalry companies with the two armies. This rebuke was written with a complacency that argued the highest professional experience in such matters, and could not have been more confident in its tone, if dictated to the greenest general of the recent appointments. Yet without the power of selecting commanders of particular corps, no generalinchief would venture to take upon himself the conduct of a critical campaign. Such selections were always made by the Father of his country, and the principle generals under him. So in the campaign of 1814, I myself sent away, against their wishes, three senior fieldofficers of as many regiments, who were infirm, uninstructed, and inefficient, in favor of three juniors, and with the subsequent approbation of Major Gen. Brown, on his joining me, and the head of the War Department. Both were well acquainted with the customs of war, in like cases, at home and abroad; and without that energy on my part, it is highly probable that no American citizen would ever have cited the battles of the Niagara without a sigh for his country. I am happy, however, that before a word had been received frrom the department, and, indeed, before it could have had any knowledge of the question, I had decided to take with me the frank and gallant colonel, and hope soon to learn that he and very many other officers have been rewarded with brevets for their highly distinguished services in the campaign that followed.
It was in reference to the same rebuke, that, in acknowledging your communication, I said, from Vera Cruz, April 5th: “I might very well controvert the military principles so confidently laid down by the department, (in the letter of the 22nd of February)—but believing that the practice of the U. States army in the two wars with Great Britain would have no weight in the particular case, I waive further reply—having, at the moment, no leisure and no inclination for controversy.”
Alluding to the heavy disappointments in respect to transports, siege trains, and ordnance stores, then already experienced, I wrote to the department, from Lobos, Feb. 28 “Perhaps no expedition was ever so unaccountably delayed—by no want of foresight, arrangement, or energy on my part, as I dare affirmand under circumstances the most critical to this entire army; for everybody relied upon knew, from the first, as well as I knew, it would be fatal to us to attempt military operations, on this coast, after, probably, the first week in April; and here we are at the end of February! Neverthless this army is in hearts and crippled as I am in the means required and promised, I shall go forward, and expect to take Vera Cruz and its castle in time to escape, by pursuing the enemy, the pestilence of the coast."
The city and castle were captured March 29th, and with about onefourth of the necessary means for a road train, (no fault of mine,) the retreat, in pursuit of the enemy, was vigorously commenced April 8th. The battle of Cerro Gordo soon followed, and we occupied Jalapa and Perote, where we were obliged to wait for supplies from Vera Cruz. In those positions, I was made to writhe under another disappointment.
In my four memorials to the department, on the further prosecution of the war against Mexico, written at Washington—and, dated, respectively, October 27, November 12, 16, and 21—[it was only intimated to me in the night of November 18, that I might prepare myself for the field]—papers in which I demonstrated that Vera Cruz was the true base of operations, and that the enemy’s capital could not probably be reached from the Rio Grande; I estimated that, after taking that great seaport, “about 20,000 men,” or “an army of more that 20,000 men may be needed: 1. To beat in the field and in passes, any accumulated force in the way; 2. To garrison many important points in the rear, to secure a free communication with Vera Cruz; 3. To make distant detachments, in order to gather in, without long halts, necessary subsistence.”
And that force, I supposed, including volunteers, and aided by land and money bounties, might be raised in time, by adding ten or twelve new regiments of regulars, and filling up the ranks of the old. A bill was introduced for raising ten additional regular regiments; and I certainly do not mean to charge the department with the whole delay, in passing the bill through Congress. But it was passed February 11, 1847; and under it, by early in April, some few thousand men had been already raised and organized. My distress may be conceived, by any soldier, on learning, at Jalapa, April 27, that the whole of that force had been sent, under Brigadier General Cadwalader, to the Rio Grande frontier!
In my letter to the department, written the day after, I said I had, expected that—“Detachments of the new regiments would, as you had promised me, begin to arrive in this month, and continue to follow perhaps into June.” “How many (volunteers) will reengage, under the act approved March 3, (only received two days ago,) I know not; probably but few. Hence the greater my disappointment caused by sending the new troops to the Rio Grande; for, besides their keeping the road in our present rear open for many weeks by marches in successive detachments, I had intended, as I advanced, to leave strong garrisons in this place, (Jalapa,) in Perote, and Puebla, and to keep at the head of the movement a force equal to any probable opposition. It may now depend on the number of the old volunteers, who may reengage, and the number of new troops that may arrive from the Brazos in time, as also in some degree upon the advance of Major General Taylor, whether I shall find this army in strength to leave the garrisons, and to occupy the capital.”
I may add, that only about fifty individuals of the old volunteers reengaged under the provisions of the act of March 3; that the remainder were discharged May4; that Maj. Gen. Taylor made no movement in advance of Saltillo; and that the new regulars, including Cadwalader’s brigade, only began to come up with me at Puebla in July, but not in sufficient numbers till August 6. The next day the army commenced its advance upon the Capital, with a little more than 10,000 effective men. It is not extravagant to say that, if Brigadier general Cadwalader’s forces had not been diverted from me to the Rio Grande, where he was mad to lose, without any benefit to Major Gen, Taylor, much precious time, I might easily have taken this city in the month of June, and at onefifth of the loss sustained in August and September. The enemy availed himself of my forced delay at Puebla to collect, to treble, to organize, and discipline his forces, as also to erect numerous and powerful defences with batteries. Nearly all those extraordinary preparations for our reception were made after the middle of June.—And it is known that the news of the victory of Buena Vista reached Washington in time to countermand Cadwalader’s orders for the Rio Grande, before his departure from New Orleans. Two rifle companies, with him, received the countermand there, and joined me early.
I know that I had the misfortune to give offence to the department, by expressing myself to the same effect from Jalapa, May 6. In a report of that date, I said: “The subject of that order (No. 135, old volunteers) has given me long and deep solicitude.—To part with so large and so respectable a portion of this army, in the middle of a hostile country which, though broken in its power, is not yet disposed to sue for peace—to provide for the return home of seven regiments from this interior position, at a time when I find it quite difficult to provide transportation and supplies for the operating forces which remain—and all this without any prospect of succor or reinforcements in, perhaps, the next seven months—beyond some 300 army recruits—present novelties utterly unknown to any invading army before. With the addition of ten of twelve thousand new levies in April or may—asked for, and until very recently expected—or even with the addition of two or three thousand new troops, destined for this army, but suddenly, by the orders of the War Department, diverted to the Rio Grande frontier; I might, notwithstanding the unavoidable discharge of the old volunteers—seven regiments and two independent companies—advance with confidence upon the enemy’s capital. I shall, nevertheless, advance; but whether beyond Puebla, will depend on intervening information and reflection. The general panic given to the enemy at Cerro Gordo still remaining, I think it probable that we shall go to Mexico; or, if the enemy recover from that, we must renew the consternation by another blow.”
Thus, like Cortez, finding myself isolated and abandoned, and again, like him, always afraid that the next ship of messenger might recall or farther cripple me—I resolved no longer to depend on Vera Cruz or home, but to render my little army “a selfsustaining machine”—as I informed every body, including the head of the War Department—and advanced to Puebla.
It was in reference to the foregoing serious causes of complaint, and others, to be found in my reports at large—particularly in respect to money for the disbursing staff officers, clothing, and Mr. Trist, commissioner—that I concluded my report from Puebla, June 4, in these words: “Considering the many cruel disappointments and mortifications I have been made to feel since I left Washington, and the total want of support or sympathy on the part of the War Department, which I have so long experienced, I beg to be recalled from this army the moment it may be safe for any person to embark at Vera Cruz—which, I suppose, will be early in November. Probably all field operations will be over long before that time.”
But my next report [July 25] from Puebla has, no doubt, in the end, been deemed more unpardonable by the department. In that paper, after speaking of the happy change in my relations, both official and private, with Mr. Trist,” I continued:
“Since about 26th ultimo [June] our intercourse has been frequent and cordial, and I have found him [Mr. T.] able, discreet, courteous, and amiable. At home it so chanced that we had but the slightest possible acquaintance with each other. Hence more or less of reciprocal prejudice; and of the existence of his feeling towards me, I knew (by private letters) before we met, that at least a part of the cabinet had a full intimation. Still, the pronounced misunderstanding between Mr. Trist and myself could not have occurred but for other circumstances: 1. His being obliged to send forward your letter of April 14, instead of delivering it in person, with the explanatory papers which he desired to communicate; 2. His bad health in May and June, which I am happy to say has now become good; 3. The extreme mistification into which your letter, and particularly an interlineations, unavoidably threw me. So far as I am concerned, I am perfectly willing that all I have heretofore written to the department about Mr. Trist should be suppressed. I make this declaration as due to my present esteem for that gentleman.; but ask no favor, or desire none, at the hands of the department. Justice to myself, however tardy, I shall take care to have done. * * *
I do not acknowledge the justice of either of your rebukes contained in the letter of May 31, (in relation to Mr. Trist and the prisoners at Cerro Gordo;) and that I do not here triumphantly vindicate myself, is not from the want of will, means, or ability, but time. The first letter (dated February 22) received from you, at Vera Cruz, contained a censure, and I am now rebuked for the unavoidable—nay, wise, if it had not been unavoidable—release on parole, of the prisoners taken at Cerro Gordo—even before one word of commendation from government has reached this army on account of its gallant conduct in the capture of those prisoners. (No such commendation has yet been received—February, 1848.)—So, in regular progression, I may, should the same army gallantly bear me into the city of Mexico, in the next six or seven weeks—which is probable, if we are not arrested by a peace or a truce—look to be dismissed from the service of my country! You will perceive that I am aware (as I have long been) of the dangers which hang over me at home; but I, too, am a citizen of the United States, and well know the obligations imposed under all circumstances by an enlightened patriotism. In respect to money, I beg to report that the chief commissary (Captain Grayson) of this army has not received a dollar from the States since we landed at Vera Cruz, March 9.—He now owes more than $200,000, and is obliged to purchase on credit, at great disadvantages. The chief quartermaster (Captain Irwin) has received perhaps $60,000, and labors under like incumbrances. Both have sold draughts to small amounts, and borrowed largely of the pay department, which has received about half of the money estimated for.—Consequently, the troops have some four months’ pay due them. Our poverty, or the neglect of the disbursing departments at home, has been made known, to our shame, in the papers of the capital here, through a letter from Lieut. Col. Hunt, that was found on the person of the special messenger from Washington. The army is also suffering greatly from the want of necessary clothing—including blankets and greatcoats.—The new troops, (those who have last arrived,) as destitute as the others, were first told that they would find abundant supplies at New Orleans; next at Vera Cruz, and finally here; whereas we now have, perhaps, a thousand hands making shoes and (out of bad materials and at high rates,) pantaloons. These articles, about 3,000 pairs of each, are absolutely necessary to cover the nakedness of the troops. February 28, off Lobos, I wrote to Brigadier General Brooke to direct the quartermaster at New Orleans to send to me large supplies of clothing. March 1623, General Brooke replied that the quartermaster at New Orleans had ‘neither clothing nor shoes;’ and that he was ‘fearful that, unless they have been sent out to you direct, you will be much disappointed.’ Some small quantity of clothing, perhaps onefifth of our wants, came to Vera Cruz from some quarter, and followed us to Jalapa and this place.”
I must here specially remark, that this report, No. 30, though forwarded the night of its date, (July 25,) seems to have miscarried. Perceiving, about November 27, that is was not acknowledged by the department, I caused a duplicate to be made, signed it, and sent it off by the same conveyance with my despatch No. 36, and the charges against Brevet Major General Worth, Major General Pillow, and Brevet Lieut. Col. Duncan, together with the appeal against me of the former. All these are acknowledged by the department in the same letter (Jan. 13) that recalls me.
It was that budget of papers that caused the blow of power, so long suspended, to fall on a devoted head. The three arrested officers, and he who had endeavored to enforce a necessary discipline against them, are all to be placed together before the same court;the innocent with the guilty, the accuser and the accused, the judge and his prisoners, are dealt with alike. Most impartial justice!—But there is a discrimination with a vengeance! While the parties are on trial—if the appealer is to be tried at all, which seems doubtful—two are restored to their corps—one of them with his brevet rank—and I am deprived of my command! There can be but one step more in the same direction:throw the rules and articles of war into the fire, and leave all ranks in the army free to engage in denunciations and a general scramble for precedence, authority, and executive favors. The pronunciamento, on the part of my factious jurors, is most triumphant.
My recall—under the circumstances, a severe punishment before trial—but to be followed by a trail here, that may run into the autumn –and on matters I am but partially permitted to know by the department and my accusers—is very ingenuously placed on two grounds: 1. My own request, meaning that of June 4, (quoted above, and there was no other before the department.) which had been previously (July 12) acknowledged and rebukingly declined. 2. The arrest of Brevet Major General Worth, for writing to the department “ under the pretext and form of an appeal,” an open letter, to be sent through me, in which I was grossly and falsely accused of “malice” and “conduct unbecoming an officer and gentleman, in the matter of the general order No. 349, on the subject of puffing letters for the newspapers at home.
On that second point, the letter from the department of January 13 is more than ingenious; it is elaborate, subtle, and profound—a professional dissertation, with the rare merit of teaching principles until now wholly unknown to military codes and treatises, and of course to all mere soldiers, however great their experience in the field.
I have not in this place time to do more than hint at the fatal consequences of the novel doctrine in question. According to the department, any factious junior may, at his pleasure, in the midst of the enemy—using “the pretext and form of an appeal” against his commander, insult and outrage him to the grossest extent—though he be the generalinchief, and charged with the conduct of the most critical operations; and that commander may not arrest the incipient mutineer, until he shall have first laid down his own authority, and submitted himself to a trail, or wait at least until a distant period of leisure for a judicial examination of the appeal! And this is precisely the case under consideration. The department, in its eagerness to condemn me, could not take time to learn of the experienced, that the generalinchief who once submits to an outrage from his junior, must lay his account to suffer the like from all the vicious under him—at least down to a rank that may be supposed without influence, in high quarters, beyond the army. But this would not be the whole mischief to the public service—Even the great mass of the spirited, intelligent and well affected among his brothers in arms, would soon reduce such commander to utter imbecility, by holding him in just scorn and contempt for his recreancy to himself and country.—And are discipline and efficiency of no value in the field? But it was not my request of June 4, nor report No. 30, [of July 25] so largely quoted from above; nor yet the appeal of one pronunciado that has at length brought down upon me this visitation, so clearly predicted. That appeal, no doubt, had its merits—considering it came from an erratic brother—a deserter from the other extreme—who having just made his peace with the true faith, was bound to signalize apostacy by acceptable denunciations of one for whom, up to Vera Cruz, he had professed, [and not without cause.] the highest obligations. [It was there he learned from me that I was doomed at Washington, and straight way the apostate began to seek, through a quarrel, the means of turning that knowledge to his own benefit.] No. There was [recently] still another element associated in the work—kept as far as practicable out of the letter of recall—an influence proceeding from the other arrested general—who is quite willing that it should generally be understood [and who shall gainsay his significant acquiescence?] that all rewards and punishments, in this army, were, from the first, to follow his recommendations. This, the more powerful of the pronunciados against No. 349, well knew a the time, as I soon knew, that he was justly obnoxious, not only to the animadversions of that order, but to other censures of yet a much graver character.
In respect to this general, the letter of recall observes, parenthetically, but with an acumen worthy of more than a “hasty” notice, that some of my specifications of his misconduct are hardly consistent with “your [my] official reports and communications.”
Seemingly, this is a most just rebuke. But, waiting for the trials, I will here briefly state, that, unfortunately, I followed that General’s own reports, written and oral,; that my confidence, lent him, in advance, had been but very slightly shaken, as early as the first week in October; that, up to that time, fro our entrance into the city, I had been at the desk , shut out from personal intercourse with my brother officers, and that it was not till that confinement that facts, conduct and motives began to pour in upon me.
A word as to the 5th article of war. I can truly say that, in this and other communications, I have not designed the slightest disrespect to the commanderinchief of the army and navy of the United States. No doubt he, like myself and all others, may fall into mistakes as to particular men; and I cannot, having myself been behind the curtain, admit the legal fiction that ALL acts of a Secretary are the acts of the President. Yet, in my defensive statements, I have offered no wanton discourtesy to the head of the War Department, although that functionary is not in the enumeration of the abovementioned article.
Closing my correspondence with the department, until after the approaching trial, I have the honor to remain, respectfully,
Your most obedient servant,
WINFIELD SCOTT
The Hon. SECRETARY OF WAR, Washington D.C.
[BWP]
REv45i1p1c4, May 5, 1848, Sort of Dilemma.
The Editors of the Whig seem to have sprung from their beds at an early hour on Tuesday morning, to enjoy the perusal of Old Zac’s letter in the Republican; for yesterday’s “leader,” of “unreasonable length,” was struck off at a heat, before the arrival of the Allison letter, which reached us by the Southern mail about half past 10<A.M. The Whig’s comments on the Baldwin or Gallaher letter open with the ominous remark, that “letterwriting has been the death of more than on e Presidential aspirant, of not occasionally of a nominee for that office.” It then proceeds to show why such are the fatal results of letterwriting, and argues, that Mr. Polk, “an adroit politician,” (the Whig press have generally ridiculed him as an “imbecile”—a nobody!) by writing one single letter, the famous “Kane letter, the model of an electioneering epistle,” succeeded in utterly “confounding those who insisted(ed) on “ putting him to the question” by the use of phrases.” It is far different, argues the Whig, with the “ingenuous, unsophisticated, unambitious” General Taylor, and the “open, frank and fearless” Mr. Clay, (the Whig does not say that he is “unambitious!”) who, “if they answer at all, as they are apt to do, will reply in categorical and explicit terms.” Hence, says the Whig, the defeat of Mr. Clay, who “answered all questions, whether from friend or foe, careless of all consequences, and desirous that his views on all questions of public policy might be understood.” And hence, we presume, the expected defeat of Gen. Taylor, who, the Whig informs us, “has written too many letters.” It is true, as that paper says, from General Taylor’s position, “ he had necessarily very little to say;” but the “misrepresentations of his opinions” compelled, him to “come out” in his letter to Mr. Baldwin or Mr. Gallaher. But, still, if the Whig means, any thing at all, it clearly means that General Taylor, who “has written too many letters,” has subjected himself to the category of the “open, frank, and fearless” but unfortunate Mr. Clay, and that, like his great prototype in letterwriting, he, too, must, for his multifarious epistles, reap the bitter fruits of “defeat.” And here we would remark, that the Whig in dilating upon Mr. Clay’s fatal cacocteries scribendi does great injustice to Messrs. Polk and Buchanan’s “electioneering,” and gives vastly too much credit to Mr. Clay’s “openness and frankness.” Mr. Polk wrote one single letter, which was read from one end of the Union to the other, and the views of which have been fully realized and carried out, since his elevation to the Presidency. [And, strange to say, the only sentence in the Kane letter upon which any doubt has been expressed, is almost identical, word for word, with a snetnece in one of Mr. Clay’s Georgia antiTariff letters!]—Mr. Clay, on the other hand, wrote a number of letters, suited to the Northern and Southern latitudes respectively. Of his many letters on Texas, some were quoted at the North, decidedly against annexition, and others cited at the South, to prove that his election alone would secure the admission of Texas. “Good Cassius” tells us that Mr. Clay on the Native American question wore two faces. On the Tariff, too, Mr. Clay’s letters to Georgia and his letter to Pennsylvania were of an antagonistic aspect. And on this question the Whig does great wrong to Mr. Buchanan. That gentleman did not, as had been fully proved, contend that Mr. Polk was a better Tariff man than Mr. Clay, but that he was as good a Tariff man; and his grounds were, that Mr. Clay, in his Georgia letter, had advocated the Compromise Act, as had done Mr. Polk. When Mr. Buchanan made his speech, Mr. Clay’s letter to Pennsylvania, openly in favor of “protection,” had not appeared. It was from his Georgia letter that Mr. Buchanan drew his parallel. When the later letter to Pennsylvania appeared, the whole aspect of the affair was changed. So much for Mr. Clay’s “openness and frankness” in writing various letters to suit various places. Is it strange that he was so utterly prostrated in 1844?
But to return from a digression, which we could not avoid, to the Whig’s comments upon the Baldwin or Gallaher letter. It is evident that the letter goes much farther than the Whig expected or desired: “The denial by General Taylor of the authenticity of the conversations ascribed to him by certain Mississippi letterwriters, (says the Whig,) places him precisely where he stood before those letters were published.—But, though the denial proves that he never in latitudinous construction, in contending that expressed any such opinions, the Whig indulges it also follows that he does not entertain them. The Whig goes on the say, that it has “not the shadow of a doubt that he (Gen. T.) is in all essential points “a Whig in principle,” and, entertaining this undoubting conviction, we are prepared to support him cordially and zealously, IF HE BE THE NOMINEE OF THE WHIG PARTY.”
Thus far all goes smoothly; but, on looking more closely into the letter, the Whig sees distinctly that Old Zac has flaunted the banner of revolt in the face of the Whig party; that, in defiance of all conventions, he means to be a candidate at all hazards, and that he will not quit the field, or “surrender” his independent position, for Mr. Clay or any body else! The Whig has too often lashed the “folly and madness” of those who would set up for themselves, independent of Whig organization, now to submit to any such proposition—and it gives to Old Zac and his “independent” friends a plain talk, which we copy in full.—Its argument is unanswerable. It tells the peculiar nolus volus Taylorites, that the game they would play is “rather too strong”—even for “the veteran political gamblers of the National Convention”—that the members of that body will never submit to the game “Heads I win, Tails you lose,” by which they must lose all and gain nothing—in a word, that as long as old Zac stands on his present independent position, he is in imminent danger of defeat both in the nomination and election. But it is unnecessary for us to make any comment on the Whig’s argument. It cannot be strengthened, as all who read the following will admit. The “independency” of Gen. Taylor means utter “disorganization” of the Whig party and openly defies their National Convention:
“In one word, we have not the shadow of a doubt that he is in all essential points “A WHIG UPON PRINCIPLE;” and, entertaining this undoubting conviction we are prepared to support him cordially and zealously, IF HE BE THE NOMINEE OF THE WHIG PARTY. We regret, therefore—and it is the only thing we much regret to see in the foregoing letter—that Gen. Taylor, while expressing a willingness to receive, under any circumstances, the nomination of the Whig National Convention, should have deemed it necessary to say, in so many words, that, should he fail to do so, he will, so far as it depends upon himself, remain a candidate. Such a declaration is calculated to deprive him of that nomination, if there were otherwise a certainty of his getting it.—“Head I win, Tails you lose,” is rather too strong a game, in politics, as in less important matters. The very basis upon which Conventions are organized is a spirit of compromise,the members, as well as those who are willing to receive the vote of such bodies, consenting, for the sake of a common triumph, to submit to the chances of an individual sacrifice. If this rule is to be violated—if one of the individuals willing to receive its vote, may say “if you nominate me, I will be a candidate in opposition to your nominee,” it is manifest that Conventions are themselves solemn farces, or even worse. It can scarcely be expected that some two hundred and fifty gentlemen will consent to meet in Philadelphia, in June next, from the most remote parts of the Union, at great inconvenience and expense to many if not all of them, simply for the purpose of NOMINATING A GENTLEMAN WHO IS ALREADY IN THE FIELD, “NOLENS VOLENS,” and intends so to remain, whether a majority of them shall think it advisable or unadvisable. For one, we confess we do not like this part of Gen. Taylor’s letter; and, foreseeing that it will constitute an insuperable objection with some, who would be otherwise in favor of General Taylor’s nomination, we regret that he has been induced to assume an attitude so embarrassing to all of his friends, except the handful who expect to support him as an “independent” candidate, and which may have the effect of defeating his own nomination and election. That the General does not care to be elected, one may readily infer from the language of his letter, but if he be thus indifferent to his own success, he ought to feel some anxiety for the triumph of sound principles and wholesome measures; and we do not very clearly comprehend, therefore, why he has determined so pertinaciously to cling to his position as a candidate for an office that he does not want, in opposition to both the Whig and Democratic nominees, IF BY DOING SO HE SHALL WEAKEN AND DEFEAT THE FORMER, and render the election of the latter inevitable.”
Soon after the above positive declarations of the Whig were penned, the Allison letter came intot he hands of the Whig Editor, and in a P.S., he eagerly clutches at a single expression, as affording some little hope of safety. He says:
“We are more pleased with it than we have been with any previous exposition of his views. Indeed, as an enunciation of general principles, it meets our unqualified approbation; and had we received it before our comments had been prepared on his letter to the Editors of the Republican, we should have deemed them unnecessary. But, as they were written, we let them remain. We understand clearly now, that although General Taylor will not withdraw his own name in the event of the nomination of another individual by the Philadelphia Convention, yet his FRIENDS are at liberty to do so whenever THEY may deem it expedient; and that they will unquestionably advise his withdrawal in the event of the nomination of any other Whig, cannot be doubted. The peculiarity of the circumstances under whish the General was brought forward as a candidate, AUTHORIZES, and almost COMPELS him to take this ground; and, for one, we are satisfied with it; as, indeed, we are with the admirable sentiments—and especially those relative to EXECUTIVE POWER AND INFLUENCE—embodied in his letter.”
Why were the Whig’s comments “unnecessary”? Does the old soldier’s second letter “surrender” the independent ground of the first? Does it indicate that he will leave the field and submit to the Convention? On the contrary, does it not, as the Republican truly says, confirm that position? It is the merest quibble, then, in the Whig to profess to be “satisfied,” with its former very strong expressions in the same article staring the reader in the face. But last evening’s Republican cuts away even this last plank of the Whig.
The Republican’s editors certainly ought to know what the Old Hero means. As his correspondents, they are his best commentators—and what do they say? They say that they “wish to be clearly understood, for we would not desire a vote, nor seek to retain one for Gen. Taylor upon grounds which are not sanctioned by his real views and position.” They, therefore, argue conclusively, that Gen. Taylor’s position, as emphatically announced in the letter to themselves, is “ entirely” confirmed in the letter to Captain Alison”—that they wrote to him expressly “in regard to his independent position,” for they “wished no concealment”—and that his letter, as published, shows his “true ground in every respect.” They continue as follows:
“Gen. Taylor, then, does not desire to withdraw, let who will be the Candidate of the Whig Convention. He cannot withdraw, because he is already the candidate of the people , made so without reference to Conventions, by men of all parties.—His declaration upon this point, in his letter to the Republican, harmonizes with those of every letter he has written, and is confirmed, instead of being modified, by the following manly avowal in his letter to Capt. Alison:
‘I have consented to the use of my name as a candidate for the Presidency. I have frankly avowed my own distrust of my fitness for that station; but, having, at the solicitation of many of my countrymen, taken my position as a candidate, I do not feel at liberty to surrender that position, until my friends manifest a wish that I should retire from it. I will then most gladly do so.’
In other words, Gen. Taylor, is in the hands of his “COUNTRYMEN,” and, being a candidate by their act, not his own, he will cease to be such when it is their desire that he should retire. And who are the “countrymen” to whom he refers?—Why undoubtedly the people—Whigs, Natives and Democrats—who, through their various Conventions and presses, have called him to the field. It is for them to say whether he shall withdraw; for them , who have never appealed to a National Convention, and many of whom are not, in fact, Whigs at all, say whether he shall retire at the dictation of a caucus. It may be as well understood now as ever, that the people have placed Gen. Zachary Taylor in the field; that he cannot withdraw, AND WILL NOT BE WITHDRAWN. We make this declaration, because it is the truth, and we wish no man to support him on any mistaken supposition. We shall be sorry if its effect is to drive any of our Whig friends from his banner, but we console ourselves with the full assurance that those Whigs who will refuse to support him are those who would never, in any event, have given him a support worth having; and that their places will be more than supplied by independent and patriotic millions of the American People.”
Nothing can be stronger than this language.—Indeed the plain words of Gen. Taylor’s two letters can mean nothing else, however the Whig may torture them by quibbles. The old soldier has taken his stand—his “friends” have taken their stand—and “he will not be withdrawn,” whether Henry Clay or any other Whig be nominated by the Convention. Here, it strikes us, the road in the Whig ranks must “make a fork.”—We shall see whether “independency” or “Whig organization” will “surrender”—whether the “handful” or the other faction will give way. As the day for the Convention approaches, we will have some “rich” developments.
Hereafter we shall have a word to say as to the exposition of Gen. Taylor’s
“principles” in the Alison letter.
[BWP]
REv45i1p1c6, May 5, 1848, No title.
The steamship Massachusetts has arrived at New Orleans from Vera Cruz, but with no later news. This is the vessel which was, it was said, to convey Gen. Scott to N. York. We presume, therefore, that not the North but New Orleans is his destination. She brought over several officers, with 148 sick soldiers—also the remains of Lieut. Perrin Watson, 14th Infantry; Lieut. M. L. Shackleford, 2d Artillery; Lieut. Calvin Benjamin, 4th Artillery, and Mr. T. T. Tucker, of East Tennessee.
The people of Texas are improving their rivers and opening their roads. A steamer now runs regularly between Galveston and Port Lavaca, in connexion with the line of steam ships to N. Orleans—a reat convenience to Western Texas.
The anniversary of the battle of San Jacinto—the 21st of April—was
celebrated “with all the honors “ in Galveston.
[BWP]
REv45i1p1c6, May 5, 1848, No title.
The Matamoras Flag of the 8th April has the following painful news from Monterey to the 29th ult. We trust that there may be some mistake as to the alleged murders:
The news of the ratification of the treaty by the U. States Senate reached Gen. Wool on the morning of the 29th, and, it is said, produced quite a stir in camp. It was rumored in Monterey, though not much credit was given to the story, that several American merchants had been recently murdered near the Mazipil.
The Monterey Gazette learns from its agent in Saltillo, that three men of the Virginia regiment had been murdered at Parras a few days ago. The murderers were arrested, and it was supposed would be hung.
Appropriate honors were paid by the garrison at Monterey, on the 23rd
ult., to the memory of John Q. Adams.
[BWP]
REv45i1p1c5, May 5, 1848, GEN. SCOTT AND MR. MARCY.
We publish today Gen. Scott’s most extraordinary and unprovoked letter,
which wantonly assails the Administration as guilty of the bases crimes
and misdemeanors. As the Union says, it is like a bill of indictment,
showing on its face that it was entirely uncalled for and baseless in its
charges. The defence of Mr. Marcy we shall publish as rapidly
as possible. It is one of the most powerful papers we have ever read, and,
as a Whig friend observed yesterday, portions of it are worthy of “Junius.”
The answer is conclusive, overwhelming, and the accuser is utterly refuted
by his won evidence. This remarkable letter of Mr. Marcy will elevate him
to a high eminence in public opinion. Even the most thorough Whigs
admit the power of the paper and the perfect vindication of the War Department
from the unjust and sweeping assault. A highly intelligent member of that
party has said that Mr. Marcy has not left General Scott “one inch of ground
to stand upon, nor a loop to hang doubt upon.” But our readers will
judge for themselves. For Gen. Scott, as a skillful and accomplished officer
and soldier, we have great respect. He has many noble qualities as
a man—but upon the present occasion, to our deep regret, his evil genius
has led him to assume an attitude of attack, from which the Secretary of
War could not fail to drive him by the weapon of truth, without surrendering
all selfrespect as a man, all dignity, and fidelity to duty as a public
officer, clothed with high responsibility.
[BWP]
REv45i1p1c7, May 5, 1848, For the Enquirer.
Messrs. Editors: Permit an humble and obscure individual, (but one who feels a deep interest in the welfare of our country,) to make a suggestion through the medium of your paper. It is very desirable that a peace, honorable to both nations, should speedily be concluded between the United States and Mexico; and I would therefore suggest, for the consideration of my countrymen, that we hold a portion of the Mexican territory—say that portion at present demanded by our Government, not absolutely and indefeasibly, but as a security for the payment of the five millions of indemnity due to our merchants from Mexico, and for all other legal and equitable demands this country may have or acquire against Mexico, either under the laws of nations or otherwise. That five years—from the date of the Treaty—shall be allowed to Mexico to pay the said claims; and if within that time she pays them, then the United States shall release every acre of Mexican soil which, in right and justice, belongs to her. But if she does not pay the said claims at or before the expiration of the five years, the said territory shall belong, indefeasibly and absolutely, to the United States.
As to indemnity for the expenses of the war, if, according to the rules and regulations of civilized warfare, it is right and proper that the United States should demand and receive it of Mexico, then we should have it; otherwise we should make no such claim. These are terms which I think Mexico can honorably accept, without the least humiliation, or without the smallest stain on her national reputation; and as this is not a war of conquest on the part of the United States, what is fair and right is all she can reasonably demand.
It would be unfortunate in the extreme if we should lose, or the least impair even, our present high national character for strict impartial justice by any false step we might take in this delicate matter; and I trust that our country will make no demand of Mexico but what is strictly just, and so acknowledged to be by all impartial and civilized nations; and I also trust that our public functionaries in arranging this matter will not forget that grand principle of our holy religion: “Do unto others as we would that they should do unto us.”
I see there is some prospect of peace. Perhaps Mexico is compelled by her present crippled and distressed condition, to accede to almost any terms. But let us show our magnanimity. Let us not absolutely take her territory, and appreciate it in fee to our own use, without indemnity; but let us merely hold it as before stated, as security for our just and legal claims against her. Such a course I think would receive the commendation of all the world; and a peace concluded on such terms would no doubt be lasting, and might beget a stronger feeling of attachment between the two countries than has perhaps ever before existed.
It might be one of the stipulations of such a treaty, that, upon its conclusion, Mexico should at once enter upon negotiations for the settlement of the boundaries of Texas; and that, in case of disagreement between the two republics as to the boundary, the matter should be submitted to some impartial and competent umpire.
These are some the views that present themselves to a plain unlearned man; and I am sure that some such reflections present themselves to every lover of strict justice, who has paid the least attention the this subject, and is not too much under the influence of party discipline. I have been, and still am, a supporter of the present administration; but if I could for a moment believe that this war was waged on Mexico for the purpose of depriving her of a large portion of her acknowledged territory, without a fair equivalent, I should at once withdraw my support; and, in thus saying, I must believe that I speak the sentiments of my countrymen, generally.
ARISTIDES.
Essex County, Virginia, 1848.
[BWP]
REv45i1p2c1, May 5, 1848, Reply of Mr. Marcy.
WAR DEPARTMENT
Washington, April 21, 1848
SIR: I would not be respectful to you to pass unnoticed your extraordinary letter of the 24th of February, nor just to myself to permit it to remain unanswered in the files of this department.
To attempt to dispel the delusions which you seem to have long pertinaciously cherished, and to correct the errors into which you have fallen, devolves upon me a duty which I must not decline; but, in performing it , I mean to be as cautious, as you profess to have been, to abstain any “wanton discourtesy;” and I hope to be alike successful. Your prudent respect for the “fifth article of war” has induced you to hold me ostensibly responsible for many things which you are aware are not fairly chargeable to me. The device you have adopted to assail the President, by aiming your blows at the Secretary of War, does more credit to your ingenuity as an accuser, than to your character as a soldier. A premeditated contrivance to avoid responsibility does not indicate an intention not to do wrong.
The general aspect of your letter discloses an evident design to create a belief that you were drawn forth from your quiet position, in a bureau of this department, and assigned to the command of our armies in Mexico, for the purpose of being sacrificed; and, that to accomplish this end, “neglects, disappointments, injuries, and rebukes” “were inflicted” on you, and the necessary means of prosecuting the war with success withheld; or, in other words, the government, after preferring you to any other of the gallant generals within the range of its choice, had labored to frustrate its own plans, to bring defeat upon its own armies, and involve itself in ruin and disgrace, for an object so unimportant in its bearing upon public affairs. A charge so entirely preposterous, so utterly repugnant to all the probabilities of human conduct, calls for no refutation.
For other purposes than to combat this fondlycherished chimera, it is proper that I should notice some of your specific allegations.
It is true that, after you were designated for the chief command of our armies, the President was desirous that your departure should not be unnecessarily delayed; but you were not restricted, as you allege, to “only four days” to make the necessary preparations at Washington. You were not ordered away until you had reported that these preparations were so far completed that your presence here was no longer required. Then, instead of going directly to Mexico, you were permitted, at your own request, to take a circuitous route through New York, and there to remain a few days. You staid at New York nearly an entire week; and, not until the 19th of December, (twentysix days after leaving Washington,) did you reach New Orleans, where you would have arrive din seven days, if you had been required to take the direct route. This solicited indulgence, by which your arrival at N. Orleans was delayed nearly three weeks, is incompatible with your allegation that you were allowed “only four days at Washington, where twenty might have been most advantageously employed.” This complaint has relation to facts within your own knowledge; error, therefore, is hardly reconcilable with any solicitude to be accurate. As this is your opening charge against the War Department, and may be regarded as indicative of those which follow, I shall make the refutation of it still more complete, for the purpose of showing with what recklessness you have performed the functions of an accuser, and how little reliance, in the present state of your feelings, can be placed on your memory. You are the witness by whom your allegation is to be disproved. On the day of your departure from Washington, you left with me a paper, in your own handwriting, dated November 23, 1846, with the following heading:
“Notes suggesting topics to be embraced in the Secretary’s instructions to general S., drawn up (in haste) at the request of the former.”
From that paper I extract the following paragraph:
“I (the Secretary of War) am pleased to learn from you (General Scott) that you have in a very few days already, through the general staff of the army here, laid a sufficient basis for the purposes with which you are charged, and that you now think it best to proceed at once to the southwest in order to organize the largest number of troops that can be obtained in time for that most important expedition”__(the expedition against Vera Cruz).
Here is you r won most explicit admission that you represented to the Secretary of War, before leaving Washington, that arrangements were so far completed, that you thought it best to proceed at once to the army in Mexico; and yet you make it your opening charge against the department, that you were forced away to Mexico before you had time for necessary preparations.
I present the next charge in your own language:
“I handed to you a written request that one of three of our accomplished captains, therein named, might be appointed assistant adjutant general, with the rank of major, for duty with me in the field, and there was a vacancy, at the time, for one. My request has never been attended to, and this I have had no officer of the Adjutant General’s Department with me in the campaign.—Can another instant be cited of denying to a generalinchief, in the field at the head of a large army—or even a small one—the selection of his chief of the staff—that is, the chief in the department of orders and correspondence?”
Were the case precisely as you have stated it to be you have given too much prominence, as a matter of complaint, to the President’s refusal to be controlled, in his exercise of the appointing power, by your wishes. Had there been a vacancy such as you mention for “ one of the accomplished captains” you named, no one knows better than you do that your request could not have been acceded to without departing from the uniform rule of selection for staff appointments, without violating the right of several officers to regular promotion, and offering an indignity to all those who held the position of assistant adjutants general, with the rank of captain. The rule of regular promotion in the staff is as inflexible, and has been as uniformly observed, as that in the line. It must appear surprising that you, who were so deeply “shocked and distressed” at the suggestion of appointing, by authority of Congress, a "citizen lieutenant general,” or vesting the President with power to devolve the command of the army on a major general without regard to priority in the date of his commission, should, in your first request, after being assigned to commend, ask the President to disregard the rights of at least four officers as meritorious as “ the three accomplished captains” named by you. The President’s views on this subject undoubtedly differ from yours. His regard for the rights of officers is not graduated by their rank. Those of captains and major generals have equal value in his estimation, and an equal claim to his respect and protection. I cannot admit that it is a just ground of censure and rebuke against the “head of the War Department” that the President did not see fit, in order to gratify your feelings of favoritism, to disregard the claims and violate the rights of all the assistant adjutants general of the rank of captain then in commission.
But, so far as it is made a ground of complaint and reproof, this is not the worst aspect of the case. You are entirely mistaken in the assertion, that there was then a vacancy in the adjutant general’s staff, with the rank of major, to which either of the captains recommended by you could have been properly appointed. There was no such vacancy. To show the correctness of this staement, and to demonstrate your error, I appeal to the Army Register and the records of the Adjutant General’s Office. You rmistake as to an obvious fact, lying within range of matter with which you are presumed to be familiar, has excited less surprise than the declaration, that by the non compliance with your request, you “have had no officer of the Adjutant General’s Department with me [you] in the campaign.” Every officer of that department—at least eight—was, as you well knew, subject to your command. When you arrived in Mexico, there were with the army at least five assistant adjutants general, all at your service. That you chose to employ none of them at your head quarters, and detached from other appropriate duties an officer to act as an assistant adjutant general, may well be regarded as a slight to the whole of that staff then with you in Mexico, and a cause of complaint; but certainly not a complaint to emanate from you against the War Department. Willing as I am to presume, though unable to conceive, that circumstances justified you in passing over all the assistant adjutants general then with the army, and in selecting an officer of the line to perform the duties of adjutant general at you headquarters, I was much surprised to learn from you that, when General Worth sent to you one of these “accomplished captains,” the first on you list, under the belief that you desired his services as an acting assistant adjutant general, you declined to employ him in that capacity; and I am still more surprised to perceive that you have made it a distinct ground of charge in your arraignment of the War Department, that you were not permitted to have him as an assistant adjutant general at you r headquarters. Had you selected him instead of another, as you might have done, you would have been bereft of all pretext for complaint. Though there was no vacancy in the Adjutant General’s staff of the grade of major, for which only you recommended the “accomplished captains”—and to which only they were properly eligible—there was a vacancy in it of the rank of captain. For this position you recommended an officer in General Wool’s staff, then on the Chihuahua expedition. This officer was subsequently appointed assistant adjutant general with the rank of captain, as you desired, and has ever since been at the headquarters of that general. Thus it will be perceived that your request, so far as it was proper and reasonable, was actually complied with.
The next specification in the catalogue of charges preferred against me, is, that a courtmartial was not instituted by the President for the trial of Gen. Marshall and Capt. Montgomery on your charges against them. The offenses imputed to them were certainly not of an aggravated character. The one, as was alleged, had been incautious in relation to a despatch under circumstances that might admit of its coming to the knowledge of the enemy, and the other had not carried a despatch with as mush expedition as you thought he might have done. As one was a general officer a court to try him must have been composed of officers of high rank. Before the order for assembling it could have reached Mexico, it was foreseen that your command would be at Vera Cruz, and probably engaged in an active siege of that city. Officers could not, therefore, have been then sent from your column to Monterey or the Rio Grande, (where the court must have been held,) without great detriment to the public service. Had you been deprived of several officers of high rank at that critical period by the order of the President, it would have afforded a better pretence of complaint than any one in your extended catalogue. Had the court been composed of officers taken from Gen. Taylor’s command, it would have still further weakened his condition, already weak in consequence of the very large force you had withdrawn from him. Subsequent events have proved that it was most fortunate the President did not comply with your request; for, had he done so, some of the officers highest in rank, and most conspicuous at Buena Vista, might, at that critical conjuncture, have been separated from their commands, and engaged in a court at a distance from that glorious scene of action. It is not fanciful to suppose that their absence might have changed the fortune of that eventful day; and that, instead of rejoicing, as we now do, in a triumphant victory—among the most brilliant in the whole course of the war—we might have had to lament a most disastrous defeat, and the almost total loss of the whole force you had left to sustain that frontier. No man has more reason than yourself to rejoice that no order emanated from Washington, though requested by you, which would have further impaired the efficiency of General Taylor’s command in the crisis that then awaited him.
My letter of the 22d of February, conveying the President’s views in regard to your order depriving Col. Harney of his appropriate command, is severely arraigned by you as offensive, both in manner and matter.
The facts in relation to this case of alleged grievance are now before the public, and a brief allusion to them will place the transaction in its true light. Under your orders Col. Harney had brought seven companies of his regiment—the 2d dragoons—from Monterey to the Brazos, to be under your immediate command; and two others—being all of the regiment in Mexico—were expected to follow within a few days. In the midst of his high hopes and ardent desire for active service, you took from him the command of his own regiment, devolved it on one of his junior officers, and ordered him back to Gen. Taylor’s line to look for what was not inappropriately denominated “an imaginary command.” Outraged in his feelings and injured in his rights, he respectfully remonstrated; his appeal to your sense of justice was unavailing. Neither to this gallant officer nor to the President did you assign any sufficient or even plausible reason for this extraordinary proceeding. The whole army, I believe, and the whole country, when the transaction became known, entertained but one opinion on the subject—and that was, that you had inflicted an injury and an outrage upon a brave and meritorious officer. Such an act—almost the first on your assuming command—boded disastrous consequences to the public service, and devolved upon the President the duty of imposing the protect the injured officer. This interposition you have made a grave matter of accusation against the head of the War Department, and have characterized it as a censure and a rebuke. It may imply both, and still, being merited, may leave you without a pretence for complaint. The President, after alluding to his duty to sustain the rights of the officers under your command, as well as your own rights, informed you that he did not discover in the case, as you had presented it, sufficient cause for such an order; that, in his opinion, Col. Harney had a just cause to complain; and that he hoped the matter had been reconsidered by you, and the colonel restored to his appropriate command. Your own subsequent course in this case demonstrates the unreasonableness of your complaint, and vindicates the correctness of the President’s proceedings.—You had really rebuked and censured your own conduct; for even before you had received the President’s views, you had, as he hoped you would, reconsidered the matter, become convinced of your error, reversed your own order, and restored Col. Harney to his command; thus giving the strongest evidence in favor of the propriety and correctness of all the President had done in the case. I give you too much credit for steadiness of purpose, to suspect that you retraced your steps from mere caprice, or for any other cause than a conviction that you had fallen into error. After the matter had thus terminated, it appears unaccountable to me that you, who above all others should wish it to pass into oblivion, have again called attention to it my making it an item in your arraignment of the War Department.
You struggle in vain to vindicate your course in this case, by referring to your own acts in the campaign of 1814. You then sent away, as you allege, against their wishes, “three senior field officers of as many regiments who were infirm, uninstructed, and inefficient, in favor of three juniors, and with the subsequent approbation of Major General Brown, and the head of the War Department.” This precedent does not, in my judgment, change the aspect of the present case. Colonel Harney was not “infirm, uninstructed, and inefficient;” you did not assign, and, in deference to the known opinion of the army and country, you did not venture to assign, that reason for deposing him. I do not understand the force of your logical deduction, that because you, on a former occasion, had deprived officers under you of their commands for good and sufficient reasons, with subsequent approval, you may now, and at any time, do the same thing without any reason whatever; and if the President interposes to the correct the procedure, you have a just cause to complain of an indignity, and a right to arraign the War Department.
As your animadversion upon the tone of my letter is probably not a blow aimed at a much more conspicuous object, to be reached through me, I ought, perhaps, to pass it without notice.—On revision of that letter, I cannot perceive that it is not entirely respectful in manner and language. The views of the President are therein confidently expressed, because they were confidently entertained. It seemed to be admitted by you, that “it dictated to the greenest general of the recent appointments,” the letter would not have been exceptionable. I was not aware that it was my duty to modify and graduate my style, so as to meet, according to your fastidious views, the various degrees of greenness and ripeness of the generals to whom I am required to convey the orders of the President, and for any such defect in my official communications I have no apology to offer.
In the same letter, wherein you complain of being censured for your course in relation to Col. Harney, you say: “I am now rebuked for unavoidable—nay, wise, if it had not been unavoidable—release, on parole, of the prisoners taken at Cerro Gordo, even before one word of commendation from government had reached this army on account of its gallant conduct in the capture of those prisoners.” Accident alone—not any oversight or neglect on my part—has given you the apparent advantage of the aggravation which you have artfully thrown into this charge. My letter commending yourself and the gallant army under your command for the glorious achievement at Cerro Gordo, was written and sent to you on the 19th of May—eleven days before that which you are pleased to consider as containing a rebuke.
But I meet the main charge with a positive denial. You never were rebuked for discharging the prisoners taken at Cerro Gordo. This issue can be tried by the record. All that was ever said on the subject is contained in the following extract from my letter of the 31st of May:
“Your course hitherto in relation to prisoners of war, both men and officers, in discharging them on parole, has been liberal and kind; but whether it ought to be still longer continued, or in some respects changed, has been under the consideration of the President, and he has directed me to communicate to you his views on the subject.—He is not unaware of the great embarrassment their detention, or the sending of them to the U. States, would occasion; but, so far as relates to the officers, he thinks they should be detained until duly exchanged. In that case, it will probably be found expedient to send them, or most of them to the United States. You will not, therefore, except for special reasons in particular cases, discharge the officers who may be taken prisoners, but detain them with you, or send them to the United States, as you shall deem most expedient.”
If I understand the force of terms, there is nothing in this language which, by fair interpretation, can be made to express or imply a rebuke. I cannot conceive that any mind, other than one of a diseased sensitiveness, over anxious to discover causes for complaint and accusation, could imagine that anything like a rebuke was contained in this extract; yet on this unsubstantial basis alone rests the charge, over and over again presented, that you were rebuked by the War Department for discharging the prisoners captured at Cerro Gordo. If, in a case where it was so easy to be right, and so difficult to get wrong, you could fall into such an obvious mistake, what may not be expected from you in other matters where your perverted feelings have a freer and a wider range?
Before considering your complaints for not having been supplied with sufficient means of transportation for the expedition against Vera Cruz, I will notice your “four memorials” to the War Department, in which you demonstrated, as you state, that “Vera Cruz was the true basis of operations, and that the enemy’s capital could not probably be reached from the Rio Grande.”
I cannot discover the pertinency of your allusion to these four memorials, except it be to put forth a claim to the merit of originating the expedition against Vera Cruz, and of being the first to discover that the most practicable route to the city of Mexico was from that point on the gulf; but your known abhorrence for a “pruriency of fame not earned,” ought to shield you from the suspicion of such an infirmity.
I am sure you are not ignorant of the fact—but if you are, it is nevertheless true—that the expedition against Vera Cruz had been for some time under consideration; that great pains had been taken to get information as to the defences of that city, the strength of the castle, and the difficulties which would attend the debarcation of troops; that maps had been procured and carefully examined; that persons who had resided there, and officers of the army and navy, had been consulted on the subject, and the enterprise actually resolved on before the date of your first memoir, and before you were thought of to conduct it.
As early as the 9th of July, 1846, within two months after the declaration of war, and before the main body of troops raised for its prosecution had reached the scene of operations, considerate attention had been given to that subject. On that day, a letter from this department to Gen. Taylor thus alluded to a movement from Vera Cruz into the interior of the enemy’s country:
“If, from all the information which you may communicate to the department, as well as that derived from other sources, it should appear that the difficulties and obstacles to the conducting of a campaign from the Rio Grande, the present base of your operations, for any considerable distance into the interior of Mexico, will be very great, the department will consider whether the main invasion should not ultimately take place from some point on the coast—sat Tampico, or some other point in the vicinity of Vera. This suggestion is made with a view to call your attention to it, and to obtain fro you such information as you may be able to impart. Should it be determined that the main army should invade Mexico at some other point than the Rio Grande—say the vicinity of Vera Cruz—a large and sufficient number of transport vessels could be placed at the mouth of the Rio Grande by the time the healthy season sets in—say early in November. The main army with all its munitions could be transported, leaving a sufficient force behind to hold and occupy the Rio Grande, and all the towns and provinces which you may have conquered before that time. In the event of such being the plan of operations, your opinion is desired, what increased force, if any, will be required to carry it out with success. We learn that the army coul dbe disembarked a few miles distant from Vera Cruz, and readily invest the town in its rear, without coming within range of the guns of the fortress of San Juan d’Ulloa. The town could be readily taken by land, while the fortress being invested by land and sea, and all communication cut off, must soon fall. From Vera Cruz to the city of Mexico there is a fine road, upon which the diligences or stagecoaches run daily. The distance from Vera Cruz to the city of Mexico is not more than onethird of that from the Rio Grande to the city of Mexico.”
The subject was again brought into view on the 13th of October, in the same year, and more particularly on the 22nd of October, in letters addressed to General Taylor. At the last date, the plan had been so far matured that several officers of the staff and line were indicated for that service. This was nearly a month before it was determined to employ you with the army in any part of Mexico.
It was never contemplated here to strike at the city of Mexico from the line occupied by General Taylor, or through any other except that from Vera Cruz. If the war was to be pushed to that extent, it required no elaborate demonstration—no profound military talents—nothing more than common sagacity and very slight reflection on the subject to see the propriety and the necessity of making Vera Cruz the base of military operations.
An alleged deficiency of means to transport the troops in the expedition to Vera Cruz seems to be most prominently presented, and most confidently relied on to sustain your charge against the War Department for neglecting this branch of its duties.
I issued, it seems to be admitted; the proper order, so far as the means of transportation were to be drawn from the north; but the allegation was that it was issued too late, and was never executed. It was issued at least four days before you arrived at New Orleans on your way to the army. If promptly executed, it was a reasonable calculation that the “ten vessels” alluded to in your letter, would have arrived in season to receive the troops as soon as you could collect them from their remote and scattered positions in the interior of Mexico, bring them to the seacoast, and prepare for their embarcation. Whether an order for ships to be sent out in ballast, issued the 15th of December, was or was not in season for the service they were designed for, depends upon the time when the expedition could be got ready to sail. To determine this, a regard must be paid to what you required to be done preparatory to the expedition, rather than to what you may have said on that subject.
A reference to two or three of your requisitions will show that no rational hope could be entertained that the expedition would set forth before the middle or the last of February. You required as one item of the outfit one hundred and forty surfboats—all to be constructed after you left Washington. Though the department urged a less number, you insisted on all. You estimated the expense of each at $200; and thought, by putting the principal shipyards on the Atlantic coast in requisition, they might be constructed by the 1st of January. To show what reliance was to be placed on your calculation, I refer to the fact that, though due regard to economy was had in procuring these boats, each cost on an average 950 dollars—nearly fivefold your estimate. Conceding that you erred much less as to the time within which they could be constructed—nay more, admitting they could have been ready by the 1st of January—and sooner you did not expect they could be made—by no reasonable calculation could they have reached the coast of Mexico before the 1st of February. The expedition could not go forth without them. In your letter to me dated the 28th February, off Lobos, you state that but a small part of the transports engaged at New Orleans, under your orders of the 28th December, &c., had arrived, and “not one of the ten ordered by your [my] memorandum if the 15th of that month, "and the whole were due at the Brazos on the 15th of January. Having thus shown, by your own opinion, that under my order “the ten vessels” ought to have been at the Brazos at least fifteen days before the expedition could have been ready to sail, I have vindicated myself from your charge of having neglected my duty by not issuing that order at an earlier date. If issued earlier, it would have involved a largely increased expenditure for demurrage, and resulted in no public benefit.
Bu the graver part of this charge is, that none “of these ten vessels” ever arrived. “Relying (you say in the letter now under consideration) upon them (the ten vessels) confidently, the embarcation was delayed in whole or in part at the Brazos and Tampico, from the 15th of January to the 9th of March, leaving, it was feared, not half the time needed for the reduction of Vera Cruz and its castle before the return of the yellow fever.” To whomever the calamitous consequences of the nonarrival of these “ten vessels,” and your “cruel disappointment” in relation to them, are imputable, he has certainly involved himself in a serious responsibility.—I hope to remove the whole of it from “the head of the War Department,” and entertain some apprehensions that it will fall in part upon the commanding general of the expedition.
The execution of the whole of the most difficult branch of duties appertaining to a military expedition—providing for transportation—is, by the distribution of the business in the War Department, allotted to the Quartermaster General. As an expedition against Vera Cruz had been resolved in some time before you were assigned to take command of it, General Jesup had gone to New Orleans to be in the best position to make the necessary preparations for such an enterprise. From his great knowledge and long experience in military affairs, not only in his appropriate department, but as a commander in the field, the government thought it fortunate that you could have the advice and assistance of so able a counsellor.
Your suggestion that it might be necessary to send ships in ballast from the North for transports was not neglected or unheeded by me. Whether it would be necessary or not, depended, according to your statement to me, upon the means of transportation which could be procured at New Orleans &c. My first step was to write to the Quartermaster General, then at that place, for information on that subject. In my letter to him of the 11th of December I said:
“It is expected that most of the vessels in the service of the quartermaster’s department can be used for transports for the expedition. It will be necessary that the department here should know what portion of the transportation can be furnished by the ordinary means which the quartermaster’s department has now under its control for the purposes of its expedition. I have to request that information on this point should be furnished without delay.
Another point on which the department desires information is, what amount of means of transportation for such an expedition can be furnished at New Orleans, Mobile, and in that quarter.
The expense of procuring transports from the Atlantic cities will be exorbitant. Freight is very high, and most of the good vessels are engaged for the ordinary purposes of commerce.”
It is important to bear in mind that you saw this letter on your first arrival at New Orleans. In writing to me from that place, December 21, you observe, “I have seen your letter (in the hands of Lieutenant Colonel Hunt) to the Quartermaster General, dated the 11th.” You could not mistake its object, because it was clearly expressed. I asked distinctly, what means of transportation for the expedition can be furnished at New Orleans, &c., and referred to the expense and difficulty of procuring transports from the Atlantic cities. You could not, therefore, but know that my course as to sending ships in ballast from the north would be regulated by the Quartermaster General’s reply. While waiting for this information, and in order to prevent delay, and be sure not to deserve the imputation you now cast upon me, I issued the order of the 15th of December, to which you refer, knowing that it could be modified and conformed to the exigencies of the service, according to the answer which I should receive from General Jesup. His reply is dated the 27th of December, and in it he says:
“Transportation can be provided here for all the troops that may be drawn from the army under the command of Gen. Taylor, and for all the ordnance, ordnance stores, and other supples, which may be drawn either from this depot (the Brazos) or from New Orleans. The public transports—I mean those owned by the U. States—that can be spared for the contemplated operations, it is estimated, will carry three thousand men with all their supplies. Vessels can be charted on favorable terms for any additional transportation that may be required."
This letter was submitted to and read by you, as appears from your endorsement thereon.After referring to some other matter sin the letter, you conclude your endorsement as follows:
“I recommend that Brevet Major General Jesup’s suggestions be adopted.” This fact shows that the letter received your particular attention. When this letter (which you knew was forwarded to the department) was here received—showing that your apprehended difficulty in obtaining sufficient transportation at the south was unfounded, and that it could be provided in that quarter in great abundance on favorable terms—my order of the 15th of December, so far, and only so far as it related to sending out vessels in ballast, was countermanded. It is strange, indeed, that, after you were made acquainted with the object of my inquiries and General Jesup’s letter in reply to them, you should have looked for transport vessels in ballast from the Atlantic cities, and still more strange that their nonarrival should be the proof you rely on to convict me of having neglected my duty in this instance. If, in truth, you delayed the expedition nearly two months for these transports, I am blameless. The responsibility is in another quarter. It cannot be said that this statement as to the sufficiency of transports to be obtained a the south had an implied reference to what I ordered from the Atlantic cities, for my order was then unknown to yourself and the Quartermaster General. You first received a copy of it several days after the date of General Jesup’s letter to me, and of your endorsement thereon. [See your letter to me of the 12th January.] Resisted as you were by “head winds,” enveloped in “frightful northers,” and oppressed with complicated and perplexing duties in arranging and preparing the expedition against Vera Cruz, some temporary bewilderment may be excused; but, to charge the War Department with your own misapprehensions and mistakes, is inexcusable.
[Remainder in tomorrow’s paper.]
[BWP]
REv45i1p2c4, May 5, 1848, For the Enquirer. GEN. SCOTT AND THE ADMINISTRATION.
The Whig papers of Richmond and elsewhere have expended much sympathy
on the “persecuted” Scott—and have as freely poured out their abuse upon
the Administration for its (alleged) “efforts to crush him.” Will
these Whig papers publish Gen. Scott’s late “indignation” letter containing
a list of all his grievances, all the counts of his long bill of indictment
against the Administration—and publish, at the same time, Secretary Marcy’s
reply thereto, that their readers may see both sides of the question?
We shall see. ONF, Who thinks Gov. Marcy ought to be prosecuted under the
law against cruel punishments.
[BWP]
REv45i1p2c4, May 5, 1848, No title.
Cassius M. Clay, denies in toto, the story of his having represented himself to the Mexicans to be a relation of Henry Clay’s. He says: “I have never claimed kinship with Mr. Clay! It was he who claimed, in his Greeley letter, ‘relationship’ to me!”
Let Cassius rest now!
[BWP]
REv45i1p2c6, May 5, 1848, Thunder Without Light!
Richmond, VA. Friday Morning, May 5, 1848. A short time since we laid before our readers the last letter of Henry Clay. On Wednesday we gave them an opportunity of perusing two letters of Gen. Taylor, one of the 20th and the other of the 22d April; the letter emphatically his last, for he concludes by saying, “I do not know that I shall again write upon the subject of national politics.” The letter of Mr. Clay was one of the lightningflashes intended to purify Whig atmosphere. These two letters, we suppose, are the thunderpeals which usually follow the electric spark. One of our Democratic friends, just from the Tenth Legion with a wagonwhip in his hand cracking it independently and carelessly, said to us as we walked together, in a very imperturbable tone, : I dought it vash donner and blitzen, but it ish nothing after all!”
We presume that Gen. Taylor had seen Mr. Clay’s letter written on the 11th April (nine days before the Baldwin or Gallaher letter,) for lightning and telegraph dispatches travel quicker than thought, and the steam in the West is hard to beat—we choose, therefore, to consider the old soldier’s first letter not so much an answer to the letter of Messrs. Baldwin and Gallaher, as a response to Mr. Clay’s letter. It comes so apropos, and is so much an answer, that, if it is not, it ought to be. Mr. Clay informed the “Public” at large and Gen. Taylor indirectly in particular, that he (Mr. Clay) would get New York, Pennsylvania and Ohio, and “that no candidate can be elected, without the concurrence of two of these three States and none could be defeated, upon whom all of them should be united.” Gen. Taylor, as plainly as a man can indirectly speak, says in his turn: “My dear Mr. Clay, I am sorry for your great desire to obtain the nomination for the Presidency, destined as you are, I fear, to a terrible disappoint. I regret to perceive your anxiety to frighten me from my propriety, but I must inform you, dear Harry, that ‘It has not been my intention, at any moment, to change my position, or to withdraw my name from the canvass, whoever may be the nominee of the National Convention, wither of the Whig or Democratic party.’” Mr. Clay assures “the Public,” and thus gives General Taylor delicately to understand “that at no former period did there exist so great a probability of my election, if I would consent to the use of my name,” and then with this great probability before him, he gives his reluctant consent. But oh the hopes, the high hopes of the effect that his letter was to have upon his dear friend Old Zac—upon him who acknowledged, in the face of day, that he would have voted for Mr. Clay at the last election against all others! And why not vote for him now, when the probability of his election is greater than at any former period? Hopes—alas, faded, blighted never to revive! General Taylor, after Mr. Clay’s own fashion, writes to Messrs. Baldwin and Gallaher in general, but indirectly to Mr. Clay in particular, and gently says,
“I do not design to withdraw my name if Mr. Clay be the nominee of the Whig National Convention, and in this connexion I beg permission to remark, that the statements which have been so positively made in some of the Northern prints to this effect, ‘that should Mr. Clay be the nominee of the Whig National Convention,’ I had stated, ‘that I would not suffer my name to be used,’ are not correct, and have no foundation in any oral or written remark of mine.” (Perfectly cool and calm!) “ I beg permission to remark to you.” My dear Harry, that notwithstanding New York, and Pennsylvania, and Ohio, are certain to vote for you, there are twentysix other States in this Union that may possibly vote for me. I beg permission also to add, that notwithstanding you have given a reluctant consent to the use of your name, and so invitingly insinuate your desire that I should withdraw, “ O shall maintain the position of independence of all parties in which the people and my own sense of duty has placed me.” Then, my friend, if you desire to retain the integrity of the Whig party, you can retire; for I am still sitting upon “Old Whitey,” surveying the battlefield, and I beg permission to inform you that it is not the first time in my life that I have seen lightning, and heard thunder. Yours to command,” &c.
But other views crowd upon us, while reading these last letters from Baton Rouge. Our friends of the Republican have seen fit to publish their new edition of the Whig Catechism, and we desire to see how all the reluctant aspirants of the Whig and “no party” parties will pass through the ordeal. How admirably the Old General stands the drill! We premise in the first place, by way of parenthensis, a single question to the Editors of the Republican; and ask, if they have given to the public the whole of their own letter to which General Taylor’s is a reply? We desire to know all the points. Their letter seems to be an extract, without the usual address, date &c., and begins rather abruptly. But thus by the way. Now, attend to the fugleman. “Will you refuse the nomination of a Whig National Convention?” To understand the evolution expected to be performed, we must remember that the Catechumen has repeatedly answered before the world, “yes, and by God’s help so I will; whether it be from a Whig Convention, or a Democratic Convention, or a Native Convention, or a spontaneous assemblage of all the people, or an unanimous meeting of every body in all creation.” Why ask the same question again? A great deal depends upon the tone of the Catechist—upon the emphasis. “Will you refuse the nomination of a WHIG Convention? [. . . ]nvention, my dear General, imbued with—(said insinuatingly,) with Whig principles; with—(said with a wink of the eye,) with Whig schemes;with—(said with a winning smile,) with a love for Whig men, and an intention to give them snug little fat Whig offices? Now, General, look like a soldier, and speak like a man.”
Answer —“If nominated by the Whig National Convention, I shall not refuse acceptance; PROVIDED I am left free of all pledges, and permitted to maintain the position of independence of all parties in which the people and my own sense of duty have placed me: OTHERWISE, I shall refuse the nomination of any Convention or Party.” I understand your winks and smiles and nods, and I know you to be “insinivating young gentlemen; but,” [said with an emphasis,] “if elected, I would endeavor to act independent of party domination. I should feel bound to administer the government untrammeled by party schemes.”
Catechist —My dear General, listen to us; we belong, you know, to the “noparty” party. ‘Tis true, we are Whigs, [and one of us was a Secretary of the late Whig Convention, and is now published to the world as a member of the Whig Central Committee of Virginia]—‘tis true, we have been as bitter as Whigs, as hot as Whigs, as can be found; but we are now no longer “ultra;” we are now sweet, gentle Whigs, and perhaps we may say, cold Whigs just now; but if we can only succeed in electing you, we will warm up again, and become “every inch a Whig.” WE do not desire you to make pledges, except one pledge. We have seen enough to satisfy us that Mr. Clay is to be a candidate, and we are afraid that you will retire—we beg you, then, to answer one other question. WE shall ask you others but they will be of no account. This one, though, we wish you to answer right up and down, outright and downright. “Do you design to withdraw if Henry Clay or any other man shall be the candidate?” Attend to the fugleman. “I do nto design to withdraw my name if Mr. Clay be the nominee of the Whig National Convention, or to withdraw my name from the canvass, whoever may be the nominee of the National Convention, wither of the Whig or Democratic party.” Answered like a man. That’s the position of a soldier. Head erect—eyes to the front—shoulders square, &c., &c.
Catechist. —But, my dear General, there are many principles we have battled for these many years; but we do not desire your opinions upon these at this moment, while at the same time it is desirable to appear to wish you to give them.—For God’s sake, however, don’t step an inch to the right or left. We will put the questions right—there is no crossexamination. All you are expected to do is answer the questions asked—but be cautious—be wary—“Have you stated that you are in favor of the Tariff of ’46, the Sub Treasury; that you originated the war, and should select your Cabinet from both parties?” We do not ask you, if you are in favor of the Tariff of ’42. We would not have you suppose, that we ask if you are in favor of any Tariff. For the sake of our party—we beg pardon—we mean of our noparty, do not say what you are in favor of. We ask, “Have you stated that you are” &c. We do not ask if you are in favor or opposed to the SubTreasury, or any treasury, or any plan for carrying on the financial operations of the government—whether you have examined whether any scheme for this purpose is in accordance with the Constitution—whether, if this particular scheme be wrong, a better can be devised—but, (again said most insinuatingly with a little nod of the head,) “Have you stated, that you are in favor of the SubTreasury?” We do not ask you—and we beg you to attend to this point, my dear General—whether the was is just or unjust—whether it could have been avoided—whether Mexico did not force it upon us—whether you advised the advance of the troops as a precautionary measure against the avowed intention of the Mexicans to reconquer and retake the whole of Texas, and whether that advance was not the cause of the war—whether you would prosecute it; if Mexico still refuses peace—whether we should not obtain some indemnity. But listen now: “Did you ever state that you”—of your own will—moved and instigated by the devil and your desire for blood and carnage, solely “originated the war?” We do not ask you, great and good General, how you will select your cabinet. We know, of course, that you will have an eye to the great Whig party. We take it for granted that, when you said you were “not an ultra Whig,” you intended to leave a large margin. Ultra, you know, means beyond, that is, way tother side, leetle beyant the Whig party. We do not wish you to go either beyant, or ahint, or fernent the Whig party, but just in the body, in the fold.—We know you will be compelled to select from one side or the other, and of course it is no use to tell us, General; but “Have you stated, that you should select your cabinet from both parties?”
Attend to the fugleman. “I have never stated to any one that I was in favor of the Tariff of ’46—of the SubTreasury; nor that I originated the war with Mexico—nor, finally, that I should (if elected) select my cabinet from both parties.” Now, my good friends, have I not toed the mark boldly? Everyone knows now my sentiments. I have expressed them upon the Tariff, the SubTreasury, and, by consequence, the Bank—upon the War and the formation of my Cabinet.”—Well may we Democrats say, after this expose, “ I tought it wash donher and blitzen—but it ish nothing after all!”
The Catechism being ended, the General adds, “Permit me, however, to add
that, should such high distinction be conferred upon me, as that is elevation
to the Executive office, the Constitution, in a strict and honest interpretation
and in the spirit and mode in which it was acted upon by our earlier Presidents,
would be my chief guide.” Now, if the General had concluded with the sentiment,
that he would act in accordance with a strict and honest interpretation
of the Constitution, that would have been true Democratic doctrine; but
when he adds “in the spirit and mode in which it was acted upon by our earlier
Presidents”—he leaves us in impenetrable fog. The earlier Presidents—General
Washington and Mr. Adams, Mr. Jefferson, and MR. Madison!—Which of these?
Mr. Adams, the embodiment of federalism and of latitudinous construction;
or Mr. Jefferson, his antipode? A little mixture of both, we suppose—lemon
and sugar—water and brandy. We have no time or space for comments on the
second (Alison) letter; but we may take up the subject at another time.
[BWP]
REv45i1p2c6, May 5, 1848, Taylorism in Virginia.
The Whig Taylor speakers in the February Whig Convention, tickled the hopes of their listeners with the bright prospect that the nomination of Gen. Taylor would open for Whiggery in Virginia. They dwelt upon the great “change” that it would inevitably effect, upon the number, of Democrats who would abandon their principles and fly to the “protection” of the Whig banner. Well, Gen. Taylor was nominated—and what is the result? Without referring particularly to the fact, that last spring the Whigs succeeded in squeezing out a small majority in the Legislature, and now that majority has been cut down, and a handsome balance piled up on the other side of the account, we would point to the result in three Senatorial Districts. Messrs. Gallaher and Bondurant were among the most active and dexterous Taylor leaders in the State, yet they were beaten; the former by 41 votes, (his district in 1844 gave Mr. Polk a majority of one,) and the latter by 53, (his district gave Mr. Clay a majority of about 100!)
[Upon this point we find the following spicy card from a bellicose friend of Henry Clay in yesterday’s Times:
COMMUNICATED. Cheering to the Friends of Henry Clay. The talented and efficient Virginia Senator, John S. Gallaher, Esq., the first man in Virginia to espouse the claims of the Whig, Democratic Native American, noparty candidate, for the office of President of the United States, has been victimized for entertaining the absurd opinion, that a noparty man could be voted for by any party; and for attempting to put upon the people of the American States, a man to manage the destinies of this great nation, who himself tells the world that he is ignorant of the Constitution of his own country. This should be a caution to some of the wouldbe great men amongst the Richmond Taylor wireworkers. Profit by it, ye no party officeseekers! CESAR]
But we have a stronger case yet—we mean the Orange Senatorial District. Three staunch Democrats were in the field, Messrs. Shackleford, Davis, and Ship—as also our worthy friend, Dr. P. Thornton, whom we cannot better describe than as an antiwar and territory, antiTariff, antiBank and antisubTreasury, DemocratWhigConservative Taylorman. The Whig and its correspondents blew their loudest blasts for the Whigs to rally upon this Taylor man, as by far the most desirable candidate for the Whigs. Note the result:
H. Shackleford—Democrat, Culpeper 588; Rappahannock 144, Greene 17; Orange 111; Madison 44. Total 904.
Thomas Davis, Democrat, greene 260; Orange 167; Rappahanock 32; Culpeper 22; Madison 276. Total—757.
W. Ship, Democrat—Madison 223; greene 53; Orange 162; Rappahannock 209; Culpeper 88; Total—735.
Dr.P. Thornton, Taylorite—Rappahannock (his own county) 115; Greene 2[!]; Orange (Gen. Taylor’s own county!) only 2[!]; Culpeper 28; Madison 14—Total 161!
In 1844, this district gave Clay 1125 votes, and now, Dr. Thornton, A
Taylor man, per se, receives only 161! Great is the strength
of Taylorism, truly! Even the Whigs (to the number of 964) refused
to vote for the candidate exclusively in favor of the nominee of the Whigs
of Virginia.” Our friend, the Doctor, is a most agreeable gentleman and
popular man; but all this could avail nothing against his Taylorism! The
facts speak for themselves.
[BWP]
REv45i1p3c1, May 5, 1848, Letter from Mexico.
HEADQUARTERS, SALTILLO, MEXICO. April 2d, 1848.
My dear friend: I have but a moment to say that I have just received an express from Ge. Price’s column, announcing the pleasing intelligence that Gen. Trias, with all his forces, has surrendered to our arms. Gen. Price entered Chihuahua on the 9th of March, and immediately gave pursuit to the enemy, whom he overtook at Santa Cruz de Rosalio, a strongly situated town some sixty miles South of Chihuahua, on the 16th. The place was invested, and after fighting all day, the plaza and church were nearly attained by burrowing through the houses, when the enemy surrendered. Our loss was one Lieutenant, two noncommissioned officers, and 12 privates—the enemy’s loss is 300 and odd killed and 72 wounded, his whole force [800,] all his artillery, [12 pieces,] 2,000 stand of arms, some 800,000 dollars worth of public property, many field officers, and General Trias at their head. Col. Ralls’ command on one side, and Col. Lane’s on the other, acted most heroically, and took the place.
My letter from Col. Ralls is dated March 22d.
I am, in haste, your, &c.,
JNO. F. HAMTRAMCK, Col. Com’g, &c.
Rob. H. Gallaher, Esq.
[BWP]
REv45i1p4c4, May 5, 1848, Thirtieth Congress—First Session.
WASHINGTON, SATURDAY, APRIL 29—P.M.
U. S. SENATE.
A message in writing was received from the President of the United States, recommending that aid and comfort should be extended to the people of the peninsula of Yucatan, by the Government of the United States.
Mr. Hannegan moved to refer the message to the committee on Foreign Relations. Mr. Calhoun addressed the Senate on the subject of the message and its reference. He regarded the aid proposed to be extended to Yucatan, as a dangerous interference on our part with the internal affairs of neighboring nations.
The sad intelligence having been communicated to the Senate, that Senator Ashley was supposed to be dying, on motion, the Senate adjourned.
[Mr. Ashley has since died, at his lodgings in this city. He had been indisposed for some time.]
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES.
The House has been engaged the entire day in discussing the message of the President, relative to affording succor to Yucatan. The message was finally referred to the committee on Foreign Relations; and the House then adjourned.
Monday, May 1, 1848. SENATE.
As soon as the Senate was called to order, the death of Mr. Ashley, Senator from Arkansas, was announced in eloquent terms by Messrs. Borland and Breese, and after the adoption of the usual resolutions for mourning and attending the funeral, which takes place tomorrow, the Senates adjourned.
In the House nothing of importance was done, except to adopt the resoltutions of the Senate in regard to the death of Mr. Ashley, which was feelingly announced by Mr. Johnson, of Arkansas, when the House adjourned.
Tuesday, May 2. SENATE.
The Senate transacted no business today—Shortly before 12 o’clock, the Committee of Arrangements and PallBearers, with the coffin containing the body of the deceased Senator Ashley, beautifully decorated with flowers, entered the Chamber, followed by the Senator and Representative of Arkansas, the widow, daughter, and personal friends of the deceased. The President and Private Secretary, with Messrs. Buchanan, Walker, and Marcy, entered immediately afterwards, and were soon followed by the members of the House of Representatives.
There were also present several officers of the army and navy, members of the corps diplomatique, and other distinguished gentlemen; but the number of spectators in the galleries and lobbies, owing to the state of the weather, was not so large as is usual when the last honors are paid at the Capitol to distinguished men of the nation.
The services commenced with an impressive and eloquent prayer by Rev. Mr. Gurley. The funeral discourse was delivered by Rev. Mr. Slicer, 1. Peter, 24th and 25th verses: “For all flesh is as grass, and all the glory of man as the flower of the grass: the grass withereth, and the flower of the grass fadeth away; but the Word of the Lord endureth forever.”
The Reverend Speaker commenced with an allusion to the fact that within the short period of eighteen months, Death had six times visited that Chamber. Heaven thus demonstrating not only the mortality of public men, but the facility with which that mortality reaches even the most elevated. The only fact stated in the course of the discourse, which has not already been published, was that the last words of Mr. Ashley, to those who surrounded his bed of death, was—“Pray for your country, and prepare to meet me in Heaven.”
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES.
The House met at 12 o’clock, and the journal was read, when the members proceeded to the Senate Chamber to attend the funeral of Mr. Ashley.
[The remains of Mr. Ashley were deposited in the receiving vault at the
Congressional Burying Ground. His remains it is understood, will not be
removed to Arkansas, and the National Cemetery will be his final resting
place.]
[BWP]
REv45i1p4c4, May 5, 1848, Later from Santa Fe.
[Telegraphed for the Baltimore Sun.] PITTSBURG, MAY 1ST, 1848.
Advices have been received at St. Louis, by an arrival from the far West, which contain accounts from El Paso to the 3d ult., and Santa Fe to a corresponding later date. General Price had finally marched for Chihuahua, with his whole disposable force, in fine order and spirits, and eager to meet the enemy, who were reported to have mustered in strong numbers, to oppose their entry into the capital of the State. At Santa Fe there were indications of another attempt at insurrection, the Mexican population daily becoming more insolent, and appearing disposed to take advantage of the absence of General Price, with his command. Precautionary measures had been taken to suppress any emeute.
Intelligence for Iowa, received at St. Louis, has settled the question
of the contested election in that State. It is ascertained from the returns,
that Harleu, Whig, has been elected Superintendent of Instruction by 76
majority, over Thomas H. Benton, Jr., the candidate of the opposite party.
This sets at rest the rumors that have been floating about in favor of
each.
[BWP]
REv45i1p4c4, May 5, 1848, Pass it Round.
‘God knows, that man does not love, never did nor never will, whom we
would prefer for the Presidency to Henry Clay, but at the same time we are
not willing to put him up again as a target at which boobies may discharge
their splatter guns at pleasure, nor are we willing to see him in a position
where he can be chatted at, and grinned at, by satyrs and monkeys.’ [Abingdon
Virginian, (Taylor Whig.)]
[BWP]
REv45i1p4c4, May 5, 1848, No title.
Here is a specimen of Whig “decency” the Democracy would do well
to consider.—Against the political course of Mr. Clay these Democratic “boobies,”
“satyrs” and “monkeys” must not open their mouths, they are not fit to vote
against him, but a the same time the editor of the Virginian is endeavoring
to cajole these “boobies,” and “satyrs” and “monkeys” into the support of
Gen. Taylor. We ask the Democrats to lay this paragraph by, and when asked
to support Gen. Taylor, show it, to prove how their intelligence is estimated.
[BWP]
REv45i1p4c5, May 5, 1848, More Taylor Letters.
We regret that our enterprising neighbors of the Republican had not brought out earlier their important missive from General Taylor; for its novelty and freshness did not last long, the Southern mail bringing, in the New Orleans Picayune and Bulletin, another (and we presume the last) letter from Old Zac to his brotherinlaw, Captain Allison, two days later. We give them out as “studies” for the ingenuity and speculations of our readers. As we cannot digest in one day two letters from the old soldier, we are induced to defer our comments. The Republican, with an air of triumph, says that the old hero’s position is now “above even the cavil of the most suspicious,” and that “those who desired General Taylor to ‘come out,’ will no longer have an opportunity for so much as a quibble.”—“Come out!” The Republican might better have said, in the language of a Whig yesterday, General T. “has knocked the Whig party into a cocked hat.” Great as was the dismay which Henry Clay’s last pronunciamento produced in the Whig camp, this double battery from Baton Rouge has excited even a more volcanic explosion among “the Whigs of Virginia.” Even some of his former zealous supporters cannot tolerate his determination to set himself above and beyond the Whig party. If his letters mean anything, they unequivocally declare that he is and will continue a candidate, in defiance of all Conventions, Whig or democratic—and he seems to take particular pains to indicate that even the great name of Henry Clay, should he be nominated, has no terrors for the: “Thunder of Buena vista,” who means to stand firmly in the field, regardless of all consequences, in defiance of all parties and politicians. Here’s truly “a pretty kettle of fish” for the great Whig party! What will they do now? Will they “disband” at once, scatter all “regular” organization to the winds, “surrender” their much praised and highly cherished Convention at the bidding of old Zac, and, as the Republican intimates, rally as “volunteers” around the independent noparty candidate? To this complexion has it come at last: the Whigs must abandon old Zac or their Convention and party organization! Truly, has he “come out,” but in a far different manner from what the Whigs had hoped for. This Taylorism will, as we predicted, prove the death of the Whig party. “Disorganization” has struck deep into its vitals and the malady must spread.
But while this single position is clear, viz—that he will be a candidate at all events, we have looked in vain to these last expositions, to ascertain what are the political sentiments of gen. Taylor. Is he for or against a Bank, Protective Tariff and SubTreasury; or does he believe them to be “obsolete”? Does he or not advocate the justice of the war, or territorial indemnity? We challenge any one to point to any passages in his two letters which shed any light on these questions. True, he thinks that they should be left to the omnipotence of Congress; but he does not tell us what his own opinions are, or what policy the interest of the country should pursue. He is willing to be President, and register the edicts of congress, scrupulously taking care to have no opinions of his own, save that he believes in the policy of the “earlier Presidents”—not, however, informing us whether he refers to Adams or Jefferson, whose principles were directly antagonistic.
But we had no idea of saying so much at present, but simply to call attention to the two letters. We shall resume our comments at some length. In the mean time we wish the Whigs joy of their independent, noparty candidate.
[From the Richmond Republican, May 2]
Annexed is the answer of Gen. Taylor to a letter from us, propounding the following inquiries:
“It has been stated in some of the papers in a most positive manner, that you have said, if Henry Clay be the nominee of the Whig National Convention, you will not suffer your name to be used a candidate.
“It has been also stated, lately, that, in recent conversations, you have declared that you are in favor of the Tariff of ’46, of the Subtreasury, of the war—that in fact the responsibility of the war belongs to you—also, that, if elected President, you will choose your Cabinet from both parties.
“W respectfully solicit an answer to the following questions:
“1. Will you refuse the nomination of a Whig National Convention?
“2. Do you design to withdraw if Henry Clay or any other man shall be the candidate?
“3. Have you stated that you are in favor of the Tariff of ’46, the SubTreasury, that you originated the war, and should select your Cabinet from both parties?”
The following is Gen. Taylor’s reply:
BATON ROUGE, LA., April 20, 1848.
Dear Sir: Your letter of the 10th instant, which alludes to certain statements that have recently been made in some of the papers at the North, and which submits several inquiries for my consideration, has been received.
To your inquiries I have respectfully to reply:
First —That if nominated by the Whig National Convention, I shall not refuse acceptance, provided I am left free of all pledges, and permitted to maintain the position of independence of all parties in which the people and my own sense of duty have placed me—otherwise I shall refuse the nomination of any convention or party.
Secondly —I do not design to withdraw my name if Mr. Clay be the nominee of the Whig National Convention—and, in this connexion, I beg permission to remark that the statements which have been so positively made in some of the Northern prints, to the effect "that should Mr. Clay be the nominee of the Whig National Convention, "I had stated" that I would not suffer my name to be used, "are not correct, and have no foundation in any oral or written remark of mine. It has not been my intention, at any moment, to change my position—or to withdraw my name form the canvass, whoever may be the nominee of the National Convention, either of the Whig or Democratic party.
Thirdly —I have never stated to any one that I was in favor of the Tariff of ’46—of the SubTreasury, nor that I originated the war with Mexico. Nor, finally, that I should (if elected) select my cabinet from both parties. No such admissions or statements were made by me, at any time, to any person.
Permit me, however, to add that should such high distinction be conferred upon me as that of elevation to the Executive Office, the Constitution, in a strict and honest interpretation, and in the spirit and mode in which it was acted upon by our earlier Presidents, would be my chief guide. In this, I conceive to be all that is necessary in the way of pledges.
The election of another candidate would occasion mortification to me, but to such a result, as the will of the people, I should willingly and calmly submit. As I have had no ambition to serve, but in the desire to serve the country, it would bring to me no disappointment. With sentiments of high respect and regard, I remain, Your most ob’t servant, Z. TAYLOR.
[To] O. P. Baldwin, Esq., or Ro. H. Gallaher, Esq., Editors of Richmond Republican, Richmond Virginia. [From the New Orleans Picayune.] BATON ROUGE. April 22, 1848.
Dear Sir—My opinions have recently been so often misconceived and misrepresented, that I deem it due to myself, if not to my friends, to make a brief exposition of them upon the topics to which you have called my attention.
I have consented to the use of my name as a candidate for the Presidency. I have frankly avowed my own distrust of my fitness for that high station; but having, at the solicitation of many of my countrymen, taken my position as a candidate, I do not feel at liberty to surrender that position until my friends manifest a wish that I should retire from it. I will then most gladly do so. I have no private purposes to accomplish, no party projects to build up, no enemies to punish—nothing to serve but my country.
I have been very often addressed by letter, and my opinions have been asked upon almost every question that might occur to the writers as affecting the interests of their country or their party.—I have not always responded to these inquiries, for various reasons.
I confess, whilst I have great cardinal principles which will regulate my political life, I am not sufficiently familiar with all the minute details of political legislation, to give solemn pledges to exert my influence, if I were President, to carry out this or defeat that measure. I have no concealment, I hold no opinion which I would not readily proclaim to my assembled countrymen; but crude impressions upon matters of policy, which may be right today and wrong tomorrow, are, perhaps, not the best test of fitness for office. One who cannot be trusted without pledges cannot be confided in merely on account of them.
I will proceed, however, now to respond to your inquiries.
First. —I reiterate what I have often said—I am a Whig, but not an ultra Whig. If elected, I would not be the mere President of a party. I would endeavor to act independent of party domination. I should feel bound to administer the Government, untrammeled by party schemes.
Second. —The veto power. The power given by the constitution to the Executive to interpose his veto is a high conservative power; but, in my opinion, should never be except in cases of clear violation of the constitution, or manifest haste and want of consideration by Congress. Indeed, I have thought that, for many years past, the known opinions and wishes of the Executive have exercised undue and injurious influence upon the legislative department of the Government; and for this cause I have thought our system wa sin danger of undergoing a great change from its true theory. The Personal opinions of the individual, who may happen to occupy the Executive chair, ought not to control the action of Congress upon questions of domestic policy; nor ought his objections to be interposed where questions of constitutional power have been settled by the various departments of Government, and acquiesced by the people.
Third. —Upon the subject of the tariff, the currency, the improvement of our great highways, rivers, lakes and harbors, the will of the people, as expressed through their Representatives in Congress, ought to be respected and carried out by the Executive.
Fourth.— The Mexican war. I sincerely rejoice at the prospect of peace. My life has been devoted to arms, yet I look upon war at all times and under all circumstances as a national calamity, to be avoided if compatible with national honor. The principles of our Governemnt as well as its true policy are opposed to the subjugation of other nations and the dismemberment of other countries by conquest. In the language of the great Washington, ”Why should we quit our own to stand on foreign ground?” In the Mexican war our national honor has been vindicated, amply vindicated, and in dictating terms of peace we may well afford to be forbearing and even magnanimous to our fallen foe.
These are my opinions upon the subjects referred to by you; and any reports or publications, written or verbal, from any source, differing in any essential particular from what is here written, are unauthorized and untrue.
I do not know that I shall again write upon the subject of national politics. I shall engage in no schemes, no combinations, no intrigues. If the American people have not confidence in me they ought not to give me their suffrages. If they do not, you know me well enough to believe me when I declare I shall be content. I am too old a soldier to murmur against such high authority.
Z. TAYLOR.
To Capt. J. S. Alison.
[BWP]
REv45i2p1c1, May 9, 1848, Mr. Marcy’s Reply to Gen. Scott. [Concluded.]
My reply to your accusations forces me to expose some of your misstatements of fact. You allege that the expedition, for the want of the “ten vessels,” was delayed from the 15 th of January to the 9th of March. You certainly mean to be understood, that, on the 15th of January, you troops were ready to embark, and were delayed for want of these transports. Bu this was not so; and I am indebted to you for most abundant proof to establish your inaccuracy. The great body of your troops for the expedition was drawn from Gen. Taylor’s command at Monterey and in the interior of Mexico; and no part of them had reached either the Brazos or Tampico—the points of embarkation—on the 15th of January. In your letter of the 12th of that month, to General Brooke, at New Orleans, you said: “I have now to state that it is probable the troops I have called for from Gen. Taylor’s immediate command to embark here (the Brazos) and at Tampico, will not reach those points till late in the present month, (January,) say about the 25th.” In a letter to me of the 26th of January, you remark that Gen. Butler responded to your call for the troops with the utmost promptitude, and that Gen. Worth made an admirable movement.—“The head of his division arrived with him a the mouth of the Rio Grande the day before yesterday” (24th January.) When the remainder came up is not stated; yet one of your “naked historical facts” places the whole command at the points of embarkation waiting for the “ten vessels” at least nine days before the actual arrival of any part of them. But if they had been there, why should they have been detained for these vessels? In the same letter—written but two days after the arrival of the head of the first division, and probably before the other troops had come up—you say that “the Quartermaster, (Brevet major General Jesup, at New Orleans,) I find, has taken all proper measures with judgment and promptitude to provide everything depending on his departemetn for the dispatch and success of my expedition.” If more was wanted, cumulative proof might be drawn from the same source—your own correspondence—to show not only that this charge against me has no foundation in truth, but that you can have no apology for having preferred it.
After showing how unfortunate you have been in your specific charges, I may with propriety meet those of a general and sweeping character with a less particular detail of proofs to show their groundlessness.
Though the “ten vessels” were not, for the very sufficient reasons I have assigned, sent out in ballast from the Atlantic cities; yet a very large number were sent thence with stores, supplies, and troops, to cooperate in the expedition.
In Genera[l] Jesup’s letter to me of the 17th instant, a copy of which is sent herewith, he states that fiftythree ships, barques, brigs, and schooners, were sent from the north, and the department actually furnished at New Orleans, Brazos, and Tampico, for the army, before it took up the line of March into the interior, one hundred and sixtythree vessels.
I have alluded to the large number of surf boats, and the great difficulty of procuring them, as the cause of the delay in their arrival. I have also a similar reason to offer in reply to your complaint for not having seasonable received the siege train and ordnance supplies. The delay is to be ascribed to the enormously large outfit you required. If it was necessary, and dispatch was used in procuring it, no one is in fault. If too large, you certainly should not regard as a reprehensible delay the time necessarily taken up in preparing it. To show that it was large, and required much time to procure it, I will select from many a single item. You demanded from eighty to one hundred thousand teninch shells, and forty or fifty mortars of like caliber. This enormous quantity of shells—about four thousand tons—was mostly to be manufactured after you left Washington. All the furnaces in the country, willing to engage in the business, were set to work; but, with the utmost diligence and dispatch, the supply of this one article, or even twothirds of it, having to
Be manufactured and transported to the seaboard from the furnaces, (located in most instances in the interior of the country) at a season of the year when water communications were obstructed by ice, could not be ready to be sent forward to you in many months after your departure from Washington. Had your requisions been moderate—and undoubtedly more moderate ones would have sufficed—they could have been furnished at a much earlier period.
The memorandum which you left “for the siege train and ammunition therefore,” was submitted to me by the Ordnance Department, on the 26th of November, with an intimation that it could not be complied with in season for the expedition to go forward as early as you had contemplated. I endorsed upon it, "comply with the above as far as practicable;" and this order, I am satisfied, after full examination, was faithfully executed.
What could be done at Washington, was promptly done. You had with you the Quartermaster General, with all the means at the command of the War Department, and with unrestricted authority to do whatever you might require. He was under your supervision, and subject to your orders, able and willing to execute them. You have never intimated that he, in any respect, failed in his duty; but on the contrary, you have spoken in highly commendatory terms of his efficient services.
I have already quoted your acknowledgment that he had taken all proper measures with judgment and promptitude to provide everything depending on his department for the dispatch and success of your expedition. In an issue of fact between you and the head of the War Department, his testimony, next to you r won confession, is the best that can be offered to correct your misstatements and to refute your charges.
In his letter to me of the 2d January, 1847, he says: “Gen. Scott left for the interior on the 29th ult., and I am taking active measures to have everything depending upon me ready for his operations. The quartermaster’s department, I find, is called upon to do a great deal that should be done by other branches of the staff. So far as Gen. Scott’s operations go, I shall have everything done that is necessary, whether it belongs to my department or to other departments to do it.”
You had with you, and subject to your orders, not only the Quartermaster General, but officers of the other staff departments. They did not look to the War Department, but to yourself, for directions; and it was your duty, and not mine, to see that your requirements were complied with. That they were so, to the utmost practicable extent, I have no reason to doubt; but if they were not, the fault, if any, is not with the War Department. You also gave the instructions in relation to providing the means of land transportation, and the officers charges with that duty were under your immediate control; and if there is blame anywhere for any deficiency in this respect, it cannot be imputed to the War Department.—Your whole correspondence with me, and the staff officers with you, shows that you very properly took upon yourself the whole charge of giving directions in this matter. Ina letter to Captain Hetzel, senior quartermaster a the Brazos, speaking on this subject of the land transportation which may be needed after the descent on the enemy’s coast near Vera Cruz, you say: “I have already discussed and arranged with you the detail of the early land transportation train,: &c. On the 19th of March, you furnished General Jesup with your estimates and directions on this subject. The staff officers being with you, and under your orders, nothing further was, or properly could be, required or expected to emanate form Washington, beyond the supply of funds; and, this being done, if you were disappointed in not realizing your expectations, you have not a colorable pretense for imputing blame to “the head of the War Department.”
As a just ground of complaint, and a matter of accusation, you refer to your deficiency of means to make the descent, and to capture the city of Vera Cruz and the castle of San Juan d’Ulloa, and assume that the extent of that deficiency was the difference between what you received and what you required. It would be quite as correct reasoning to say, that what you had having proved sufficient for the purpose, that difference showed the extent of the errors in your estimate. The truth lies, perhaps, between the two extremes,You had less, probably, then you should have had, and you required much more than was necessary. That you did not have more, and, indeed, all you asked for, I have already shown was not the fault of the war Department.
Gen. Jesup was with you at Vera Cruz, saw your means, and is capable of forming an estimate of their sufficiency. He is, as his letter herewith shows, disposed to be just, and even generous to your fame. To his opinion on the subject, no wellfounded exception can be taken. He says, in reference to your complaints on account of a deficient supply of surfboats, siege train and ordnance stores: “The result shows that he (General Scott) had surfboats and stores enough!”—And of the delay of which you complain, he fully exonerated the War Department, and ascribes the whole to yourself, and to unavoidable accidents. The imputation that you were designedly crippled in your means, is a charge as preposterous as it is unfounded.
I am aware that the execution of some of the many arrangements for the Vera Cruz expedition was obstructed and delayed by accidents, but they were such as common sagacity could not foresee, or human agency control. They were not, however, more than a considerate mind, bringing into view all the vast difficulties of the case, would have expected. When your complaints on this subject were first received here, evincing, as they did, that you intended to hold the department responsible for every untoward event, the heads of the several bureaus were called on by me to show how they had executed the duties which had been confided to them, particularly in regard to matters referred to by you. The evidence they presented of having done all that was required, or could have been expected, convinced me—and I venture to say that on a full examination, it will satisfy any mind open to conviction—that all your complaints, so far as they imputed blame to the War Department, or any of its branches, are unfounded. It will do much more—it will show that great industry, promptness, uncommon capacity, and extraordinary exertions, in relation to everything connected with the war, have characterized the action of each of these subordinate departments. As a commendation justly merited by these several branches of the department, assailed as they are indirectly by you, I see no good reason for withholding my opinion, that an instance cannot be found where so much has been done, and well done, in so short a time, by any similar body of officers under similar circumstances.
As you have, by implication, laid a heavy hand upon the bureau which is charged with the onerous duties of executing the laws and orders for raising and sending forward the recruits and levies, I feel bound to affirm that you have done to that branch of the public service the greatest in justice. No industry has been spared—no possible omitted—to raise the forces which were authorized, and to send them to their destination within the briefest practicable period.—The numerous orders issued from the Adjutant General’s office, and its voluminous correspondence on that subject, will sustain this assertion.
You have pressed with unwonted zeal the charge in relation to diverting the detachments of the new regiments under Gen. Cadwalader’s command to the Brazos, and have indulged in the wildest speculations as to the sad consequences which attended this imputed error. Assuming that my orders diverted these troops, or any others,[an assertion which I shall controvert hereafter,] the circumstances justifies the measure. The critical condition of gen. Taylor, according to all received here at that time, is stated in my letter to you of the 22d of March. To show that the department acted properly, though it incurred your reproof, it is necessary to recall the facts as they then appeared here. They are presented in the following extracts from that letter:
“The information which has just reached us in the shape of rumors, as to the situation of gen. Taylor, and the forces under his command, has excited the most painful apprehensions for their safety. It is almost certain that Santa Anna has precipitated the large army he had collected at San Luis de Potosi upon Gen. Taylor; and it may be that the General has not been able to maintain the advanced position he had seen fit to take at Agua Nueva, but had been obliged to fall back on Monterey. It is equally certain that a Mexican force had been interposed between Monterey and the Rio Grande, and that it had interrupted the line of communication between the two places, and seized large supplies which were on the way to Gen. Taylor’s army.
“If the hostile force between the Rio Grande and General Taylor’s army is as large as report represents it, our troops now on that river may not be able to reestablish the line, nor will it, perhaps, be possible to place a force there sufficient for the purpose, in time to prevent disastrous consequences to our army, unless aid can be afforded from the troops under your immediate command.
“From one to two thousand of the new recruits for the ten regiments, for this quarter, will be on the way to the Brazos, in the course of three or four days. All the other forces will be directed to that point, and every effort made to relieve General Taylor from his critical situation. You will have been fully apprized before this can reach you of the condition of things in the valley of the Rio Grande, and at the Headquarters of General Taylor, and have taken, I trust, such measures as the importance of the subject requires. I need not urge upon you the fatal consequences which would result from any serious disaster which might befall the army under Gen. Taylor, nor do I doubt that you will do what is in your power to avert such a calamity.”
The course pursued by the War Department on that occasion, which you convert into a charge, must, on revision, I think, commend itself to general approbation. Had it been indifferent to the alarming condition of General Taylor’s army, and forborne to use, a the earliest moment, the most energetic measures, to guard against the fatal consequences of its defeat, then too probable, it would have deserved an arraignment as severe as that which you have made against it for having done its duty in that critical emergency. When you first received the reasons assigned for the course adopted here, they appear to have been satisfactory. In your dispatch on the 28th of April, you say: “Yesterday I learned, by your letter of the 22d, and the Adjutant General’s of the 26th ult., that all the recruits of the regiments—some 3,000—raised or likely to be raised in time for this army, have been ordered to the Rio Grande.” You did not then intimate the slightest dissatisfaction—not even a premonitory symptom of that deep distress with which, instantly on Mr. Trist’s arrival in Mexico, you represent yourself to have been seized. It is a coincidence not unworthy of notice, that the letter containing your first commendatory remark on this subject was written on the day of the date of Mr. Trist’s first note to you, and only the day before your captious reply to it; and in both you assail the War Department. Your withering disappointments seem to have slumbered for ten days, and then to have been aroused by the appearance of Mr. Trist in Mexico, and your quarrel with him. If the order from the War Department had in fact “diverted” the forces with general Cadwalader, still it was fully justified by the threatening aspect of affairs on the Rio Grande; but I am quite sure it did not divert them. No previous order form the department had designated any other place of rendezvous than the Brazos for the troops that were to join your column. It was well understood, before you left Washington, that all the troops for both armies were to be sent to that place, and there to fall under your command.
This arrangement was not, nor was it expected that it would be here changed, until you had penetrated so far into the enemy’s country as to render your communications with that place of general rendezvous difficult and dilatory.
You also complain that the order was not countermanded. If there had been such an order and it had been countermanded, what would have been the consequences? The troops would have gone forward from the Untied States under the former orders of the department, which would have taken them to the same place.
You allege that “the news of the victory of Buena Vista reached Washington in time to countermand Cadwalader’s orders for the Rio Grande before his departure from N. Orleans.” I notice this specification of neglect of my duty, to show the extent to which you have carried your faultfinding, and the industry with which you have searched for occasions to indulge it.
Your assumption is, that the news of the victory of Buena Vista should have satisfied the War Department that Cadwalader’s forces were not needed on the Rio Grande; and the omission to countermand, as soon as that news was received, the orders to send them there, was a neglect deserving severe animadversion. How did you act under similar circumstances? With better means of information as to the actual condition of the Rio Grande frontier, after the victory of Buena vista, you did not deem it prudent, after being fortyone days in possession of the news of that victory, to issue positive orders to remove a single man from that frontier; yet you venture to censure me for not having sent the troops away the moment the news reached Washington.
You received information of that victory on or before the 14th of March, for on that day you proclaimed it in orders to your army. On the 25th of April, more than forty days thereafter, you issued an order to the commanding officer at the Brazos to embark for Vera Cruz “such detachments of the new regiments as may have been ordered by the War Department to Point Isabel;” but you made it conditional with reference to the safety of the line of the Rio Grande; and said to that officer, that you relied upon his “sound judgment to determine on the spot whether that line would not be too much exposed by the withdrawal of the troops in question.”—Thus it appears that you do not hesitate to impute neglect of duty to me, for not having adopted and acted on the conclusion of that the line of the Rio Grande was safe the moment I heard of the victory of Buena Vista; but, when acting on the same subject, you dared not adopt that conclusion, although you had been in possession of the same information fortyone days. Your own conduct in this matter completely refutes this charge of yours against the War department.—It does more: it shows how rash and inconsiderate you have been in selecting topics for attack.
But the most serious consequences are attributed to the long delay of these troops at the Brazos. For your sake, I sincerely hope these consequences are much exaggerated, because I am quite confident it will be shown that you alone are responsible for the delay. The War Department did not—and it was proper that it should not—issue any order in regard to the movement of these troops after their arrival in Mexico.—The order from the department of 30th of April, making a division of the new levies between the two columns, does not contradict this assertion, for these levies were then mostly within the United States; only portions of them had then reached Mexico. Until this order took affect, the troops at the Brazos, and, indeed, on the Rio Grande and with General Taylor, were under your entire and unrestricted command. As to this matter, you were under no misapprehension; for, on the 25th of April, before you were informed what had been done here to secure the Rio Grande line, you issued an order in relation to the troops at the Brazos. This place, you well knew, was the general rendezvous of the new levies from the United States, and before you sailed on your expedition to Vera Cruz you were notified that the Mexican army were advancing upon General Taylor. To have assumed that you had not left at the Brazos, with a view to meet any probable contingency, orders for the proper disposition of the troops which were, or might have been sent there, would have implied an opinion that you wanted suitable qualifications for the high station which had been assigned to you.
These troops were a part of your command, and subject to your orders; and if they remained one day at the Brazos after it was there known that they were not needed on the Rio Grande line, and would be serviceable with your column, the fault was entirely your own, and in nowise imputable to the War Department. If your opinion be not extravagant—and you say it is not—that but for the diversion of General Cadwalader’s forces from you, and the “much precious time” lost at the Brazos, you “might easily have taken this city [Mexico] in the month of June, and at onefifth of the loss sustained in August and September,” you have indeed a most fearful account to settle with your country.
I cannot, however, regard your speculative opinions on this subject as fanciful and wild.—You greatly overestimate the force which landed at the Brazos and subsequently joined you.—from the best calculation which can be made from data in the Adjutant General’s office, the number was much less than you imagine, and did not probably exceed one thousand. As the refutation of your charge against the department for diverting these troops is in nowise impaired by the number, be it more or less, it is not important to inquire into that matter. But there is a question of serious import, to which I think the country will expect you to answer.
If these new levies, which had just entered the service, would have enabled you to capture the city of Mexico in June, with a comparative small loss, why did you, at the very time you discovered that they were so much needed, and would have been so useful, send away from your army three times as many volunteers, who had been many months in service, and were, as you acknowledge, “respectable in discipline and efficiency,” and who had distinguished themselves at Vera Cruz and Cerro Gordo, and, in the hour of peril, had fought by the side of your veteran troops, and merited an honorable share in the glory of those memorable conflicts? The period of their engagement had not expired. When thus sent away, but one of the seven regiments had less than thirty, and most of them had more than fortyfive days to serve. According to your own opinion, concurred in by the department, they could have been legally retained on your line of operations till the last hour of their engagement. If not deemed expedient to take them on towards Mexico with you, their services, at that critical period, would have been of inestimable value in holding the post at . . . [illegible] and so unexpectedly abandoned—and in keeping open the communication between Vera Cruz and your headquarters, whereby supplies, munitions and recruits could be safely and expeditiously forwarded to you. Had this been done, you would have been spared the trouble of inditing many items of grievance and complaints against the War Department for having failed to furnish them. If you had retained the twelve months’ volunteers until the end of their agreement—and no sufficient reason has yet been shown for their premature discharge—you might, for a season at least, have received, without much obstruction, supplies from the main depot on the Gulf; the army might have been strengthened by reinforcements at an earlier period; and many of the revolting scenes of barbarity on the road from Vera Cruz to Jalap, in which so many lives of our fellowcitizens have been sacrificed by the ruthless guerilleros, would not have occurred.
Another and still more lamentable calamity is, I think, fairly to be ascribed to the early obstruction of this important line of communication. The brave and patriotic men who were hurried on to Mexico, in small detachments, in order to reinforce your army, were unexpectedly, but necessarily, detained at Vera Cruz until the numbers there collected there were sufficient to force their way through the strong guerilla bands which held the difficult passes on the Jalapa road.—While thus detained on this inhospitable coast, in the sickly season, they were exposed to the attacks of a wasting pestilence, more formidable, and, as it unfortunately proved, more destructive, than the Mexican army.
When the unwelcome news of the premature discharge of this large body of volunteers was received here, unaccompanied by any explanation to show the necessity of the act, it excited very general surprise and regret. Its consequences were at one foreseen; but the step had been taken, and could not be retraced. It was loudly condemned. Many did not believe that a measure which appeared to be so unwise and so injurious to the operations of the army, could have emanated from yourself; but they were less charitable toward the President and Secretary of War. Both were denounced for what you had done; they were unscrupulously charged with weakness and incapacity; with being actuated by hostility to you, and a desire to secure popularity with the volunteers. Nor were these bitter assaults intermitted, until it began to be suspected that they were misdirected.
If you really regarded, on the 6th of May, the augmentation of your forces as being of such vital importance, it is almost as difficult to account for the course taken to reengage the volunteers, as for their premature discharge. I am misled by information, on which I ought to rely, if many of these volunteers would not have continued in service, if proper measures had been taken at Jalapa, while they were indulging the hope of participating in further triumphs, and of being among those who would enjoy the enviable distinction of first entering as victors the proud capital of the Mexican republic. Thought eh subject was there presented to their consideration, no vigorous efforts seem to have been made—no attempt to form new companies—or to muster them into service, until this powerful inducement was weakened or withdrawn—until they had been detached from a victorious army, as if no longer deemed worthy to be a part of it—sent sixty mile toward their homes into a pestilential region, and there brought within the sympathetic influence of the sentiments which it was natural that many should feel and manifest at the moment of embarking to return to their families and friends. Considering the manner in which the President’s order on this subject was attempted to be executed, it is not strange that, among more than three thousand patriotic volunteers, sent away by your order of the 4th of May, only about “fifty individuals” were found willing to reengage.
You seem to have suddenly conceived the notion of converting the army, “like Cortez,” “into a self sustaining machine;” and, to make the resemblance between yourself and the Spanish hero more complete, you indulged a dream of fancy, until you seem to have adopted it as a matter of belief, that you were “doomed at Washington;” and you became, “like him, always afraid that the next ship or messenger might recall or further cripple you.” It should not be forgotten, that the design of this unaccountable military movement was first communicated to Mr. Trist, before you had given any intimation of it to your government, and while under the perturbation which his unwelcome presence in Mexico had produced. Had you confided this extraordinary plan of a campaign to him after the “happy change” in your relations—after you had digested his “farrago of insolence, conceit, and arrogance”—and after he, too, mistaking notoriety for fame, had sought to win it by disobeying the orders of his government, defying its authority, and assailing its conduct—this distinguishing mark of your confidence in him would have caused much less surprise. This novel conception, so suddenly adopted, was as suddenly carried out; your army was, indeed, converted “into a self sustaining machine;” you discharged the twelve months’ volunteers, and broke up your posts at Jalapa, and on the way to your main depot, “resolved,” as you announced, “no longer to depend on Vera Cruz or home”—you put yourself beyond the reach of the supplies which had been provided by the government, and rendered yourself, in a great measure, inaccessible to the recruits and levies (except in strong parties) which had been raised to augment your command. In this way, you rendered unavailing, for a time at least, all that had been or could be done by the assiduous and incessant labors of the War Department in all its branches; and then you recklessly put forth the groundless complaint of “a total want of support and sympathy” from it.
Your letter of the 25th of July, which was not received at Washington until the 30th of Dec’r last, abounds with complaints against the department, and refers in strong terms to the wants and sufferings of the army at that time. Before you ventured to make its then destitute condition a ground of charge against the War Department, you ought to have recollected that these afflictions fell upon it in the midst of your experiment of making it “a self sustaining machine”—and were the legitimate fruits of that experiment. These sufferings came upon it before your estimated period of isolation from “Vera Cruz and home” had necessarily abandoned both, and entered upon your selfsustaining position, “cut off from all supplies and reinforcements from home, until perhaps in late November,” by what pretense of justice do you complain of the War Department for the distresses you thus voluntarily inflicted upon yourself and the gallant army under your command? Something very different from censure and reproof is due for the extraordinary efforts which were successfully made to reach you with recruits and supplies in your sequestered situation, and to rescue you from the embarrassments in which your ill judged measures had involved you. I have brought into view this unaccountable movement of yours, with no purpose to make any comment upon it as a military measure, but solely to show that the evils resulting from it are not just grounds of accusation against the War Department, and that the labored attempt to pervert them to such a purpose discloses the manner and spirit with which you have executed the assumed task of its accuser.
As you have indulged in the widest range of speculation in regard to the alleged sinister motives and covert designs of others, I feel less reluctant to present my views as to the main object of your last communication. Throughout the whole of it, and particularly in the concluding part, you manifest the most solicitude to place yourself in the position of an injured and persecuted man. With all the aid you can derive from dextrous strategy, you will be likely to fail in your attempt, unless you can have the full benefit of your high coloring of some facts, and your forgetfulness of others, together with all your fanciful conjectures and surmises. Your recall is, you assert, the long suspended “blow of power,” which you had the sagacity clearly to predict. It is somewhat remarkable that your predictions preceded the events which you imagine provoked that blow. As early as the 25th of July, soon after the “happy change in my (your) relations, both official and private, with Mr. Trist,” you looked, you say, “to be dismissed from the service of my (your) country.” If your recall can be regarded as a dismissal, you are entitled to all the credit of the fulfillment of your own early prediction.
In presenting in its true light the President’s compliance with your own request to be recalled, which you now denominate your dismissal, I may be obliged to strip it of the embellishments you have ingeniously thrown around it; though in doing this, you may be deprived of much upon which you depend to sustain your claim to be considered a persecuted man.
As early as June, you begged to be recalled.—You allege that this application was “rebukingly declined.” This is not saying the exact thing.—The reply to your request was, “that it would be decided with . . . [illegible] . . . proper in his [the President’s] opinion to withdraw you from your present command, his determination to do so will be made known to you.” This was not a denial, but a suspension of present action, accompanied with an assurance of future action on the subject. Your request was still pending; a regard to the public good then stood in the way of the immediate gratification of your wishes; but the President promised to act definitely on the question when that obstacle should be removed. Judging from the state of things at the headquarters of the army in January, he concluded that it was removed, and that he ought no longer to require of you reluctant service as commanding general. This certainly cannot be called persecution or punishment. I do not deem it proper to comment on the state of things at the headquarters of the army, to which illusion is made in the letter granting your request; nor to express an opinion as to the share of responsibility therefor, which rests upon yourself or others; that matter is, to a considerable extent, involved in the investigations before the court of inquiry, now sitting in Mexico. Your request to be recalled, thus ultimately granted, was prefaced with imaginary complaints, which could not be passed without notice, nor noticed without exposing their groundlessness. If the exposition has given offence, you can blame only yourself for introducing complaints so entirely unfounded.
The crowning outrage, as you regard it, is the simple fact that you, and “the three arrested officers,” “are all to be placed together before the same court—the innocent and the guilty—the accuser and the accused; the judge and his prisoners are dealt with alike.” “Most impartial justice!” you exclaim. And why is it not impartial justice? On what ground of right can you claim to have your case discriminated from theirs? It is true, you have assumed to be their judge, and have pronounced them guilty; and complain and repine that the laws of the country do not allow you, their accuser, to institute a court to register your decree. But you are not their rightful judge, although they were your prisoners. Before that court you all stand on the same level, and all have equal rights. Though you may have the same selfsatisfying conviction that you are innocent and they are guilty, the government could act upon no such presumption. By becoming an accuser, you did not place yourself beyond the reach of being accused; and unless you are clothed with the immunity of despotic power, and can claim the benefit of the maxim “that the King can do no wrong,” I know not why your conduct, when made the subject of charges, may not be investigated by a court of inquiry; nor can I perceive what other or better right you have to complain of and arraign the government, than the other officers whom you have accused, and whose cases, with yours, were referred to the same court. If yours is a hard case, theirs is not less so. If you can rightfully complain of persecution by the government, so can they, with equal justice, and an equal claim to public sympathy.
The charges against you did not emanate from the government, nor did they relate to a matter in which it could feel any peculiar interest. Not believing it impossible for you to do wrong, or that you were exempt from all responsibility for whatever you might have done, the government deemed it proper, when charges were preferred against you, coming from a source entitled to respect, to cause them to be investigated. As the usual and mildest mode of proceeding, they were referred to a court of inquiry. Until you can show that you enjoy the transcendental privilege to have your official conduct exempt from all examination in any form whatever, you have no cause to complain of the course taken in regard to the charges against you.
If your extraordinary pretensions are to derive any support form your distinguished services in the field, you ought to be mindful that the three accused officers put under arrest by you have like claims for distinguished services. In the pages of impartial history, their names and their gallant deeds must appear with yours; and no monopolizing claims, seeking “malignant exclusions” at the expense of the “truth of history,” will be permitted to rob them of their fair share of the glory won by our gallant arm while under your command.
With your assault upon the character of your “erratic brother,” I shall not intermeddle; but I must repel your charge, that he has been favored for being a political deserter "to the true faith"—for signalizing his apostacy by acceptable denunciations of one “to whom he had ‘formerly’ professed [and not without cause] the highest obligations. The reasons for not sending your charges against Brevet Major General Worth to the court of inquiry, are set forth in my letter of the 13th of January. I regret that they are so entirely unsatisfactory to you, but am consoled with the assurance that they are in other quarters more favorably received. The errors of your commentary on my letter have arisen from your misapprehension of the text. The principles there laid down is of vital importance to subordinate officers, and in no respect impairs the rights or the authority of those in chief command. As the principles which you arraign are the creations of your own fancy, and have no countenance or support from my letter, I am in no way implicated by “the fatal consequences” you deduce from them. Whether legitimate or fanciful, they do not disturb the positions laid down in my letter.
I cannot, however, but regard your solicitude for the support of discipline to be more ostentatious than profound. When a general at the head of an army of freemen, who do not lose their rights as citizens by becoming soldiers, sets up pretensions to dictatorial power—when he condemns the authority of his government, and is much more ready to censure than to execute its orders and instructions—when he denounces as an outrage and a punishment the attempt to submit his acts, charged to be an offence against a subordinate officer, to an investigation in the mildest form—when he administers an indignant reproof to his superior, for upholding the sacred right to appeal, upon which the security and protection of all under his command,such a general sets an example of insubordinate conduct of wide and withering influence upon sound military discipline.
By extending my comments upon your letter, I might multiply proofs to show that your accusations against the head of the war Department are unjust; that your complaints air unfounded; that the designs imputed by you to the government to embarrass your operations, impair your rightful authority as commander, and to offer outrage and insult to your feelings, are all the mere creations of a distempered fancy; but to do more than I have done, would, in my judgment, be a work of supererogation.
In conclusion, I may be permitted to sat, that, as one of the President’s advisers, I had a full share in the responsibility of the act which assigned you to the command of our armies in Mexico. I felt interested , even more than naturally appertained to my official position, that success and glory should signalize your operations. It was my duty to bring to your aid the efficient cooperation of the War Department, I never had a feeling that did not harmonize with the full and fair discharge of this duty. I know it has been faithfully performed. There are some men for whom enough cannot be done to make them grateful or even just, unless acts of subserviency and personal devotedness are superadded. From you I expected bare justice, but have been disappointed.—I have found you my accuser. In my vindication, I have endeavored to maintain a defensive line; and if I have gone beyond it at any time, it has been done to repel unprovoked aggression.—To your fame I have endeavored to be just. I have been gratified with the many occasions I have had to bear public testimony to your abilities and signal services as a military commander in the field. It had been, and, under any change in our personal relations, it will continue to be, my purpose to be liberal in my appreciation of your distinguished military merits. In respect to your errors and your faults, though I could not be blind, I regret that you have not permitted me to be silent.
I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your obedient
servant,
W. L. MARCY, Secretary of War.
Major General Winfield Scott,
U.S. army, Mexico
[BWP]
REv45i2p1c5, May 9, 1848, Quartermaster General’s Office, Washington City, February 18, 1848.
SIR: In reply to the complaint of General Scott, in his despatch of the 25th of December, that Lieutenant Colonel Johnson’s train had returned without one blanket, coat, jacket, or pair of pantaloons, the small depot at Vera Cruz having been exhausted by the troops under Generals Patterson, Butler, and Marshall, respectively, all fresh from home—I have the honor to state, that if the facts are as set forth by the General Scott, the responsibility lies at other doors than mine. Understanding fully his. . . [illegible]...wishes. . . under his command; those corps, I believe, never. . . seven thousand men; to supply them, I. . . eleven thousand forage caps; fourteen thousand wool jackets, and four thousand cotton jackets, fifteen thousand flannel shirts, and seventeen thousand cotton shirts; eighteen thousand pairs of wool overalls, and four thousand pairs of cotton overalls; seventeen thousand pairs of flannel drawers; thirtyseven thousand pairs of booties, (I ordered fifty thousand pairs;) twenty thousand pairs of stockings; two thousand four hundred great coats, and nine thousand two hundred blankets. These supplies were all sent to Vera Cruz previous to the 30th of June.
I made no provision for the volunteers, for you are well aware I had not a single cent that I could legally apply to the purchase of clothing for them. If the generals named by General Scott exhausted the clothing placed in depot at Vera Cruz, by applying it to the use of their respective commands, they acted in violation of the 36th article of war, and the General should hold them accountable.
It is known here that several thousand suits of clothing, sent to New Orleans and Mexico for the old army, have been issued to the new regiments and to volunteers. But Gen. Scott is mistaken in supposing that the depot at Vera Cruz was entirely exhausted by those issues; for I have official information, as late as the 6th of December, some time after Lieut. Col. Johnson’s train left Vera Cruz, there still remained in depot, at that post, eight thousand forage caps; three thousand none hundred wool coats and jackets, and six thousand nine hundred cotton jackets; nineteen hundred wool, and seven thousand seven hundred cotton overalls; twentyseven hundred flannel, and thirteen thousand seven hundred cotton shirts; fifteen thousand six hundred pairs of drawers; two thousand seven hundred greatcoats; seven thousand blankets, and eleven thousand pairs of bootees.
If the volunteers and new regiments went to Mexico without the proper supplies, that was the fault of those who commanded them. Gen. Butler, I understand, was specially directed to superintend the organization, equipment, and movement of the volunteer force. It was his business, not mine, to see that they were properly clothed and supplied; and neither he, Gen. Patterson, nor Gen. Marshall, had any right to take for their commands the supplies I had placed at Vera Cruz for Gen. Scott’s old regiments.
For the new regiments I had made timely arrangements, and would have sent to Vera Cruz, in November, a large supply of clothing; but I received, in October, a report from Capt. Irwin, (acting quartermaster general of Gen. Scott’s army,) dated at the city of Mexico, the 27th of September, of which the following is an extract: “I have now a thousand people engaged in making clothing. The quality of the material is not so good as our own; and the price, on the average, is 50 per cent. Higher; still, supposing the road between this and Vera Cruz to be entirely open, I think the government will lose little, if anything, by purchasing here. I shall be able to fill, in a very short time, every requisition which has been made on me, with clothing, which, though not exactly our uniform, will be comfortable and good.”
This information, sir, was from a man who not only knew how to supply an army, by putting into requisition all the resources of the country around him, but was better qualified to command a large army than most of your generals in the field. The report of Capt. Irwin delayed my action here; but, in December, I ordered from Philadelphia a supply of clothing sufficient for the whole army, regulars and volunteers.
To enable me to do this, I have been obliged to apply, on my own responsibility, three hundred and sixtyeight thousand dollars of the funds of the quartermaster’s department to the purchase of clothing, and to authorize purchases to be made on credit, which have been paid for by bills drawn on me at ninety days, which I have accepted—hoping that Congress, by making an appropriation, will enable me to meet them by the time they become due.
I have the honor to be, sir, your ob’dt serv’t,
TH. H. JESUP, Quartermaster General.
(To The Hon. Wm. L. Marcy, Secretary of War, Washington City.)
[BWP]
REv45i2p1c5, May 9, 1848, Quartermaster General’s Office, Washington City, April 17, 1848.
SIR: I have received the extracts from General Scott’s letter to you, dated the 24th of February, complaining of the want of means of transportation, of supplies, and of funds form the Quartermaster’s Department; in consequence of which, he informs you, he was embarrassed and delayed in his operations, as well in the attack of Vera Cruz as in his movements afterwards, and I have to state, in reply, that delays did occur in the movement upon Vera Cruz which were most vexatious, but which were not occasioned by any neglect or mission on my part, or on that of any other officer of the department, as a detail of the facts will show. The memorandum from the War Department for the Quartermaster General, alluded to by General Scott, fixed the number of transport ships for his expedition at fortyone, viz. twelve for the volunteers, ordnance, an supplies, from the Atlantic, five for surf boats or lighters; ten to go out in ballast for troops on the Gulf of Mexico; and fourteen to be supplied by the officers of the quartermaster’s department at New Orleans and on the Gulf. That number, I take it for granted, was determined upon by Gen. Scott himself, or by the War Department, with his assent; as I have not understood that the at any time objected to the number as insufficient. He complains that the ten in ballast for troops were not sent, and that the embarkation was delayed thereby, “in whole or in part, from the 15th of January to the 9th of March.”
Colonel Stanton informs me that the order to charter those ten vessels was countermanded in consequence of a letter from me, dated at Brazos, Santiago, the 27th day of December, which was read by gen. Scott before it was sealed, and to which he added a postscript. The general no doubt relied upon those vessels. I expected them; for I believed they would be chartered and on the way before my letter could be received; but so boisterous was the season, that I thought it unsafe to trust to their arrival, and made my arrangements as if they had actually failed; which fact I reported to Gen. Scott, as well as I now remember, either through Captain Wayne or the late Captain Hetzel.
It will be seen by reference to the memorandum referred to, that twentyseven vessels were to be sent from the Atlantic with troops, supplies, and in ballast. Not one was sent in ballast; but there were actually fiftythree ships, barques, brigs and schooners, sent with troops and supplies. It was expected that I should furnish fourteen ships.—The department actually furnished at New Orleans, Brazos, and Tampico for the army, before it took up the line of march into the interior, one hundred and sixtythree vessels, some of which made several voyages.
I submit a copy of a report from the late Capt. Hetzel, (marked A,) dated at the Brazos, the 21st of February, 1847, which shows what had been done by the department up to that time. Of the 102 vessels contained in that report, five were from the Atlantic—four only of which had reported there, the other had been wrecked. I also submit paper marked B, which is a list of vessels chartered at Tampico, to transport thence troops, horses and mules.
Under the mist favorable circumstances, much time would have been required to organize so extensive a transport service; but, owing to the drenching rains throughout the month of January, the ships and other vessels chartered at New Orleans could not be prepared and sent to sea as rapidly as was desirable; and the frightful northers described by General Scott in his letter of the 12th of January, 1947, and mentioned in many of his subsequent letters, delayed their arrival at the Brazos and Tampico, as well as the movement from those points. The time lost from these causes alone, may be fairly estimated at from twentyfive to thirty days. But a measure of General Scott, which he seems to have overlooked in summing up his difficulties, produced not only embarrassment and increased expense, but delays more injurious to the service than the want of the ten ships promised from the Atlantic, even had others not been substituted in their place. It was the change in the destination of the Mississippi, Louisiana, North Carolina, Massachusetts, and Virginia regiments. Had the two former been sent direct to Lobos, and a regiment already at Tampico been left there for the defence of the place, and the regiment replaced by the Mississippi regiment been left with General Taylor, double lighterage would have been avoided at a time when lighters were not abundant; delay would have been prevented; and six ships, that were rendered comparatively useless, would have been available for the campaign, the places of which had to be supplied. Had cutters or pilotboats been dispatched to cruise off Cape San Antonio, with orders for the North Carolina, Massachusetts, and Virginia regiments to proceed direct to Sacrificios, double lighterage, as well as the transports for the troops that replaced them, would have been saved.
General Scott certainly . . . [illegible]...he, not you or I, is responsible . . . increased expense, and delay . . . by that change.
As to the complaint of the want of funds; you are aware that the appropriations were nearly exhausted—the small amount available I was obliged to use so as to preserve the credit of the department; and I made the only arrangement in my power for the supply of funds, by authorizing the officers of the department to draw on me without limit. The service, I know, was carried on with as little embarrassment as ever attended the service of any army in a foreign war.
The complaint of General Scott in regard to clothing is fully answered in my report of the 18th February last, which will be found in executive document No. 56, page 250, to which I respectfully refer.
General Scott complains that not more than half of the surfboats he required
came at all; and of the siege train and ordnance stores, only about onehalf
had arrived when the Mexican flags were replaced by those of the United
States at Vera Cruz. The science and valor of the army, he says, had to
supply all deficiencies. The result shows that he had surfboats
and stores enough; and one of his high merits as a commander is, that he
never doubted the science and valor of his army, but made the best use of
both. He had invaded a country with resources sufficient to support
large armies against us; he availed himself, with great ability, of the
resources of the enemy. This, I know, you and the President expected
him to do; had he failed to do so, or had he doubted the science and valor
of his army, he would have proved himself unfit for the high trust confided
to him, and those who placed him in command would have had a heavy account
to settle with the country. But his complaints are entirely groundless,
as he, in his cooler moments, I have no doubt will admit. He is one of
the best informed military men now living; but it would puzzle him to show
a single instance in the military history of the last two centuries, in
which an army, whose personnel and materiel had to be
collected from so vast a territory, was as well appointed and supplied as
his army had been. The glorious results of his campaign are a sufficient
answer are all his complaints—results so astonishing, that the faithful
chronicler of the events as they occurred, will probably be considered rather
the compiler of fables then the relater of facts. I have the honor to be,
sir, your obedient servant, THOS. S. JESUP, Quartermaster General. [To Hon.
Wm. L. MARCY, Secretary of War, Washington City.]
[BWP]
REv45i2p1c6, May 9, 1848, Quartermaster General’s Office, Washington City, April 18, 1848.
Sir: Since my letter of yesterday, I have received a report from the principal quartermaster at the city of Mexico, dated the 20th of March, from which I make and submit for your consideration the following extract:
“I am happy to inform you that this army (the army under Gen. Butler) is well supplied with clothing, camp and garrison equipage. At Vera Cruz there still remains for issue or transportation to the interior a good supply of the above articles.”
This is a fine commentary on the complaints recently made to you of the delinquencies of the department.
I am, sir, respectfully, your obedient servant, TH. S. JESUP, Quartermaster
General. [To The Hon. W. L. MARCY, Secretary of War, Washington City.]
[BWP]
REv45i2p2c1, May 9, 1848, Thunder Without Light.
Tuesday Morning, May 9, 1848. Gen. Taylor’s tow last letters do not contain more thunder than is produced in our theatres by frolling the mustardbowl on the floor above;” we are certain that the light they give only serves to make their internal “darkness visible.” The Taylorboys consider them “tall thunder,” and the Whigs, though they groan in spirit while they peruse, will continue to exclaim until after the Convention, “Light, boys, Light!” After the Convention it will be “Fire in the mountains; run, boys, run;” and when Mr. Clay receives the nomination, and the Taylor flag still floats in the breeze, they will tear these letters into tatters.—We will then compose ourselves with a glass of something cool, for it will be very hot, and smile complacently while they fight the fire.
We gave our comment upon the Baldwin and Gallaher correspondence. As we thought, there was something omitted in the letter to which the General’s was a response; but we are assured that it was not of the least importance, and we take it for granted—though people will differ upon what is considered important. We have heard a lady scream because a tiny ant ran over her neck;a woodman would have thought it of not the least importance. We proceed, now, to review the General’s letter to his brotherinlaw, Capt. Allison. We should have been pleased to have had the letter to which it was an answer.—To understand a witness, much depends upon the questions asked, and the manner in which they are propounded.
Gen. Taylor commences: “My opinions have recently been so often misconceived and misrepresented, that I deem it due to myself, if not to my friends, to make a brief exposition of them upon the topics to which you have called my attention.” How could the General expect anything else?—Who knew, or who knows now, what his opinions are? Here we have in our own city the Whig and the Republican, both warm Taylor presses until Mr. Clay’s nomination of himself, and then one hot Taylor man, and one lukewarm sort of a Taylor man, disputing over the meaning of his last two letters. In his first he says, “I do not design to withdraw my name if Mr. Clay be the nominee of the Whig National Convention.” “It has never been my intention at any moment, to change my position, or to withdraw my name from the canvass, whoever may be the nominee of the National Convention, either of the Whig or Democratic party.” And in his second letter he says: “But having, at the solicitation of many of my countrymen, taken my position until my friends manifest a wish that I should retire from it.” Suppose his friends should be divided;some screaming at the top of their voices, “Hold on, hold on,”—others begging gently, “Let go, let go,”—some affirming, “Henry Clay is most available”—others “You are.”—Some swearing, “You will beat the crowd; you will get democratic votes”—others imploring, “The Convention has nominated Mr. Clay, Gen. Scott!” Under such circumstances, how will the General act? Will he take the vote? Will he assemble his friends in one grand Mass Meeting, and then put the question, “All you who are in favor of Gen. Taylor, say aye!” and “As for the noses, I shall not count them.”—This will probably be the method adopted; for the General says, “I have no concealment—I hold no opinion which I would not readily proclaim to . . . [illegible]. . . It would be great. . . sight, twentyfive millions of people assembled to hear the General go through his catechism!
Gen. Taylor says, “I have no private purpose . . . [illegible] . . . enemies to punish, nothing to serve but my country.” How will the Simon Pure Whigs relish this? “No party projects to build up.” No American system, consisting of a high protective Tariff, to fill, as they say, the public coffers to repletion—of internal improvements by the General Government, to waste the public money upon illadvised and squandering logrolling schemes; buying up the people with their own money, and demoralizing every branch of society—no bankrupt law, to induce cheating and swindling, and to deprive honest creditors of their just rights, that dishonest debtors may revel and live upon the earnings of others—no Bank, expanding its discounts today, scattering its rags broadcast thro’ the land, until money is depreciated and every thing else is bloated with a factitious and speculative value, and then tomorrow contracting with the force of a boaconstrictor, causing its incautious customers, who have come within its folds, to be crushed and destroyed, and every thing to be depressed far beyond its intrinsic value. What will they think?
But, we will ask, what does the general mean by “Party Projects?” Governments must be administered upon some principle. Every thing must be done in some way. Well, men differ as to the principle—as to the mode; one set of men think this principle right, another think it wrong. This difference of opinion constitutes and gives vitality to parties. The Constitution declares that the President “shall fro time to time give Congress information of the State of the Union, and recommend to their consideration such measures as he shall judge necessary and expedient. "Well, as soon as the President is inaugurated, [if he knows nothing before hand of the minutiae of government, as General Taylor confesses,] he begins to turn his attention to such subjects. He finds the SubTreasury, for instance, in existence. His Secretary of the Treasury is an out and out Whig. It has so happened, not through design, but the General selected him not to carry out party schemes, it so happens that he has been brought up in the Whig school; his mind is under a bias against the system. He says, “Mr. President, this scheme id wholly wrong—it won’t work—we can’t get along with it—the country will be ruined unless you recommend some change.” The President turns to another Secretary—he happens to be a Democrat. He says it is the best scheme in the world—it is the constitutional mode of managing the finances; “Mr. President, you must either have this mode, or you must have an United States Bank, or you must employ State Banks.” Now the President says, I will wait for Congress to act.” Congress don’t look into the workings of the system—they are engaged in abusing the President and in praising the President. His Cabinet pull and haul this way and that; and finally he recommends to Congress to pull down the SubTreasury and to build up a Bank. Is this or is this not a party project? He says, “I will recommend nothing. I think the SubTreasury works very well.” Is he not taking just as much by failing to recommend, and thereby permitting things to remain as they were? If he lets it alone, is he not playing into the strong hand of the Democrats? Is this no party project? We could take up every other party measure, and show how utterly futile is any such position. If a man is elevated to the Presidential Chair, he is forced, by circumstances beyond his control, to have party projects and party schemes, and he is wholly unfit for the elevated honor, who has not studied all party schemes and party measures, and has not made up his mind to choose between them. If he takes a ground between the two, and others follow him, than he erects a new party, and carries out their plans.
Again, says the General, “I have been very often addressed by letter, and my opinions have been asked upon almost every question that might occur to the writers as affecting the interests of their country of their party. I have not always responded to these enquiries for various reasons. "The Yankee when asked why he did not play, said he had forty reasons for refusing: “First, I have no money.” ‘My dear, Sir, you need not go farther. One such reason is sufficient.” The General in some of his numerous letters assigned as a reason for not answering, that he had formed no opinions upon the great questions of the day—he had been too long in camp—he had not slept in a house for years upon years—and if the people took him, they must take him as a man takes his wife, “for better, for worse.” Under these circumstances, we will ask for no other reasons.
The General continues: “I confess, whilst I have great cardinal principles which will regulate my political life, I am not sufficiently familiar with all the minute details of political legislation to give solemn pledges to exert my influence, if I were President, to carry out this or defeat that measure.”
In some of his numerous letters he says: “I was educated in the Jefferson school.” If these are the great cardinal principles which will regulate his political life, we confess we should think that, if the Whigs succeed in electing him, they will “catch a Tartar.” But, then, he says in his Baldwin and Gallaher letter, “Should such high distinction be conferred upon me as that of elevation to the Executive office, the Constitution, in a strict and honest interpretation, and in the spirit and mode in which it was acted upon by our earlier Presidents, would be my chief guide.”—Among our earlier Presidents was old John Adams, with his ultra Federal notions. We confess, if the principles which he maintained are the great cardinal principles which will regulate the General’s life, then, if he is elected, the Democrats will catch a Tartar, and the country will catch a Tartar too.
He reiterates, “I am a Whig—but not an ultra Whig.” Are the principles of the Whigs the great cardinal principles that will regulate his political life? No; for he immediately adds, “If elected, I would not be the mere President of a party—I would endeavor to act independent of party denomination. I should feel bound to administer the government, untrammeled by party scheme!” He has great cardinal principles—these would guide his actions; but he will not be guided by party rule, by party schemes, by party pledges; he must be independent of all parties.—Are you in favor of a Bank? No; this is a party scheme. Are you in favor of the SubTreasury? No; this is a party scheme. Are you for Internal Improvements? No; this is a party scheme. Are you against making such improvements? No; this is a party rule. Are you for the Tariff pf ’46? No; this is a party scheme; a rank, hot, ultra party measure. Are you against the war? I don’t know; if I say No, the Whigs are against it—if I say Yes, the Democrats are for it;I will make no pledges.—“One who cannot be trusted without pledges cannot be confided in merely on account of them.”
“Second—The Veto power. The power given by the Constitution to the Executive to interpose his veto, is a high conservative power; but, in my opinion, should never be exercised, except in cases of clear violation of the Constitution, or manifest haste and want of consideration by Congress.” The Constitution provides that “Every bill which shall have passed the House of Representatives and the Senate, shall, before it becomes a law, be presented to the President of the United States; if he approve, he shall sign it; but if not, he shall return it, with his objections,” &c. According to this cardinal principle laid down by the General, there must be a clear violation of the Constitution, or manifest haste and want of consideration. Who is to decide whether it be a violation or not, or whether it is a clear violation?—One party will swear it is manifestly a violation, the other will prove it entirely constitutional.—What may not be vetoed under the saving clause of want of consideration? How long must Congress consider a subject? A wrong measure might be passed by a majority of one, after the greatest consideration. As the Union says, with great strength—
“The more protracted the discussion, the more violent the contest, [illegible]...said to be hasty or illconsidered but the more. . . legality. . . be doubled. Men...argue and dispute about propositions of manifest benefit and utility to all. Where the contest is more protracted and violent, is there the greatest occasion for the President to exercise a sound discretion in determining between two parties. Yet it is precisely in such a case that the principle of gen. Taylor converts him into an automaton.”
The President sees reasons against such a measure; is he to violate his oath to support the constitution and not interpose his objections?—What is the object of requiring him to make his objections? Is the measure necessarily defeated thereby? If Congress thinks his objections valid, a new bill may be introduced without the objectionable features. If they think them invalid, two thirds may pass it. What is manifest haste?
Gen. Taylor says, “The personal opinions of the individual, who may happen to occupy the Executive chair, ought not to control the action of Congress upon questions of domestic policy; nor ought his objections to be interposed, where questions of constitutional power have been settled by various departments of government and acquiesced in by the people.” How can the recommendations which the Constitution requires the President to make to Congress of “such measures as he shall judge necessary and expedient,” control the action of Congress? They are free to act as they please, after his recommendation. How can his opinions unexpressed control their action? The personal opinions of the Executive ought not to control their action, says the General, and we hold it to be equally clear that the opinions of Congress, if believed to be wrong by the President, while our Constitution exists, ought not to control his action.—If he permits it, without interposing his objections, he violates his oath. “Nor,” adds he, “ought his objections to be interposed where questions of constitutional power have been settled by the various departments of government and acquiesced in by the people.”—How long must it be acquiesced in? While one party is in power, a measure is passed, which is denounced by their opponents as unconstitutional. It is acquiesced in rather than have recourse to a Revolution; but is the lapse of years the other party come into power, and, believing the measure to be unconstitutional, it is repealed. The repeal is acquiesced in by the party proposing the measure, just as long as they are out of power and no longer. Must the President fail to interpose his objections to the repeal, if he believes the measure constitutional and wholesome? This commentary, we find, is extending our article to too great a length; we will pursue the fruitful theme on some other occasion.[BWP]REv45i2p2c2, May 9, 1848, Which Will “Surrender?”
The republican declares that Gen. Taylor will continue in the field as a candidate for the Presidency, no matter who may be nominated by that body—and his authority we acknowledged is very good for this declaration: Gen. Taylor himself. Yet, strange to say, the Republican of Saturday evening adopts as its leading editorial an article from the “new Orleans National” containing a list of the States which it is expected Gen. T. will get in the Convention, and an argument showing the chances and probabilities of his getting the nomination from that body!—“All that is required (says the article in the Republican) to assure the nomination of Gen. Taylor by an expression quite as strong as that indicated, is for his Whig friends to stand fast and firm to the organization of the party. The Whig nomination is necessary to his success; and that nomination will be awarded him without contention or difficulty, if they will only be true to him and themselves. In the present aspect of things, it cannot be otherwise.”
What doesthe Republican mean? Doe sit expect the friends of Clay, (towards whom General Taylor has significantly pointed his finger in connexion with this subject,) and the friends of Scott, and the several candidates for the nomination, will allow General Taylor or his friends to have any part or lot in that Convention, with the declaration of General Taylor and his friends staring them in the face that they will not abide its decision—or while there remains even a doubt as to the course General Taylor and his friends will pursue in the event of his not receiving the nomination? Has not the Republican’s neighbor, the Whig, a fellow colaborer in Taylorism, exposed the absurdity of such a “farce?”—has it not told the republican that: ‘Heads I win, tails you lose,” is rather too strong a game,” &c.? It seems to us, who care not how these Whig difficulties may be settled, that if the Whig Convention has any sense of propriety or selfrespect, the door of the Convention will be rudely slammed in the face of the “independents,” if they shall make their appearance at the Convention, and boldly stand up there and use the following language (found in General Taylor’s late letter: )
“I do not design to withdraw my name if Mr. Clay be the nominee of the Whig National Convention—and, in this connexion, I beg permission to remark, that the statements which have been so positively made in some of the Northern prints, to the effect, ‘that should Mr. Clay be the nominee of the Whig National Convention,’ I had stated ‘that I would not suffer my name to be used,’ are not correct, and have no foundation in any oral or written remark of mine. It has not been my intention, at any moment, to change my position, or to withdraw my name from the canvass, whoever may be the nominee of the National Convention, wither of the Whig or Democratic party.”
Will not the Convention require from every man who goes there to participate in its proceedings, an introductory oath, somewhat in the following form—(found in Mr. Clay’s late letters: )
“I have, therefore, finally decided to leave to the National Convention, which is to assemble next June, the consideration of my name, in connection with such others as may be presented to it, to make a selection of a suitable candidate for President of the United States; and whatever may be the issue of its fair and full deliberations, it will meet with my prompt and cheerful acquiescence.”
We are puzzled to know how the republican, which seems to belong to two parties, viz: the Taylor Independent party and the Whig party, can be calculation Gen. T.’s chances in a Convention which he and that paper boldly repudiate –a Convention towards which Gen. T. himself holds this emphatical language:
“It has not been my intention at any moment to change my position, or to withdraw my name from the canvass, whoever may be the nominee of the National Convention, wither of the Whig or Democratic party.”
Gen. T., his friends say, “never surrenders.”—We shall soon see, when
the Convention meets, who will surrender—whether the friends of all the other
candidates combined, or the “corporal’s guard,” the “Independents.”
[BWP]
REv45i2p2c4, May 9, 1848, To the Editors of the Enquirer.
JAMES BUCHANAN, ESQ.—THE TARIFFS OF 1842 and 1846
Messrs. Editors—Now that our spring elections are over, and a victory obtained, as we hope and believe, all are looking forward to the Baltimore Convention. Upon whom the nomination is to fall, is an enquiry upon the lips of all. Many great and good men have been spoken of, and I have yet to see the first Democrat who will not support the nominee, be he who he may; provided he is not in favor of the “Wilmot Proviso.”—No man who is so forgetful of the rights of the whole country as to support it, can hope to find any favor with the mass of the Democratic party. It is very evident that the only hope or expectation of the Whigs is the dark spot in New York. Can it be that that great State will madly and recklessly throw away her great power? Will she be unmindful of the past? Justice and gratitude forbid it! Bu tit go she will—if her distinguished sons shall so will it—if they will calmly and deliberately decide to take the last fatal leap, we must give her up, and try to do without her; we must give her up, as we once were compelled to do her distinguished son, although it be with a “bleeding heart.” Messrs. Editors, we can elect, and triumphantly too, the nominee of our Convention. Who then, is to be the fortunate man?
It is pleasing to see the spirit manifested by the friends of the different candidates—a spirit worthy of the cause, worthy of the Democratic party. No bickering, no attacks upon each other; but a temperate advocacy of the claims of each. All this seems to the writer to be legitimate, indeed necessary, to a proper appreciation of their pretensions.
It is with such feeling I address you this hasty scrawl. It is well known to every reading politician, that the distinguished gentleman whose name heads this article, has received more than “his share” of Whig denunciation—perhaps more than all the rest. Why is this so? Is it not that he is dreaded more than nay other? Certainly this is a fair inference. During last summer and fall, that chaste and ever truthful journal, the Richmond Whig, hunted up and published all kinds of slanders against him,slanders and gross falsehoods, which had been over and over exposed, and become to be so well known, that the decent papers of Pennsylvania would not touch them. About that time, a writer in the Enquirer, over a signature of “A Republican of the Old School,” in a series of numbers, fully and triumphantly exposed them here in Virginia.—He appealed to the records for fifteen or twenty years back, (and could have appealed to Mr. B.’s speeches on “Chilton’s” famous resolutions in 18267 and 1828,) and placed Mr. Buchanan upon true Southern, true American ground, from which himself and friends may proudly defy their puny assaults. The Whig was made to behave with some decency, for a time at least; but since then the great State of Pennsylvania, the keystone, has spoken through her State convention, and her trumpet tones majority of eighteen or twenty thousand. Mr. B. seemed to be getting rather too strong to be resisted by Whiggery; and now another desperate game is resorted to. He is charged with the sin of voting for the Tariff of 1842, and being opposed to that of 1846 by the makers and advocates of the tariff of 1842, and the open enemy of the one of 1846. If these charges were true, it is clear they would not constitute any ground of objection, with them. No, no; their hope is to injure Mr. B. with the Democratic party, and thereby get clear of a troublesome adversary.
A few remarks in relation to the Tariff of 1842 and 1846, I think, will satisfy all who are seeking truth, that Mr. B. cannot be objected to by us on account of his opinions respecting them. Every intelligent man knows that a peculiar state of things existed in 1842. For a time, by the action of Mr. Clay and his friends, no duties could be collected; the Compromise Act had ceased to be. Just at this crisis, the vile Tariff of 1842 was brought forward, and the alternative presented, to vote for it or let the whole machinery of Government stop; all efforts to modify and improve it were resisted. At that time Pennsylvania was almost unanimously in favor of a Protective Tariff; and Mr. B., as her representative, would have been faithless to his trust if he had not, under all the circumstances then existing, given the vote he did. But can it be that nay politician in the country (much less such as make politics a trade) does not know that Mr. B, and the lamented Wright, gave their votes with a protest? I ask again if there is one, let him turn to the proceedings of the Senate of August 1842, and he will there find a pledge on the part of Mr. B., whenever an opportunity was afforded, with any prospect of success, he would make an effort to bring it down to the revenue standard. Do we desire any thing more than this? It is well known that no such opportunity offered during his service in the Senate.
Tariff of 1846The Tariff has become so popular, and has worked so well, and under which the “high Priests” of Whiggery are reeling and tottering like a ship at sea, it is not to be wondered at, that the surest way to kill off a Democrat is make it appear he is opposed to it, as a whole. It is not believes that any tariff has, or ever will be framed, in all its details, wholly acceptable to all sections. The Tariff of 1846 was not, and is not, considered perfect by Mr. Calhoun and his friends, and, it may be, that some of its features are even now not acceptable to Pennsylvania and other States, but that it is getting daily more popular, no candid man will deny. I tell the gentlemen Whigs that I know the fact, that Mr. Buchanan is the fast and sincere friend of the Tariff of 1846. Let them make the most of it.
Messrs. Editors: In this my “last appearance” before our Convention
meets, may I express the hope that harmony, wisdom and justice may mark
its proceedings—may each member attend it with proper feelings, and with
a firm determination to frown down any effort to distract its proceedings.
The nomination once made, let us cordially sustain it. Let us throw our
banners to the breeze, and let the watchword be, “UNION.” Eastern
Virginia, 6th of May, 1848.
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REv45i2p2c5, May 9, 1848, To the Editors of the Enquirer.
Washington, May 6, 1848.
Messrs. Editors: A somewhat piquant debate took place in the Senate on Thursday, on a motion of Mr. Hannegan to take up the message of the President, communicated on the state of affairs in Yucatan, one of the States of Central American, and nominally one of the States of Mexico. Messrs. Hannegan, Foote and Cass were for immediate action—Mr. Calhoun, aided by Mr. Niles, wished delay. But why for delay, they did not state, in detail, to the Senate. Mr. Foote took the liberty of telling Mr. Calhoun a little piece of his mind, which cut rather close to the skin of this consistent Senator; yes, this Senator that has never changed his political text book, although he has boxed the compass with all kinds of opinions. Mr. Calhoun has a way of assuming Senatorial dignity when he is pressed too hard, and declines to answer “that man,” or this man. This will not suffice. In this country the people know of no superiority in a Senator or Representative but what his talents and his patriotism give to him; certainly Mr. Calhoun cannot for a moment believe that in his person are to be found all the knowledge and patriotism of the land. Why should he? Since the war commenced he has done nothing to aid his country. Where is a vote to be found, or a word to be spoken by him in debate, in aid of the war, or in approbation of the success of our gallant army? No where. From May ’46, to the present time, examine the record, and you will find him arrayed with those who have given “aid and comfort” to the enemy. Even the sons of South Carolina, whose blood of noble daring and of patriotism, stained the heights of Cerro Gordo, and now crimsons the rocks of Contreras, have with him no sympathy in “this rash and precipitate war.” How Mr. Calhoun can call the movements of the Executive “rash and precipitate,” I cannot understand! Years had been wasted in negotiation, our Minister rejected, and our Government insulted, and, finally, our territory being invaded by a Mexican army, we had no remedy but fight or disgrace. The Executive, by the advice of General Taylor, took the proper course, and, from that day to this, Mr. Calhoun has not sustained his country. So well and so distinctly has his public career in the Senate been understood in Mexico, that he has been complimented in general meeting of the Philanthropic Society of Mexico as one of the “illustrious champions of the Mexican cause,” and “justly gained the gratitude of all our good fellowcitizens” by being one of “the defenders of the cause of justice and civilization.”
And let me remark, that Mr. Botts, your Representative in Congress, is named along with Mr. Calhoun and others. Call you this supporting your country? If it is, I should like to know in what that support consists. If withholding supplies and condemning the Executive, and opposing the welfare of the country constitute Mr. Calhoun a republican, then, in fact, am I at a loss to understand his movements. But so we go. Mr. Foote is not to be driven from his duty to his country. He will deal justly, love mercy, and defend his country from Mexican allies, and Mexicans themselves, without fear or favor and his friends throughout the country will applaud and sustain him in his patriotic course.
The question being postponed until yesterday, it was again taken up, and an interesting debate continued. Mr. Hannegan defended the President in a very animated manner and sustained the country with his usual patriotic impulse. He told the Senate how England had already made advances in Yucatan and had an eye in prospective on the island of Cuba. Mr. Clayton opposed the action of the Senate as premature and as being contrary to the armistice regulation now entered into with Mexico. Yes, Mexico, sympathy for Mexico! You understand, Messrs. Editors, how that sympathy is applauded by our Mexican enemies; vide their complimentary resolution of thanks to certain persons. Gol. Jefferson Davis advocated the bill in an energetic speech and did himself and country full and ample justice. Mr. Crittenden took the opposite side. He was opposed to the bill almost on any ground except as a charity bill to the Yucatan sufferers, Mr. Davis of Mississippi rejoined, defending the bill, and Mr. Foote followed, closing the debate for the day, in an animated speech in defence of the bill, and against the opinion of the Whig opposition in the Senate—that opposition, so reckless, so vindictive, that has sympathies for our enemies and none for our country. Mr. Foote played “cut and thrust” and did the sympathizers up in right good earnest.
Gen. Scott has gained ground with the Whigs in proportion as he loses the good will of the administration, or rather, as he provokes from the administration merited and just castigation for the futile imaginations of his brain. He stands an equal chance with Clay or Taylor for the nomination, and rather in advance of Mr. Crittenden and Judge McLean. Many of the patriotic Whigs will not touch Judge McLean since the publication of his Cincinnati letter. I still believe Mr. Clay will be the man, after all the management here to the contrary.
The gallant Col. Harney has been made by the President and Senate a Brigadier General in the regular army. So says Madam Rumor all over the city, and what every body says must be true. He deserves it, as well as some others deserve promotion, particularly our own intrepid and gallant Col. Garland.
Many of the members of the Baltimore Convention are coming in to spend
a few days in Congress, before the consummation of the important business
of selecting a Presidential candidate. Those I have seen are buoyant
in hope of a cordial meeting and speedy and untied nomination. Yours, NED
EVANS.
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REv45i2p2c7, May 9, 1848, Six Days Later from Vera Cruz.
Return of Mr. Trist and Gen. Cadwalader.
The steamships Augusta and Virginia left Vera Cruz on Saturday, the 22d inst. The Augusta came up to town, yesterday afternoon, (says the New Orleans Picayune, April 30,) while the Virginia having got a drift log in on e of her wheels, was obliged to come to anchor at Poverty Point, fifteen miles below the city. It is hardly probable that she will come up before our paper goes to press.
Gen. Cadwalader and Mr. Trist came over passengers on the Virginia, and will no doubt come up to town this morning.
The great mail was sent by the Virginia, but we received a package of letters and papers by the Augusta containing Vera Cruz papers tot eh 22d, and from the city of Mexico to the 15th. In another column we have given the twentysixth day’s proceedings of the Court of inquiry. We understand that the impression was that the court would not adjourn for three weeks, and that Gen. Scott would await its adjournment.—The Star of the 15th says that he is in fine health.
The burden of the editorial articles in the Star is that there is yet no quorum of Congress at Queretaro. It is obvious from the Star’s reiterated complaints that there is great fear lest no quorum should meet at all. We have not room today for its articles, but this is the burden of them.
Major Stewart of the Pay Department, arrived in the city of Mexico on the 14th.
Paredes as late as the 11th inst. Had not been arrested by the Mexican Government. He was still at San Luis, and, according to a letter in El Eco de Comercio, “taking up his residence with the different lawyers in the place.” We hear nothing more of his designs.
There is no further news from Chihuahua.
The ship American sailed from Vera Cruz for this port on the 19th inst. with ninetytwo sick soldiers in charge of Dr. Wright.
We gather some miscellaneous intelligence form the Vera Cruz papers.
[From the True American of the 18th.]
Arrival of Gen. Cadwalader and Mr. Trist.—A train arrived yesterday from the city of Mexico. The escort was commanded as far as Jalapa by Lieut. Col. Emory, and from Jalapa to this place by Major Gardner. The mounted escort was under the command of Lieut. Waters, of the Louisiana Volunteers.
Gen. Cadwalader and Mr. Trist, framer of the treaty, accompanied the train.
On the road, near Passa la Vego, a Mexican reported to the commander of the escort that he had been robbed of some mules, and stated that the robbers were in the chaparral. Lieut. Hawkins dismounted ten of his men and started in search of the ruffians, and shortly afterwards returned with them, having surprised and taken them in in the most admirable manner. They are now in custody.
This train left Mexico on the 7th inst., and on the 10th day after its departure arrived here.
A grand banquet was given in Vera Cruz the evening of the 16th inst. by the French residents and others in honor of the revolution in France. It is quite out of our power to give place to the enthusiastic proceedings. The Americans were to celebrate the same glorious event on the 22nd inst.
The Free American remains of opinion that there is little prospect of peace. On the 19th its language is:
“We announced, a few days ago, that we had conversed with a gentleman
from Mexico, who was of opinion that the members of Congress would not vote
for the treaty as ratified at Washington. We have since seen two letters
from influential men, one at Queretaro and the other at Mexico, who coincide
with the opinion of the gentleman in question. Another letter says
that should the members of Congress violate the constitution of Mexico by
ceding any part of the territory, the same members will have to ask the United
States to leave a force of several thousand men to keep order in the Republic.
The writer is of opinion that so soon as the American troops will embark
for the Untied States, the Government will be overthrown, and the new causes
for war will be given to the United States by the turbulent people og this
country.”
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REv45i2p3c1, May 9, 1848, No title.
We regret to learn that Gen. Kearny has been seriously ill at Vera Cruz; at the same time we rejoice that he was pronounced out of danger and convalescent at last accounts.
The State of Mexico gives its voice for Gen. Herrera as President, he receiving 152 out of 166 votes.
There was a caucus of the members of Congress present at Queretaro on the 10th inst., at which resolutions were adopted to prevent members then present from afterwards absenting themselves, and to fill one or two seats made vacant by promotion or otherwise. It appeared that but few members were then wanting to form a quorum—but this is an old story.
The Congress of the State of Vera Cruz assembles this day; that of Puebla met on the 10th. D. Juan Mujica y Osorio was appointed Governor of the latter State.
There are 2000 Mexican troops in Queretaro, and yet on the 12th inst. a diligence was attacked within half a mile of the city by eight men. They fired upon the passengers, but the latter showed fight and killed one of the robbers. The passengers returned to town, however, lest they should again be attacked.
The Monitor Republicano of the 14th inst. says that,
on the 10th, Gen. Bustamente was at the village of Dolores with
a party of his division, while another portion had gone against the Indians
of the village of Xichu, an insurrection of whom had become formidable.
They had had the audacity, so confident were they in their numbers, to
sack the village of San Diego del Bischocho.
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REv45i2p4c1, May 9, 1848, Thirtieth Congress—First Session. Washington, Thursday May 4.
SENATE.
Mr. Clayton presented a memorial in favor of the proposed new railroad from Philadelphia to New York, and took the occasion to remark that the petitioners were prepared to prove the statements therein set forth.
Mr. Hannegan, chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations, reported a bill to enable the President to take temporary military occupation of Yucatan—to employ the army and navy of the United States for that purpose, and to repress the incursions of the savages against the white population of that country—to furnish the white population with arms, ammunition, &c., to repel the attacks of the Indians—and to authorize the raising of additional volunteers, equal in number to replace the troops withdrawn from other portions of the service, for this service in Yucatan.
The bill was twice read, and Mr. Hannegan moved that it be made the special order for tomorrow.
Mr. Calhoun thought the day named too early—more time should be given for reflection. He proposed Monday next.
Mr. Hannegan said it was important that this bill should be acted upon without delay. A day or an hour might be productive of calamitous consequences to the people of Yucatan. He had seen letters from Lieut. Murray Mason, now in the Gulf, stating that the whole coast was darkened with women and children, without food or clothing.
Mr. Cass also was in favor of prompt action. Never a better occasion presented for them to vindicate before the world the character of the nation.
Mr. Foote expressed his strongest surprise at the effort to procrastinate action on this bill.Mr. Calhoun saw enough in the message to require from this body the most deliberate caution. The Executive had been in no hurry, if he had taken from the 7th of March down to the date of the message, to make up his mind on the subject; surely two or three days would not be considered too long for reflection upon the subject. In his remarks the other day he had simply expressed his regret that the President should have mixed up a mere question of humanity with other subjects of high political consideration. Mr. Foote said that the Senator himself had also mixed up with the subject, another, of high political consideration—he had referred to the present war with Mexico, and declared that he had hoped its results had taught the president a lesson—this war which the Senator said had cost the country 30,000 lives—a war brought on, in a great measure, by the act of the annexation of Texas—a measure necessary for the protection of the South and Southern interests—for which the administration, of which the Senator was then a prominent member, was mainly responsible. In regard to the movement of the army from Corpus Christi to the Rio Grande, he had believed that Gen. Taylor would, with some of Jackson’s independence of character, assume the responsibility of his own acts. And he now had it from an authentic source, that Gen. Taylor, scorning to skulk, had assumed such responsibility.
The Senator from South Carolina, he must be permitted to tell him, occupied a peculiar position before the country, on subjects of this kind. The Senator, he believed, had once been in favor of a national Bank, and many other measures to which it was not necessary to refer. It had been boasted by some of his friends, too, that he was the father of the system of internal improvements. He said these things with no unkind feelings, but to show that he should be more circumspect in his declarations, where he is himself responsible, to a great extent, for the consequences to which he refers.
The great issues of the campaign of 1844 were furnished by the Senator. We had placed a man in the presidential Chair upon those issues, and who had successfully and gloriously carried out the great principles for which the Senator had contended. Yet who had ever heard him commend the Administration? He had sometimes acted with them, but he had generally been among the first to give the administration a thrust under the fifth rib.
Why had it been, he would ask the Senator? Had it been that the Senator had not girded on his armor in defence of the administration—an administration which has secured upon the pages of history a name more glorious than even any administration which had preceded it—one of the wisest, so far as its measures were concerned, ever known in this country?
Why was he seen surrounded, after these attacks upon the Administration, by highminded and honorable Senators of the other side, with their warm congratulations? He hoped he would do himself justice before the close of this debate, and take the lead in support of this bill.
Mr. Calhoun denied that he had opposed any measure of the Administration which he deemed right, those only of any Administration did he support. It had been agreed on all hands, Mr. Polk included, that the annexation of Texas was not just cause for war on the part of Mexico. He denied that the present war necessarily grew out of it, and contended that it might have been avoided, annexation notwithstanding. He took his seat in this body with reluctance, and with a sincere desire to give the Administration of Mr. Polk a fair support. He had endeavored to perform his duty faithfully, and if he had failed, it was a question to be settled with his own conscience.
Mr. Hale said that he had been charged with being a fanatic for declaring that the war had grown out of the annexation of Texas. He was happy to have it in his power, whenever again so charged, to call the Senator from Mississippi to the stand, to declare upon the responsibility of his Senatorial oath, that this war grew out of the annexation of Texas, a measure necessary for the protection of the South. It did not come this time from fanatics, but from one of the faithful, one of the sachems of the tribe.
Mr. Cass said the question was merely whether the bill should be considered tomorrow or at a later day. He thought that if anything was to be done, it should be done speedily. The delay on the part of the administration had been occasioned by their efforts to obtain correct and official information. That information had now been obtained, and was before them. By delay they would be able to obtain nothing further. Then why delay? He had regretted the remarks made by the distinguished Senator from South Carolina in regard to what he had characterized this wretched war.
Mr. Calhoun. This rash and precipitate war.
Mr. Cass. He begged the Senator’s pardon, but his expression had been so quoted here this morning, without contradiction, by the Senator from Mississippi.
Mr. Calhoun. I did not consider it necessary to contradict what that Senator said.
Mr. Foote retorted, but his remark was not distinctly heard.
Mr. Cass proceeded, chiefly on the causes of the war, and insisting that, from all the information before them—from the declaration at the time of Mexico herself—the annexation of Texas was a cause of the war; though he said, as now universally admitted, no just cause of war.
Mr. Calhoun replied to the remarks of Mr. Cass, the question of boundary being introduced,