INDEX
NNR 72.269-72.270 Gen. Joseph Lane's supplemental report on the action at Buena Vista
NNR 72.270-72.271 Gen. Gideon Johnson Pillow's address to the public on his attack at Cerro Gordo
NNR 72.272 train under Col. James Simmons McIntosh attacked and forty wagons lost
NNR 72.272 vomito increasing at Veracruz
NNR 72.272 communication to Gen. Winfield Scott cut off
NNR 72.272 guerrillas around Veracruz
NNR 72.272 promise of liberty to an American prisoner
NNR 72.272 expectation of opposition to Gen. Winfield Scott's entry into the Mexican capital
NNR 72.272 removal of Mexican government urged
NNR 72.272 troops available to defend Mexico City
NNR 72.272 lack of reports about fortifications at Rio Frio
NNR 72.272 Gen. Jose Urrea stationed at Tula
NNR 72.272 departure of generals after the resignation of Gen. Antonio Lopez de Santa Anna, suspension of military prosecutions
NNR 72.274 ship Carmelita expected to be released
NNR 72.274 Com. Matthew Calbraith Perry's order opening Mexican ports
NNR 72.274 blockade of Yucatan ports officially removed
NNR 72.275 reported loss of wagon train en route to Santa Fe in an attack by Indians
NNR 72.275 Gen. Winfield Scott's preparations to advance on the capital
NNR 72.275 Gen. William Jenkins Worth's official report of march to and occupation of Puebla
NNR 72.275-72.276 account of the attack on the train from Veracruz
NNR 72.276 George Wilkins Kendall's account of movements, detachment under Capt. William Phillips Bainbridge leaves Puebla for Veracruz, affairs on the route
NNR 72.276-72.277 return of Capt. Duperu's dragoons to Veracruz, his account of the train, arrival there of the dead and wounded, arrival of troops, Gen. George Cadwalader reaches the train with reinforcements and takes command
NNR 72.277 Capt. Samuel Hamilton Walker's retaliation on Mexican guerrillas
NNR 72.277 report of the determination to remove the military depot from Veracruz to Tuxpan and opening a new line of communication
NNR 72.277 insurrection attempted at Tampico
NNR 72.277 report that Gen. Winfield Scott had advanced, and that the Mexicans had sent propositions of peace
NNR 72.277 exhaustion of the troops returning to Veracruz, rumors and dissatisfaction at the manner in which the train had been managed
NNR 72.277-72.278 Gen. Antonio Lopez de Santa Anna's resignation and manifesto on resuming executive power
NNR 72.279 Col. Alexander William Doniphan's achievements, casualties, fight with Lipans at El Paso, letter to Maj. E.M. Ryland
NNR 72.283 speculations respecting peace
72.284 items
NNR 72.288 vomito prevails at Veracruz, rumor of Mexican peace proposals denied
NNR 72.288 Col. Alexander William Doniphan's division reaches the states
NNR 72.288 unenviable position of Col. Sterling Price's division
NNR 72.288 accounts from California
NNR 72.288 various items from Brazos, Matamoros, and Monterey, capture of Mexican dispatches
NNR 72.288 review of the posture of our several armies, &c.
NNR 72.288 murder of an Arkansas volunteer by guerrilla, retaliation
NNR 72.288 Col. Samuel Ryan Curtis appointed governor of Saltillo
NNR 72.289 Gen. Winfield Scott and Nicholas Philip Trist
NNR 72.290-72.291 traits of American character, privates in the volunteers elected to political office
NNR 72.297 contradiction of
report of Gen. Winfield Scott having advanced or the Mexicans having proposed
peace
NNR 72.297 Gen. George Cadwalader, after several conflicts, reaches Jalapa with the train
NNR 72.297 Gen. Gideon Johnson Pillow organizing another reinforcement at Veracruz
NNR 72.297 number of troops under Gen. Winfield Scott after he is joined by reinforcements
NNR 72.297-72.298 business at Veracruz at a stand, refusal of one firm to pay the tariff
NNR 72.298 punishment of various criminals
NNR 72.298 guerrillas audacious
NNR 72.298 Gen. Gideon Johnson Pillow marches with 1,800 men and 125 wagons, his skirmish with guerrillas
72.298 report arrives at Veracruz that Gen. Antonio Lopez de Santa Anna was dictator and at the head of 30,000 men
NNR 72.298 Gen. Gideon Johnson Pillow's effort to march his troops in the middle of the day
NNR 72.298 destruction of guerrillas by dragoons
NNR 72.298-72.299 speculators harvesting on bounties paid to discharged soldiers
NNR 72.299 return of Alabama and Georgia volunteers to the United States
NNR 72.302-72.303 reception of returning volunteers at New Orleans
72.304 Dr. Vanderlinden, rumors from the Army and the capital
NNR 72.304 Antonio Lopez de Santa Anna's withdrawal of his resignation
NNR 72.304 National Guards
collecting to defend Mexico City, accounts of the guerrillas
NNR 72.304 Mexican skepticism about troops and funds available to Gen.
Winfield Scott
NNR 72.304 natives of the US ordered to leave Mexico City
NNR 72.304 consideration of Tuxpan as a port of supply in lieu of Veracruz
NNR 72.304 position of forces in California
NNR 72.304 rumors, votes for Mexican president
NNR 72.305 refutation by the Washington "Union" of the charge by the "Courier and Enquirer" that the administration has authorized Nicholas Philip Trist to interfere with the operations of Gen. Winfield Scott
NNR 72.305 description of Col. Alexander William Doniphan and his men
NNR 72.305 British mediation suggested between the United States and Mexico
NNR 72.306 Connecticut resolutions on the war
NNR 72.307 Cuban refusal of passports to the United States or Mexico
NNR 72.307 Mexican comments on the American force at Puebla, decree against publishing information on the state of defenses at Mexico City and against intercourse with the part of the country under occupation
NNR 72.307 "Union" insists that Gen. Winfield Scott will have over 20,000 men
NNR 72.307 Gen. Gideon Johnson Pillow's letter
NNR 72.307 Gen. Robert Patterson's opinion of the plan for conquering a peace
NNR 72.307 release of Maj.
John Pollard Gaines and other persons
NNR 72.307 Maj. Edwin Vose Sumner's report on operations of dragoons under
his command on 11 and 14 September
NNR 72.308
liberated prisoners met and detained by Gen. Jose Urrea en route for
Tampico
NNR 72.308 movement and position of corps, reinforcements, ordered back to embark for Veracruz, all hope of advancing abandoned
73.308 General Wool at Agua Nueva or Saltillo
NNR 72.308 preparations for
defense of Tampico
NNR 72.308 Gen. Winfield Scott detained at Puebla for want of reinforcements and supplies
NNR 72.308 Jalapa evacuated
NNR 72.308 less than 300 men garrison Veracruz
NNR 72.308 Tabasco taken
NNR 72.308 Gen. George Cadwalader at Perote waiting arrival of Gen. Gideon Johnson Pillow's forces
NNR 72.308 provisions and forage available at Puebla
NNR 72.308 capture and condemnation of a Mexican spy
NNR 72.308 rumors
NNR 72.308 vomito still prevailing at Veracruz
NNR 72.308 Gen. Franklin Pierce at Veracruz organizing reinforcements
NNR 72.308 letter from an officer at Saltillo about lack of troops on that line
NNR 72.313-72.314 reception for returning volunteers at New Orleans, tribute to the Mississippians
NNR 72.315-72.316 reply of Col. William T. Haskell to Gen. Gideon Johnson Pillow concerning the action at Cerro Gordo
NNR 72.316-72.319 "welcome home" to Col. Alexander William Doniphan's detachment at Saint Louis
NNR 72.320 movement of government funds to New Orleans
NNR 72.320 Col. Sterling Price at Santa Fe
NNR 72.320 battle at Red River
Canyon, &c.
NNR 72.320 attack
by Indians on government wagon trains
NNR 72.321 bustle of exports from Cuba to Mexico after announcement of the American administration regarding the tariff imposed on Mexico
NNR 72.322 list of killed and wounded in the attack on Tabasco
NNR 72.322 letter from aboard the Raritan about the taking of Tabasco
NNR 72.322 order of Com. Matthew Calbraith Perry commending the forces involved in the seizure of Tabasco
NNR 72.326-72.327 correspondence between Mexico and the United States concerning the mission of Nicholas Philip Trist to Mexico
NNR 72.327 article from the New York "Herald" about forces in the field
NNR 72.327 account of the Tennessee regiment when starting for the war and when returning from the campaign
NNR 72.327 letter from Maj. John Pollard Gaines
NNR 72.327-328 rumors of British mediation
NNR 72.327 report of naval activities, incident near Tabasco
NNR 72.327 Gen. Franklin Pierce still at Veracruz
NNR 72.327 Mexican Congress
summoned, apparently to consider appointment of Nicholas Philip Trist
NNR 72.327-72.328 rumor of British mediation in arranging a peace
NNR 72.328 forces in the field
NNR 72.328 article from the Baltimore "American" about the inadequacy of troops in the field
NNR 72.328 article from the Alexandria "Gazette" questioning the administration's energy and vigor in prosecuting the war
NNR 72.328 article from the Washington "Union" about the troops in Gen. Winfield Scott's Army
NNR 72.328-72.329 Gen. Enos D. Hopping to head the camp of instruction
NNR 72.329 letter from Monterey
NNR 72.330 news of naval operations in the Pacific
NNR 72.330 establishment of civil government in California, proclamation, choice of a seat of government
NNR 72.336 prisoners detained at Huejutla, Col. Lewis Gustavus DeRussy's expedition to relieve American prisoners
NNR 72.336 health of Tampico reported more favorable
NNR 72.336 Capt. J. Mayo's expedition in search of Caledonio Domeco Jarauta
NNR 72.336 celebration of the Fourth at Veracruz, train still not started from Veracruz
NNR 72.336 Gen. Winfield Scott's
council of war, whether to advance or delay for reinforcements, Mexican
account of Scott's force
NNR 72.336 "Republicano" on peace
NNR 72.336 rejection by the Mexican Congress of communications on peace
NNR 72.336 Gen. Winfield Scott leaves Puebla for the Mexican capital
NNR 72.336 Gen. Franklin Pierce nearly ready to start for Jalapa and Puebla
NNR 72.336 complaints among troops in command of Gen. Gideon Johnson Pillow
NNR 72.337 members of a legislature nominated in California
NNR 72.339 resolution on slavery
and acquired territory in the Maine legislature
NNR 72.339 resolutions of the New Hampshire Democratic Party
convention against the extension of slavery in acquired territory
NNR 72.341 Gen. Zachary Taylor's reply to Mexican inquiry as to manner of conducting the war
NNR 72.341 items, "Union"'s implied censure of Gen. Winfield Scott relative to Nicholas Philip Trist's proposals
NNR 72.341 peace rumors, "Union"'s remarks
NNR 72.341-72.342 "the war and its generals"
NNR 72.342 Gen. Zachary Taylor's orders No. 68, assigning posts to be occupied, &c., volunteers under him
NNR 72.342 escape and arrival of eight American prisoners at New Orleans
NNR 72.342 effects of illness among the Virginia volunteers in Mexico
NNR 72.342-72.343 disturbances in and around Tabasco
NNR 72.343 rumors about a descent
on Reynosa by Gen. Jose Urrea, troops sent there, suspicions of Urrea's object
NNR 72.343 gang of desperadoes near Brazos
NNR 72.343 compliment to the tenth regiment
NNR 72.343 letter from Lt.
William T. Barbour, a prisoner in Mexico
NNR 72.343 refusal of the president to sanction Gen. Stephen Watts Kearny's
actions conferring rights on citizens of New Mexico
NNR 22.343 Col. Russell's speech in favor of Col. John Charles
Fremont
NNR 72.343 need to relieve the "military mob" at Santa Fe
NNR 72.343 depredations by fugitives from Taos
NNR 72.343-72.344 attack on Lt. Jonathan Love by Indians
NNR 72.344 dictatorship suggested for Mexico
NNR 72.344 coalition of states in defense of federalism
NNR 72.344 letter about the collection of American troops at Puebla
NNR 72.344 letter of the Mexican Gen. Juan Alvarez about his plans
NNR 72.344 description of Puebla
NNR 72.352 Gen. Franklin Pierce's
train attacked, returns to Veracruz for reinforcements, advances again
NNR 72.352 Col. William Gates' requisition
NNR 72.352 Gen. Winfield Scott at Puebla awaiting response from the Mexican Congress
NNR 72.352 Col. Lewis Gustavus DeRussy's detachment
attacked, returns to Tampico, alarm there
NNR 72.352 another report that Mexican commissioners were appointed to treat
NNR 72.352 disposition of the forces of the Army of Occupation
NNR 72.352 toast to Gen. Zachary Taylor as next president of the United States
NNR 72.352 advance and retreat of Mexicans at Buena Vista
NNR 72.352 Carmelita, brig, seized by Mexican privateer, released
NNR 72.357 spirit of the Mexican press, index of popular feeling in Mexico, threat of enslavement of the Mexican people
NNR 72.357-72.358 accounts of the fighting during the expedition to Huejutla
NNR 72.359 march of the train under Col. James Simmons McIntosh from Veracruz to Perote
NNR 72.359-72.360 troops from Jalapa reach Perote
NNR 72.361-72.362 account of the national anniversary celebration at Monterey, speeches, toasts
NNR 72.362-72.365 ceremony at Frankfort, Kentucky, in honor of those who fell in the Battle of Buena Vista
NNR 72.368 correction of account of attack on Gen. Franklin Pierce's division
NNR 72.368 intense anxiety for news about overtures for peace, rumors relating to mission
of Nicholas Philip Trist
NNR 72.368 Gen. Winfield Scott to march from Puebla to Mexico City, Gen. Antonio Lopez de Santa Anna to give him battle
NNR 72.368 Gen. Franklin Pierce again leaves with train, attack on those following the train
NNR 72.368 vomito declining at Veracruz
NNR 72.368 train of wagons and pack mules attacked between Camargo and Monterey
NNR 72.368 financial pressure on the administration because of expenditures for the war
NNR 72.369 tariff receipts at Tampico
NNR 72.369-72.370 article on the state of government finances
NNR 72.370 Lt. Col John Charles Fremont arrested for disobedience of orders, dispute between Gen. Stephen Watts Kearny and Com. Robert Field Stockton
NNR 72.370 American fleet off Lower California, troops concentrating in that direction
NNR 72.370 Col. John Charles Fremont arrested and sent home for trial, Gen. Stephen Watts Kearny and Com. Robert Field Stockton returning
NNR 72.371 the Col. Yell lost on Aransas Bar
NNR 72.372 United States requisition for volunteers for service on the Plain
NNR 72.372 Texas Rangers under
Capt. Jack Hays sent to Veracruz
NNR 72.372 some Arkansas volunteers return to New Orleans, new company formed
NNR 72.372 eight new companies of Indiana volunteers arrive at New Orleans
NNR 72.372 departure of the
steamship Galveston for Tampico and Veracruz
72.372 company of Pennsylvania volunteers enrolled by Capt. Edward
Watts accepted for service in Mexico
72.372 Gen. Joseph Lane expected to leave for seat of the war
72.372 reduction in the force of the Virginia regiment in Mexico
NNR 72.372 account of Capt. Braxton Bragg's battery at Buena Vista
NNR 72.372 departure of the Maryland battalion for Veracruz, their mission
NNR 72.372-72.373 report that the capital was taken
NNR 72.373 Gen. Franklin Pierce leaves Veracruz with 3,000 men to join Gen. Winfield Scott
NNR 72.373-72.374 "Union"'s statement of forces
NNR 72.374 order for organization of the corps of American citizens in Veracruz
NNR 72.374 Capt. John Holliway's account of Maj. Edmonson at the battle of Grand Canon
NNR 72.374 affairs at Veracruz, spy arrested by the Mexicans with dispatches
NNR 72.374-72.375 Gen. Stephen Watts Kearny's proclamation to the people of California
NNR 72.375 Com. James Biddle's blockade order
NNR 72.375 affairs at Santa Fe
NNR 72.384 rumors at Matamoros
of Gen. Winfield Scott's having entered Mexico
NNR 72.384 Gen. Enos D. Hopping's requisition for dragoons
NNR 72.384 operations of Col. Carvajal
NNR 72.384 Gen. Caleb Cushing reaches Monterey, troops suffering with disease
72.384 peace rumors contradicted, Gen. Franklin Pierce's train reaches Perote
NNR 72.386 war tax on exports from Mexican ports discontinued by Com. Matthew Calbraith Perry
NNR 72.386 orders to West Point cadets to the seat of the war
NNR 72.386 court of inquiry on actions of Gen. William Jenkins Worth at Puebla
72.387 From the Washington "Union"
NNR 72.387 deaths of sailors of the squadron at Tabasco
NNR 72.389-72.390 general orders on the recruiting service
NNR 72.394 receipt of dispatches from Gen. Winfield Scott at Puebla, Gen. Franklin Pierce's affairs with the guerrillas, Gen. Persifor Frazer Smith's brigade to meet Pierce
NNR 72.394 Gen. Gabriel Valencia reaches Mexico with reinforcements
NNR 72.395 letters from Puebla
NNR 72.396 accounts from the capital, George Wilkins Kendall
NNR 72.396-72.397 Col. Lewis Gustavus DeRussy's report on his expedition to Huejutla
NNR 72.398 Mexican committee
of foreign relations on Nicholas Philip Trist's propositions
NNR 72.399 letter about
Gen. Winfield Scott's plan to advance on the capital as soon as Gen. Franklin
Pierce arrives with reinforcements
NNR 72.399 consultation between Gen. Winfield Scott and Nicholas Philip Trist
NNR 72.399 Gen. John Ellis
Wool ordered to advance on Encarnacion and San Luis
NNR 72.399 outrages committed by Mexicans on their countrywomen and countrymen
NNR 72.399 Lt. Brown and
party killed, Maj. Edmonson overtakes and chastises the murderers
NNR 72.399 another conspiracy discovered, Lt. Larkin and four privates killed
NNR 72.400 Col. Henry R. Jackson's vindication against a charge of having plundered the hacienda of Gen. Antonio Lopez de Santa Anna
NNR 72.400 "National Intelligencer" on Gen. Winfield Scott's probable course
NNR 72.401 shifting of specie from New York to New Orleans for war expenses
NNR 72.401 invalids brought to Pensacola from Veracruz
NNR 72.401 fever aboard the Decatur
NNR 72.402 production of the Mexican mines, opportunities to supply the American Army in Mexico with specie
72.402 arrival of remainder of California expedition in California
NNR 72.408-72.409 tribute to the deceased officers of the first dragoons
NNR 72.409 expectation that guerrillas can be driven from the sand hills near Veracruz and the road opened to Jalapa
NNR 72.409 "Union's" denial of the "National Intelligencer's" statement on Gen. Winfield Scott's actions
NNR 72.409 failure of efforts to exchange Midshipman Robert Clay Rogers
NNR 72.409 Nicholas Philip Trist despairs of negotiating at present
NNR 72.409 refusal of the Mexican Congress to consider overtures for peace
NNR 72.409 Gen. Winfield Scott awaiting Gen. Franklin Pierce before advancing on Mexico
NNR 72.409 various rumors about the Mexican peace party, gathering of Mexican troops at Mexico City
NNR 72.409-72.410 correspondence between Gen. Winfield Scott and Gen. Antonio Lopez de Santa Anna relative to peace intercepted by the Mexicans
NNR 72.410 troops under Gen. Gabriel Valencia arrive at Mexico City
NNR 72.410 dispute between Gen. Antonio Lopez de Santa Anna and the Mexican Congress on entertaining peace overtures
NNR 72.410 details of a letter from Tampico
NNR 72.410 withdrawal of troops under Gen. Jose Urrea from Tula
NNR 72.410 American comments on the leadership of Gen. Antonio Lopez de Santa Anna
NNR 72.410 Brownson's "Quarterly Review" on the war
NNR 72.410-72.411 Washington "Union" on the Whig Party's policy toward the war with Mexico
NNR 72.411 New Hampshire "Statesman" on the Whig Party and the Mexican war
NNR 72.411 letter from the Army of Occupation
NNR 72.411 Mexican atrocities near Matamoros, barbarities near Parras
NNR 72.411 arrival of a portion of Col. Alexander William Doniphan's command at Saint Louis
NNR 72.411 "the starving Mexicans at the battle of Buena Vista"
NNR 72.411 comments on the withdrawal of the second and third Indiana regiments from Mexico
NNR 72.411 praise for Private Divers and Corporal Agnew
NNR 72.411 incident involving Maj. Joseph K.F. Mansfield at the Battle of Monterey
NNR 72.411-72.412 comment on Sr. Pacheco's circulars on conduct of the war with the United States and establishment of peace
NNR 72.412 plans to enforce a government on Mexico
NNR 72.416 Gen. Winfield
Scott issues orders to his several divisions to advance on the city of Mexico
NNR 72.416 Gen. Franklin Pierce joins Gen. Winfield Scott
NNR 72.416 Maj. Jonathan Pollard Gaines and Midshipman Robert Clay Rogers escape from the Mexicans
NNR 72.416 Gen. Antonio Lopez de Santa Anna marches to meet the American Army
NNR 72.416 Maj. Folliot Thornton Lally's affair at the National Bridge
NNR 72.416 Capt. Charles Frederick
Ruff's affair with Mexicans
NNR 72.416 active preparations against night attack at Tampico
NNR 72.416 reports of illness in the squadron at Veracruz and along the coast
NNR 72.416 troops at Puebla in want of funds, American and Mexican troop movements
NNR 72.416 call for Illinois regiment to keep open communications to Santa Fe
NNR 72.416 "Old Europe and Young America"
NNR 72.416 new Illinois regiment
collecting for New Orleans and Veracruz
NNR 72.269-72.270 July 3, 1847 Gen. Joseph Lane's supplemental report on the action at Buena Vista
Gen. Lane's Supplementary Report.
From the N.O. Picayune.
The following report by Brigadier General lane is supplementary to his first official report of the operations of his brigade in the battle of Buena Vista. He has thought it called for by the developments of a court of inquiry held since his first report was made, and by the various statements made in the papers injurious to the character of Indiana. As an act of justice to the Indiana troops and as a part of the record of the great deeds of the 23d of February, we cheerfully give the report an insertion in our column.
Buena Vista May, 1847.
From the comments of the press, the numerous letters that have been written and published, the many false and ridiculous statements uttered by different persons at sundry places concerning the battle at this place on the 22d and 23d of February last, and more particularly in consequence of the erroneous statements invented and circulated in reference to the Indiana brigade in connection with that memorable day, I feel myself constrained, in discharge of an imperious duty to give to the public a succinct account of facts which may enable every candid reader to arrive at correct conclusions, and that the public mind may be disabused of a studied and systematic attempt at misrepresentation and detraction.
The disposition of the troops seems to have been confided to General Wool, and they were posted in the following order, viz: The 2d regiment of Indiana volunteers, commanded by Col. Bowles, with three pieces of artillery under Captain O'Brien, were posted on the extreme left. The 3d regiment Indiana volunteers, commanded by Colonel Lane, occupied a height in rear of Washington's battery. The 1 st Illinois regiment, commanded by Colonel Hardin, were stationed on a high hill near and a short distance to the left and front of he same battery.-The 2d Kentucky volunteers, under Colonel McKee, was on the 22d posted on the right of a deep ravine at the distance of a half mile, on the right of he battery, but on the morning of the 23d were ordered to recross the ravine, and took place near Col Hardin and to his left. The 2d Indiana regiment were placed; which regiment, as before remarked, occupied the extreme left of the field, near the base of the mountain. The four rifle companies of my command, under Major Gorman, were at early dawn of day ordered to move up the side of the mountain to engage the enemy, some three of four thousand strong, who were endeavoring to cross the points of ht mountain and to turn our left flank.-These riflemen were directed to check their advance if possible. Three rifle companies of the 2d Illinois regiment, three companies of Col. Marshall's mounted regiment, were dismounted and sent up the mountain so the assistance of Major Gorman, who had not for some time been hotly engaged with the enemy. The contest on the mountain brow raged with fury for the space of about three hours, when I was informed by Colonel Churchill that the enemy in great force were advancing under cover of a deep ravine about four hundred yards in my front and to the right. I immediately put my small command in motion to meet them. IT should be borne in mind that my whole force was the eight battalion companies of the 2d Indiana regiment and Capt. O'Brien's battery of three guns-in all about four hundred men. On arriving at a narrow ridge between two deep and rugged ravines, I found the Mexican infantry, from four to six thousand strong, supported by a body of lancers. The infantry were coming up out of the ravine on my left and forming in beautiful order across the ridge, leaving the lancer in the ravine. I immediately directed Captain O'Brien to halt his battery and get ready for the fray. The column was halted when the first company was up with and on the left of the battery, and formed forward into line of battle. I rode in front of the column, and continued in front as the companies were forming in line, and was much delighted to see the officers and men move forward in good order; coolness and courage were depicted in every countenance.-By the time in companies were inline, and while I was yet in front, the Mexicans opened their fore from their entire line. In a moment the left companies were in line. I passed to the rear, and the fire was returned with promptness and good effect.
Thus commenced the battle on the plain of Buena Vista. The distance between the enemy's line and my own was about one hundred and twenty yards. About the time the action commenced, the enemy opened a tremendous fire from their battery of three heavy guns, posted on my left and a little to the rear, which nearly enfiladed my line. In this manner the battle continued to rage for nearly twenty five minutes, the firing being very severe on both sides, the lines of the Mexican infantry presenting one continued sheet of flame. I observed the Mexican line to break and fall back several times, but their successive formations across the ridge enabled them at once to force the men back to their position and keep them steady. I then formed the determination to take position nearer the enemy, with the hope of routing and driving them from that part of the field, and for the purpose of placing the lines out of he range of the enemy's guns, which had succeeded in getting the range so as to be doing some execution nearly every fire. For that purpose I sent my aid to direct Captain O'Brien to advance his battery some fifty or sixty yards to the front, and to return to the same point. He went with the battery to its advanced position. I was at that moment near the left of my line. Before my aid returned to me, I was much surprised to see my line begin to give way on the right, and continuing to give way to the extreme left, not knowing at that time that Colonel Bowles had given an order to retreat, and it was several days after the battle (and not until after I had made my official report) before I was satisfied that the regiment had retreated in obedience to an order given by Colonel Bowles. The order was not obeyed until it had been thrice repeated, as has since been proved in a court of inquiry, appointed to inquire into the conduct of the colonel. Lieut. Col. Haddon and twelve other good witnesses have testified to his having twice or thrice given the order before the line broke, so unwillingly were they to abandon their position. The 2d regiment occupied an important position-it was the key to that part of the field-and were unsupported by any other troops. An evidence of their being in a very hot place is that about ninety of them were killed and wounded before they retreated. They had stood firmly doing their duty, as well as ever did veteran troops, until they had discharged over twenty rounds of cartridges at the enemy, killing and wounding some three hundred of them; and I have no hesitation in saying that if it had not been for that unnecessary, unauthorized and cowardly order to retreat, they would not have left their position. I hesitate not to express my belief that if my order to advance had been carried out and we had taken the advanced position as intended, that we would have driven the enemy from the ridge. Although the men retired in some confusion, the most of them soon rallied-say, to the number of two hundred and fifty-and they continued to fight like veterans throughout the day. Lieut. Robinson (my aid-de-camp) and Lieutenant Colonel Haddon were ordered to proceed to the rancho and bring back such of our men as had gone in that direction; which was promptly done. Capts. Davis, Kimball, McRae, Briggs, Lieutenant Spicely (then in command of his company in consequence of the fall of ht gallant and lamented Kinder,) Adjutant Shanks, and Lieutenants Hoggart, Burwell, Lewis, Foster, Bennefiel, Kunkl, Londermilk, Roach, Rice, and Zenor, with most of the company officers, were also very active in rallying their men. Capt. Sanderson, and Lieutenants Davis, Hogan, and Cayce, and several other officers were wounded and had to leave the field; as also Captain Dennis, who had fought like a hero with a gun in had, found himself from fatigue and indisposition unable to remain longer the field. Paymaster Major Dix, having arrived on the field. Paymaster Major Dix, having arrived on the field at this moment, was very active in assisting to rally our broken and scattered forces-He seized the colors from their bearer, who was unable to carry them longer, and handed them to Lieut. Kunkle, who carried them triumphantly throughout the day. These colors, now in the possession of Capt. Sanderson, are well riddled with balls-one 24 pound shot, one6 pound shot, and many musket balls passed through them while they were in the hand of this victorious young officer, and they could at all times be seen high above the heads of the Indiana brigade, moving to and from wherever it was necessary to meet and repulse the enemy. Lieut. Peck (now captain) of he rifle battalion, who had been compelled to retire from the mountain to the plain, after the fall of his gallant old Captain Walker, succeeded in rallying about twenty men, and joining the regiment continued to fight gallantly throughout the day. The severe lost in killed and wounded which the 2d Indiana regiment sustained in the action will convey some idea of the danger they faced and the tenacity with which they struggled: 107 of their number were killed and wounded.
At or about the time of the retreat of my small command under that ill-fated order, the riflemen were compelled by superior numbers to abandon their position on the mountain side and retreat to the plain below. The cavalry which had been posted some distance in my rear, and out of range of the enemy's battery, to act as circumstances might require, either to advance upon the enemy and cut them off in case they should be compelled to fall back, instead of affording me the least assistance, left their position without receiving one fire from the enemy, and made a precipitated retreat to he rear along the foot of he mountain, pursued by a large body of lancers, who succeeded in cutting of and slaughtering quite a number of our forces, most of them riflemen. If they had made a bold stand and allowed the riflemen and the 2d Indiana regiment to rally on them, altogether they would have been sufficient to check the enemy before he had gained any considerable advantage. After these successful and almost simultaneous retreats of the different forces on the left, it remained wholly undefended, and the enemy, numbering several thousand, came pouring down from the mountains and from the front, and formed in good order along the foot of the mountain and in the rear of the position at first occupied by our forces. Soon after the retreat of the 2d, and while I was rallying them, the Mississippi regiment arrived on the field, and in a most gallant manner engaged the enemy, but were compelled by vastly superior numbers to fall back.
At this time the 3d Indiana regiment, under Col. Lane, was ordered into the fight, and, joined with the 2d Indiana and Mississippi regiments, composed a force of about one-fifth as large as the enemy, but sufficient to engage them with success. Capt. Sherman, with one gun of his battery, at this time joined us. The whole moved towards the foot of the mountain and engaged the enemy. Here the artillery proved very effective. This portion of the enemy's forces became at length so closely pressed, and our artillery continuing to waste them away with its destructive fire, and they begin separated from the enemy's main force, would have in a short time been compelled to surrender, when a white flag was seen on the field, and we were ordered to cease firing. We did so; but the Mexicans continued to fire from their battery, thus covering the retreat of their forces. This flag was sent to the left wing from Gen. Taylor, in consequence of Santa Ana having sent him a flag, which the general naturally supposed conveyed propositions either of truce or surrender. Hence the white flag on our part of the battle field. This flag proved to be nothing more than a stratagem of the Mexican general to extricate that portion of his troops which he saw was absolutely in our power. During the delay occasioned by this interchange of flags, this portion of his army, so completely in our power, moved off and made good their retreat to where the enemy's main force was posted.
We now moved and took position to meet a large body of lancers supported by about 2,000 infantry. The Mississippi and a portion of the 2d Indiana regiments were formed across a narrow ridge, between two deep ravines, supported by one gun from Capt. Sherman's battery, and the other part of the 2d and all of the 3d Indiana regiments were on the brow of one of the ravines and parallel to the same, the line being nearly in the shape of an L, and faced by the rear rank. The charge was made on the left flank of he 3d Indiana-now right, as they were faced. This charge, it is due to the enemy to say, was made most gallantly, and was as gallantly received by our forces, delivering our fire when they were within a short distance. It proved most destructive to the enemy, felling many a horse and his rider, breaking their columns and putting them to flight, leaving many of their companions dead on the field.
Soon after this successful repulse the field on the left was completely cleared of the enemy's forces; and hearing a sharp and continued firing on our right, and to the left of Washington's battery, I put my command in motion at double quick time, for the purpose of taking part in the conflict. This fire proved to be a severe action between the entire Mexican infantry and the 1 st and 2d Illinois and 2d Kentucky volunteers, which was Santa Anna's last and great effort. These forces had been repulsed by overwhelming numbers, and were retreating in confusion, hotly pursued by thousands of Mexicans, who were loading and firing on our men at every jump, when my command, consisting of the 2d and 3d Indiana and Mississippi regiments, arrived within musket shot, which we did by coming up suddenly of a ravine, and opened a destructive fire upon them. Finding themselves suddenly attacked, and from an unexpected quarter, they quit the pursuit, formed promptly into line, and returned our fire with considerable effect; but they in turn were compelled to retreat under our well directed fire to the position they had occupied in the morning. This was the last firing between the infantry of the opposing forces on that memorable day, although the cannon continued to play at intervals until dark. The battle on the plain was opened, as has been shown, by the 2d Indiana regiment, and the last musketry fired was by the 2d and 3d Indiana and Mississippi regiments. It should also be stated that our forces had been under arms since the morning of the 22d, and remained upon the field of battle until the morning of the 24th.
I have here given a brief and faithful account of the operations of the Indiana brigade on the 23d of February, as came under my observation, and there was not one minute, from the time the battle commenced until the last gun was fired, that I was not with them. Captain O'Brien who commanded the battery of light artillery posted on my right at the commencement of he battle, as well as Capt. Sherman, who acted with us part of the day, are deserving particular praise for their gallantry and good conduct-moving and discharging their pieces with all the coolness and precision of a day of ordinary parade. The intrepid and honorable conduit of the 2d Kentucky and 1 st and 2d Illinois volunteers could not have been exceeded, and no commendation of mine could add lustre to the glory that should and would be theirs. There is enough of honor and glory for each man who did his duty at Buena Vista, and he must be an uncharitable and selfish citizen who would knowingly wish to detract from any portion of that glorious little army, with a desire to augments that of any other corps at the expense of another. The many gallant officers and men who did their duty on that day should not suffer by invidious comparison.
If I have neglected to particularize the conduct of the Arkansas and Kentucky cavalry, or to define their position on the field, it is not because I deemed them of little moment or importance, but for the reason, that from the time of their retreat I had no opportunity of seeing any thing of their movements. They participated in the rancho fight, when the gallant Yell fell nobly at the head of his column. He, with the noble should who fell on that day, should never be forgotten. The ambition of distinction should never prompt us to deface any portion of the tablet of fame which our country will erect to the honor of the actors in that battle, and the regular and volunteer army should be proud of it, as one of the greatest epochs in our country's history.
It is due to the commanders of he different batteries of light artillery to say that their efforts were most powerful and efficient towards gaining the almost unparalleled victory of Buena Vista. Ready at all times to meet the enemy at fearful odds, their guns wasted them away with their fire in a handsome manner, compelling them to retreat whenever coming within their range. Gens. Taylor and Wool were present as commanders-the former as commander in chief. They were exposed to dangers almost every instant of the day, watching the movements of he enemy, and ordering and disposing our troops to meet and repel them. By their coolness and courage in gaining this victory they have won laurels and a fame that shall endure as long as traces of American history shall exist.
Respectfully your obedient servant,
John Lane, Brig. Gen.
[ANP]
NNR 72.270-72.271 July 3, 1847 Gen. Gideon Johnson Pillow's address to he public on his attack Cerro Gordo
Gen. Pillow's Statement.
An article in the Picayune of the 29th ultimo, signed by Col. Haskell and other officers of he 2d Tennessee regiment, addressed to the public, calls for some notice from me. This article professes to be "a simple statement of facts;" and, in advance, disclaims any other motive in making the publication that such as arises from a desire "to do justice for themselves." If those gentlemen had made a correct statement of facts, and had left the public to form its own judgment upon those facts, I should have been content to have passed the publication by unnoticed; for, from a statement of facts I have nothing to fear.
This article professes to describe the enemy's works, and he order of attack of my brigade in the battle of Cerro Gordo. It says: "There were on the line of works, extending from the National Road to the gorge of the mountains, through which the river passes, three works, known to our engineers as batteries Nos. 1,2, and 3, and that, by the order of battle for my brigade battery No.1, situated upon the river bluff was to have been assaulted by Col. Wynkoop's regiment, supported by Col. Campbell's; and battery No. 2 was to have been assaulted by Haskell's regiment, supported by Col. Roberts' regiment.
Instead of three works in this line of works, as those gentlemen say, there were known to be four before the battle. Battery No. 1, situated on the river bluff, and No. 2 at the extreme left of the enemy's line of breast-work, and not nearer to the point assaulted than from four hundred to six hundred yards, and batteries Nos. 3 and 4 were still further towards the National Road-the place assaulted made the 5th battery. Col. Haskell (who is the author of this article) says further that he was to assault battery No. 2, and Colonel Wynkoop battery No. 1.
It never was, however, intended by me to assault batteries No. 1 and 2, and no order was ever given to that effect. He was not ordered to assault battery No. 2, nor was that battery ever assaulted. Col. Wynkoop was not ordered to assault battery No. 1. The position intended to be assaulted was, what was believed by both the engineers and myself, to be the angle of those batteries formed by the long line of stone breast-works, about four hundred yards from battery No 1. In my official report, bearing date 18th April, 1847, and prepared immediately after the battle by an officer of my staff, (for being disabled in my right arm I could not write,) I distinctly stated that the points of assault were "the adjacent angles of batteries Nos. 1 and 2." But, in the after part of that report, for the sake of brevity, and for the purpose of designating the positions of he two assaulting forces, I speak of batteries Nos. 1 and 2, without repeating tin each paragraph the words "adjacent angles."
At this suppose dangle no guns could be seen, and none were believed to be there-though, on the last day of reconnaissance, something presenting the appearance of one gun was seen. Still it was believed to be the weakest point in the line of works, and was therefore selected by the engineer on duty with my brigade for the assault.
Agreeably to my plan of attack, Haskell's assaulting force was to attack the left of this angle and Wynkoop's the right, so as to engage at the same time the forces upon both sides of he angle.-General Scott's order of battle was ling, and reached me about 9 o'clock the night of the 17th , and too late for me have the necessary copies of it prepared and issued to my command. I therefore sent for Colonels Campbell, Haskell, Wynkoop, and Roberts, and at my own quarters read to them the general order of battle, and explained to them particularly the position of the different batteries, my position for assault, and the order of movement for each regiment, and the order of movement for each regiment, and for the position to be assumed by each preparatory to the assault.
The assault was made at the place previously determined upon, and made known to these officers; and, though this point turned out to be a strong work, mounting eight pieces of artillery immediately in front, and two more on a retired line, all which were to the moment of attack, entirely concealed and completely masked by the stone wall and brush, yet, up to that time, it was believed to be an angle in the large stone breastwork, connecting the batteries Nos. 1 and 2. That such was the position tended to be and actually assaulted, will conclusively appear from my official reports of this battle, made almost immediately after the battle, dated 18th and 28th April.
Colonel Haskell cannot understand why his regiment was place between Wynkoop's and Campbell's in Campbell's between his (Haskell's) and Roberts' regiment, on the march from the encampment. This (to him) incomprehensible order of march, which he seems to think was a blunder of mine, will perhaps be under stood by him when I state to him the object.
The narrow pathway along which we were obliged to march pierced the enemy's line of works just at the place selected for the assault. By my order of attack, Wynkoop's assaulting column was to form on the left of the path, fronting the right side of the angle, and Haskell's assaulting force was to form on the right side of the path, and was to attack the works on the left side of the angle. Wynkoop's position was further advanced on the road that Haskell's and therefore he was place dint he advance.
When Wynkoop's regiment reached its position, it was to form, and did form, on the proper side of the 5th. When Haskell's regiment had formed, it cleared the path for Colonel Campbell's regiment t ass up to Wynkoop's support. The passage of Campbell's regiment left the way clear for Roberts' to come forward to Haskell's support. Thus it will be seen that the only order of march by which it was possible to have placed the regiments, with their supporting forces, in proper position was adopted; and it resulted in the proper formation of each assaulting force, without the least confusion or disorder, although there was no road but a narrow pathway.
Again: Colonel Haskell says that I placed his regiment in position by directing him "to rest his right flank right of the path, extending his left square off to the left, so as to form his line of battle parallel with the centre field work of the enemy." He en says that, "by this maneuver, it will be perceived that the ranks of Colonel Haskell's command are reversed, the front rank becoming the rear, and the right of the regiment its left." Now, how s possible for a regiment which is marching by the flank to reverse its ranks and change its wings from right to left, by this order, it will be difficult for any military man to comprehend. If the right of the regiment was upon the right of he path, and the left extended square off to the left, as the says was ordered by me, it was as impossible for the wings to have been reversed any that order, as it would be for a man to reverse the position of his own arms, and equally so for the ranks to have been reversed; for they could not possibly be reversed except by the whole regiment being ordered to face by the rear ranks, which would have turned to backs of he men to the enemy; and yet, Colonel Haskell comes to the conclusion that, by this order, his wings and his ranks were reversed. I cannot account for such inexplicable confusion of mind in a military man. To suppose him so ignorant of he principles of military science, would show him utterly unfit for the command of a regiment. It would be entirely immaterial by which flank he marched; the order which he says I did give, would, if executed, place the regiment in proper position for the assault upon the enemy's works.
First, then, Col. Haskell misstates the number of works in the enemy's line, and their positions. Secondly, he misstated the work which in fact I indented either himself of Wynkoop to assail , and the work which was actually assailed. Thirdly, the order of march, which he regards as a blunder of mine, was proper, and the only one by which the assaulting parties could possibly reach their positions; and the regiments were each placed in the march with this express object. Fourthly, my order for the formation of his command into line of battle, which he says reversed the wings and the ranks of the regiment, was right and proper; and, agreeably to that order, there was no possibility of his wings and his ranks being reversed; and yet the public are told, in the very outset of this article, that the publication is to be "a simple statement of facts, "which is by no means complimentary to the general's talents as a military man." Is my military reputation to be affected before an intelligent nation by such an assault as this?
Again: He says I professed to have carefully reconnoitred these works; "but the truth is, the general was ignorant of the ground and enemy's strength and preparations of defence." I did profess to have reconnoitred these works and ground as carefully as , from the nature of he ground and other obstacles, I could; but I deny that either the engineers or myself did or could carefully reconnoitre them, or ever said we had. Colonel Johnston, engineer, while engaged in a reconnaissance of these works was shot through the body twice. Lieutenant Tower, engineer, and myself devoted three other days to the examination of these works, were repeatedly shot at, and once hotly pursued, and narrowly escaped a capture. On this last occasion Colonel Haskell was along himself. Lieutenant Tower and myself had as carefully reconnoitred these works as it was possible to do under the constant fire to which we were exposed from the enemy's picquets. I professed to have examined them as carefully as I could, but we did not know, and could not, by any possibility, have known, the character of the works which we attacked, for they were completely masked by the stone wall and brush. In the strength of this work we were all deceived. It was not my duty professionally to examine or to know these works: that belonged exclusively to the engineer corps; but I took it upon myself to reconnoitre them that I might have a personal acquaintance with the ground, which could only be acquired by a personal reconnaissance. Colonel Haskell was invited to be present at these reconnaissances, and was along more than once, and was as much deceived as any one else. Who does not know that it is impossible to look through stone walls, covered over with brush? What means have either engineers or other officers of discovering works completely masked when the approach to the vicinity of those works is guarded by the enemy's picquets, who fire upon them every time they come within sight of any portion of their line of works? The stone breastwork was extended from battery No. 1 to battery No. 2, a distance of about 800 yards; this work was at all points partially concealed with brush and there was nothing at the point assaulted which indicated concealed or masked works at that place more than any other portion of the line. No matte what portion of he line was approached, the enemy's picquets fired upon the reconnoitring parties. Under these circumstances it was impossible for he most skilful engineers, by acts the most daring, to make any better reconnaissance than was here made during four days' arduous and perilous duty, exposed to the constant fire of he enemy's picquets.
I knew the works were very strong, and so reported to the general in chief, and that it would cost a large portion of my command to carry them. His reply was, "the enemy is there in strong position and force, and he must be whipped, and I direct you to assault him in the front, believing you will do you duty. If we had known the exact strength of his position, we would probably have sought some other place to have assailed him, but it is not probable we would have fared much better.
The question is distinctly asked, "why I assaulted battery No. 2? Why I did so before I was ready, and with so small a force?" As an answer to these questions, I refer to the following portion of my detailed report: "Upon arriving at my position for assaulting forces, without the loss of a moment's time. I had myself placed Colonel Haskell's regiment in position for assault, upon the left side of the angle; had placed Colonel Roberts' regiment (the supporting force of Haskell's regiment) in position in a short distance in the rear; had ordered Wynkoop's regiment (the advance of he other assaulting force) to its position; (and it was on its way to its position, with Colonel Campbell's regiment as its supporting force,) when the enemy, discovering our position, directed a most galling fire into the command. This fire was so destructive that it would have swept away my entire command, had it remained in its position even long enough to have completed the formation of the forces for the assault. Owing to the impenetrable chaparral which covered the whole face of the country, it was equally impossible to fallback and complete the movement, even if such a movement would not have thrown the force entirely out of position. Seeing that no alternative was left me but to retreat, with the whole command, in the face of he enemy's fire,, and break up the order of battle, and violate the orders of he general in chief, and thus bring disgrace upon the whole brigade, or to dash rapidly forward upon the enemy's works with the forces which were in position, I instantly sent my aid-de-camp, Lieutenant Rains, with orders to bring Col. Roberts' regiment as quickly as possible to the support of Colonel Haskell, and directed this last regiment to charge the enemy's works with the forces which were in position, I instantly sent my aid-de-camp, Lieutenant Rains, with orders to bring Col. Roberts' regiment as quickly as possible to the support of Colonel Haskell, and directed this last regiment to charge the enemy's works. I also directed my aid-de-camp, Lieutenant and Anderson, to Colonel Wynkoop, with orders for a similar movement upon the works in front of his position, being on the opposite side of he angle. .Haskell's regiment dashed nobly forward, with a shout of enthusiasm." Hence it will be seen that the course which I took of charging the works was the only one left me.
It is manifest, therefore, tat the effort to throw upon me the responsibility of the failure to carry the work assaulted at Cerro Gordo is altogether unjust. The alleged errors in my orders and dispositions of the assaulting forces, I have shown were not errors; but that they were, on the contrary, the proper orders and dispositions for hat purpose. A most vigorous and determined effort was made to carry them by Colonel Haskell's regiment. It was not successful because of he strength of the work assailed, and the almost insurmountable obstacles and barriers to its approach. Though Col. Roberts was in close supporting distance of Colonel Haskell, being within 150 or 200 yards, and was ordered to is immediate support before the latte was ordered to charge, yet he did not get up in time to sustain the assault mad by Haskell's regiment before it was cut down and forced to retire. Upon the report of the fact to me, though at the time I was entirely disabled in the use of my right arm by a canister shot, Immediately formed the whole command to renew the attack, and had ordered the charge, when the enemy ran up the white flag and surrendered..-I am not disposed to charge the fault of this failure to the misconduct of any officer or portion of my command, but to the Gibraltar like strength of the works themselves.
The colonel further says I enjoy the reputation of leading his command in this charge at Cerro Gordo. I was not aware that I enjoyed the reputation of doing what I nowhere claim to have done. In my official report I distinctly state that I was at the head of the column-in person, placed his regiment in position, ordered Colonel Roberts to his support, ordered Colonel Wynkoop to his position, and that, after having ( for reasons which are fully explained in my detailed report) ordered the charge of his regiment, I then moved across the line of the enemy's fire, intending to lead in person the storming party of which Colonel Wynkoop's regiment constituted the advance, but was prevented by a wound received from doing so. If I had led the charge of Haskell's command, I think I should have let it differently and with different results; and if he severity of he fire had cut sown all my filed officers except myself, and driven back my command, I think I should have fallen back with it in good order.
Gideon Pillow.
New Orleans, June 7, 1847.
NNR 72.272 July 3, 1847 Train under Col. James Simmons McIntosh attacked and forty wagons lost
THE TRAIN ATTACKED--On the night of the 4th inst. Colonel McIntosh, with 800 troops, started from Vera Cruz with the train of 125 wagons and 600 pack mules from Puebla, having $225,000 for paymaster and quartermaster departments in specie in the wagons.
At a well selected pass, twenty-five miles from Vera Cruz, where a party of guerrillas had made some preparations for the purpose, an attack was simultaneously made on the 6th instant on each extremity, and on the center of the train, but mainly directing the assault at the wagons which they supposed contained the specie.
Private accounts represent that the attack was so far successful that forty of our wagons were destroyed--though not those containing the specie--two hundred mules loaded with subsistence were taken, and thirty of our men killed. The American Eagle of the 9th says twenty, but private accounts, from responsible sources, give the loss, at thirty men.
The check was so severe that Colonel McIntosh determined not to hazard an advance without reinforcements. Our troops accordingly entrenched themselves behind their wagons, and despatches were sent off to General Cadwallader at Vera Cruz. The general left on Monday evening, the 7th instant, with a force of about five hundred men and four howitzers. Private accounts say that on the 10th a part of the voltigueurs also left, with four howitzers, to join the train.
The Eagle represents that our troops received the attack with the utmost coolness, and that the enemy, being repulsed feel back towards the Puente Nacional, which some suppose they may attempt to defend. No later news from the train had been received the morning of the 11th .
No later news had been received from the army of Gen. Scott. The reason is obvious; communication has been entirely cut off. But it indicates a necessity for some cavalry force upon the line to clear away the brigands which infest it, and who must have mustered in greater force than had been anticipated to attack a train guarded by 800 troops.
But the audacity of these guerrillas does not stop here.
They are entering Vera Cruz and stealing our horses. For several nights alarms had been created in the city by these predatory attempts. Private letters say that sixty horses were stolen from one pen in the immediate vicinity of the town. A regiment of Texas rangers, it seems to us, would find ample scope for employment in the vicinity of Vera Cruz.
The steamers Palmetto and Edith arrived at Vera Cruz on the 8th inst. The schooner Gen. Worth had also arrived with one company of voltigueurs. [CCB]
NNR 72.272 July 3, 1847 Vomito increasing at Veracruz
ARMY OF INVASION
The United States ship Massachusetts reached New Orleans on the 19th , with accounts from Vera Cruz to the 11th instant. She brought 155 sick and wounded soldiers under charge of Dr. Tudor. Eight deaths occurred on board.
The vomito is on the increase at Vera Cruz. Paymaster Bosworth, who left New Orleans on the 18th ult. sickened and died of it. His brother returns in the Massachusetts with his remains. [CCB]
NNR 72.272 July 3, 1847 communication to Gen. Winfield Scott cut off
No later news had been received from the army of Gen. Scott. The reason is obvious; communication has been entirely cut off. But it indicates a necessity for some cavalry force upon the line to clear away the brigands which infest it, and who must have mustered in greater force than had been anticipated to attack a train guarded by 800 troops. [NGP]
NNR 72.272 July 3, 1847 guerrillas around Veracruz
But the audacity of these guerrillas does not stop here.
They are entering Vera Cruz and stealing our horses. For several nights alarms had been created in the city by these predatory attempts. Private letters say that sixty horses were stolen from one pen in the immediate vicinity of the town. A regiment of Texas rangers, it seems to us, would find ample scope for employment in the vicinity of Vera Cruz. [NGP]
NNR 72.272 July 3, 1847 promise of liberty to an American prisoner
A letter from an American officer, a prisoner in Mexico dated the 28th, states that the had been again and again promised his liberty, and expected to be released on the 30th beyond doubt. He writes that it was expected that General Scott would reach the capital in eight days, and he thought no formidable opposition would be made. [NGP]
NNR 72.272 July 3, 1847 expectation of opposition to Gen. Winfield Scott's entry into the Mexican capital
The Picayune says that private letters which they have seen express the persuasion that Gen. Scott will meet with further opposition to his entry to the capital. [NGP]
NNR 72.272 July 3, 1847 removal of Mexican government urged
El Republicano urges strenuously that the seat of government should at once be removed; the government should still exist and form a centre of union for a rallying point. [NGP]
NNR 72.272 July 3, 1847 troops available to defend Mexico City
In an earlier article upon the subject of the defense of the capital, El Republicano sets down the troops available for the purpose as follows: The garrison them in the capital was not far from 10,000 men, while there were to arrive, says the editor, from the state of Guanajuato 3,000, from the south of Mexico 3,000 from Michoacan 2,000, and from Queretaro 1,000. We enter from allusions made to an article in El Razonador that the latter paper ridicules the idea of making any defense of the city, says the Picayune. [NGP]
NNR 72.272 July 3, 1847 lack of reports about fortifications at Rio Frio
We see nothing in the paper about the formidable works said to be going on at Rio Frio. We are inclined to the opinion that the resistance anticipated at this point has been much exaggerated. The Mexican papers which we have seen say nothing about it, and speak only of the fortifications in the immediate vicinity of the capital. It looks as though parties were marshalling their forces for a struggle for power among themselves rather than to defend their country against a foreign foe. [NGP]
NNR 72.272 July 3, 1847 Gen. Jose Urrea stationed at Tula
Gen. Urrea was stationed at Tula, with a large guerrilla force, levying contributions alike on friends and enemies. [NGP]
NNR 72.272 July 3, 1847 departure of generals after the resignation of Gen. Antonio Lopez de Santa Anna, suspension of military prosecutions
We find in the papers a copy of the new constitution, or rather the amendments to the constitution of 1824, which have been adopted. The address, too of Gen. Herrera, Gen. Santa Anna, and the president of the supreme court upon the former promulgation of the new law, are given at length. We have looked into that of Gen. Herrera with much curiosity to find what he has to say of the war. He touches upon it only in general terms. He says that a people truly free was never yet conquered by a foreign invasion; and conjures Mexicans to lay aside their animosities and unite in support of the laws and constitution. This done he promises that their defense of the independence of their country cannot fail. Santa Anna's address is in his usual vein; we get no new ideas of his designs from it.
From San Luis Potosi we have dates to the 25th of May. All is quiet and indifference there. There were about 7,000 of the debris of Santa Anna's army in the place, but they had orders to repair to the capital, leaving a few of the national guard for the defense of the place. Fortifications miserably constructed, nothing were doing in them.
They were under the impression that Gen. Taylor would not march on that place, but would advance on the capital, by way of Zacatecas, the inhabitants of which are said to be highly favorable to the Americans. [NGP]
NNR 72.274 July 3, 1847 ship Carmelita expected to be released, Privateers
MEXICAN PRIVATEERS.
The Barque Carmelite. A letter from Capt. Littlefield, of said
barque received by Messrs. Brett & Vose, New York, dated "Barcelona,
20th May," says:
"After being retained as prisoners of war on board the privateer until the 9th inst., during which time I protested against the capture, we were put in possession of our own vessel, and the prize crew removed on board the privateer May 12th . The Mexican colors were hauled down on board the privateer, the vessel taken possession of, and the crew imprisoned by the Spanish authorities, to be tried for piracy. The probability is that more or less of them will be shot and the remainder of them will have to be confined to the galleys for life. There has been a report of other vessels being fitted out on this coast as privateers, but I know it to be incorrect. We are detained to await some formalities concerning the prisoners. As I have avoided being the accuser, I think soon to be able to proceed on our voyage unmolested. The Queen's Governor has informed the American minister, as soon as proof shall be received that she was not a legal letter of marque, the captured should immediately be set at liberty, and all expenses and damages should be paid by the felucca and owners, they being Spanish subjects, and most of them old offenders against the laws." [CCB]
NNR 72.274 July 3, 1847 Com. Matthew Calbraith Perry's order opening Mexican ports
Flagship Mississippi, Sacrificio, May 24, 1847
Notice having already been given of the opening of the ports of Matamoras, Tampico, Vera Cruz, and Alvarado, it is hereby made known that the additional ports of Tuspan, Goaxacoalcos, Frontera, and Laguna, now in the possession of the United States naval forces, are also open to the admission of American and neutral vessels not having on board articles contraband of war, and subject to the regulations, established by an order of the United States government, dated April 7th, 1847.
By order of Commodore M.C. Perry
H.A. Adams, Commander and staff officer
[NGP]
NNR 72.274 July 3, 1847 blockade of Yucatan ports officially removed
Notice is hereby given, that the restrictions formerly imposed on the commerce between the ports of Mexico in possession of the United States forces and the State of Yucatan, are no longer in force: and that trade may be carried on from the p orts of Yucatan as from neutral ports.
By order of Commodore M.C. Perry
H.A.Adams, Commander and flag officer
[NGP]
NNR 72.275 July 3, 1847 reported loss of wagon train en route to Santa Fe in an attack by Indians
Sad news from the plains - Capture of a wagon train - murder of teamsters. A gentleman arrived at St. Louis, on the evening of the 21st, from Westport, who informs the editors of the Reveille, that just before his departure, a Delaware Indian had arrived from the Plains, giving an account of a wholesale murder of teamsters, by a combined force of Arapahoes, Camanches and Pawnees. The Indian is a son of Nacomi, the principal chief of the Delawares, and is generally considered a man of voracity. He was found a prisoner at Taos, when Col. Price took that place and was liberated.
His story is, that having started homeward, he fell in with a large body of Indians, of the tribes mentioned, on the Arkansas. They made him prisoner, and only spared his life on the condition that he would join them against the whites. He sets their number down at two hundred fires, which would make the total number of the force about 1,000 men.
Near Walnut creek, he states this formidable party met and attacked a train of thirty wagons, drawn by mule teams, and accompanied only be the drivers and eight or ten horsemen. The Indians surrounded them and charging suddenly drove the teamsters from their saddles, and massacred every man of the party. The wagons were loaded with government stores, which, with the mules, the Indians appropriated to their own use.
The day succeeding this massacre, young Nacom was permitted to depart, having been presented with a fine large American mule. This animal bears the mark "U.S." and has been recognized as one of those belonging to a government train which left Fort Leavenworth a few weeks since.
We further learn that the Delawares are preparing to send a war party against the Osages. The latter tribes have recently taken three Delaware scalps. The Indian who gave the information respecting the murder of the teamsters, says there were a few Osages among the murderers. [NGP]
NNR 72.275 July 3, 1847 Gen. Winfield Scott's preparations to advance on the capital
Dispatches were received on Saturday night by the war office from General Scott's camp. Several of the soldiers were sick in the hospitals of Vera Cruz, Jalapa, Perote, and Puebla; but, with the reinforcements that were en route from Vera Cruz, he would probably have troops sufficient by the 22nd to march to the capital, perhaps without any serious opposition. He had ordered all our troops to evacuate Jalapa, in order to strengthen his active army. The last accounts by the steamer James Day are from Vera Cruz to the evening of the 16th which state that Gen. Scott had advanced to Rio Frio, where a dispatch is said to have met with him a proposition for peace. If this last report be true, it is probably that he will remain at Rio Frio, and not forth march to the capital, but according to the intimation in his own dispatches, wait till about the 22nd, both to give himself the opportunity of receiving reinforcements, and to allow the Mexicans more time to negotiate with the better grace. [NGP]
NNR 72.275 July 3, 1847 Gen. William Jenkins Worth's official report of march to and occupation of Puebla
Sir I have the honor to report, for information of the general in chief, that the forces under my command, including the brigade of Major Gen. Quitman, took military possession of this city at 10 o'clock today. Halting yesterday at Amosoque, to await the junction of Gen. Quitman, I found my position suddenly menaced, at 8 o'clock, by a large body of cavalry. This force approached somewhat stealthily by a road on our right unknown to us. A rapid examination, as it unmasked itself, exhibited, as was supposed, some 2,000, but from accurate information obtained here, 3,000 cavalry of the line, unsupported either by infantry or artillery, and moving a mile on our right and toward the rear, led to the conclusion that it was a ruse to attract attention in that quarter, while the real attack was to be looked for on the high road in front, or a movement on Gen. Quitman, who might have been supposed the usual day's march in the rear. It was presently reported that a heavy column was actually approaching on the main road. Thus it became necessary while directing a portion of the force against the visible enemy, to guard our large train, reserve ammunition, packed in the square, against the invisible.
The 2nd artillery section of Duncan's battery under the brigade commander, Col. Garland the 6th infantry under Maj. Bonneville, with Stephoe's battery, was promptly moved, and so directed as to take the enemy in flank. The head of his column having now reached a point opposite the center of the town, and distant about half a mile, the batteries soon opened a rapid and effective fire. After some twenty five founds, the entire column broke without attempting a charge or firing a shot, and hastily fled up the sides of the convenient hills. Only one company of the infantry was enabled, from distance, to deliver its fire. The march in the direction of Gen. Quitman's approach. The 2nd artillery and 8th infantry, with two sections of the light batteries, was put in its track, when the enemy again swerved to the left, and disappeared in the hills. Two miles distant Gen. Quitman was met by the last named detachment. He had already discovered the enemy, of whose proximity the firing had admonished him, and promptly taken his order of battle. This discomfited enemy reached Puebla late at night, and evacuated the place at four in the morning We took some prisoners, and found a few dead. The enemy acknowledged a lost of 89 killed and wounded. Gen. Santa Anna conducted the enterprise. Enclosed, marked A, is a copy of a communication addressed on the 12th to the civil authorities of Puebla. Again, marked C, on the 14th with reply to the latter, marked D: also copy of circular, dated 9th, addressed to commanders of corps, to regulate their conduct in certain contingencies on the march. It is understood the force which retired from this city the day before yesterday, and today is to take post at Puente del Tesmaluca, distant 12 leagues on the road to the capital, where it is where it is proposed to fortify. Our reception was respectfully and coldly courteous, but without the slightest cordiality. Incessant occupation has not allowed me a moment to look into the resources in way of supply; but Mr. --- says, breadstuff will be had in abundance, less of beef, and perhaps a liberal quantity of small rations.
Very respectfully, your obedient servant
W.J. Worth
Brevet Major General Commanding
[NGP]
NNR 72.275-72.276 July 3, 1847 account of the attack on the train from Vera Cruz
The arrival of the Galveston at N. Orleans, from Vera Cruz, which she left on the 15th June, furnished a variety of interesting items from the army, of which we proceed to furnish a synopsis.
THE ATTACK ON THE TRAIN UNDER COL. McINTOSH.
A correspondent of the N. O. Bee, in a letter dated Paso de Ovejas, June 12th , writes: The train of wagons and pack mules under the direction of Col. McIntosh, which left Vera Cruz on the 4th inst., escorted by Capts. Duperu, Ford, and McReynolds, companies of dragoons--the two latter mounted--and three hundred infantry commanded by Major Lee, arrived in this village on the 7th inst., after a march of three days.
The train consisting of 150 wagons laden with specie, and ammunition, and 500 pack mules with provisions &c., proceeded without molestation until about noon on Sunday last, 6th inst., when our advanced guard of Capt. Ford's Indiana dragoons was suddenly attacked by a large body of Mexicans, killing two men and wounding five or six. In this skirmish the enemy succeeded in capturing several horses and a large quantity of baggage, among which I have to regret the loss of all my clothing and papers. Half an hour afterwards the rear of the train was attacked, and before the rear guard who were unfortunately too far behind could come up to its defence, the Mexicans captured a large number of pack mules, and robbed several wagons of a portion of their contents. With their booty their retired into the dense chaparral, where it was impossible to pursue them. One of the rascals actually dragged from a wagon, the wife an hospital steward, and throwing her across his horse, was making his escape, when he was fortunately shot by one of the infantry, and the terrified lady delivered in safety into the arms of her husband.
After the train which reached several miles had come into order, the whole body moved forward, the two companies of mounted dragoons forming the rear guard. At sunset, when passing along a low portion of the road, with an open chaparral on our left, and a large cleared field hemmed in about 100 yards from the road, by a heavy chaparral and commanded at the further end by a hill on the side of which is a small line fort, our whole advanced guard, consisting of 25 mounted dragoons, about 250 infantry, and our company (Duperu's) of dismounted dragoons, was assailed by a heavy discharge of musketry, from the fort, the hill in its rear, and the chaparral beyond, and the cleared field. Our boys received their tire, steadily and unflinchingly, and returned it briskly for a few minutes. We hen charged on the chaparral at the rear of the open space, silenced the fire of the enemy and drove them entirely off. At the same time the mounted dragoons charged on the hill, routed the Mexicans out of the fort, and drove them over the hills.
The whole action lasted about half an hour, and our troops, who were principally raw recruits, behaved in the most gallant manner. The Louisiana boys acquitted themselves admirably, and were the first to reach the chaparral. The friends of Capt. Duperu and his company, in New Orleans, will be gratified to learn that we have sustained their highest anticipations. The loss in our company, on this occasion, was three wounded, viz: Samuel Lankin, in the thigh, severely;-----Wallace, in the thigh and hand, severely; William Hassel, in the thigh, slightly. They are all doing well.
We suffered greatly for want of water, but about 9 o'clock, came to a small muddy brook, were we bivouacked for the night, sleeping in the middle of the road. The next morning early we were put in motion, and about 10 o'clock our vanguard was again attacked by the enemy, who, upon being charged by the dragoons, were repulsed and forced to retreat into the chaparral.
An hour afterwards we entered the town of Paso de Obejas, (passage of the sheep,) where we were quartered, to award the arrival of reinforcements of artillery from Vera Cruz, with which to pass the National Bridge, six miles from this place, and the heights of Cerro Gordo, where, it is supposed, the enemy will show opposition. About 9 o'clock yesterday morning a small train of 4 or 5 wagons came in direct from Puebla. They contained the baggage, and were escorted by some two hundred discharged sick soldiers and a few teamsters, whose term of service had expired. They were attacked from the heights, while in the act of crossing the National Bridge. Not being able to return their fire, the Mexicans being concealed, they simultaneously raised a shout and ran towards them, whereupon the yellow skinned cowards vamoosed. One wagon master was killed. I have forgot to mention in the proper place, that our whole loss in the two days fighting was 40 killed, wounded, and missing.
The forces at Jalapa have received marching orders, and will join us on our route to 'headquarters,' Gen. Scott and his whole army, with the exception of the Jalapa force are occupying Puebla. He will remain there, until sufficiently reinforced to march on the capital, which will not be, it is anticipated, until fall.
Late yesterday afternoon reinforcements arrived here from Vera Cruz, under the command of Brig. Gen. Cadwallader. They number near five hundred strong; two twelve pound howitzers: the Kentucky company of mounted dragoons, under Capt. Gaithers and four or five companies of infantry. We will probably leave here tomorrow, and should the rancheros give us a fight, we will demolish them.
YOURS, THE DRAGOON.
[CCB]
NNR 72.276 July 3, 1847 George Wilkins Kendall's account of movements, detachment under Capt. William Phillips Bainbridge leaves Puebla for Veracruz, affairs on the route
The New Orleans Delta gives the following synopsis of the news.
The following highly important intelligence was communicated to us by Lieuts. Floyd and McWilliams, of the 2d Pennsylvania Volunteers, who came over on the steamship Galveston, this morning at 6 o'clock. On the 8th a small recruiting party, together with some citizens disbanded soldiers, in number about 150 with 75 armed men, and thirty mounted, left Puebla for Vera Cruz. This party was under command of Capt. Bainbridge, of 3d artillery.-On leaving Jalapa and getting near Cerro Gordo, this party was informed hat it would bet be prudent to go through the pass, as here were about 4,000 Mexicans in the chaparral along the pass. Previous to this tow officers who had gone to the rear of the train were fired at from the chaparral. At the mouth of the pass the party was organized and marched through without meeting an enemy. Arrived at the bridge that evening. Whilst they were bivouacked on the other side of the brigade, being so fatigued that they were unable to furnish a guard, they were informed that some persons were barricading the bridge. A guard was then stationed between the bridge and the encampment, to prevent the party being surprised. At this time signal lights on the ridges and cliffs were distantly seen.
Before daylight the sick and wounded of this little party were removed to Santa Anna's hacienda-a quarter of a mile from the bridge. A scouting party was then sent out, and also a party to clear the bridge, which was done without any opposition. The main body of he party then passed over the bridge. Everything appearing then to be safe, and all danger being passed, Lieut. McWilliams and Mr. Frazer were sent back to bring on the train on the other side of he bridge. Just as they were entering the bridge a party of about twenty five Mexicans appeared on the ridge, and fired several volleys on them. The wagon master and four others, who were passing the bridge, were fired on and the whole five were killed, and a wagon was captured, of no great value.
After the fire had ceased, a party of lancers appeared on the bridge and seemed to be preparing to charge, but seeing that Capt. Bainbridge's party were preparing to receive them, they wheeled their horses and galloped off.
Capt. Bainbridge resume his march in good order, followed by 400 or 500 of the lancers, who hung upon his rear and flanks for four or five miles, but at a respectable distance. Thus hemmed in this little party pursued its way until it arrived at the pass of La Voilta, where Col. McIntosh had encamped with his large train. The Mexicans who had attacked Bainbridge's party were the same who had compelled Col. McIntosh to halt and wait for reinforcements. The party remained that night in McIntosh's camp, and during the whole time the Mexicans kept a continual fire on the camp, approaching, with the greatest boldness, very near to our sentinels.
On the next day Capt. Bainbridge's party resumed its march to Vera Cruz, being joined by Capt. Duperu's dragoons, who were sent back to get their horses. This company, with its gallant Captain, had behaved very handsomely in the attack on McIntosh's camp. Its gallantry was the theme of universal praise and admiration in the army. Indeed , it was generally admitted that Col. McIntosh's command was saved by the gallantry of Duperu's party. Bainbridge's party continued their march to Vera Cruz, where they arrive in safety. In the meantime Duperu's party, having a long return train to guard, and being threatened by a large body of lancers, halted at Santa Fe, where they were charge by a greatly superior force, which they gallantly repulsed, killing many of the enemy, and suffering no loss themselves. It was said however, that some of our wagons were cut off, and the drivers taken prisoners. Capt. Duperu arrived safely in Vera Cruz, having lost three killed and three wounded.
On the day Capt. Bainbridge's party left McIntosh's camp Gen. Cadwalleder had arrived, with a force of 800 men and two howitzers. The two commands were then joined, making, in all, about 1000 men, with two howitzers, under the command of General Cadwallader, and pushed on towards the National Bridge.
On approaching the bridge General Cadwallader occupied the heights commanding the bridge from which the enemy had fired on Capt. Bainbridge's party, where he was attacked by a large force of the Mexicans, posted in the ridges and chaparral, and some hard fighting was carried on for several hours, the Mexicans losing more that 100 men, a and Gen. Cadwallader loosing some 13 killed and some 30 or 40 wounded. The