Petrus Iohannis Olivi, Treatise on Usus Pauper
	Translated by David Burr, History Department, Virginia Tech, Blacksburg, VA.

In his Treatise on Usus Pauper, written shortly before his censure in 1283, Olivi offered his second and last sustained argument for usus pauper as an essential part of the Franciscan vow. Here as in the ninth of his Questions on Evangelical Perfection, he tried to show that the Franciscan vow demanded not only lack of ownership but restricted use . In effect, he contended that whatever goods the Franciscans seemed to possess actually belonged to others, not themselves; and that the Franciscans should use these things only insofar as it was necessary to use them. The word "should" bears a very specific weight in this context. Olivi insisted that this limited use was a matter of precept and thus failing to conform with it entailed mortal sin.

Olivi's opponents insisted that only lack of ownership was an essential part of the vow. We might be tempted to suggest that their desire to limit their responsibilities in this way betrayed a penchant for lax living, but that would unduly oversimplify the problem. Two things must be made clear. First, those who wanted to exclude usus pauper from the vow recognized that by Olivi's time the Franciscans were performing in a variety of roles that made it virtually impossible for them to observe a life like the one practiced by Francis himself. They were university professors, royal officials, bishops, cardinals, even inquisitors. Olivi's opponents wanted to avoid a formulation of Franciscan poverty that would make it impossible for a Franciscan bishop to play the episcopal role assigned him without violating his Franciscan obligations and thus incurring mortal sin.

Olivi had his own answer to that problem. He insisted that the notion of necessity was a flexible one. The Franciscan bishop might find it necessary to live in a way that would be absolutely sinful if adopted by a normal brother in a small Franciscan house. A Franciscan sholar might need to use a great many books. The usus pauper requirement had to be seen in context.

Such a reply to Olivi's opponents might seem to satisfy one of their objections, but at the cost of intensifying another one. They opposed inclusion of usus pauper as part of the vow because they felt it was too vague a requirement to be demanded by precept. In the case of anything so required the boundary between observance and violation should be clearly defined. For example, celibacy worked well as a precept because it was more or less clear who was celibate and who was not. They felt much the same way about lack of possessions. (Their certainty would melt away in the early 1320s when John XXII put the axe to their notion of poverty as lack of possessions, but that is another story.) Usus pauper was another matter. In a world where every situation seemed to require a different notion of what was necessary, making violation of usus pauper a matter of mortal sin seemed to condemn all except the most ascetic Franciscans to spend their lives walking through a mine field , never knowing just where the trip wires lay.

Olivi had an answer to this problem, too. He distinguished between those things that were required determinately and those that were required indeterminately. In the former case the line between observance and violation was sharp and obvious. Chastity and lack of possessions fit within that category. In the case of things demanded indeterminately the line was indistinct and thus only gross violation entailed mortal sin. Most Franciscans who lived active lives could expect to observe usus pauper only imperfectly, with occasional minor slips. The average Franciscan could carry out his duties in the confidence that, as long as he was trying to live out the Franciscan life as best he could, he did not have to worry about inadvertantly violating the precept of usus pauper. If invited to dine with a wealthy merchant family he could graciously accept a chicken breast and a glass of excellent white wine without fearing that he had just feasted his way into mortal sin. Gross and repeated violations were another matter.

In the first four sections of the Treatise on Usus Pauper Olivi tries to marshal authorities, arguing that his position is supported by the recent Franciscan leaders like Bonaventure and John Pecham; by papal pronouncements; by the gospels; and by the Franciscan rule. He does a good job with what he has at his disposal. By the time he is finished the reader can be sure that Bonaventure, Pecham and various popes all assume all assumed that the Franciscans were bound, not only to owning nothing, but to limited use of goods. The problem is that he is really asking a much more technical question. He is asking whether they vow the latter in the same way they vow the former. One suspects that if Bonaventure, Pecham and those popes had been asked that question they would have said, "Of course!" The problem is that no one asked them. They had never heard of the usus pauper controversy. It had begun only in 1279 with the ninth of Olivi's Questions on Evangelical Perfection. Thus they never quite said what Olivi wants them to have said.

After a fifth section which draws three sinister conclusions from his opponents' position, Olivi settles down to the most interesting part of his treatise, a statement and refutation of his opponents' arguments. It is this sixth section that is translated here.

A word on the words usus pauper. They can be translated literally as "poor use," but something on the order of "restricted use" seems more fitting. I have evaded the problem by simply saying usus pauper.

The translation is from the Latin text in De usu paupere: The Quaestio and the Tractatus (Florence, 1992).

Sixth, we must pay some attention to dissolving these people's sophistical delusions. They argue that usus pauper cannot fall under the vow because, in the first place, one should not make a vow concerning anything that cannot be rationally described. A great many dangers would follow from doing so, because no one would be able to determine the precise limits of obligation. A vow of usus pauper would be indeterminate in just that way.

In the second place, either one would then be bound to observe usus pauper for all time, and in that case whenever one had a fancy meal one would sin mortally; or one would be bound for some sizable period (let's say a month), and in that case whoever ate good bread or chicken or drank white wine used anything else he could have done without would sin mortally.

Third, scholars in our order agree that any deviation from a precept or vow is a mortal sin, and thus the least deviation from usus pauper would be such. If so, it would become a snare of damnation for those who vowed it.

Fourth, it's commonly recognized today that the Friars Minor eat and drink well, often dress well, and live in big, beautiful houses; yet it's also commonly acknowledged that the pope has approved and confirmed their status. Thus we can conclude that their present way of acting must be in accordance with the vow of evangelical perfection and the highest poverty. Otherwise the pope would have been mistaken in approving them and they would be in a state of mortal sin.

Fifth, it's also said that Bonaventure and others who wrote about poverty lived very laxly themselves. Thus it seems they didn't think usus pauper was a part of the vow.

Sixth, Bonaventure himself thought some other way of life [religio] could exceed ours in austerity. Seventh, one is held by vow only to what he actually vows, but no one says, when he vows our rule, "I vow to observe usus pauper." Eighth, in Lord Nicholas [III]'s declaration [Exiit qui seminat] and in all others it's said that we're held by precept only to those things in the rule which are stated as precepts or prohibitions; yet nowhere in the rule do you find the words "I order" [praecipio] or "they are required" [teneantur] in reference to usus pauper.

Ninth, both canon law and Lord Nicholas' declaration confirm that no one obligates himself by vow to anything to which he does not intend to obligate himself, at least in cases where no one taking the words of the vow in their commonly accepted sense would think himself so obligated. But according to these people they themselves did not have any such intention, nor to they think others commonly do.

Tenth, because such a vow would be injurious to large groups. For, they say,, even though such might be beneficial to a single individual, it could be such to a great multitude, because what was superfluous to one would be necessary to another and what was valuable to one would not be so to another. Thus a large group could not live in peace and unity under such a vow.

Eleventh, they say it's a part of evangelical perfection that the poor should accept good meals in the homes of the rich and powerful, just as Christ did in the homes of Martha, Zachaeus and Matthew. And partaking of the same good meals in their own houses is no less perfect, because in order to avoid setting a bad example we should behavior more soberly outside our houses than in them, and in any case we inhabit our own homes as strangers and pilgrims just as we do the houses of others, and the food we eat in both places belongs others.

These are the arguments I've been able to read or hear. I have already answered all the good ones insofar as I was able in previous writings, and if they offer more I'm ready, with Christ's help, to answer them too. Before doing so here, though, it should be pointed out that in order to compensate for the poverty of their arguments they do some word-twisting meant to fool the simpleminded, resorting to false appearances rather than solid, subtle reasoning. For almost every time they present their argument they conclude from it that usus pauper is in no sense a part of the vow or precept, and yet to keep the brothers from thinking they are saying something horrible they add that [lavish] use of possessions, even if it's not directly contrary to the vow or precept, is nonetheless against its intention. Nevertheless, in saying this they are throwing a coverlet of duplicity over their view; for they state that according to Brother John Pecham we are not held to this or to anything else unless a word of precept or something similar is used, except in cases where there is some approved custom the breach of which might cause scandal, thus leading in turn to mortal sin. But then they deceitfully say, "But I believe it's against the intention of the rule." Moreover, lest they seem to say we can live a luxuriously and splendidly as kings, they say kingly use of good, even if it's not directly against our vow or a precept or our rule, is nevertheless against its intention. But any use short of kingly use, however showy or opulent it might be, is licit for us. Beyond that, lest they be accused of showing contempt for usus pauper and preaching a doctrine of laxity, they sometimes say that. although usus pauper is not a part of the vow, it is nevertheless so perfect, useful and, as it were, necessary in avoiding vice that without it the profession of poverty is of little use or of no use at all. And in this manner with remarkable deceit they simultaneously bless and curse usus pauper.

Therefore, in order to remove these delusions and distortions from our midst, roots and all, I'll deal with them in order. As for the first, if they wish to state simply and universally that nothing falls under the vow or precept unless the precise level of observance required of us can be determined, then they are clearly contradicted by other vows in the rule. For I ask them if it's always fully clear to them at what point socializing or conversing with women becomes suspect, or the degree to which it should be avoided, or how long or how thoroughly we are required to avoid carnal thoughts or desires, or how often the simple word of a superior can be transgressed before we are guilty of mortal sin, or to what extent we can neglect to obey that simple word before we are guilty of mortal sin. I believe they'll be forced to say they cannot know this sort of thing fully. All they can offer is a probable judgment.

The same is true with precepts of the divine law. I ask if they know the precise degree of pride, envy, vainglory, sloth, gluttony or wrath required to be in mortal sin. I suspect they'll have to say they know only in a very general and confused way, for example when it's against God, or something equally vague. In a particular circumstance they can make a probable judgment that enables them to avoid mortal sin by keeping a safe distance between their own conduct and the sort of behavior that might seem to approach mortal sin or incline one to it. This can be done just as adequately with the vow of poverty as with that of obedience or of mental, bodily and social chastity. Aristotle say the same where he speaks of the mean of virtue, its determination and its observance.

To the second it should be said that usus pauper is not violated by a single good meal, for it's clear that the needy and beggarly are sometimes invited to have a first-rate dinner. On the contrary, it's perfectly fitting for an apostolic man to condescend in this way to the wishes of ill or holy hosts as long as he knows how to do it fittingly for the time and place, and it was in that way Christ ate with publicans. That's what Paul means when he says, "I know how to experience both plenty and penury." Augustine says of that passage that Paul praises not having riches but knowing how to have them, something accomplished by very few. Thus the holy anchorites did something more festive, something beyond their normal mode of life, when holy fathers arrived. Thus Abraham cooked a lamb on the arrival of the three men (or rather angels). As for what it added here, that they would sin mortally whenever they used something they could do without, that would be the case only if they used it so often or so extensively that their behavior was so inconsistent with usus pauper that it could be described rather as rich use [usus dives].

It must be recognized, therefore, that being able to get along without something must be interpreted in two senses. First, that anyone can live without it. Second, that without it a person can satisfactorily perform all the duties belonging to his particular status, office and society. And this second sense can be subdivided into two senses: either that thing is in no way fitting and useful, or it is useful but something else can be substituted. If we take it in the first sense, there are many things without which a person can live yet which are in no way contrary to usus pauper, on the contrary they are quite fitting to it, as is proved quite well in the decretal [Exiit qui seminat].

When, however, the thing is in no way useful in the aforesaid senses but is entirely superfluous to our status, if such is evident then its use is always a sin, smaller or greater depending on how superfluous it is and how much it is used. In the case where something is fitting to our status but something else can be substituted, no sin is involved as long as one is not using the other thing too.

The aforesaid decretal says all this explicitly, though in few words., when it says the brothers should not have the use of all things, but only those that are clearly necessary. It then immediately adds, "But ministers and custodes shall discretely decide on these matters according to the exigencies of individuals persons and places, since these things need to be decided on the basis of differences among persons and places and the varieties of weather. Again, one can distinguish between what is necessary to someone's particular role and what is necessary to that person simply and absolutely.

From all this one can deduce what we mean by usus pauper, namely that usage which, all things considered, is fitting for the evangelical poor and mendicant. And there can be diverse grades of it: fitting, more fitting, most fitting. The first, fitting, can be such with a mixture of venial unfitting elements or without such, although in this life one can scarcely find the latter, except perhaps in him who is fitting in the highest possible degree.

To the third is much be said that many modern scholars feel only that should be taken as a precept the transgression of which inevitably involves mortal sin. According to this viewpoint any violation of a precept undoubtedly entails mortal sin. If one defines precepts in this way, however, then usus pauper, undue socializing with women, indulging in carnal attachments, and transgressing or neglecting the simple word of a superior will be precepts only when they appear in such a degree that the offense is mortal. The same would go for precepts of the divine law such as pride, envy, etc. Our holy forefathers took the word "precept" to mean something different, though, for they thought the entire, perfect fulfillment of the precept was included as a precept. Thus they spoke in many places of venial transgressions being contrary to the precept, that is, contrary to the perfect observance of the precept, though not contrary to the degree of observance required for salvation. Brother Alexander of Hales, in his third book, in the question concerning whether lying is prohibited, offers this view as a solemn one held by Augustine, as I have explained in my work on venial sin. This view can also be inferred from what Brother William de la Mare says in his Corrections of Brother Thomas, where he shows that one who vows the rule does not sin mortally if he transgresses anything whatsoever in the rule, just as the Jews did not sin mortally if they transgressed anything whatsoever in the law, even though in the four ways mentioned there by William the latter were held to fulfillment of everything in the law. I've examined all this in its proper place, however.

Nevertheless, if these Professors of the New Laxity want to follow the first group of scholars and, accepting the sense of "premise" used by them, wish to infer from it that transgression of usus pauper within the degree at which it becomes a mortal sin or is contrary to the precept (in the sense used by these scholars) is not even a venial sin, they should recognize that they are not following the scholars' thought to its logical conclusion. The latter see venial sins as certain distortions inclining people to transgression of the precept. Thus, just as they see many venial sins as related to the precepts of the divine law, so in this case they should do the same. If we follow the second opinion, though, it's much easier to show how any undue departure from usus pauper, any lascivious fraternizing or thought, constitutes a venial sin by the very fact that it's contrary to perfect observance of the vow, even though it's not contrary to the sort of observance required for salvation.

To the fourth, it should be said that we should not only consider the state of the Brothers Minor to be good, we should believe that it will never fail until judgment day. What's more, I hold without a trace of doubt that the order will be completely purged of the afflictions it has contracted through some of its members. It must be recognized, though, that "status" can be taken as meaning the rule and profession of it, and in this sense it's quite true that the pope approved and confirmed our status. "Status" can also be taken to mean the group of perfect professors who strive to observe the rule in its purity. In this sense too our status was approved and indeed ought to be. The word can be taken in a third sense, meaning the multitude of the imperfect (of whom I, least in good qualities and greatest in sins, include myself), and I believe he gave his approval to our status in this sense as well, although in view of the words of our fathers it's hard to comprehend him giving his approval to anything lower than the sort of observance which is always and everywhere necessary for salvation.

There is a fourth sense in which the ignorant take the word: the multitude of flawed customs in force throughout the order today. Concerning these I say, following the previously stated sentiments of the fathers, that many dangers lurk within these customs unless they are soon corrected. Nevertheless, lest I seem to wound all with these words, I should add that I see born out what Bernard [of Clairvaux] said in his letter about Cluniac abuses. "These abuses," he said,

are observered almost everywhere throughout the order, and are accepted practically without argument by all, although in different ways. Some make use of things as if they weren't using them, and thus they do so without offense, or at least with very little. Some behave in this way through simplicity, others through charity, others through necessity. Some observe these customs simply because they are ordered to do so, but they would be ready to do something else if told to do so. Some observe them in order to avoid discord with their companions, seeking in these things not their own desires but the peace of others. Others conform because they see the futility of resiting the multitude who freely defend the customs.

Thus speaks Bernard. I think, however, anyone of sound mind will agree that the final group - I mean those who attack perfection and defend imperfections - are living very dangerously.

If they wish to say the pope approved imperfections of this sort, I reply that he says nothing of the sort in his declaration. He never suggests there that the brothers are doing well by building palaces in violation of their statutes and against the warnings of their minister (some of which I've included above). On the contrary, he declaration vehemently emplhasizes the purity of the rule. And our minister general Brother Bonagratia, in a letter sent to the entire order, announced that the aforesaid pope told him in the presence of many provincial ministers that we would be shaken right to the hair of our heads if we were not more careful in the future,both in word and in deed, about observance of the rule. And farther on in the same letter he says that as far as regular observance of the statutes is concerned, the brothers seem to be cooling notably, as experience shows.

If one should ask whether these customs place the majority of Franciscans in mortal sin, I believe three things should be considered. The first is the attitude of the user. Are these things displeasing or very pleasing to him? The second is the user's environment. How difficult would observance be for him, how great is the lack of observance, and how big a group is he in? Some things which in another time and environment would be easy to reject become very hard to avoid because of mental imperfection, corporeal frailty, an old established custom, or general inexperience. In the same way, some things which would be considered enormities if found in those who are perfect or associated with the perfect become less terrible when found in an imperfect man living among the imperfect. Thus many of our vicious habits would have been enormities if found among the ancient anchorites, or would be enormities for me if I were living among them in the time of primitive fervor. Jesting, jokes, idleness, overcuriosity, overeating, inquisitive wanderings and the like would have been, in the common judgment of all, enormities. Again, certain things are superfluous in a small group yet might be necessary in a large one, and thus what would be "rich use" in a small group becomes poor and frugal in a large one.

Third, one should consider the example or scandal offered to others; and fourth, perhaps, one should take into account some hidden condescension and tollerance on God's part up to a certain certain time predetermined by him. By examining all these factors carefully and combining or comparing them in various ways, one can attain some insight into how excusable present behavior is in some cases, how inexcusable in others. As for what they say about the order being approved by those who know about these laxities, I am amazed if they mean to say they approve of the laxities themselves, since we find many people criticizing our excessive fund-raising, building and the like.

It must be recognized, however, that just as illness corrupts the human body rather than making it healthier or the wound of concupiscence weakens rather than strengthening the matrimonial state, even though the body may remain alive and the matrimonial state holy, so the aforementioned laxities act upon our status even before they become criminal or mortal to those engaging in them. The aggravation or alleviation of these abuses should be considered, in any case, not on the basis of what everyone thinks about them, but according to the judgment of those wise people who know all these things well, both in general and in particular.

To the fifth it must be said that it was hitherto customary to cite pious men as examples of perfection; yet today, alas, they are cited as examples of laxity by these people, thus at one stroke wounding the men by their accusations, mutilating themselves by the example they draw from it, and infusing poisoned doctrine into others. I say, therefore, what I know of the aforesaid father. He was of the best and most pious inner disposition, and in his words he always endorsed whatever is consistent with perfect purity, as is clear from what has been said above; yet he had a frail body and was perhaps a bit self-indulgent in this respect, as I often heard him humbly confess. For he was not greater than the apostle, who said, "We all offend in many things." Nevertheless, he so grieved at the widespread laxity of this age that in Paris, in full chapter with me present, he said there was no time since he became minister general when he would not have consented to be ground to dust if it would help the order to reach the purity of Saint Francis and his companions, which Francis indeed intended his order to attain. Thus the holy man was largely if not entirely innocent of these charges, for he was not among the number of those defending relaxations and assailing the purity of the rule, nor among the number of those who seem to enjoy wallowing in the aforesaid impurities. On the contrary, if he shared any of them he did so with sorrow and lamentation. Such defects, I believe, are not to be considered mortal sins unless, all circumstances considered, they are very great.

As for the sixth, it must be said that at present we can consider austerity in three ways. First, in relation to austerity, the virtue properly oriented toward maceration of the flesh. Second, in relation to the highest poverty, oriented toward exposing men to perpetural want. Third, in relation to a some exercise of virtue, which directed toward God or one's neighbor. In relation to the last two there is no more austere evangelical order simply and universally, although one might be more more austere in some particular sense. There is nothing problematic about some order being more austere in the first sense, especially in the matter of ceremonial austerities. For something is taken from the first so that more attention can be given to the following, which are of greater perfection. Whence the apostle Timothy is encouraged to use a little wine for the sake of his stomach and his infirmities, with the explanatory, and adds as a reason that bodily exercise is good for a few things, but respect toward God and souls is beneficial to all things.

The proper reply to the seventh argument is clear enough from everything that has been shown above, for in vowing to live according to the the rule as understood above we vow usus pauper. Should anyone say the usus pauper is not actually mentioned there, that seems a ridiculous argument because by the same logic neither would be vow to surrendor all joint rights or to avoid suspect relationships with women or not to use money or not to enter nuns' convents or any of those other precepts of the rule which are not explicitly stated in the vow.

The reply to the eighth is also clear, for as has been abundantly shown above not only are many things in the rule demanded in the manner of precepts by simple statements, but in fact the basic principal of our entire way of life, "The brothers shall appropriate nothing to themselves," is demanded in this way.

To the ninth it must be said that if these people did not, as they now claim, intend to oblige themselves to observe usus pauper, then I am convinced that they were never true Brothers Minor. If however they did intend it and now do not, they should be considered genuine apostates. Their assertion that such is generally not intended by other is triply false. First because it is the common opinion of those entering the order and and in fact or the whole world that our life should always be one of mendicacy, without possessions, prebends or access to any incomes. And they think we neither care nor should care about providing for ourselves except in the case of present or imminent necessity. And I am certain that right up to today such is the message preached by this order to all.

Second, it is false because according to our statutes certain austerities are preached to those who want to make progress in our order, and among them one of the greatest is the necessity of remaining in need. For they are not offered the certainty of receiving bread and water, let alone riches. Third, it is false because all the brothers intend to promise and know that they actually have promised to observe this rule in which many aspect of usus pauper are expressly included. It should also be recognized that even if someone does not intend such explicitly it is sufficient that he intend it implicitly, that is that he intend that which the rule, its creator, and the entire order intend

To the tenth, it should be said that these people seem to be introducing not one heresy but a whole series of them. They seem to say expressly that severe disciplining of the flesh in food and other things is not expedient for most religious; yet all the saints and masters believe the opposite, and in many places they condemn this belief as a heresy, for it is in fact the heresy of Vigilantius against which Jerome battled in his book against Jovinian and his letter against Vigilantius, where he says among other things, "You seem to me to be concerned that if continence, sobriety and fasting catch on among the Gauls your taverns will stop making money and you won't be able to spend the night in the devil's vigils and drunken parties." Certain moderns also adhered to this heresy, and our Brother John Pecham wrote against them in the twelfth chapter of his book on perfection. So did Brother Bonaventure in his apology where he deals with the perfection of fasting and penitence.

As for their argument that what is necessary to one would be superfluous and inexpedient to another and thus they cannot share a common, harmonious set of practices, I am astonished. Do they mean to suggest that there can be no common, harmonious set of practices unless the quantity and quality of food, drink and all else is precisely the same right down to the last jot and tittle? Who would accept anything as ridiculous as the suggestion that sick and well, young and old. scholars and laborers, coleric and sanguine, large and small should be equal in all these things or else there can be no peace among them? Are they ferocious wolves or birds of prey? Or perhaps they mean to say that usus pauper should be observed by all according to equality of quantity rather than according to equality of proportion or proportionality. If they do mean this, then they certainly contradict themselves even as they suggest it, because in the same place they say that what is necessary to one is superfluous to another, etc.

To their eleventh point it must be said that nothing can be said to conform with evangelical perfection unless it is soberly performed, always and everywhere. Nor can one compare receiving things outside a Franciscan house with receiving things inside it, as they do, because there is a double use involved in things received inside it, namely dispensation or distribution on the one hand and consumtion or final application on the other. In things received outside the house there is only one type of use, consumption, for it is not our place to dictate or demand what or how much should be distributed. That would suggest not poverty but lordship.

Beyond this, use has a different appearance within the house and outside it. Although there is no appropriation or proprietary right in either, use of goods inside the house has the appearance of such, because we seem to use things as if they were our own. In use outside the house just the opposite is true, but in that context it is apparent that the person is using someone else's goods in a way that befits their being someone else's goods. That is why opulent use of goods inside the house damages our reputation for poverty more easily and offers the world a poorer example than opulent use elsewhere. Moreover, proprietary feelings are more easily encouraged by interior use than by exterior use, because what is used there seems more like one's own property than what one receives elsewhere as a guest. tht is why, as I have said in the questons dealing with this matter, one cannot practice excess at home in any great degree or for any significant length of time before one begins to develop proprietory feelings, a point amply demonstrable by observing current use of books and places.

Note, though, the craziness of these people's position. According to them it is perfectly legitimate for us to consume five or six delicate pieces of meat on golden plates in the refectory every day, simply because it is not illicit for us to do so in the homes of secular persons. Now Christ, when he said, "Eat what is placed before you," was speaking of the time when his disciples went out to preach, as is clear from the text. Doing so projected the image of loving poverty and solidarity while avoiding hypocrisy. I think, though, that there are some cases in which a person could offend more in use outside the house, for example through flattery or carnality, or if one eagerly sought things in such a way as to give the impression of a certain vile cupidity, greediness and worliness.

After this, therefore, against the first distortion, their claim that opulent use of possessions is contrary to the intention of the rule though not directly contrary to the vow, the deceit involved here is obvious. The arguments they use to defend their position suggest precisely the opposite. They say, for example, that we are held to nothing by precept of the rule unless the words "I order" (praecipio), "let them be require" (teneatur), or something similar are used. Moreover, I ask them how they conclude that this sort of use is any more contrary to the intention of the rule than superfluous use of other things, particularly since sparing use of possessions in cases of necessity is less conducive to vice and more reasonable than excessive use of food, drink, and luxurious houses. Moreover, when they go on to say that according to Brother John [Pecham] use of such things is illicit only because of approved custom and fear of scandal, their deceit is all the greater, for they know that master is more to believed than they, and they seem more interested in persuading others than stating what they really believe, and thus they seem to masking out of fear what nonetheless is clearly implied by what they say.

Nevertheless, that Brother John actually believed precisely the contrary is clear enough from the passages given above, and this can be shown most clearly concerning use of possessions. The words they cite from him to support their argument are misinterpreted by them. At the end of the ninth chapter [of his Tractatus pauperis] he says, "All who examine the rule of the Friars Minor should know that nothing in it is considered obligatory unless the word "precept" or something equivalent is used." Note that he does not simply say "precept" but adds "or something equivalent to it." Thus in the following chapter he maintains that the words "let the brothers appriate nothing for themselves" is to be considered a precept. Later he says the same thing about shoes. In dealing with the passage, "Those who are forced to do so by necessity may . . ," etc., he says, "In using the word "shoes" [calciamenta] it does not prohit sandals, because the same Lord who prohibited shoes to his disciples allowed them sandals. But because necessity knows no law, he allowed shoes in case of necessity." And later in the tenth chapter he says, "Bishops are not required to go around with shoes as they would be if they were obliged to do so through apostolic poverty and perfection, for in one and the same precept the Lord prohibited possessions and shoes to the apostles, as is seen above." That is what John says.

Thus they are not being faithful to John when they cite against us what he says in the ninth chapter just after, namely that there are certain other things, like the nature of the Franciscan habit, transgression of which is considered a crime and leads to scandal because of an accepted custom in the order. It cannot be argued from this that the nature of the habit is not a matter of precept for us. If we are referring to accidental aspects of the habit, then I do not believe we are bound to them by precept of the rule. If we are referring to the substantial form of the habit, then I think if it is instituted not by the rule but only by custom, then we are held to it only by custom. But because in our rule the form of the habit is in fact instituted in three respects, namely in vileness and paucity (in abolishing shoes and extra habits), in honesty (in allowing drawers), and in cruciformity (in imposing one tunic with a hood), I believe that we cannot change the form in these respect except on occasion through necessity. Such is the case because these things are demanded not by us but by the rule, because they are a distinctive and unifying sign of our profession, an profession of religion as it were, to which we are bound (As Paul says [Rom. 10:10], "Faith in the heart leads to justification, confession on the lips to salvation") and because the vileness and paucity of the habit are aspects of usus pauper to which we are bound.

Again, when they says it is against the intention of the rule, what they mean by "against the intention." Do they simply mean it is against its ultimate intention? If so, then it would follow from others things said by them that abdicating use of such things is not a matter of precept, because in the process of arguing against restricted use they say that although it is the goal [finis] toward which poverty is directed, it is not follow that it is itself part of the vow as poverty is. Moreover, whatever they may mean by saying that it is against the intention of the rule, as long as it is not demanded by precept in the rule there is no way transgression of it could be mortal. Thus the diabolical and poisonous nature of this distortion is obvious.

The second distortion, in which they claim that all use short of regal use is licit for us and that even regal use is not against the vow but only against the intention of the rule, is at the same time perverse and ridiculous. In the first place, it follows from their own argument that restricted use is not in the vow at all. In the second place, something they see as a great problem would nonetheless follow, namely that something would fall under the vow indeterminately, for the precise point at which we arrive at regal use would not be determined for us.

Third, we could have as many changes of clothing as the burghers have, or all we want short of what kings have. Moreover, we could eat as much as we want as often as we want, perhaps seven meals a day and one or two during the night. We would have summer and winter residences, or three or four in a single city for the same Franciscan community, as the burghers and knights do. We could ride horses and wear shoes all the time. We could wear precious clothing of every color imaginable short of those befitting royal splendor. Who can bear such foolishness? Perhaps they will say an approved custom prevents all these things, but in time the custom could die out and it would all be legal, as with monks or clerics. Further, does violating any approved custom incur mortal sin? Aren't customs often altered into their opposites by civil, ecclesiastical and even monastic law.

Fourth, they consider licet to us the sort of use which both the saints and legists allows neither to monks, clerics, nor perhaps even common Christians.

The third distortion in which they say that restricted use is so perfect that poverty is of no use without it, and yet that vowing it is dangerous, smacks of blasphemy. Who can hear without indignation that our profession of poverty, defended and praised over such a long time by our fathers, is in itself of no use or value, so that we can observe it in all its fullness without transgressing the vow and yet reap no value from it as long as it is observed without restricted use? Approaching the matter from the other side, what danger is there in vowing to observe restricted use befitting the state of poverty in such a way that by sufficiently observing what is fitting and avoiding that which is unfitting one avoids mortal sin, given that we see a fitting observance of poverty, not as conforming to a precisely determinable amount, but as falling within to a certain acceptable range containing diverse degrees of excellence within itself? Or do they, like the Stoics, think there are no degrees within virtues?

But perhaps they would say concerning the first that there is nothing inconsistent about saying that poverty in and of itself is useless, because we see that it is useless if it observed without love (caritas). I would ask in response to this whether they mean to suggest that love is not included or presupposed in the observance and fulfillment of the vow concerning the rule. I would consider anyone insane who believed that he could fulfill his vow without love. Such is particularly true of that vow which is directly evangelical, for that religion is a state of supererogation and perfection transcending the normal state and since it is a certain state of perfect penitence. More on this later, though.

Again, the comparison is not a good one because, although the perfection of love is not entirely intrinsic and essential to the virtues, each of the virtues has its proper perfection through which in and of itself it is useful to the perfection of charity.

Beyond this, I have heard them offer a ridiculous sophism. They say that since we vow the highest poverty, then if restricted use falls within the vow we are held by vow to the poorest or strictest possible use. Thus whenever we do not observe the highest level of restricted use we will be in a state of mortal sin. In order to show how fatuous this argument is I shall argue against them on the same grounds. It is clear that poverty accompanied by restricted use in whatever small degree is higher than poverty taken without it. But we, our rule, papal privileges, and the writings of our doctors and fathers all agree that we vow the highest poverty. Therefore we vow it accompanied by restricted use.

And it is certainly remarkable that they see themselves as vowing the highest poverty without restricted use, and yet they cannot imagine how we could vow the highest poverty with restricted use exercised in a moderate way, but rather assume that it would have to be exercised in the strictest possible way. Is this not the same sort of sophism advanced by certain heretics in arguing that through our vow of the highest poverty we have renounced all necessary use of everything and thus have made a vow that is foolhardy and impossible to observe? The papal decretal [Exiit qui seminat] neutralizes the poison of this just this sophism when it says, "Nor should anyone object erroneously these people are committing themselves to endangerment of their lives," or when it says shortly thereafter, "Such a surrender of property should not be taken to imply complete renunciation of use." As the pope shows there, no vow can exclude necessary use, and thus he concludes that this vow does not entail renouncing the simple use of all things.

It should be said, therefore, that evangelical poverty is called the highest poverty, not because it entails extreme want purely and simply, but because it is the highest sort of poverty which can be included in a rational and perfect vow. This demands that it exclude danger of death, impossibility of fulfillment, of even excessive difficulty of observance, yet also exclude the possibility of riches or rich use of things. It must exclude the latter in such a way that there is nothing dangerous in the vow. Thus "highest" must be taken here not according to the degree of external actions but according to its relation to the vow, habit and internal act of poverty.

Furthermore, I have been given to understand that they offer one other monstrous argument. They say it is not the act of a virtue but its habit that falls under the precept. Thus it would seem that one who vows poverty is vowing not the act but the habit of poverty. What a marvelous thing! According to this logic we can be saints while lying in our beds and not attempting to perform a single virtuous act! Certainly, quite to the contrary, all precepts are more commonly referred to in terms of acts rather than habits. "You shall not worship other gods," "observe the sabbath," "do not steal," etc. Who would dare to say that we are not obliged by precept to the act of divine love or obliged by our vow to the act of obedience or chastity? What is this new doctrine, or rather heresy?

Note, therefore, that I understand restricted use to be included in the vow of our rule in such a way that it simply rejects certain types of use, simply demands other types, and restricts us to using some things in a moderate way rationally determined according to circumstances. It simply rejects use of money, possessions, and fixed incomes. It simply demands that whatever is used be seen as not belonging to us and be used accordingly. For just as all right to or jurisdiction over temporal things is denied us by the rule, so all claim to or defense of them is also denied us. In matters pertaining to food, clothing, divine worship and study, we are restricted to moderate use rationally determined according to circumstances, and this applies both to present and future use.

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